From Profiteers to Victims of Dowry: Law, Poverty, Culture, and Media/ Mahtab Alinezhad

HRANA- What is a dowry? In Islamic culture and jurisprudence, a dowry is property that the husband commits to the wife at the time of concluding a marriage contract, which he must pay her upon her demand. This property can be cash, coins, gold, real estate, or even non-material items like Quranic education or arranging a pilgrimage trip, provided that it has a defined financial or spiritual value. According to the laws of Iran and Islamic Sharia, the dowry is considered a legal and religious right of women that, upon the formal conclusion of the marriage contract, becomes the husband’s obligation and the wife’s property. In the Quran, dowry is called ṣadaq, meaning gift and offering, and is intended to be a symbol of affection, honesty, and sincerity. Its primary aim was to show respect for the woman and provide financial security for her. However, over time, it has undergone cultural and economic changes and seems to have deviated from its original position and meaning.

In June 2022, the Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly conducted a public opinion poll. The subject of this survey was regarding dowry and people’s opinion about legal intervention in it; in a society where dowries equal to the age of women have been frequently observed, and headlines such as “The Problem of Heavy and Strange Dowries” appear in the media. Also, if researchers search in cyberspace, they will encounter headlines about the impact of heavy dowries on couples’ divorces. But in this survey, only 36.6% of citizens said that dowry is very important or quite important in their lives. Also, only 8.6% of citizens believed that heavy dowries lead to stronger families—dowries that have led many men to prison and incarceration. In Dey 1403 (January 2025), the head of the board of trustees of the Diyat Headquarters of the country stated, “At present, we have 2,367 individuals imprisoned across the country due to dowry and alimony debts,” adding that of this number, 1,910 are dowry debtors and 457 are alimony debtors. (1) A figure that may seem low at first glance, but according to Jowzi, a lawyer and former judge, “Official statistics on dowry-related prisoners must be analyzed more carefully because most of these detentions end quickly upon the submission of a request for insolvency or a financial guarantee.” (2)

Dowries—especially coin-based ones—have existed for years between couples and have been a matter of dispute. When coin prices rise, the dispute intensifies. Heavy dowries that are either on demand, where the husband must pay them even if financially unable, or based on capability, where the husband is obligated to pay only when he is financially able. These heavy dowries are one of the main causes of divorce in Iranian society. (3) Women who, after marriage, initiate enforcement of their dowry and grooms who then realize the wife’s aim was not cohabitation, but to claim the dowry.

The issue starts with “who has given and who has taken.” But once the marriage is formalized, the so-called gift becomes something the wife receives from the husband. If he cannot afford to pay it, and the dowry is on-demand, the husband ends up in detention and prison. But the issue is not that simple. The profiteers and those who generate income from this situation are not just women. Registry offices and the government are also among the dowry profiteers, especially in the case of heavy dowries, through something called the dowry registration fee.

Let us first consider the women. Comments such as “women are making a business out of dowry” are often made. One media outlet headlines, “Unveiling the Business of Virgin Girls Collecting Dowries,” and another, quoting the Vice President of the Judiciary and Legal Committee of Parliament, refers to the transformation of dowry into a “shop for some women’s business,” advising people to marry those of equal status and accept dowries suitable to their financial means. However, the fundamental point here is that, given the current laws in Iran, many of the marriage rights are structured in favor of men. In this context, dowry becomes a guarantee for protecting the woman’s rights within a marital relationship. That is, today, considering the civil laws of Iran, dowry is not merely a financial security for women—it is, in practice, a point of reliance for maintaining the family unit and discouraging men from seeking divorce or demanding the dowry be waived in exchange for divorce; as the well-known expression goes: “Keep the dowry, give me my freedom.” In the event of the husband’s death, considering Iran’s inheritance laws where the wife receives only a small portion of the inheritance, the dowry becomes the only financial right of the woman that has payment priority. (4) In reality, dowry here acts as a guarantee—a guarantee to preserve family life and dignity within it. But why are dowries becoming so heavy? One of the causes of the rise in heavy dowries, according to many sociologists, is the lack of social and economic security for women in Iran. Women who have limited access to the labor market, restricted job opportunities, and inadequate social support may, in such a situation, see dowry as a type of “marriage insurance.” That is, if the marriage fails, they can use the dowry to compensate for their loss. In fact, women use this financial right in critical situations like divorce to preserve their dignity, status, and independence after the end of the shared life.

Nonetheless, despite all this, it can still be said that the business of dowry by women is a real phenomenon. Evidence and reports show that some women enter marriage with the intent of exploiting men and obtaining large dowries. In such cases, marriage becomes merely a tool to acquire property and financial benefits. Of course, proving such intent in court is very difficult, and most judges act based on existing evidence and legal procedures. In recent years, there have also been reports of sham or short-term marriages where the main goal was to receive the dowry and quickly separate. This trend has coincided with a rise in divorce cases and dowry enforcement. Each time coin prices rise, dowry prisoners and dowries put into enforcement increase. This issue is not exclusive to the multi-million toman coins of recent years either. In Azar 1397 (December 2018), when the dollar rose above 12,000 tomans and gold coins reached 4 million tomans, the Diyat Headquarters of the country announced that the number of prisoners accused of dowry debt increased by more than 40% in 1397 (2018). Also, according to the head of the Diyat Headquarters in the same year, the number of dowry debtors in prison doubled between 1393 and 1397 (2014–2018). During this period, the price of each full gold coin increased more than 3.1 times. (5) These numbers must be scrutinized. They show that with rising coin prices, the number of enforced dowries increases, and as a result, the number of dowry-related prisoners grows. That is, as people become poorer, with the rise in dollar and coin prices and the increasing cost of living, more women reach the conclusion that they must enforce their dowries to secure themselves financially in unstable economic conditions. No one denies the existence of dowry profiteers. But considering these numbers and statistics, it seems the main culprit is not the citizens, but the country’s economic environment. An economic atmosphere that worsens by the day—leading to family breakdowns due to poverty and deprivation on one hand, and incentivizing some opportunistic women to enforce dowries as a financial guarantee for an uncertain economic future on the other.

Of course, it seems that beyond unequal laws between women and men, the country’s deteriorating economic conditions, and opportunistic women, there is another responsible party—media and cyberspace. In recent years, cyberspace has played a key role in shaping public attitudes toward dowry. Posting pictures of marriage contracts with strange dowries like “one copy of the Holy Quran, one flower, and 1,369 full Bahar-e Azadi gold coins,” or “several tons of iron” has sparked a kind of competition or show-off culture in society. Additionally, the portrayal of stories about women who, after just a few months of marriage, managed to receive hefty dowries and earn large incomes has created the notion that marriage can be a tool for financial exploitation. Of course, one can argue that misinterpretation or exaggeration also occurs in the news. But it seems that these sensational headlines and the show-off culture—once limited to families and neighborhoods and now expanded to social media—have also become a factor in making dowries stranger and the figures larger. These dowries, in turn, become a motive for dowry profiteers who, by leveraging this environment, demand astronomical dowries. The outcome is women chasing dowries, men trying to pay them from inside or outside prison, and marriages that become so bitter, and women so damaged by them, that they declare: “Keep the dowry, give me my freedom!”

As previously mentioned, another dowry profiteer is the registry offices and the government. This may be surprising at first. But the dowry registration fee charged by official marriage and divorce registrars has become another way to extract money from couples wanting to formalize their marriage. This fee applies to dowries over 14 coins, calculated as follows: up to 100 coins, 0.4% of the value; from 100 to 200 coins, 2% of the value; and for more than 200 coins, 15% of the value. This fee is paid by both the bride and groom. The money goes to the registry office registering the marriage. A portion of it is paid as a registration service fee, another part is paid as tax or the government’s share into the state treasury, and another portion remains with the registrar as compensation. Previously, the dowry registration fee charged by registrars was based on legal tariffs and was a small fee collected from the couple for registration services. But with the addition of this new dowry registration fee, the income of registrars who record high dowries has multiplied. One argument for this registration fee is that it’s meant to control high dowries—that is, the couple might avoid proposing high dowries due to the high registration cost. But the problem is that this fee, in addition to imposing extra financial pressure during marriage, causes some families to avoid registering the dowry they agreed upon, which ends up harming women. In effect, this registration fee, like the dowry issue itself, has created a business that benefits both the government treasury and the registrars and has not, in practice, achieved its aim of reducing registered dowries.

Based on what emerges from statistics and news, dowry in Iran is no longer a simple religious tradition or agreement between spouses and families. It has become a mirror in which one can see a crisis-ridden economy, unjust legal structures, gender gaps, and sensationalist media culture all at once. The issue of dowry is no longer a private matter between a man and a woman. It is intertwined with government intervention, profiteering by registrars, legal silence, structural poverty, and psychological manipulation through cyberspace. On one side of the story are women who, in the absence of financial and social security, use dowry as their last legal and human support. On the other side are men who have become and continue to become victims of exploitation, profiteering, economic hardship, and legal shortcomings. In reality, dowry has both victims and profiteers. It attracts both those who exploit it with malicious intent and those who seek it to defend their lives and future. In these circumstances, if change is to occur, it must involve reforming legal structures, recognizing economic realities, strengthening social insurance for women, making legal processes transparent, and public education on family rights. Dowry was never meant to be a weapon, a blank check, or a tool of exploitation. Until these legal and economic issues are resolved, the story of dowry will persist—with its victims, its profiteers, and the women who count on it for their future.


References:

  1. “Who Has Ever Given or Taken a Dowry?/Strange Statistics of Dowry and Alimony Prisoners in the Country,” Khabar Online, 15 Dey 1403 (January 5, 2025).

  2. “Statistics of Dowry Prisoners; A Closer Look at the Reality,” Mehr News Agency, 11 Khordad 1404 (May 31, 2025).

  3. “Heavy Dowries Are Among the Main Causes of Divorce in Society,” Mehr News Agency, 30 Azar 1403 (December 21, 2024).

  4. “Women; The Right to Divorce and the Removal of Dowry,” Pegan Bani-Hashemi, BBC Persian, 17 Khordad 1397 (June 7, 2018).

  5. “Consequences of the 4-Million Toman Coin; 40 Percent Increase in Dowry Prisoners in Iran,” Euronews, November 26, 2018 (5 Azar 1397).


Written by Mahtab Alinezhad
Originally published in Khat-e Solh (Peace Mark) monthly magazine on June 22, 2025.

Dowry: A Guarantee of Women’s Rights or a Tool for Reproducing Gender Inequality?/ Alireza Goodarzi

Dowry (Mahr) can be understood within the broader context of tradition: it has come down to us from a distant past and represents a period that may not necessarily align with the needs of our present. I put forth this claim on the basis of questions that have been persistently asked within our society for many years. Every few years, Iranian lawmakers make minor—or sometimes even major—adjustments to Dowry regulations in an attempt to, as the writer Mohammad Ghaed once said about mechanics, “tweak it just enough to make it fit” into today’s society. But today’s Iran is not a brand-new, high-tech vehicle. If we consider Dowry as akin to a cartwheel due to its historical background, no type of automobile can run on it. Contemporary Iranian society is a mixture of cartwheels and automobiles. A cartwheel might have been useful a century ago, but beyond that, it lacks clear utility.

From the days when our grandmothers were breaking ice in the courtyard pools to today, when women are active participants in society—despite all the glass ceilings—even in the most conservative sectors, the world of Iranian women has changed. It is now rare for women to have five or six children and devote themselves entirely to the minutiae of household work. Those who still live such lives are often on the margins of society, voiceless, and untouched by the waves of change. Yet, policymakers frequently attempt—through propaganda or even official policy—to nudge the rest of society closer to this marginalized model. This apparent regression may not be ideal for society, but it clearly illustrates the gap between the cartwheel and the automobile.

For a woman who has spent her entire life in the kitchen and by the water basin, dowry could serve as a safety net, ensuring that if the man of the house ever decided to “discard” her, she would not be left destitute and could claim some share of what had been built under the name of “family.” Such a woman, who worked without official hours or wages to keep the household running, could find partial compensation in the form of dowry. This function may still exist in certain segments of society. To be honest, I don’t personally know anyone in such circumstances and perhaps cannot accurately convey their experiences, but I do know that even in traditional contexts, pursuing such a path is not without hardship and is not necessarily just.

Consider a woman from an upper-class family marrying someone of lesser status. The mehr al-mithl—the Dowry deemed appropriate by societal norms—is higher for her than it would be for a woman from a lower-class background. It’s as if cooking, cleaning, and bearing children in a household entitles a woman from an upper class to a higher sum. Dowry is only one example of such class-based distinctions. Bride price, maintenance, housing, and “suitable” employment fall into this same category, though they go beyond the scope of this discussion. In any case, while dowry may not ensure justice at the societal level, it might still offer a degree of financial security to an individual woman facing an uncertain future. From this angle, for those whose voices are not represented here, dowry might still serve a function.

However, as a legal construct—which is presumed to govern all members of society—it appears unlikely to solve any major issues for a significant portion of the population. It’s clear that a woman who works for pay outside the home contributes directly to the family economy; she brings money into the household and, based on cultural expectations, may still bear the larger burden of domestic work. Such a woman might also live independently in her own home, financially unbound to her father or husband. If we look at her through the same lens as in the past, it either results in overprotection (which creates its own set of problems) or simply fails to align with the rhythm of her life. The goal here is not to assign value between a woman who stays at home and lacks economic independence and one who earns an income. The issue is that the solution envisioned by lawmakers to secure the livelihood of one woman cannot be “tweaked” to fit the life of the other.

There are still segments of society that insist dowry is a tool for protecting women. Perhaps that’s true for some, but certainly not for all. The lawmaker, by leaning on its religious legitimacy, only introduces minor adjustments to dowry laws—and ultimately, these changes fail to resolve the societal issues at hand. Some parts of society have not yet grasped their position in the current moment: they insist their daughters obtain higher education, not to secure independent economic lives, but so that their dowry value will increase. Reality changes, and sometimes our mindset fails to keep pace with that change. This rigidity of thought ensnares lawmakers, beneficiaries of the previous system, and those who are simply accustomed to it and find adapting to new realities difficult. In any case, one thing I am sure of: if our mindset regarding women and the economy that governs their lives changes, these traditions—whether legally sanctioned or not—will inevitably evolve.


written by Alireza Goodarzi
Originally published in Khat-e Solh (Peace Mark) monthly magazine on April 21, 2025.

Truck Drivers’ Strike: A Symbol of Economic Crisis and Government Inaction/ Roozbeh Bolhari

For several days, a very large number of cities across Iran witnessed a truck drivers’ strike—an action that began on the first of Khordad (May 22, 2025) and, due to its scale and its reflection on social media and in public opinion, forced officials of the Islamic Republic to respond.

Truck drivers protested a wide range of issues, including the introduction of a three-tiered diesel pricing system, rising insurance costs, increases in the price of tires and spare parts, and the delayed payment of freight charges.

While, according to the National Truck Drivers Association, the strikers had 50 demands, government officials stated they would only address three or four of them.

Meanwhile, the significance of the truck drivers’ strike—which, according to some reports, spanned more than 150 cities—placed it at the forefront of labor protests, not only in recent years, but over the past several decades. Although truck drivers had gone on strike previously in 2018, that protest lacked the current level of scope and organization.

The Government’s Response to the Strike and the Striking Truck Drivers

The truck drivers’ strike is one of the clearest signs of the state’s inability to effectively manage economic and social crises. Many truck drivers, due to rising costs and reduced income, have found themselves in dire financial situations—conditions that have affected not only their livelihoods but also the country’s supply and distribution chains.

As the strike expanded day by day and garnered significant public support, the government—like in previous instances—resorted to a combination of “carrot and stick” policies.

Simultaneously, officials began offering promises to end the strike, such as halting the implementation of the three-tiered diesel pricing policy and offering discounts in the insurance sector. These promises were made even though it was clear that the government had no intention of abandoning its two new policies and was merely trying to buy time in order to implement them later.

It was also announced that transportation fees would be paid on a regular basis.

Overall, it must be noted that in response to strikes in various regions, the government has made promises to improve conditions for the strikers—only some of which have been fulfilled.

On the other hand, law enforcement, intelligence, and judicial bodies arrested dozens of individuals in relation to the strike. These arrests were mostly carried out under the pretext of “disrupting the transportation network.” Prior to that, the government launched a media campaign to create the impression that the strike had caused disruptions in the provision of basic necessities to the public and had halted the delivery of agricultural products.

In this context, the repressive aspect of the response became more prominent. This is rooted in the government’s concern that the continuation and expansion of the strike could lead to a full-scale halt in the transport and distribution of goods, which in turn could fuel public dissatisfaction and ignite broader social crises.

At the same time, the strike had the potential to serve as a catalyst for workers and other wage earners—especially given that, in recent years, independent workers’ and retirees’ associations have repeatedly emphasized the need for wage earners to take to the streets to claim their rights.

For this reason, the government did not want to see the truck drivers’ strike become a model for other labor and social groups. The experience of the decades following the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran has shown that the government is deeply concerned about the spread of labor protests.

In the case of the truck drivers’ strike, it seems that this large-scale labor protest ended temporarily—through promises, some official measures, and the arrest of dozens of participants. However, the failure to fulfill promises and the government’s temporary approach to the truck drivers’ problems could lead to further dissatisfaction and renewed protests.

At the same time, based on past experience, it must be remembered that the government’s punitive and repressive tactics have only short-term effects and have failed to prevent renewed protests at factories and industrial units across Iran.

In this regard, the truck drivers’ strike should be viewed as a warning signal to the government, revealing the urgent need for serious reforms in the economic and social policies implemented by the Islamic Republic. But the government has shown that—despite its slogans and even its own constitution and legislated laws—it is not committed to resolving the livelihood problems of tens of millions of Iranians. This failure, in the end, may lead to broader and more extensive labor protests in the near future.


Originally published in Khat-e Solh (Peace Mark) monthly magazine on April 21, 2025.

Report Offers Blueprint for Holding IRGC Accountable for HRVs and International Crimes

April 9, 2025 – HRA’s latest report published today presents a detailed roadmap for accountability for members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and alleged involvement in serious human rights violations and international crimes both inside Iran and around the world.

Accountability Pathways: A Practitioner’s Guide to Addressing Alleged Serious Human Rights Violations and International Crimes Committed by the IRGC in Iran and Abroad


This publication, prepared by HRA with the legal support of UpRights, is part of the Pasdaran Documentation Project (PDP), an HRA initiative dedicated to mapping the IRGC from inception to the present day alongside addressing violations and international crimes perpetrated by its members.

The guide spans over 20 judicial and quasi-judicial pathways for accountability, offering practitioners concrete guidance on available mechanisms to seek justice for serious human rights violations and international crimes attributed to the IRGC both within Iran and abroad.

The IRGC has played a central role in the systematic suppression of political dissidents, activists, and journalists within Iran, as well as in the abduction and extrajudicial targeting of perceived regime enemies beyond Iran’s borders. The IRGC’s involvement in armed conflicts, particularly in Syria and Iraq, has also led to allegations of grave international crimes. Despite these extensive allegations, Iran’s legal system lacks independence, rendering domestic accountability mechanisms ineffective. The Iranian judiciary remains complicit in widespread human rights abuses, making external avenues for justice essential.

This guide is designed to equip civil society actors, victims, and legal practitioners with practical tools to navigate the complex landscape of accountability mechanisms. It systematically outlines the feasibility, strengths, and limitations of various pathways, categorized into:

  • Domestic judicial mechanisms in third states, including universal jurisdiction and extraterritorial prosecutions;
  • International tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice;
  • United Nations mechanisms, including special procedures and treaty bodies;
  • Targeted sanctions regimes, such as Magnitsky-style sanctions against human rights violators;
  • Truth-seeking initiatives and other transitional justice approaches.
  • And more

The publication also draws on 12 incidents that were analyzed under international law as part of the Pasdaran Documentation Project by UpRights and HRA.

These incidents and their associated analyses and alleged perpetrators, provide critical insights into patterns of violations and the modus operandi of the IRGC. These incidents’ full details and legal implications can be accessed at iranpdp.org.

Given Iran’s non-cooperation with international accountability mechanisms and its rejection of key human rights instruments, practitioners must employ a strategic approach. The guide underscores the importance of combining judicial and non-judicial pathways, leveraging international pressure, and ensuring victim-centered approaches throughout.

Ultimately, Accountability Pathways aims to facilitate informed, coordinated, and effective efforts to hold perpetrators accountable while centering the needs and rights of victims in the pursuit of justice.

“This isn’t about theory — it’s about action. When impunity prevails, we need practical options. This guide arms practitioners with concrete tools to start the conversation on how we can move, strategically and creatively, toward justice. It’s a call to coordinate, to act, and to make clear that accountability is possible — even when states refuse to deliver it. It comes alongside a body of extensive work to uncover an intentionally veiled institution — one designed to shield decision makers and key perpetrators from public scrutiny and consequence. Together, both work in coordination to offer an opportunity to discuss new, timely, and creative paths forward.” Skylar Thompsin, Deputy Director, HRA.

Looking Ahead

The publication arrives at a moment of heightened international scrutiny of Iran’s human rights record. In recent weeks, the mandate of the  UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran has been renewed as it has identified crimes against humanity in many ways linked to the IRGC’s suppression of the 2022 protests and beyond. 

Despite these developments, the report cautions that accountability will require sustained effort and international coordination. It urges states, international bodies, and civil society actors to work collaboratively, pool resources, and support  action across all feasible fronts.

Download the full report, “Accountability Pathways,” in PDF

It is Time that Iran be Held Accountable 

HRANA – Last month the world turned its attention to Iran for its seemingly arbitrary transfer of a detained British-Australian academic. Kylie Moore-Gilbert, who was detained in September 2018 and is serving a ten-year sentence, was moved from the notorious Evin Prison to an unspecified location. When Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) released the report, nearly every major media publication across the globe once again jumped to denounce her detention. Widespread speculation as to Moore-Gilbert’s whereabouts ensued. 

As a human rights professional who focuses on Iran, it was gratifying to see such a swift and appropriate response. However, what about the countless grave and horrific human rights violations that happen every day in this country? Violations that are so numerous that they have become seemingly rote. 

In the week following Moore-Gilbert’s transfer, peaceful protestors outside Iran’s Ministry of Petroleum were violently attacked by Regime Security Forces. In the month of October, at least 130 Iranians were arrested for activities related to their political or ideological beliefs; 83 of which involved the detention of individuals participating in peaceful gatherings related to the ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. 

Iran carried out 19 hangings in the month of October alone, sentencing an additional 8 to that same fate throughout the month.

At least 12 members of the Baháʼí religious minority were barred from entering university based solely on their religious beliefs. One man received 80 lashes for converting to Christianity; a thief was sentenced to having his hand amputated.

Iranian courts tried more than 70 political cases which resulted in convictions that totaled 295 years in prison and 2,590 lashes.  A cleric was summoned to court for suggesting there was no problem with women riding a bicycle, an activity for which all women in the country are banned. Two women, sentenced to 33 months each for writing a letter requesting the resignation of the Supreme Leader, were summoned by authorities to begin serving their time. A teacher was sentenced to 45 lashes for drawing a cartoon.

This list is by no means exhaustive. 

These violations are not a secret. HRANA, the very source that initially reported on Moore-Gilbert’s move, reported and continues to report on the numerous human rights violations happening daily in Iran against Iranians, as well as dual and foreign nationals. There remains little to no response.

Detained British-Australian academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert

Why is this? 

I do not have the answer to that question, but I do know the differences these cases bear. The violations listed above are against Iranian citizens; Moore-Gilbert is a foreigner. Her case is, therefore, more appealing to the press it garners a more widespread response – and outcry. 

 

I’m reminded of a quote from Howard Bakerville, a young American who famously became a martyr of Iran’s Constitutional Revolution; he once said, “The only difference between me and these people is my place of birth, and that is not a big difference.” Today I fear there are times, unacceptably so, that this is the difference between life and death, between respect for rights and deprivation thereof. Will the world only shine the light on Iran when a Westerner is tangled in its web? Under international human rights law, States have a duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of those within their jurisdiction. It’s time that Iran be held accountable to its own citizens just as it is to those dual and foreign nationals that find themselves trapped within the confines of a state where deprivation of fundamental human rights continues to be the norm. 

 

Moore-Gilbert has since been returned to Evin Prison. Her return, much like her move, was documented extensively. The reason for her move remains unknown.

 

Skylar Thompson

Skylar Thompson is a Senior Advocacy Coordinator with Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI). For inquiries please contact email: [email protected]

 

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Iranian Parliament Deputy Immune from Prosecution Despite Accusations of Sexual Assault

Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) – Based on evidence, documents and testimonials HRANA has obtained from reliable sources, there are at least two new allegations of multiple counts of sexual harassment and assault against Salman Khodadadi, a current Member of Iran’s Parliament and the Chair of the Parliament’s Social Committee. Mr. Khodadadi was previously accused of sexual harassment and assault and was detained on the charge of raping his secretary and a visitor to his office. Mr. Khodadadi held the position of MP and was a member of the Parliament’s National Security Committee and Health Committee from 1996 to 2012. However, in 2012, Iran’s Ministry of Interior barred Mr. Khodadadi from running for Parliament. The Guardian Council reversed the ban in 2016 and allowed him to return as a member of Parliament the same year. In 2014, while Mr. Khodadadi was barred from the Parliament, he was appointed an adviser to Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif.  

A 28-year-old woman who has asked to be identified as “Z.N.” broke her silence to HRANA. She claims to be a victim of Mr. Khodadadi and that he abused his position of power. Ms. Z.N. claims Mr. Khodadadi sexually assaulted and harassed her for four years. She tells HRANA that she knew Mr. Khodadadi through her father who was Mr. Khodadadi’s colleague in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). After her father’s death, Ms. Z.N. says she was searching for a job due to her mother’s illness and their difficult financial situation.

“One day, I went to the Governor’s office to seek help. I was informed that Mr. Khodadadi would be coming there to listen to the people’s problems. Mr. Khodadadi received my letter and told me to contact him. When I did, he said that he would help me gain a position with the Audit Court.”  

According to Ms. Z.N., she followed up with that promise and Mr. Khodadadi invited her to Tehran. Ms. Z.N. says she went with her mother on her first visit but they left without receiving any results. Ms. Z.N. says Mr. Khodadadi contacted her again and advised her to return to Tehran but alone this time. Once in Tehran, Ms. Z.N. allegedly attempted to track Mr. Khodadadi down until she was finally instructed to meet him at his office.

“Once in his office, he locked the door and raped me. He warned me to not tell anyone. I will never forget that day. It was as though the whole world came crashing down on me. My muscles were locked up and I felt paralyzed. He told me I had to leave immediately because a few of his colleagues were coming to see him. I asked him whether his intention was just to rape me, instead of helping me and my family. He replied that he wanted to help and have sex with me too. I left his office and headed to the train station to return home. On the way back, all kinds of thoughts crossed my mind and I even contemplated suicide, but because of my family and their situation, I decided to keep silent…He contacted me after the incident under different pretexts and managed to get me to come to his residential home in Tabriz where he raped me again.”

“After a long period of intimidation and enticement by Mr. Khodadadi, I finally called him to tell him that I didn’t want the job anymore. I told him to leave me alone or else I would file a complaint against him. He replied that I could not do a damn thing to him and hung up the phone on me. After a while he called me back and said that he likes me and wants to talk to me. I did not accept and didn’t go see him. He was even sending me threatening messages that if I didn’t go see him, he would hurt me. I still did not go, and out of fear for my life, I constantly moved residences.”

Ms. Z.N. claims that Mr. Khodadadi had more than one victim. “Some time later, I was with friends when I heard from one of them that Mr. Khodadadi had promised her a job as well and then raped her. This friend wanted to commit suicide on several occasions. That is when I understood that I was not the only victim, but none of the victims are prepared to file a complaint out of fear for their lives.”

“I waited for some time so that he would stop his harassment, but to no avail. I finally called him and begged him to leave me alone or I would tell everyone about what happened. He replied that if I say anything he would have me killed. I was very afraid. I took a train to Tehran and decided to go to the committee responsible for the supervision of MPs. I did not know how to access this committee so I went to the Parliament’ security and told them. First, they did not listen to me until I threatened to go to the Guardian Council. Finally, they accepted to consider my story but said that I would need to provide proof. I told them that I have voice and SMS messages containing threats.”

Mr. Khodadadi allegedly contacted Ms. Z.N. several times after the complaint was filed and said that if she did not withdraw her complaint that he would harm her.

“I told him that I will go through with my complaint because it was my right. He contacted me several more times and told me to visit him to resolve the problem. Again, he promised me a job and pledged to make everything right if I withdraw my complaint. I refused…Since April 2018, when I filed my complaint, I have contacted the Parliament’s security department multiple times, but each time they tell me that they need more time to investigate.”  

HRANA has obtained a copy of the documents in Ms. Z.N.’s case, including the threatening remarks made by Mr. Khodadadi. HRANA will consider releasing the documents publicly, but will first consider the victim’s safety and the progress made with the legal proceedings.

Salman Khodadadi’s Background:

Salman Khodadadi was born in 1962 and was recruited by the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus in his youth. During the 1980s purge of political dissidents he was working in the East Azerbaijan Intelligence office. He made an unsuccessful run for Parliament in the early 1990s but was appointed as Director of Ardabil’s Intelligence Bureau and later as the IRGC commander in Malekan.

In the sixth Parliament (2000-2004), Mr. Khodadadi was a member of the Parliament’s Health Committee, despite having no background in that field. Toward the end of his third term in Parliament, he was summoned to court on charges of moral corruption and engaging in illicit relationships, after two women pressed charges against him. He was released on bail. Since he had been elected for a fourth term to the Parliament and was sworn in as a Parliament Deputy, his case was closed.

When two women MPs raised objections regarding Mr. Khodadadi’s credentials, his case was sent to the Parliament for further investigation. Although some of the people of Malekan had gathered in front of the Parliament demanding Khodadai’s ousting, the Parliament voted to approve his credentials and allowed him to serve his term. Mr. Khodadadi refused to comment on his case citing ongoing investigation and his reluctance to provide material for enemies and foreign media.

In the parliamentary election that followed, Mr. Khodadadi was barred from running. However, due to his membership in the 1990s in the National Security Committee, he had a close relationship with Hassan Rouhani, the current President of Iran, and other current members of Mr. Rouhani’s cabinet. Mr. Khodadadi supported Mr. Rouhani in the 2013 Presidential election and was being considered for the position of Governor of Bushehr (Iranian southern province). Mr. Rouhani later changed his mind and Mr. Khodadadi was appointed an advisor to Javad Zarif.

In the most recent parliamentary elections, Mr. Khodadadi was once again barred from running for Parliament by the Supervisory Council (operated by the Executive Branch), but the Guardian Council lobbied on his behalf and he was elected one more time.  Mr. Khodadadi had the support of the “Omid List”, a list of candidates aligned with Mr. Rouhani. Once in Parliament, Mr. Khodadadi became the Chair of the Parliament’s Social Committee.

When he first began to serve in the Parliament, Salman Khodadadi was a management studies student. During his many terms in the Parliament, he received a Master’s degree in Political Science and a PhD in International Relations.

Civil Society Institutions, Society’s Need and Todays Necessity

Peace Line Monthly / Hossein Raeesi – Certainly complexity of social relations and diversity of social and individual needs for long has strengthen the necessity for a society, that would not be able to fulfill all its needs, pass all its barriers and problems and earn the public trust, without the existence of the civil society institutes. Continue reading “Civil Society Institutions, Society’s Need and Todays Necessity”

A Glance at The Beginning Days of HRAI’s Activism

Peace Line Monthly / Behrouz Sadegh Khanjani – I met Keyvan Rafiee for the first time in the winter of 2007, in ward 209 of Evin Prison. A young person who was trying to play his part in improving human right in Iran. I remember he was transferred from solitary confinement to our prison cell, and he was holding a few meaningful painting; all of Keyvan’s Painting showed concern for human rights.

Behrouz Sadegh Khanjani

Despite all the dangers of the time, Keyvan Rafiee was trying let the outside world hear the voices of the Political Prisoners. At the time social media’s were not as widespread as today, and those like Keyvan with the little they had tried to let the world hear the voice of the political prisoners so that they would not be forgotten. As I mentioned before, due to the lack of the existence of a widespread social media, quite often political, civil and human right activist would have been imprisoned and nobody would have known. Those years, many were completely forgotten and faced a bitter fate. I believe this is why Keyvan and his friends thought of establishing Human Right Activists in Iran (HRAI). An organization that has become the neutral voice of numerous groups and various spectrums of people. This organization has fought against numerous executions by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which have terrified the global society. HRAI regularly publishes the cruelty endured by various political and ideological groups, and reflects the suppression and pressure on the civil society and its activists in Iran. Continue reading “A Glance at The Beginning Days of HRAI’s Activism”

Baluchistan and HRANA in Three Glances

Peace Line Monthly / Habibollah Sarbazi – First Glance: Baluch People are deprived of a TV or Radio that would voice their issues. Islamic Republic media have boycotted Baluchistan’s news, and what is being broadcasted of Baluch people has an untrue show like quality. Overall the Islamic republic state TV and Radio programs that are about the violation of human rights of the Baluch people, are not true to the existing reality of these people and they are literally “Blackwashing” and “Lies”. In other hand the lack of independent domestic websites, newspapers, magazines, weeklies or even monthlies that could freely voice the reality of this province which is known as the “most disadvantaged” and the “most security atmosphere” of Iranian provinces, has contributed to the problems.  The weakness of the civic society has also substantially increased these issues; all together they have killed the sparkles of hope among people who are carrying the weight of enormous oppressions and deprivations on their backs. Continue reading “Baluchistan and HRANA in Three Glances”

HRAI Repudiated the Kind of Human Rights Reporting of “the Human of Our Own Kind.”

Peace Line Monthly / Shahed Alavi – The story of violations of human rights in Kurdistan is full of sorrows. This sorrowful story, this open wound was denied for a very long time, either because it was labeled as a lie and victimization, or because sometimes it was narrated in a way that was too heroic and vague and was hard to believe for the audience. Somewhere on this disastrous land, for many years, people have lived with suppression, prison, torture and executions as part of their daily life; that is for numerous reasons, but foremost because of their inevitable resistance. More heart breaking is that they were used to screaming in silence, even worst, they were used to hearing the cheers coming from the opposition of the center which itself is wounded by the suppressive system.

The suppression of the margin was not by the centre or the opposition of the center. The real tragedy was the silence in favor or the endless doubts by the movements and peoples who were so called human rights activist and human rights organizations, and it was their duty to report human rights violations. For those who had followed their political opinions to lead them to human rights activism, were the real example of the kind of human rights reporters and watches, were the one was considered “human” if it was one of their own. Continue reading “HRAI Repudiated the Kind of Human Rights Reporting of “the Human of Our Own Kind.””