Category: Publications

Eight Women Face Death Sentences in Iran in Political, Security-Related, and Protest Cases

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Executions, News, Prisoners, Publications, Women
akhshan Azizi, Arghavan Fallahi, Bita Hemmati, HRANA, Leila Abolhasani, Mahnaz Chardoli, Maryam Hodavand, Souda Ebrahimi Shamsabadi, Taraneh Rahimi, Varisheh Moradi, Zahra Shahbaz Tabari

HRANA – At least eight imprisoned women are facing death sentences in various prisons across Iran. The sentences were issued in cases involving charges including “armed rebellion” (baghi), “enmity against God” (moharebeh), and “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz).

According to HRANA, a review of the judicial cases of imprisoned women shows that at least eight women in different parts of the country are facing death sentences.

These women include Pakhshan Azizi, Arghavan Fallahi, Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, Maryam Hodavand, Mahnaz Chardoli, Leila Abolhasani, Taraneh Rahimi, and Souda (Marzieh) Ebrahimi Shamsabadi.

Four of these women, Maryam Hodavand, Mahnaz Chardoli, Leila Abolhasani, and Taraneh Rahimi, have been sentenced to death in cases related to the protests of the January 2026. Souda (Marzieh) Ebrahimi Shamsabadi is also facing a death sentence in a case connected to security-related developments that occurred during the war. Pakhshan Azizi, Arghavan Fallahi, and Zahra Shahbaz Tabari have been sentenced to death in separate political and security-related cases.

These sentences were issued by various branches of the Revolutionary Courts in Tehran, Isfahan, Rasht, and Bandar Abbas. The judges who issued these sentences include Iman Afshari, Abolghasem Salavati, Vahid Hemmat-Nejad, Morteza Barati, Mohammadreza Tavakoli, Mohammad Ali Darvish-Goftar, and Judge Hajizadeh.

According to the latest available information, the death sentences of Pakhshan Azizi and Arghavan Fallahi have been upheld by the Supreme Court. Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, whose initial death sentence was overturned, has once again been sentenced to death by a parallel branch of the court. The death sentences in the cases of the other five women remain at the trial or appellate review stages.

The latest status and judicial proceedings in each of these prisoners’ cases are detailed below:

1. Pakhshan Azizi, held in Evin Prison, is one of the women sentenced to death in political and security-related cases. She was arrested in Tehran on August 4, 2023, and in August 2024, Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Iman Afshari, sentenced her to death and four years in prison on the charge of “armed rebellion (baghi) through membership in groups opposed to the country.” Ms. Azizi’s death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in January 2025, and her requests for retrial have also been denied.
2. Arghavan Fallahi, another woman sentenced to death, is being held in Evin Prison. She was arrested in Tehran in February 2025, and her case was heard by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati. Ms. Fallahi was sentenced to death on the charge of “armed rebellion (baghi) through membership in groups opposed to the government and armed action.” The sentence against her was upheld by the Supreme Court in August 2026.
3. Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, 68, who is held in Lakan Prison in Rasht, is another woman sentenced to death in a political and security-related case. She was arrested at her home in Rasht in April 2025. Ms. Shahbaz Tabari was initially sentenced to death by Branch 1 of the Rasht Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Ahmad Darvish-Goftar, but the Supreme Court overturned the sentence. Her case was subsequently referred for retrial to Branch 2 of the Rasht Revolutionary Court, presided over by Mohammad Ali Darvish-Goftar. On April 14, 2026, the court again sentenced her to death on the charge of “armed rebellion (baghi) through membership and activity in an opposition group.”
4. Maryam Hodavand, 45 and a mother of two, is being held in Evin Prison. She was arrested in connection with the events of January 8, 2026, in Pakdasht, in a joint case involving three other defendants. Their case was heard by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Iman Afshari. Ms. Hedavand has been sentenced to death on charges including “participation in the killing of two Basij members,” “deliberately setting fire to a religious site,” “destruction of public property,” and “assembly and collusion against national security.” According to the latest available information, the sentence against her remains at the trial-court stage.
5. Mahnaz Chardoli, held in Qarchak Prison in Varamin, was prosecuted in a case related to the January 2026 protests in Tehran. She and Mehdi Nazer were tried in a joint case before Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati. The charges against her include “attacking a mosque with a Molotov cocktail,” “participating in gatherings,” and “assembly and collusion.” According to available information, Ms. Chardoli has received an initial death sentence, but the status of the sentence before the Supreme Court has not yet been determined.
6. Leila Abolhasani, approximately 43 years old and the mother of two teenage daughters, is being held in Dowlatabad Prison in Isfahan. She was arrested on January 8, 2026, during protests in Shahin Shahr, Isfahan. Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, presided over by Vahid Hemmat-Nejad, sentenced her to death on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh). Following an appeal by her attorney, the case was referred to the Supreme Court for appellate review. A source close to her family previously told HRANA that the charge against Ms. Abolhasani stems from her presence at and filming of the scene of a fire at a store, while judicial authorities have accused her of involvement in setting the fire.
7. Taraneh Rahimi, another woman sentenced to death in connection with the January 2026 protests, is imprisoned in Dowlatabad Prison in Isfahan. She was arrested along with a number of protesters in Isfahan, and her case was heard as part of a case known as the “Isfahan Shohada Square” case. Branch 1 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, with Judges Morteza Barati and Mohammadreza Tavakoli presiding, sentenced Ms. Rahimi and nine other defendants to death and 11 years in prison each. The charges in the case include “enmity against God (moharebeh) through carrying a bladed weapon,” “destruction of public property,” “assembly and collusion,” and “propaganda activity against the regime.” Her sentence remains at the trial-court stage.
8. Souda (Marzieh) Ebrahimi Shamsabadi, 32, who is held in Bandar Abbas Prison, is the only woman on this list whose death sentence was issued in a case related to security developments during the war. She was arrested on March 29 by Ministry of Intelligence agents and was subsequently tried before the Bandar Abbas Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Hajizadeh. Ms. Ebrahimi Shamsabadi was sentenced to death on the charge of “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz), as well as charges including “insulting the Supreme Leader,” “media and propaganda activities contrary to national security,” “intelligence and security activities on behalf of hostile governments,” and “photographing a military site and sending the images to Persian-language media outlets based outside Iran.” The sentence against her remains at the initial trial stage.

Bita Hemmati and Varisheh Moradi: Death Sentences Overturned, Cases Remain Unresolved Pending Retrial

In addition to the eight women who, according to the latest available information, continue to face death sentences, the cases of Bita Hemmati and Varisheh Moradi are also noteworthy because both were previously sentenced to death and their judicial proceedings remain ongoing. The Supreme Court overturned both prisoners’ death sentences and referred their cases to parallel branches for retrial; however, the final outcomes of their cases remain undetermined.

Varisheh Moradi, who has been in detention since August 2023, was sentenced to death in late November 2024 by the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati, on the charge of “armed rebellion” (baghi). The Supreme Court overturned the sentence in late December 2025 and referred the case to a parallel branch for retrial. A retrial hearing in her case, which had been scheduled for July 2026 before Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, was canceled because Ms. Moradi did not appear. As of the time of this report, the final outcome of the retrial remains unknown.
Bita Hemmati, one of those arrested during the December 2025–January 2026 protests, was previously sentenced by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Iman Afshari, to death on the charge of “conducting operations on behalf of the hostile government of the United States and hostile groups,” and to five years in prison on the charge of “assembly and collusion against national security.” In June 2026, the Supreme Court overturned her death sentence and referred the case to a parallel branch for retrial. Ms. Hemmati, who was arrested in Tehran on January 9, 2026, is currently being held in the women’s ward of Evin Prison. HRANA’s investigations into the outcome of her retrial and her latest judicial status are ongoing.

A Year of Pressure on Lawyers: At Least 135 Targeted by Judicial and Security Authorities

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Freedom of Expression, News, Publications
Abolfazl Ranjbari, Alireza Farzaneh Jajromi, Amir Bahadorifar, Amir Raisian, Astareh (Maryam) Ansari, Babak Eslami Farsani, Bahar Sahraian, Bahareh Aghaei, Dariush Ganjehpour Qashqai, Ebrahim Parsamehr, Elham Zeraatpisheh, Enayatollah Keramati, Fatemeh Rouhandeh, Golaleh Vatandoust, Hadi Sharifzadeh, Hamid Norouzi, Hassan Younesi, Hesam Pourahmadi, Hossein Shokri, Iman Soleimani, Ja'far Zarei, Jafar Keshavarz, Javad Alikordi, Khosrow Alikordi, Mahmoud Taravat Rouy, Masoud Ahmadian, Masoud Shirmardi Shah-Ghasemi, Masoumeh Pourshahrani, Mehdi Ansari, Mehran Ansari, Milad Panahipour, Mohammad Hadi Jafarpour, Mohammad Najafi, Mohammad Tarighat Esfanjani, Mohammadreza Faghihi, Mohammadreza Tak, Mohsen Darginejad, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Nasser Rezaei Ahangarani, Nazanin Baradaran, Nazanin Salari, Omid Darabi, Reza Gharloghi, Reza Shafakhah, Reza Tayyebnia, Saeed Sheikh, Sepideh Taheri, Seyed Mehdi Karimi Farsi, Seyed Mohammadreza Razavifard, Shadi Falahati, Shahab Soleimani, Shahrzad Sharbiani, Shima Ghosheh, Taher Naghavi, Tahereh Pour-Esmaeili, Teymour Salari, Yilmaz Mehrali Beiglou, Zahra Naghshineh, Zohreh Javani

HRANA – At least 135 attorneys across Iran were subjected to judicial and security measures between September 2025 and September 2026, including arrests, summonses, prison sentences, bans from practicing law, and travel restrictions. HRANA identified 60 of the lawyers across 14 provinces and documented at least 75 additional cases in which the individuals’ names were not made public. The findings point to a marked escalation in pressure on the legal profession, particularly since January 2026. This report details the arrests, prison sentences, cases of lawyers currently behind bars, collective actions, and other restrictions imposed during the period.

According to HRANA, a review of cases documented between September 2025 and September 2026 shows that actions against attorneys during this period ranged from summonses and the opening of judicial cases to arrests, prison sentences, bans from practicing law, travel bans, and other judicial restrictions.

Among the cases compiled, HRANA verified the identities of 60 lawyers across 14 provinces. In addition, information concerning at least 75 other lawyers whose names have not been made public was documented. A significant portion of these cases involved collective actions against lawyers in East Azerbaijan, Fars, and Gilan provinces.

According to the latest available information, at least five lawyers are currently serving prison sentences, at least 11 others have received prison sentences, and the arrests of at least 34 identified lawyers were documented during the period under review. A number of others have faced summonses, the opening of judicial cases, suspension or revocation of their licenses to practice law, travel bans, and other restrictions.

Report at a Glance

IndicatorNumber / Status
Total number of lawyers documented in the reportAt least 135
Lawyers whose identities have been confirmed60
Lawyers whose identities have not been made publicAt least 75
Geographic scope of identified lawyers14 provinces
Lawyers currently serving prison sentencesAt least 5
Lawyers who have received prison sentencesAt least 11
Identified lawyers whose arrests were documentedAt least 34

January 2026: Peak of the Arrests

A review of the chronological sequence of documented cases shows that following an increase in actions against lawyers in Gilan Province in September 2025, January 2026 marked one of the most significant periods during the year under review.

In January alone, at least 16 identified lawyers were arrested or subjected to judicial and security-related actions. A significant number of these arrests took place amid the nationwide protests in January.

Shima Ghosheh, Mohammad-Hadi Jafarpour, Jafar Zarei, Jafar Keshavarz, Nazanin Baradaran, Enayatollah Keramati, Omid Darabi, Hossein Shokri, Zohreh Javani, Sepideh Taheri, Teymour Salari, Alireza Farzaneh Jajromi, Fatemeh Rouhandeh, Mohsen Darginejad, Amir Bahadorifar, and Masoud Shirmardi Shah-Ghasemi were among the lawyers whose arrests were reported during January 2026.

Some of these individuals were released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security. However, actions against lawyers continued in the following months, with new cases of arrests, summonses, and the opening of judicial cases documented in February and March.

At Least Five Lawyers Are Currently Serving Prison Sentences

According to the latest available information, Mohammad Najafi, Javad Alikordi, Taher Naghavi, Seyed Mehdi Karimi Farsi, and Golaleh Vatandoust are currently serving prison sentences.

Mohammad Najafi, an attorney imprisoned in Evin Prison, was sentenced by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court to three years in prison, a fine, and a two-year ban on leaving the country and membership in political and social groups in a case opened against him while he was incarcerated. This case is separate from the sentences he was already serving. In April 2025, the Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges also permanently barred him from practicing law.

Javad Alikordi, an attorney in Mashhad, was arrested on December 12, 2025. Branch 1 of the Mashhad Revolutionary Court sentenced him to a total of 18 years in prison, permanent disbarment from the legal profession, exile, and additional penalties. According to the latest published information, after approximately four months in solitary confinement, he was transferred to Ward 6.1 of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

Taher Naghavi has been imprisoned in Evin Prison since February 2024. His sentence of four years in prison, a two-year travel ban, and two years of deprivation of social rights was upheld on appeal. In October 2025, Branch 6 of the Disciplinary Court of the Center for Lawyers suspended his license to practice law. Another case was opened against him while he was imprisoned in March 2026.

Seyed Mehdi Karimi Farsi was taken to Evin Prison on January 4, 2026, to begin serving his one-year prison sentence. The sentence had previously been issued by Branch 29 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court and was upheld in full by Branch 36 of the Tehran Province Court of Appeals.

Golaleh Vatandoust, an attorney from Marivan, was arrested on May 2, 2026, to begin serving her sentence and was transferred to Sanandaj Prison. She had previously been sentenced to six years, seven months, and 20 days in prison.

Prison Sentences Issued to at Least 11 Other Lawyers

During the period under review, at least 11 attorneys, Nazanin Salari, Mahmoud Taravat-Rouy, Masoud Ahmadian, Elham Zeraatpisheh, Mehdi Ansari, Mehran Ansari, Babak Eslami Farsani, Mohammadreza Faghihi, Saeed Sheikh, Seyed Mohammadreza Razavifard, and Mohammad Tarighat Esfanjani, received prison sentences and, in some cases, additional penalties. Details of the sentences and the latest status of each lawyer are provided below.

In Fars Province, Nazanin Salari, Mahmoud Taravat-Rouy, and Masoud Ahmadian were each sentenced by Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court to three years in prison and a two-year travel ban. The case against the three lawyers had been ongoing since 2020 and resulted in these sentences in June 2026.

Elham Zeraatpisheh was also arrested in May 2026. In July of the same year, Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court sentenced her to five years in prison on the charge of “assembly and collusion against national security” and one year in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime.” She was also sentenced to a two-year travel ban and revocation of her passport for two years. In early August, she was released from Adelabad Prison in Shiraz after posting bail.

Mehdi Ansari was also sentenced to imprisonment and a travel ban as proceedings in his case continued. Mehran Ansari, another lawyer arrested during the January protests, was sentenced in late May 2026 by the Shiraz Revolutionary Court to one year in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime.”

Babak Eslami Farsani was sentenced in August 2026 by Branch 23 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court to nine months in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime.”

Mohammadreza Faghihi had previously received a prison sentence and additional penalties. He was released from Evin Prison in June 2026 after his request for a retrial was granted.

Saeed Sheikh was sentenced in Tehran to one year and six months in prison, a fine, and a one-year ban from practicing law. In November 2025, he announced that 12 months of his prison sentence had been suspended.

Seyed Mohammadreza Razavifard was also sentenced in late June 2026 by Branch 1 of the Qom Revolutionary Court to 10 years in prison on the charge of “propaganda activity against the country’s national security.”

Mohammad Tarighat Esfanjani, a member of the East Azerbaijan Bar Association, was sentenced in June 2026 by the Osku Revolutionary Court to one year in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime” and two years in prison on the charge of “insulting the Supreme Leader and the founder of the Islamic Republic.”

Arrests of Lawyers Across Several Provinces

During the period under review, Zahra Naghshineh, Abolfazl Ranjbari, Yilmaz Mehrali Beiglou, Shahrzad Sharbiani, Shadi Falahati, Hesam Pourahmadi, Tahereh Pour Esmaeili, Mohammadreza Tak, Masoumeh Pourshahrani, Hamid Norouzi, Hadi Sharifzadeh, Dariush Ganjehpour Qashqai, Astareh (Maryam) Ansari, Bahar Sahraian, Ebrahim Parsamehr, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Shahab Soleimani, and Bahareh Aghaei were arrested in various provinces. Some of these lawyers were released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security, while in some cases legal proceedings against them remain ongoing. Details regarding the arrests and the latest status of each individual are provided below.

In East Azerbaijan Province, Zahra Naghshineh was arrested on September 9 after appearing before Branch 15 of the Investigation Office of the Tabriz Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office. Her case was opened following a report by the Tabriz Intelligence Department concerning her activities and her legal and critical writings.

Abolfazl Ranjbari was arrested in May 2025 and, after approximately one year, was released from Tabriz Prison in May 2026 after posting bail of 50 billion tomans.

Yilmaz Mehrali Beiglou was arrested in Jolfa in July 2025. He was initially transferred to the Ministry of Intelligence’s detention facility in Tabriz and later to Jolfa Prison. He was released after a period of detention upon posting bail. In December of the same year, an interrogation session concerning the charge of “disturbing public opinion” was held at Branch 1 of the Investigation Office of the Jolfa Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office.

In Gilan Province, Shahrzad Sharbiani, Shadi Falahati, and Hesam Pourahmadi were arrested in September 2025. During the same month, Tahereh Pour-Esmaeili, Mohammadreza Tak, and Masoumeh Pourshahrani were also arrested in Rasht. The three lawyers were released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security.

In Fars Province, Hamid Norouzi was arrested in Shiraz on February 14, 2026. He was released from Adelabad Prison on February 24 after posting bail.

Hadi Sharifzadeh and Dariush Ganjehpour Qashqai were also arrested in Shiraz during the winter of 2025–2026 and were subsequently released.

Astareh (Maryam) Ansari and Bahar Sahraian were separately arrested in May 2026 and transferred to Adelabad Prison in Shiraz. The two lawyers were released from prison in late July of the same year after posting bail.

In Khuzestan Province, Ebrahim Parsamehr was arrested in June 2025 and transferred to Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz. An indictment was subsequently issued in his case, which was referred to the Ahvaz Revolutionary Court. HRANA continues to investigate his latest status.

Nasrin Sotoudeh was also arrested in Tehran in April 2026 and was later released from the Greater Tehran Prison on a surety bond.

In Kermanshah Province, Shahab Soleimani was arrested by IRGC Intelligence forces in Ravansar County on July 17. According to information received, he was released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security.

Bahareh Aghaei was also arrested by security forces in January 2026 and transferred to Qarchak Prison in Varamin. According to the latest available information, she has remained in detention for more than seven months without resolution of her legal status.

Collective Actions Against Lawyers in East Azerbaijan, Fars, and Gilan

A significant portion of the 135 cases documented in this report relates to actions taken collectively against groups of lawyers, not all of whose identities have necessarily been made public.

The largest number of collective summonses during the period under review was recorded in East Azerbaijan Province. According to available reports, more than 40 lawyers who are members of the province’s Bar Association were summoned by the Judiciary’s Intelligence Protection Office, and cases were opened against some of them. Charges in some of these cases included “propaganda against the regime” and “spreading false information.”

In Fars Province, Mostafa Ansari, head of the Lawyers’ Support Commission of the Fars and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Regional Bar Association, stated that following the January 2026 protests, judicial cases were opened against approximately 20 lawyers, 12 of whom were arrested.

In Gilan Province, at least 10 lawyers were summoned by judicial and security authorities, without their names being made public.

An attorney who asked not to be named for security reasons told HRANA that around November 2025, IRGC Intelligence forces went to the offices or homes of a number of lawyers in Gilan Province, including the president and several officials of the province’s Bar Association, and confiscated their mobile phones and other belongings.

According to the source, cases were also opened against two other lawyers. However, no information is available regarding their identities or the details of their cases.

Because the exact number of individuals subjected to these actions during the visits by security forces in Gilan is unclear, these cases were not included in the final total of 135 lawyers.

Summonses, Judicial Cases, and Restrictions on Lawyers’ Professional Activities

In addition to arrests and prison sentences, a number of lawyers during this period faced summonses, the opening of judicial cases, judicial and disciplinary proceedings, and restrictions on their ability to continue practicing law. Reza Tayyebnia, Amir Raisian, Milad Panahipour, Reza Shafakhah, Reza Gharloghi, Iman Soleimani, Hassan Younesi, Khosrow Alikordi, Nasser Rezaei Ahangarani, and Behnam Nezadi were among them. Details of the documented cases involving each of these lawyers are provided below.

Reza Tayyebnia was summoned in August 2026 to Branch 6 of the Assistant Prosecutor’s Office of the Kohgiluyeh County Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office.

Amir Raisian and Milad Panahipour had judicial cases opened against them in May 2026 at Branch 3 of the Tehran Security Prosecutor’s Office. The charges brought against them were “spreading false information” and “propaganda against the regime.”

Reza Shafakhah received a summons in December 2025 ordering him to appear before District 16 of the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office to defend himself against the charge of “spreading false information.”

Reza Gharloghi, an attorney residing in Karaj, faced disciplinary proceedings in October 2025 following comments he made online. The indictment in his case was referred to Branch 1 of the Disciplinary Court of the Bar Association.

Iman Soleimani, an attorney in Khuzestan, faced a request for the revocation of his license to practice law and renewed disciplinary proceedings in September 2025. He had previously faced charges including “propaganda against the regime,” “insulting religious sanctities,” and “insulting the Supreme Leader,” but the case had been declared closed. Nevertheless, the same evidence was once again referred to the Lawyers’ Disciplinary Court along with a request to revoke his license to practice law. The court acquitted him, but the disciplinary prosecutor appealed the ruling, and the case was referred to the Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges.

Hassan Younesi was also interrogated at the Culture and Media Prosecutor’s Office in August 2025 and, by judicial order, was prohibited from engaging in online activity for three months.

Khosrow Alikordi, an attorney in Razavi Khorasan Province, was barred from pursuing further education in September 2025. He died on December 5, 2025. Because the action against him occurred within the period covered by this report, his name has been included among the identified lawyers documented in the report.

Nasser Rezaei Ahangarani was assaulted by security forces on the evening of January 3, 2026, during protests in Khorramabad.

Behnam Nezadi also faced judicial proceedings in connection with his work as a lawyer, but was ultimately acquitted by Branch 31 of the Tehran Province Court of Appeals.

Additionally, according to information received by HRANA, since January 2026 at least three other lawyers have received warnings in connection with content published on their personal social media accounts, and their pages were made inaccessible for at least two months. HRANA has not yet verified the identities of these individuals; therefore, these three cases were not included in the report’s final total.

Impact on Access to Legal Representation

The continuation of this trend, in addition to its direct impact on the lawyers involved in these cases, may also affect citizens’ ability to access legal counsel and receive an effective defense. Attorneys play an essential role in safeguarding defendants’ right to a defense in many judicial cases, particularly those involving civil rights and security-related charges.

Conclusion

The data compiled in this report indicate that over the past year, a number of lawyers have faced judicial and security-related actions not merely because of the circumstances of their clients, but also in connection with their own legal activities, public statements, and conduct in their professional capacity as attorneys. Continued monitoring of this trend is essential for assessing the extent to which citizens have independent and unrestricted access to legal services.

Record of HRA’s Germany Accountability Initiative

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News, Other, Publications
Berlin event, HRANA, Jennifer Connet, Sina Yousefi, Skylar Thompson, UpRights, Valérie Gabard, Völkerstrafgesetzbuch

HRANA– In September 2026, Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) launched a legal and advocacy initiative aimed at advancing accountability for alleged crimes against humanity committed by Iranian State authorities. At the center of this effort was HRA’s submission to Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General requesting the opening of a structural investigation (Strukturermittlungsverfahren) into the situation in Iran, with a particular evidentiary focus on the repression surrounding the nationwide protests of December 2025 and January 2026.

1. Overview

HRA submitted the request on September 1, 2026, with legal support from UpRights and German counsel. The nearly 109-page submission was the product of months of intensive investigation and drew on more than 60 interviews with victims, witnesses, and family members inside and outside Iran, together with extensive documentary and digital evidence. HRA also conducted weapons and injury analysis and mapped suspected perpetrators, relevant institutions, and command structures. The submission identifies upwards of 50 suspected perpetrators and analyzes their roles, institutional affiliations, links to documented incidents, and positions within relevant command structures.

The filing was accompanied by a coordinated public-engagement effort intended to explain the legal strategy, bring greater attention to the evidence documented by HRA, and build support for sustained accountability work. This included a public event in Berlin on September 3 bringing together German policymakers, lawyers, civil society representatives, media, and human rights practitioners; an article in Just Security explaining why Germany is particularly well placed to act and why investigative work should begin now; and an upcoming Just Access podcast addressing the filing.

Together, these activities sought to advance a central proposition underlying HRA’s work: documentation undertaken today can create the evidentiary foundation for accountability opportunities that may arise years later.

2. The Criminal Complaint and Request for a Structural Investigation

The submission asks Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General to open a structural investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Iranian State authorities under Section 7 of the German Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, VStGB). HRA argues that the information submitted provides sufficient factual indications of multiple underlying acts potentially amounting to crimes against humanity and meets the threshold under Section 152(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure for opening an investigation.

The submission focuses principally on the nationwide protests that began on December 28, 2025. What began with shopkeepers and bazaar merchants in Tehran rapidly developed into a nationwide movement encompassing at least 203 cities across all 31 provinces. HRA documented 682 protest events, including 627 street demonstrations and 55 university assemblies.

According to HRA’s verified minimum figures at the time of submission, at least 7,068 people were killed, including 6,548 protesters, 236 children, and 77 other civilians, and at least 53,987 people were arrested or detained. HRA also documented at least 369 forced confessions broadcast through State and associated media. HRA emphasizes that these figures are verified minimums and do not purport to capture the full scale of the alleged violations.

Nature and Patterns of the Alleged Crimes

The evidence presented describes an alleged nationwide campaign involving multiple organs of the Iranian State, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Basij forces, the Law Enforcement Command (LEF), intelligence and security forces, and the Judiciary.

The submission documents allegations including unlawful killings and mass shootings; arbitrary arrest and mass detention; enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention; torture and other ill-treatment; forced confessions; sexual violence; politically motivated persecution; interference with access to medical treatment; intimidation and coercion of victims’ families; interference with funerals, burials, and the recovery of bodies; and the use of capital proceedings and death sentences following manifestly unfair trials. More than 50 representative incidents are included to illustrate alleged criminal conduct across different locations, victim profiles, State institutions, and methods of repression.

HRA’s investigation also identified recurring features across geographically dispersed locations. These included the use of live ammunition, pellet-firing weapons, tear gas, and other forms of force against predominantly unarmed protesters and bystanders. The submission further describes a correlation between the nationwide telecommunications shutdown, the deliberate shutdown of public street lighting, and a marked escalation in lethal and other unlawful force. HRA argues that the recurrence of substantially similar methods across different locations indicates a coordinated pattern rather than a series of isolated incidents.

The submission also addresses alleged abuses following arrest. HRA documented reports of incommunicado detention, denial of access to lawyers, coerced confessions, expedited proceedings involving capital offenses, and death sentences following proceedings lacking basic fair-trial guarantees. It argues that these practices raise serious concerns that the criminal justice system itself has been used as an additional instrument of repression against protesters and perceived dissidents.

Suspected Perpetrators and Institutional Structures

A significant component of the investigation involved moving beyond documentation of individual incidents to examine who may bear responsibility for the alleged crimes.

The submission identifies nearly 50 suspected perpetrators and analyzes their positions, institutional affiliations, geographical areas of responsibility, links to representative incidents, and roles within relevant command structures. They include commanders within the IRGC, Basij, and LEF; heads of intelligence departments; governors; prison officials; prosecutors; and judicial authorities. The underlying information draws in part on HRA’s Spreading Justice Database and Pasdaran Documentation Project Database.

This perpetrator mapping was intended not to prejudge individual criminal responsibility, but to preserve and organize information relevant to determining how particular individuals, units, institutions, and command structures may have contributed to the alleged crimes.

3. Why a Structural Investigation

The request for a structural investigation reflects the nature of both the alleged crimes and the practical obstacles to accountability.

Unlike an investigation centered from the outset on a particular available suspect, a structural investigation would allow German prosecutors to examine the broader factual and organizational structures underlying the alleged crimes; collect and preserve testimonial, documentary, and digital evidence; identify patterns connecting individual incidents; map relevant State institutions and units; establish command structures and institutional relationships; and assess the potential responsibility of individuals who may have planned, ordered, facilitated, contributed to, or directly committed the underlying acts.

Although the December 2025–January 2026 crackdown provides the submission’s principal evidentiary focus, HRA argues that an investigation should not necessarily be confined to that period. The submission situates the recent events within a broader recurring pattern of repression against perceived opponents and civilian protesters, including the response to the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests.

The objective is therefore both immediate and long-term: to preserve evidence and investigate structures now, rather than waiting until an individual suspected of involvement happens to become available to German authorities.

4. Why Germany

HRA argues that there is currently no realistic domestic route to accountability in Iran for alleged crimes committed by State authorities. Iran is not a State Party to the Rome Statute and has not lodged a declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction, leaving the ICC without jurisdiction over crimes committed wholly within Iran absent an unlikely United Nations Security Council referral.

At the same time, there are concrete links between the alleged crimes, available evidence, and Germany and the wider European context.

Victims, Witnesses, and Evidence in Europe

Victims, witnesses, and family members of people killed, injured, tortured, arbitrarily detained, or otherwise affected are already outside Iran. HRA has interviewed individuals who fled following the protests and are in Turkey or reaching EU countries, as well as victims and family members elsewhere in Europe and North America. HRA anticipates that continuing displacement may result in additional victims and witnesses reaching Europe.

Germany’s substantial Iranian diaspora provides additional possibilities for identifying witnesses and securing testimonial, documentary, and other evidence. A German structural investigation could also facilitate cooperation with other European jurisdictions in identifying and interviewing victims and witnesses and preserving evidence for possible future proceedings.

Potential Future Presence of Suspects

HRA has also documented past travel to Germany and other European States by senior current and former Iranian officials, including IRGC, government, and judicial officials, for personal, family-related, and medical reasons. HRA argues that these patterns make it realistic that persons potentially implicated in the alleged crimes may enter or transit through Germany or another European jurisdiction in the future, even though it is impossible to predict precisely who will travel, when, or where.

A structural investigation would therefore allow the evidentiary and investigative groundwork to be developed before such a situation arises, rather than requiring prosecutors to begin from scratch once a potential suspect comes within reach.

Transnational Repression

HRA further situates Germany’s interest within the context of Iranian State-sponsored transnational repression. It describes links between Iranian State actors—including the IRGC, Quds Force, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and associated networks—and surveillance, intimidation, threats, attempted abductions, and assassination plots targeting perceived opponents abroad. The submission notes that members of the Iranian diaspora have faced threats and intimidation in Germany and argues that some State actors implicated in domestic repression are also linked to increased transnational activities targeting perceived opponents outside Iran.

Together, the availability of evidence and witnesses, potential future presence of suspects, Germany’s Iranian diaspora, transnational repression affecting Germany, and Germany’s experience with structural investigations form the principal practical nexus supporting HRA’s request.

5. September 3 Berlin Event

Two days after the submission, HRA and UpRights convened a panel event in Berlin to publicly announce the filing and discuss its significance. The audience included German policymakers, lawyers, civil society representatives, media, activists, and human rights practitioners.

The panel was moderated by Skylar Thompson, Deputy Director of HRA, and featured Jennifer Connet, Legal Advisor at HRA; Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights; and Sina Yousefi, an Iranian human rights lawyer and former Deputy Chair of the Human Rights Commission of the East Azerbaijan Bar Association.

Skylar Thompson

Thompson provided the broader context for HRA and UpRights’ efforts to pursue legal action in Germany and discussed plans for continued cooperation with investigative and prosecutorial efforts across Europe. She emphasized the importance of sustained documentation and international coordination, particularly as victims and witnesses continue to leave Iran and opportunities for accountability may emerge unpredictably. She also underscored that systematic documentation is the foundation on which both present and future accountability efforts depend.

Sina Yousefi

Yousefi brought the perspective of an Iranian human rights lawyer who had practiced in Iran in the aftermath of the 2022 nationwide protests. Drawing on his professional and personal experience, he discussed patterns of repression directed against protesters and explained why the events following the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests remain relevant to understanding the more recent crackdown.

His contribution also reinforced an important aspect of the submission: the December 2025–January 2026 crackdown should not necessarily be understood in isolation from recurring patterns of State repression documented during earlier protest movements. The Executive Summary similarly asks German prosecutors to consider the broader situation in Iran, including alleged international crimes committed in connection with the 2022 protests.

Jennifer Connet

Connet presented aspects of HRA’s investigation and its engagement with victims and witnesses. She discussed the scale of HRA’s documentation and emphasized that the investigation depended fundamentally on the courage and trust of individuals who shared their experiences and evidence, including people who remain inside Iran.

Her presentation placed individual testimony within the broader patterns identified through HRA’s investigation: killings and shootings, injuries caused by live ammunition and pellet weapons, fear of seeking medical treatment, detention and torture, forced confessions, interference with families’ efforts to recover and bury their relatives, and other alleged abuses. These individual experiences form part of the evidentiary basis through which HRA has sought to identify patterns extending across locations, institutions, and stages of the crackdown.

Valérie Gabard

Gabard explained why a structural investigation is particularly suited to the allegations documented by HRA. As she emphasized, the alleged crimes are not connected simply to one suspect or one isolated incident, but to a broader State-backed system. A structural investigation can therefore provide a framework for investigating the broader situation while supporting potential future criminal accountability.

This closely reflects the rationale set out in the complaint: German prosecutors would be able to examine organizational structures and patterns, preserve evidence, identify relevant institutions and command relationships, and assess potential individual responsibility without waiting for a particular suspect to become immediately available.

The event concluded with questions from participants and a broader discussion about legal strategies, practical challenges, and opportunities for pursuing accountability beyond Iran, including the role German and European civil society could play as the initiative develops.

6. Extending the Initiative Beyond the Filing

The Germany initiative extended beyond the formal submission and the September 3 Berlin event. HRA also sought to bring the legal and strategic questions raised by the filing into broader legal, policy, and public discussions, with particular emphasis on why investigative action is possible before a specific suspect becomes available to German authorities.

As part of this effort, HRA’s Skylar Thompson and Jennifer Connet published an article in Just Security examining the strategic rationale for opening a structural investigation in Germany. While the submission sets out the underlying evidence and legal basis for HRA’s request, the article situates that request within the broader practice of universal-jurisdiction accountability. It emphasizes the value of beginning investigative work before the future presence of a particular suspect can be predicted, drawing on Germany’s experience with structural investigations concerning other situations, including Syria and Ukraine.

Together, these engagements form part of HRA’s broader effort to ensure that the filing serves not only as a submission of evidence to German authorities, but also as a basis for sustained engagement with legal practitioners, policymakers, civil society, and others working on accountability for alleged crimes committed in Iran.

7. Civil Society Engagement and Next Steps

The submission expressly contemplates continued cooperation between German authorities and civil society organizations possessing relevant evidence and expertise. HRA asks the Federal Prosecutor General to engage directly with HRA and other organizations that have documented the events. It notes that civil society organizations have established trusted relationships with victims and witnesses, accumulated substantial documentation concerning incidents and suspected perpetrators, and developed contextual and technical expertise that can support investigative efforts.

HRA has stated its readiness to cooperate with German authorities, including by facilitating access to relevant information and, where appropriate and subject to necessary safeguards and informed consent, supporting engagement with victims and witnesses.

The Berlin event was therefore not simply a launch event. It was also intended to begin a longer conversation with German policymakers, lawyers, and civil society about how these constituencies can support accountability efforts after the filing itself. The legal submission provides the formal request; continued documentation, engagement with victims and witnesses, monitoring of potential suspects, civil society coordination, and engagement with prosecutorial authorities constitute the next phase.

8. Significance of the Initiative

The September 2026 initiative brings together several strands of HRA’s work: documentation of individual violations; analysis of patterns of repression; identification and mapping of suspected perpetrators and State institutions; engagement with victims and witnesses; legal analysis; and advocacy aimed at translating that documentation into concrete accountability opportunities.

The filing is particularly significant because it seeks to convert a substantial body of civil society documentation into an investigative framework capable of supporting accountability over the long term. The Executive Summary argues that the alleged crimes were neither isolated nor confined to particular perpetrators, but formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population involving multiple State institutions. HRA therefore asks German prosecutors to investigate the structures, patterns, evidence, and potential responsibility underlying the alleged crimes rather than waiting until a particular suspect becomes available.

Justice Beyond Borders: HRA Files Criminal Complaint and Holds Event in Berlin

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Activites, News, Publications
Berlin event, Spreading Justice

Berlin — On September 3, 2026, as Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) filed a criminal complaint with Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor General concerning the crackdown on Iran’s nationwide protests, prominent lawyers, activists, and human rights experts gathered in Berlin to examine legal avenues for pursuing accountability for serious human rights violations committed during the protests.

The event, held at betahaus in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, was hosted by Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) and UpRights.

The panel was moderated by Skylar Thompson, Deputy Director at HRA, and featured Jennifer Connet, Legal Advisor at HRA; Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights; and Sina Yousefi, an Iranian human rights lawyer and former Deputy Chair of the Human Rights Commission of the East Azerbaijan Bar Association.

Panelists examined HRA’s investigation into the crackdown, including more than 60 interviews conducted with victims and witnesses, as well as extensive perpetrator mapping. They also discussed why Germany was chosen as a jurisdiction in which to pursue accountability and HRA’s plans to continue supporting judicial action against individuals allegedly responsible for abuses committed during the crackdown, including through accountability efforts across Europe.

Skylar Thompson outlined efforts by HRA and UpRights to pursue legal action in Germany in connection with the crackdown and discussed plans to continue this work through cooperation with investigative and prosecutorial efforts across Europe. As victims and witnesses continue to leave Iran while alleged perpetrators remain shielded by impunity, Thompson emphasized the importance of sustained documentation and international coordination.

Thompson stressed that documentation provides the foundation for both present and future accountability efforts and has been fundamental to HRA’s filing in Germany.

Sina Yousefi reflected on his experience practicing law in Iran in the aftermath of the 2022 nationwide protests and described patterns of repression targeting protesters. He emphasized that those experiences have not occurred in a vacuum and are in fact relevant to our understanding of recent events. 

Jennifer Connet discussed HRA’s months of documentation and engagement with victims and witnesses. Connet emphasized that the courage and trust of victims and witnesses have been essential to documenting alleged violations and creating opportunities to pursue judicial avenues at the international level.

Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights, addressed the complaint filed by HRA and UpRights with German prosecutors, stating:

“Since the crimes committed in Iran are not linked to a single suspect or an isolated incident, but rather to a state-backed system that has been operating for several decades, requesting a structural investigation [within the German judicial system] makes sense, as such an investigation can establish a framework that supports future criminal accountability [of the Iranian government].”

The event concluded with questions from participants and a broader discussion of the legal strategies, challenges, and opportunities associated with pursuing accountability beyond Iran’s borders.

Criminal Complaint Filed in Germany

The Berlin event followed HRA’s filing of a criminal complaint with Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor General on September 3, 2026, seeking the opening of a structural investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed in Iran under Section 7 of Germany’s Code of Crimes against International Law (VStGB). The complaint draws on extensive documentation and evidence collected by HRA. Further details on the filing, its legal basis, and the underlying evidence are available in HRA’s report on the criminal complaint.

Escalation of Judicial Crackdown on Protesters: A Review of the Most Significant Cases from the Past Two Weeks

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Executions, Freedom of Expression, News, Publications
Abolfazl Dadgostar, Abolfazl Sepahi, Ahmadreza Saeedi, Ali Booari, Alikhani Square, Alireza Sepahi, Ehsan Khodadadi, Erfan Esfandiari, Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi, Hamed Mehralian, Isfahan Shohada Square, Kianoush Hamzehei Kazerouni, Mahnam Navab Safavi, Majid Nikandish, Mehdi Asadi, Mehdi Mansouri, Mehdi Zarif, Mehrdad Booari, Milad Booari, Mohammad Amini Dehaghani, Mohammadreza Abdollahpour, moharebeh, Mojtaba Dehbandi, Morteza Zamani, Navid Elyasi, Romina Rahimi, Setayesh Saedi, Shandiz, Taraneh Rahimi

HRANA – Over the past two weeks, Iranian authorities have sharply escalated the use of capital punishment in cases linked to the January 2026 protests and politically motivated or national security prosecutions. Death sentences have been issued, upheld, and carried out across multiple cities, signaling an intensification of the judiciary’s crackdown on protesters and other defendants facing political and security-related charges.

According to HRANA, over the past two weeks, judicial proceedings in a number of cases related to the January 2026 protests and other security-related cases have entered a new phase, marked by the issuance and implementation of death sentences, the commencement of trials, and growing concerns over the condition of detainees.

The cases reviewed by HRANA span Isfahan, Shahrud, Mashhad, Tehran, Shiraz, Mahallat, Karaj, and Tabriz. They are accompanied by persistent allegations of fair trial violations, including denial of effective access to legal counsel, forced confessions, court hearings held inside prisons or conducted remotely, and a lack of transparency regarding the evidence relied upon by the courts. HRANA’s findings indicate that at least seven prisoners in protest- and security-related cases were executed during this period.

This report examines the most prominent recent cases that have resulted in death sentences or executions, or in which defendants are facing charges such as “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “spreading corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz). In cases where the available information is based solely on reports received by HRANA, the agency explicitly notes this and continues its independent investigation into the details of each case, including judicial proceedings, defendants’ access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the courts.

Several of these cases have drawn particular attention not only because of the number of defendants and the severity of the sentences, but also due to questions surrounding the judicial process. Reported concerns in some of these cases include restrictions on defense lawyers’ access to case files, court sessions held remotely or inside prisons, the failure to provide some families with the full text of court verdicts, and allegations that confessions were obtained under coercion.

Among these, the cases known as the “Alikhani Square” case and the “Isfahan Shohada Square” case have emerged as some of the most prominent during this period due to the harsh sentences imposed, the large number of defendants, and unresolved concerns regarding the judicial process. Meanwhile, the issuance of death sentences and the continuation of proceedings in similar cases in Shahrud, Mashhad, Shandiz, Shiraz, Mahallat, Tehran, and Malekan indicate that this pattern is not confined to a single city or a single case.

Below are the details of the cases for which HRANA has independently gathered and verified information, including the charges brought against the defendants, the course of judicial proceedings, and the status of the sentences from issuance through implementation.

Isfahan

The “Alikhani Square” Case: Death Sentences Issued and Carried Out Against Several Detainees

In this case, 59 individuals arrested during the January 2026 protests in Isfahan have been tried. According to information received by HRANA, 14 of them have been sentenced to death. HRANA has so far verified the identities of 12 of those sentenced to death.

The case was opened in connection with events that took place on January 8, 2026 in Alikhani Square in Isfahan, where the judiciary has alleged that police forces were attacked, public property was damaged, and violent acts were committed. The defendants face charges including “enmity against God” (moharebeh), destruction of public property, offenses related to attacks on law enforcement officers, and the killing of four members of the police force.

HRANA has verified the identities of the 12 defendants sentenced to death as Alireza Sepahi, Abolfazl Sepahi, Erfan Esfandiari, Gol Mohammad Mohammadi, Ghaem Hosseini, Sharvin Bagherian, Amirhossein Safari, Amirhossein Maleki, Ali Dashti, Abolfazl Ebrahimi, Alireza Raeisi, and Amirhossein Ebrahimi Analoucheh.

In the early hours of July 19, the death sentences of Erfan Esfandiari and Gol Mohammad Mohammadi were carried out. Subsequently, the transfer of Alireza Sepahi and Abolfazl Sepahi to solitary confinement has heightened concerns that the death sentences of the remaining condemned prisoners in this case may soon be implemented.

The handling of this case has raised serious concerns regarding compliance with fair trial standards. According to information received by HRANA, court hearings were conducted via video conference, and lawyers and the families of some defendants were denied access to the complete case files and the full text of the court’s verdicts. Additionally, some defendants were reportedly subjected to pressure and torture during interrogations in order to compel them to admit to the charges against them.

The “Shohada Square” Case

This case stems from the January 2026 protests in Isfahan and involves 16 defendants currently facing judicial proceedings. It relates to incidents that occurred in the vicinity of Shohada Square in Isfahan, near several shoe stores, during which two individuals were killed.

The charges brought against most of the defendants include “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through carrying bladed weapons, destruction of public property amounting to moharebeh, assembly and collusion, and propaganda against the state. Two of the defendants are charged with complicity in moharebeh and complicity in the destruction of public property.

HRANA has verified the identities of 12 of the defendants: Ahmadreza Saeedi, Navid Elyasi, Abolfazl Dadgostar, Mehdi Mansouri, Hamed Mehralian, Mehdi Asadi, Milad Booari, Mehrdad Booari, Ali Booari, Taraneh Rahimi, Romina Rahimi, and Setayesh Saedi.

The handling of this case has also raised concerns regarding judicial procedure. Although the case was formally registered with Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, the defendants’ charges have been adjudicated by judges from Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court in the same city. Hearings have been held inside Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan before Judge Morteza Barati and Judge Mohammadreza Tavakkoli, with a representative of the prosecutor’s office also present.

The defendants are being held in Dastgerd and Dowlatabad Prisons in Isfahan. Their defense lawyers have stated that they were not granted full access to the case files prior to the hearings. Additionally, some defendants were reportedly subjected to torture during interrogations.

It is also noteworthy that the indictment issued against these defendants does not contain any specific charge related to the killing of the two individuals who died during the Shohada Square incidents. According to information received by HRANA, no evidence has been presented demonstrating the defendants’ direct involvement in those deaths.

Execution of the Death Sentence of Mohammad Amini Dehaghani

The case of Mohammad Amini Dehaqani is related to the January 2026 protests in Dehaqan County, Isfahan Province. According to the judiciary’s media outlet, he was sentenced to death on charges of “setting fire to the Dehaqan governor’s office and police station by throwing Molotov cocktails” and “destroying public property in Imam Hossein Square” in the city. His death sentence was carried out on July 15, 2026, at Isfahan Prison.

According to publicly available information, the execution was carried out following judicial proceedings and the confirmation of the final verdict by the Supreme Court. HRANA has not yet been able to independently verify the details of the case, the judicial process, the evidence relied upon by the court, or the defendant’s legal defense. Further investigation into the case is ongoing.

Death Sentence Issued for Mahnam Navab Safavi

The case of Mahnam Navab Safavi, a 22-year-old rapper from Isfahan, is related to the nationwide protests of 2026. He was arrested on January 10, 2026, and was subsequently sentenced to death by Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court.

The charges brought against him include “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through the destruction of public property in the Sheikh Sadough area of Isfahan, “propaganda against the state,” “assembly and collusion,” “encouraging people to kill one another,” and “writing slogans.”

According to information received by HRANA, he is currently being held in Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan. HRANA has also received information indicating that he was subjected to forced confessions during his detention and that his trial was conducted remotely. HRANA is continuing to investigate the details of the case, the judicial proceedings, the defendant’s access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court.

Kermanshah

Execution of the Death Sentences of Two Defendants Convicted of “Armed Rebellion”

This case dates back to 2017 and concerns allegations of membership in an armed group and activities against the Islamic Republic. The judiciary’s media outlet claimed that Mohi al-Din Abdollahi and Hossein Palani were “members of a group affiliated with ISIS” who intended to carry out armed operations inside Iran. According to this claim, following court proceedings, the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced both men to death on the charge of “armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic of Iran” (baghi).

After the Supreme Court upheld the verdicts, the death sentences of the two prisoners were carried out in the early hours of July 14, 2026, at Dizelabad Prison in Kermanshah.

The judiciary’s media outlet stated that, following the completion of the investigation and the issuance of the indictment, the case was referred to the Tehran Revolutionary Court, which ultimately issued the death sentences.

Soroush Karami Remains in Judicial Limbo on the Charge of “Enmity Against God”

The case of Soroush Karami, a resident of Kermanshah, is related to the January 2026 protests in Kermanshah. He was arrested during the protests on January 8, 2026, and has been charged with “enmity against God” (moharebeh). His case is currently under review by Branch 16 of the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office in Kermanshah.

He was transferred from a security detention facility to Kermanshah Central Prison (Dizelabad) and is currently being held in solitary confinement in the prison’s security ward.

Soroush Karami has been denied access to legal counsel since the time of his arrest.

Karaj

Execution of Aref Khoshkar

The case of Aref Khoshkar was related to the nationwide protests of 2022 in Tehran. He was arrested during protests in the Fallah neighborhood and sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court on charges including “enmity against God through carrying and using a weapon,” “the killing of a member of the Basij,” and “assembly and collusion against national security.”

Aref Khoshkar’s death sentence was carried out on July 15, 2026, at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj, after his family’s efforts to halt the execution and a meeting aimed at obtaining the victim’s family’s consent proved unsuccessful.

According to information received by HRANA, Aref Khoshkar’s lawyer had previously pointed to ambiguities in the case, stating that there were no surveillance cameras at the site of the killing and that there was insufficient evidence linking the charges to his client.

Execution of Mehdi Khanki

The case of Mehdi Khanki, age 26, was related to the January 2026 protests in Karaj. According to the Judiciary Media Center, he had been sentenced to death on charges including “operational activities in support of Israel, the United States, and hostile groups” and “manufacturing, procuring, and possessing firearms and military ammunition, and using them.”

He was arrested by security forces at his residence in Karaj on February 10, 2026. After the Supreme Court upheld his sentence, he was executed on Wednesday, July 15, 2026, at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj.

According to the judiciary, the case was heard by a branch of the Karaj Revolutionary Court, which issued the death sentence. HRANA has not yet been able to independently examine the details of the case, the evidence relied upon by the court, or the judicial proceedings. Further investigation into the matter is ongoing.

Shahrud: Death Sentence Issued for Arvin Kheirkhahan

The case of Arvin Kheirkhahan, aged approximately 20, is related to the January 2026 protests in Shahrud. He was arrested during the protests and is currently being held in Shahrud Prison.

He has been sentenced to death on charges of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz). His case has now been referred to the Supreme Court for review. To date, no detailed information has been made public regarding the branch handling the case, his access to legal counsel, or the details of the judicial proceedings.

Mashhad: Majid Nikandish Sentenced to Death

The case of Majid Nikandish, a 25-year-old resident of Quchan, is related to the January 2026 protests in Mashhad. He was arrested during the protests and is currently being held in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

He was tried by Branch 1 of the Mashhad Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Gholamreza Akbari, and sentenced to death on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh). According to information received by HRANA, he remains detained in Vakilabad Prison. HRANA has also received information indicating that he was subjected to forced confessions during his detention. The organization is continuing to investigate the details of the case, the judicial proceedings, and other aspects of his prosecution.

Shandiz: Mehdi Zarif Sentenced to Death

The case of Mehdi Zarif, aged 22, is related to the January 2026 protests in Shandiz. He was arrested in Shandiz on January 10, 2026.

He has been sentenced to death on charges including the destruction of public property. His death sentence has been upheld by the Supreme Court. According to information received by HRANA, he was subjected to forced confessions during interrogation.

Tehran: Mohammadreza Abdollahpour

The case of Mohammadreza Abdollahpour, one of those arrested during the 2026 nationwide protests, involves charges including “espionage” and the killing of a police officer during the January 9, 2026 protests in Tehran’s Saadat Abad district.

Following his arrest, he has spent more than five months in detention and remains held at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj without a verdict having been issued.

According to information received by HRANA, court hearings in his case were held in April–May 2026, but no judgment has yet been issued. A source close to his family also stated that he has been denied access to a lawyer of his own choosing.

At present, little additional information is available regarding the judicial proceedings in this case. It is only known that Mohammadreza Abdollahpour’s trial sessions have been held, but no verdict has yet been issued.

The following cases are based on information that is still under review. HRANA is currently verifying the details of these cases, including the judicial proceedings, the legal status of the defendants, and other relevant aspects.

Shahrud: Protester Morteza Zamani Sentenced to Death

The case of Morteza Zamani, a 27-year-old resident of Shahrud, is related to the January 2026 protests in the city. He was arrested on January 8, 2026, during protests on Istgah Street in Shahrud and was subsequently transferred to Shahrud Prison.

Morteza Zamani has been sentenced to death on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through the destruction and arson of public property.

No detailed information is currently available regarding the specifics of the case, the judicial proceedings, or his access to legal counsel. HRANA’s investigation into these matters is ongoing.

Shiraz: Two Citizens Sentenced to Death in Connection with the January Protests

The case of two citizens in Shiraz is related to the January 2026 protests. In this case, both defendants were sentenced to death by Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court.

The charges brought against them include “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through setting fire to public places and burning a Quran, as well as “acting against national security by sheltering protesters.” Their death sentences were issued more than two months ago.

The two defendants have been identified as 23-year-old Mojtaba Dehbandi and 27-year-old Kianoush Hamzehei Kazerouni. Following their arrest, they were transferred to Adelabad Prison in Shiraz.

The death sentences were issued at the trial court level and are not yet final. HRANA’s investigation into the details of the judicial proceedings, the defendants’ access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court is ongoing.

Malekan: Ehsan Khodadadi

The case of Ehsan Khodadadi, a 32-year-old resident of Malekan, has been under investigation since June 2025 in connection with national security charges. The central allegations in the case involve claims that he sent the location of an Iranian Air Force facility in Tabriz, attempted to establish contact with Mossad, and transmitted information to the Iran International television network.

Ehsan Khodadadi has now been sentenced to death by Branch 1 of the Tabriz Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Reza Abdi. He was convicted on charges of “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz) through espionage for the benefit of the Israeli regime, “security, cultural, media, and propaganda activities for Israel,” “cooperation with hostile states,” “propaganda against the state,” and “cooperation through providing information to media outlets opposed to the regime.”

He is currently being held in Tabriz Prison. Reports have alleged that Ehsan Khodadadi was subjected to pressure, torture, and forced confessions during interrogation. HRANA has not been able to independently verify these claims. HRANA’s investigation into the details of the case, the judicial proceedings, the defendant’s access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court is ongoing.

Tehran: Two Defendants Sentenced to Death in Connection with the January 2026 Protests

The case of three individuals arrested during the January 2026 protests in Tehran has resulted in severe sentences, including two death penalties. They were arrested on January 11, 2026, and their case was subsequently heard by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati.

The charges brought against the defendants include “attacking a mosque with Molotov cocktails,” “participation in unlawful gatherings,” and “assembly and collusion.”

The defendants have been identified as Mehdi Nazer, Mahnaz Chardouli, and Atefeh Nazer. Mehdi Nazer and Mahnaz Chardouli were each sentenced to death and 10 years’ imprisonment, while Atefeh Nazer was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.

Lordegan: Ali Rahimi-Rigi Faces Political and Security Charges

The case of Ali Rahimi-Rigi, a 31-year-old detainee arrested during the January 2026 protests, stems from events related to those protests. He faces a range of charges, including “enmity against God” (moharebeh), “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz), possession and carrying of firearms and ammunition, destruction of property, unlawful assembly, propaganda against the state, assembly and collusion against national security, brandishing a weapon, and disrupting public order. He is currently being held in Lordegan Prison.

No detailed information has been made public regarding the branch handling his case, his access to legal counsel, or the evidence relied upon by the court. HRANA’s investigation into the details of the judicial proceedings is ongoing.

Mahallat: Five Protest Detainees Sentenced to Death

Five individuals arrested during the January 2026 protests in Mahallat, Markazi Province, have been sentenced to death by a judicial authority on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh). Their death sentences were issued at the trial court level and are not yet final.

The defendants have been identified as Erfan Khalili, Ali Akbar Mahlouji, Hessam Isaei, Hossein Shokouhi, and Abolghasem Kazem Aslani. They are currently being held in Arak Prison.

HRANA’s investigation into the judicial proceedings, the defendants’ access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court is ongoing.

Arak: 18-Year-Old Mahan Rahmati Faces Charge of “Enmity Against God”

The case of Mahan Rahmati, a resident of Arak born in January 2008, is related to the January 2026 protests. He has been charged with “enmity against God” (moharebeh), an offense that may carry the death penalty. He remains in detention, and recent information has heightened concerns regarding both the judicial proceedings in his case and the conditions of his detention.

No detailed information has been made public regarding the branch handling his case, his access to legal counsel, or the evidence relied upon by the court. HRANA’s investigation into the details of the judicial process is ongoing.

Overall, during the past two weeks, at least 50 individuals arrested in connection with the January 2026 protests have either been executed, sentenced to death, had their death sentences upheld, or faced charges such as “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz), offenses that can carry the death penalty. The cases of a number of these individuals remain under investigation or judicial review, and complete information regarding the legal proceedings and court rulings is not yet available.

Background: The January 2026 Protests

It should be noted that protests and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and within two days spread beyond markets and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests became one of the largest protest movements of recent years. Following the crackdown by security and law enforcement forces, thousands were killed or injured, and tens of thousands were arrested or summoned by security agencies. For more information, readers may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report titled “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days following the outbreak of Iran’s nationwide protests.

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Ten-Day Report on the New Wave of Attacks on Iran: Human Casualties and Disruption of Critical Infrastructure

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News, Other, Publications
Bushehr, Hormozgan, HRANA, irgc, Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchestan, U.S. attacks

HRANA – From the beginning of the new wave of U.S. attacks on Iran on July 8 through July 17, HRANA documented at least 376 incidents related to these attacks across 54 locations in 15 provinces nationwide.

The collected data indicates that a significant portion of the attacks has been concentrated in southern Iran, particularly along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Military bases and defense facilities have been among the announced or reported targets. However, ports, piers, fishing vessels, bridges, railway lines, airports, telecommunications towers, and a number of infrastructures related to water, food, communications, transportation, and local economies have also been targeted or damaged as a result of the attacks.

Based on the cases that HRANA has documented and verified as of the time of publication, at least 48 people have been reported killed and 68 injured. In one of the most severe reported incidents, a one-year-old child in Bandar Abbas lost one hand after being struck by shrapnel, and the child’s condition has been reported as critical.

The head of the Ministry of Health’s Public Relations and Information Center has also announced that the number of people injured in the attacks has exceeded 400, while 38 people have lost their lives. The official did not specify whether these figures include military personnel, civilians, or both groups, nor whether they represent all casualties or only those registered at medical facilities. The discrepancy between HRANA’s figures and the official statistics underscores the challenges of verification under the current circumstances. Given the ongoing attacks and restrictions on access to information, the actual number of casualties may be higher than the documented figures.

This report does not assess the competing claims made by the parties regarding the nature or use of the targeted sites, nor does it evaluate the legal legitimacy of the military operations. Instead, it focuses on the documented consequences of these attacks for the civilian population, including access to essential services, transportation, communications, livelihoods, and the economic security of local communities.

About the Data and Counting Methodology

All documented incidents, including attacks, projectile impacts, explosions, and other events related to aerial operations, have been included in the overall incident count. Therefore, the registration of 376 incidents does not necessarily mean that 376 separate attacks or military operations took place. Multiple incidents may correspond to different waves of a single attack, multiple impacts within the same area, or separate reports concerning the same operation.

Because the attacks are ongoing, access to some affected areas remains restricted, communications have been disrupted, and information continues to emerge gradually, the figures presented in this report represent minimum confirmed counts and remain subject to revision. In cases where there was a possibility of overlap, duplicate counting, or insufficient information, HRANA refrained from reporting definitive figures and included only those cases that could be verified to a reasonable degree.

Key Findings

Between July 8 and July 17 :

• At least 376 incidents related to the attacks were documented across 15 provinces.

• These incidents were reported in 54 geographic locations, including 45 cities and urban areas, four counties, one district, and four islands.

• At least 48 people have been reported killed and 68 injured.

• Among the victims documented by HRANA, 20 civilians have been reported killed and 46 civilians injured.

• At least 40 fishing vessels were damaged or completely destroyed.

• A number of bridges, railway lines, airports, telecommunications towers, piers, water facilities, and food storage centers sustained damage.

• The highest concentration of reported incidents was recorded in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Bushehr, Sirik, Chabahar, Choghadak, and Konarak.

Geographic Distribution and Concentration of Attacks in Southern Iran

An analysis of the collected data indicates that the provinces of Hormozgan, Bushehr, Khuzestan, and Sistan and Baluchestan have been among the principal geographic focal points of this new wave of attacks.

Bandar Abbas recorded the highest number of reported incidents. It was followed by Qeshm, Bushehr, Sirik, Chabahar, Choghadak, and Konarak among the most frequently affected locations. The concentration of incidents in cities, ports, islands, and coastal areas indicates that the coastlines of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman have been among the primary operational theaters of these attacks.

The high concentration of naval, air, and air defense bases in southern Iran may be one factor behind the focus of the attacks in these areas. At the same time, the presence of civilian populations, commercial ports, fishing piers, industrial facilities, transportation routes, and public service infrastructure has meant that the consequences of the attacks have extended well beyond military installations.

The attacks have not been confined to southern Iran. Incidents have also been documented in the provinces of Tehran, Isfahan, Semnan, Lorestan, Ilam, and several other provinces.

Casualties and Human Impact

According to data documented and verified by HRANA, at least 48 people have been reported killed in the course of the attacks. Of these, 20 were civilians and 28 were military personnel.

In addition, at least 68 people have been reported injured, including 46 civilians and 22 military personnel.

Among the documented cases, the injury of a one-year-old child in Bandar Abbas stands out as one of the most alarming humanitarian consequences reported. The child lost one hand after being struck by shrapnel, and the child’s condition has been reported as critical.

In several other cases, deaths or injuries have been confirmed, but insufficient information was available regarding the exact number of victims, their identities, or whether they were civilians or military personnel. These cases have not been included in HRANA’s final statistics pending further verification.

Meanwhile, the head of the Ministry of Health’s Public Relations and Information Center announced that, as of 6:30 a.m. on July 17 (Europe time), more than 400 people had been injured as a result of the attacks, while 38 people had lost their lives.

According to these official figures, the injured included 22 women and 9 individuals under the age of 18, while the fatalities included three women and one person under the age of 18. The official also stated that 37 of the injured remained hospitalized.

The Ministry of Health did not specify whether these figures refer solely to civilians or also include military casualties. It is also unclear whether the reported numbers represent all casualties or only those who were transported to medical facilities.

Accordingly, the official figures and HRANA’s findings should be regarded as two separate datasets, likely based on different methodologies and scopes, and should not be combined without additional corroborating information.

Major Targets and Damaged Infrastructure

The documented targets during this reporting period can be classified into four main categories:

1. Military and Defense Facilities

A significant portion of the documented incidents involved military bases and defense installations. Reported targets included Army naval and air force bases, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters and command centers, air defense systems, military garrisons, barracks, troop deployment sites, and coastal control centers.

Notable documented examples include:

• The First Naval District of the Army;

• Shahid Abdolkarimi Base;

• Bandar Abbas Air Base;

• The Konarak Naval Military Zone;

• An IRGC headquarters in Saravan;

• A number of IRGC command centers and facilities;

• Naein Military Base;

• Military and air defense facilities in the provinces of Bushehr, Hormozgan, Tehran, Isfahan, and Sistan and Baluchestan.

Independent and comprehensive information is not yet available regarding the extent of the damage, the operational status of these facilities following the attacks, or the number of personnel present at the time.

2. Ports, Piers, and the Maritime Economy

One of the most prominent patterns documented during this period is the damage inflicted on infrastructure associated with maritime activities and the coastal economy.

Reportedly affected infrastructure includes:

• Sirik Commercial Pier;

• Fishing piers in Sirik and Bandar Abbas;

• Bonood Pier in Asaluyeh;

• Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar;

• Shahid Kalantari Port in Chabahar;

• Sirik Commercial Port;

• A Maritime Traffic Control Center;

• Fishing boats and traditional fishing vessels operating along the southern coastline.

Based on the information collected, at least 40 fishing vessels were burned, severely damaged, or sunk.

The damage to piers and fishing vessels extends far beyond the destruction of property. It may disrupt the livelihoods of fishermen, port workers, truck drivers, local merchants, vessel repair workers, and families whose incomes depend on the maritime economy for an extended period.

A comprehensive assessment of the number of people who have lost their jobs or sources of income, the financial cost of the damage, and the duration of disruptions to port and pier operations is not yet available.

3. Transportation and Communications

A number of transportation and communications infrastructure sites were also damaged during the attacks. Documented cases include:

• Iranshahr Airport;

• Semnan Airport;

• The Aq-Tappeh Khan Railway Bridge on the Tehran–Mashhad railway line;

• The Bandar Abbas railway junction;

• Several bridges in Khamir County;

• Telecommunications towers in eastern Hormozgan Province;

• Several additional telecommunications towers in other parts of the country.

Damage to bridges, railways, and airports can disrupt the movement of civilians, the transport of patients, emergency response efforts, the delivery of food and medicine, and broader supply chains.

Even where a transportation route or facility also serves a military function, civilian populations and the distribution networks for essential goods may depend on the same infrastructure. The destruction or closure of these routes can restrict public access to food, medicine, healthcare services, hygiene supplies, and other basic necessities.

In the city of Veysian, in Lorestan Province, one of the attacks disrupted landline telephone, mobile phone, and internet services in the Veysian District and Mamulan County. In Bandar Abbas, damage to a telecommunications tower was also accompanied by a power outage in the Tappeh Allah Akbar area.

Disruptions to communications can affect more than daily life. They may also limit people’s ability to contact emergency services, receive security warnings, check on the safety of family members, and document conditions in affected areas.

4. Water, Food, and Industrial Facilities

Some infrastructure related to essential needs and economic activity was also among the documented sites damaged during the attacks, including:

• Hendijan Water Pumping Station;

• Hoveyzeh Wheat Storage Silo;

• Souza Fish Meal Factory on Qeshm Island;

• A bottled water factory in Dehloran.

Damage to water facilities may disrupt local residents’ access to drinking water and municipal water services. Damage to wheat storage silos may also affect the storage and distribution of food supplies, particularly if transportation routes and supply chains are disrupted at the same time.

Factories and processing facilities are also major sources of employment for local workers. The suspension of their operations may result in reduced production, temporary or prolonged unemployment, and loss of household income.

At present, there is insufficient information regarding the extent of the damage, the duration of operational disruptions, the number of affected workers, or the potential environmental consequences.

Impact of the Attacks on Civilians’ Daily Lives

The humanitarian consequences of the attacks extend beyond the number of people killed and injured. Damage to or the disruption of critical infrastructure can affect a broad range of people’s everyday needs.

Damage to roads, bridges, and railway lines may slow or halt the transportation of food, medicine, fuel, medical supplies, and other essential goods. The destruction of piers and fishing vessels may threaten the livelihoods and food security of coastal communities. Disruptions to telecommunications may make it more difficult to contact emergency services and access information. Damage to water facilities and food storage infrastructure may also have more direct consequences for public health and well-being.

Damage to homes, vehicles, vessels, businesses, and other private property may also impose significant financial burdens on families through the loss of assets and the reduction or loss of income.

These consequences may persist even after the attacks have ended, particularly in areas where rebuilding infrastructure, replacing equipment, and restoring economic activity will require substantial time and resources.

The Need to Distinguish Military Claims from Humanitarian Consequences

The United States has stated that some of the targeted sites served dual-use functions, were being used for military purposes, or played a role in Iran’s military logistics network. Iranian officials have likewise presented differing accounts and claims regarding the nature of the targets and the consequences of the attacks.

In this report, HRANA is not in a position to confirm or reject the operational or military claims made by either party. Nor does the report reach conclusions regarding the legality or illegality of any specific attack.

Nevertheless, regardless of the parties’ competing claims, it is essential to examine the actual impact of the attacks on civilian life. A road, bridge, airport, port, or telecommunications network may, irrespective of any alleged military use, also be indispensable for the movement of civilians, the distribution of food and medicine, access to healthcare facilities, and the continuation of economic activity.

For this reason, documenting damage to infrastructure should be accompanied by an assessment of its consequences for local populations, public services, and access to essential needs.

Conclusion

The data documented by HRANA between July 8 and July 17 indicates that the latest wave of U.S. attacks on Iran has affected a broad geographic area, with its primary concentration in the country’s south, particularly along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Bushehr, Sirik, Chabahar, Choghadak, and Konarak were among the locations with the highest number of reported incidents. In these areas, in addition to military bases and facilities, damage was documented to piers, fishing vessels, port infrastructure, maritime traffic control facilities, and communications, transportation, and public service infrastructure.

According to HRANA’s current data, at least 48 people have been reported killed and 68 injured. Among them, 20 civilians have been reported killed and 46 civilians injured. The Ministry of Health has also reported more than 400 injuries and 38 fatalities, although insufficient detail has been released to allow a direct comparison between the official figures and HRANA’s data.

The available findings indicate that the consequences of the attacks have extended beyond direct casualties and damage to military facilities, affecting transportation, communications, water and food supply, the maritime economy, local industries, and the livelihoods of civilians.

Given the continuation of the attacks, restricted access to affected areas, and the lack of complete information regarding some incidents, the figures and findings presented in this report should be regarded as minimum documented counts as of July 17. A more comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian, economic, and infrastructural consequences will require continued verification, greater access to local information, and independent assessment of the condition of public services and affected communities.

The current wave of attacks forms part of the broader conflict that began on February 28, 2026, with the start of U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory attacks. Following mediation by Pakistan, Iran and the United States reached a temporary memorandum of understanding on June 17, providing for a cessation of military operations and the start of a 60-day process aimed at continuing negotiations and reaching a final agreement. However, the arrangement remained in effect for less than a month. Over the past ten days, with both sides accusing the other of violating the agreement, military attacks and tensions have resumed on a sustained basis.

This report focuses on the incidents and humanitarian consequences of this latest phase of the conflict following the temporary agreement. HRANA has previously published a comprehensive report examining the course of the war since February 28, the scope of the attacks, and their humanitarian and infrastructural consequences. Readers seeking a fuller background on the conflict may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report on the war.

Who is Responsible for the Sharp Rise in Political and Security-Related Executions Following the January 2026 Protests in Iran?

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Executions, News, Publications
Behrouz Zamani Nezhad, Bita Hemmati, Ehsan Hosseinipour Hessarlou, Erfan Amiri, Kourosh Zamani Nezhad, Maryam Hodavand, Matin Mohammadi, Mohammadreza Majidi-Asl

HRANA – Since March 2026, Iran has witnessed a sharp escalation in executions on political and security-related charges, as 40 people were executed between March 18 and June 3.

In response to this surge, Spreading Justice examined the officials and institutions responsible for facilitating these executions. While such executions continue beyond the reporting period, this report focuses on the two months between March 18 and May 18, 2026, during which at least 32 individuals were executed following grossly unfair trials. The youngest among them, Amirhossein Hatami, was only 18 years old. Although limited in its temporal scope, the findings reflect a broader and ongoing pattern, with executions on political and security-related charges continuing at an alarming pace.

A significant number of those executed were accused of involvement in the January 2026 protests, known as the Dey Protests, which began on December 28, 2025, and rapidly spread across the country amid widespread public anger over economic collapse, corruption, and state repression. Demonstrations continued for weeks despite a violent regime crackdown involving mass arrests and the widespread use of lethal force, resulting in the deaths of at least 7,007 individuals in conduct likely amounting to crimes against humanity. The same period also saw the highest recorded number of forced confessions in recent years, surpassing 350 documented cases.

Others executed during this period were accused of involvement in the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests or alleged activity connected to the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025.

Comparatively, according to HRA documentation, between March 18 and May 18, 2025, a total of 198 individuals were executed in Iran, compared to 65 executions during the same period in 2026. However, only 8 individuals were executed on political and security-related charges in 2025, underscoring the sharp escalation in the use of executions as a tool of political repression in 2026.

Spreading Justice has identified the judicial authorities responsible for issuing these arbitrary death sentences. These individuals have long-standing records of involvement in violations of the right to life and the systematic denial of fair trial guarantees Among them, Judge Iman Afshari has played a particularly central role. During this same period, Afshari sentenced at least eight individuals to death on political and security-related charges, including:

• Ehsan Hosseinipour Hessarlou ( Sentence upheld)
• Matin Mohammadi ( Sentence upheld)
• Erfan Amiri ( Sentence upheld)
• Maryam Hodavand ( Sentence upheld)
• Mohammadreza Majidi-Asl ( Sentence overturned)
• Bita Hemmati ( Sentence overturned)
• Behrouz Zamaninejad
• Kourosh Zamaninejad

Afshari is also implicated in at least six additional cases outlined below that resulted in arbitrary executions.

The following list includes 14 individuals who were executed between March 18 and May 18, 2026, in connection with their participation in the January 2026 Dey Protests.

VictimIndividuals Involved in Violations of the Right to Life
Mehdi Ghasemi

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 19, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the United States; inciting people to war and murder

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Saleh Mohammadi
Age: 19
Date of Execution: March 19, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the United States; inciting people to war and murder		Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Saeed Davoudi

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 19, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the United States; inciting people to war and murder		Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Amirhossein Hatami

Age: 18
Date of Execution: April 2, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups

Abolghasem Salavati
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Mohammad-Amin Biglari

Age: 19
Date of Execution: April 5, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups

Abolghasem Salavati
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Shahin Vahedparast

Age: 30
Date of Execution: April 5, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups

Abolghasem Salavati
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Ali Fahim

Age: 23
Date of Execution: April 6, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups

Abolghasem Salavati
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Amirali Mirjafari

Age: 24
Date of Execution: April 21, 2026
Charge: Operational action for the Israeli regime and hostile governments; collaboration with Mossad-linked networks; arson and destruction of public property

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Erfan Kiani

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: April 25, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh through use of a bladed weapon to intimidate the public and participate in destruction of public property

Revolutionary Court of Isfahan
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Sasan Azadvar Junaqani

Age: 21
Date of Execution: April 30, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God)

Seyed-Mahmoud Kazem Zadeh
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Mehdi Rasouli

Age: 25
Date of Execution: May 3, 2026
Charge: Operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups

Gholamreza Akbari Moghadam
Ghasem Mazinani
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Ebrahim Dolatabadi
Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 3, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh and leading the protests		Gholamreza Akbari Moghadam
Ghasem Mazinani
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Mohammadreza Miri

Age: 21
Date of Execution: May 3, 2026
Charge: Operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups

Gholamreza Akbari Moghadam
Ghasem Mazinani
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Mohammad Abbasi

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 13, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God)

Abolghasem Salavati
Seyyed Kazem Sadati Firuzabad
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad

 

During this period, 18 individuals were also executed on political and security-related charges. However, these charges were not connected to the January protests. Instead, these individuals were executed for their alleged involvement in the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests and alleged activity during the 12-day war with Israel.

VictimIndividuals Involved in Violations of the Right to Life
Kourosh Keyvani

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 18, 2026
Charge: Espionage for Israel

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Akbar Daneshvar-Kar
Age: 59
Date of Execution: March 30, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups		Iman Afshari
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Seyed Mohammad Taghavi-Sangdehi

Age: 60
Date of Execution: March 30, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups

Iman Afshari
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Babak Alipour

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 31, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups

Iman Afshari
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Pouya Ghobadi

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: March 31, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups

Iman Afshari
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Abolhassan Montazer

Age: 68
Date of Execution: April 4, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups

Iman Afshari
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Vahid Baniamerian

Age: 34
Date of Execution: April 4, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups

Iman Afshari
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Mohammad Masoum Shahi

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: April 20, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh, cooperation with a hostile state, assembly and collusion against national security, and membership in a group with intent to disrupt national security

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Hamed Validi

Age: 45
Date of Execution: April 20, 2026
Charge: Moharebeh, cooperation with a hostile state, assembly and collusion against national security, and membership in a group with intent to disrupt national security

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Mehdi Farid

Age: 55
Date of Execution: April 22, 2026
Charge: Efsad-e fel-arz (corruption on earth) through cooperation with Israel

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Soltanali Shirzadi Fakhr

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: April 23, 2026
Charge: Cooperation with Israel and moharebeh

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Amer Ramesh

Age: 22
Date of Execution: April 26, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) and membership in an armed opposition group

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Mehrab Abdollahzadeh

Age: 28
Date of Execution: May 2, 2026
Charge: Corruption on Earth

Ghorban Shahini
Seyyed Kazem Sadati Firuzabad
Ghasem Mazinani
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Yaghoub Karimpour

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 2, 2026
Charge: Distributing information and images of military sites. Manufacturing sounds bombs, and field cooperation with Mossad Officers

Sajjad Doosti
Ghasem Mazinani
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Naser Bekrzadeh

Age: 26
Date of Execution: May 2, 2026
Charge: Espionage for Israel

Ghorban Shahini
Seyyed Kazem Sadati Firuzabad
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Erfan Shakourzadeh

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 11, 2026
Charge: Spying for CIA and The Mossad

Abolghasem Salavati
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Abdoljalil Shahbakhsh

Age: 24
Date of Execution: May 12, 2026
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through armed attacks on law enforcement facilities and membership in the insurgent group Ansar al-Furqan

Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad
Ehsan Afrashteh

Age: Not specified
Date of Execution: May 13, 2026
Charge: Spying for Israel

Abolghasem Salavati
Seyyed Kazem Sadati Firuzabad
Ghasem Mazinani
Sheykh Abbasali Alizade Baygi
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i
Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri
Mohammad Movahediazad

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A Report on the Poor Quality of Virtual Education and Deprivation of Access to Learning

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Children, News, Publications, Students
HRANA, right to education, Rubika, Virtual Education

HRANA – While virtual education was initially intended as a temporary solution to allow students to continue their studies during the wartime crisis, many families and teachers now say that rather than serving as a sustainable substitute for in-person schooling, it has led to a severe decline in the quality of education.

The following report, prepared by HRANA based on interviews with students’ families, teachers, school administrators, and education experts, examines the deepening crisis of remote education in Iran. The report explores how widespread internet disruptions, inadequate educational infrastructure, limited access to digital equipment, mounting economic pressure on families, and the absence of coherent planning for an uncertain future have severely undermined access to effective education across the country.

Many of the individuals interviewed by HRANA say that education in recent months has effectively been left adrift amid internet outages, unstable educational platforms, and contradictory decisions by officials. According to them, this situation has not only reduced the quality of learning but has also raised serious concerns about students’ educational future.

After schools were closed due to wartime conditions, education initially continued through an application called Shad. However, widespread disruptions in the platform forced many schools to move classes to another application called Rubika, a platform which, according to families and teachers, also suffers from numerous problems. Many students say that online classes either fail to open altogether or experience constant interruptions in audio and video during sessions. Some educational files fail to upload, and in certain cases, even sending a simple video or audio file can take hours.

It is around 10 a.m., and a science class at a middle school has just begun, but the teacher’s voice keeps cutting in and out. Several students repeatedly write in the class group chat: “We can’t hear anything,” “The image isn’t loading,” “The file won’t open.” A few minutes later, the class becomes inaccessible, and attempts to reconnect begin again. One parent says this happens almost every day.

She says:

“Some days, the children spend more time clicking the refresh button than actually studying, just hoping the class will reconnect. In the end, the class is left unfinished because either the teacher gets exhausted or the internet cuts out.”

The mother of an elementary school student says her child has effectively lost concentration and connection with schoolwork:

“Most of the class time, the children are saying things like ‘Ma’am, the sound cut out’ or ‘The image isn’t loading.’ Sometimes the class doesn’t open at all. In the end, half the lesson remains unfinished.”

She says many families have been forced to increase spending on internet access and mobile phones so their children can attend classes, yet despite this, the quality of education remains poor.

In some areas, the problem is not limited to software disruptions; restricted or weak internet access has also caused some students to effectively fall behind in the educational process. A high school teacher says some of her students can only join classes using their parents’ mobile phones, and if the parents are at work, those students are effectively deprived of attending class that day.

She says:

“We send files, but many students either don’t have suitable internet access or can’t open the files at all. Some only mark their attendance and then leave the class completely because the phone doesn’t belong to them.”

According to her, virtual education in recent weeks has become more like attendance registration than real learning:

“Sometimes at the end of class I ask the students if they understood anything. They stay silent. Some of them don’t even know what the teacher taught because half the class was disconnected.”

In some households, several students are forced to share a single mobile phone in order to attend classes. Some parents also say that due to economic hardship, they cannot afford suitable phones or reliable internet access, placing additional pressure on students.

The father of one student in southern Tehran says:

“We have three school-age children, but only one relatively functional phone at home. When their classes are held at the same time, one or two of them are effectively deprived of attending lessons.”

In some areas, power outages have further compounded the problems of online education. Families say there have been many instances where students were disconnected from online classes or exams due to electricity cuts and internet shutdowns.

An eleventh-grade student says:

“Sometimes it takes half an hour just to enter the class. And when we finally connect, the teacher says there’s no time and rushes through the lesson. In the end, we don’t understand anything.”

At the same time, amid the ongoing disruptions, some schools attempted to hold limited in-person classes to compensate for students’ academic decline. However, according to families, these decisions were also accompanied by confusion and contradictory restrictions.

Several families say that during meetings, schools asked parents to provide written consent for remedial classes to be held outside the formal school environment, since the Ministry of Education had not authorized in-person classes inside schools.

One parent of an elementary school student says that during one of these meetings, it was suggested that classes be held at the local mosque or that families collectively rent a location for lessons.

She says:

“They asked us to let the children attend classes twice a week for two hours each time so they wouldn’t fall too far behind in their studies, but many families opposed the idea.”

According to her, families’ concerns are not limited to education alone; wartime conditions and insecurity have also made many unwilling to send their children to locations outside school premises.

“Some families said they would not allow their children to attend classes in mosques or unspecified places. Everyone is afraid of the situation. Private homes are also completely unsuitable for holding classes for such a large number of students.”

Following these disagreements, some schools, with the agreement of a number of parents, decided to hold limited classes at centers run by the Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults. However, these classes were also suspended after only a few sessions.

One teacher at a girls’ school in Tehran says that schools were later informed that no in-person classes should be held anywhere:

“We were told that under no circumstances were we allowed to hold in-person classes, neither inside the school nor anywhere else. They emphasized that education must remain entirely virtual.”

Some teachers say that even school principals often do not know exactly which directives are supposed to be implemented. Circulars change constantly, and decisions are sometimes completely reversed within just a few days.

One administrator at a private school says:

“One day they tell us to hold limited in-person classes, and two days later they call and tell us to cancel them immediately. Neither the families nor the schools know what they’re supposed to do.”

At the same time, some teachers report educational pressure and unofficial directives aimed at ensuring all students pass to the next grade, a development that has further deepened concerns about declining educational standards.

One high school teacher, who asked not to be named, says schools have recently been instructed that students at all grade levels must be promoted, even if their academic performance is weak.

She says:

“Some teachers were told that if a student fails, the teacher themselves would have to hold remedial summer classes until the student passes. In practice, it means no one is supposed to fail.”

According to her, under such conditions, assessing students’ actual learning has become nearly impossible:

“When a student hasn’t had proper classes, real exams, or full access to education, how can anyone know what level they’re really at? But in the end, we’re still expected to pass everyone.”

Some families say their children have lost motivation to study in recent months. The mother of a ninth-grade student says her son spends hours in front of a mobile phone but ultimately learns very little from class:

“At the end of the night, when I ask him what he learned today, he says, ‘Nothing, the internet kept disconnecting and the teacher couldn’t teach.’”

Another parent says:

“Children used to have school, recess, friends, and teachers. Now their entire school has turned into a mobile phone screen that constantly freezes.”

Educational experts have warned for years about the consequences of unstable education, but families say their concern today is not merely declining grades, but the deterioration of real learning quality. According to them, many students are advancing to higher grades without properly learning foundational concepts.

One elementary school teacher says some of her students are now struggling even with reading and writing, yet will likely still be promoted to the next grade:

“A child who still hasn’t fully learned this year’s lessons is going to move up to the next grade. This problem isn’t just about this year, its effects may only become visible years later.”

Some psychologists and education activists have also warned about the psychological consequences of the current situation. They say the combination of insecurity, prolonged isolation, unstable education, and economic pressure could have long-term effects on students’ concentration, motivation, and mental health.

One educational counselor in Tehran says:

“We’re not only facing academic decline. Some students have developed feelings of exhaustion, hopelessness, and constant anxiety. For some children, school no longer has the meaning it once did.”

While officials describe the continuation of virtual education as a solution for overcoming the crisis, many families and teachers say what is actually taking place is more a form of minimum crisis management than real education. Students whose classes are disrupted by internet outages, interrupted audio and video, unopened files, and contradictory educational decisions are now expected to advance to higher grades without proper evaluation.

For many families, the concern is not simply falling behind in a few subjects. They say the real issue is a generation of students who, during one of the most important periods of their education, have lost access to regular and effective learning, a generation that now experiences school mainly through a mobile phone screen; a screen on which classes sometimes fail to load, the teacher’s voice cuts out, and in the end, the only thing left from a school day is a recorded attendance mark.

At night, in many homes, students still try to download files sent by teachers or watch videos that fail to load. Some parents sit beside their children in hopes that an online class might finally proceed without interruption, while others simply hope the school year ends as soon as possible.

Overall, at a time when the country’s formal education system remains caught between closures, virtual learning, and bans on in-person classes, many students are experiencing not education itself, but a state of educational uncertainty, an uncertainty whose real consequences may only become clear years from now.

Between Missiles and Repression; HRA Releases New Report on US/Israeli Operations in Iran

Posted on by Hrana
News, Publications
Between Missiles and Repression, Israel attacks, US-Iran War

HRANA – Today, Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) released a new report examining the US and Israeli military campaign in Iran between 28 February and 8 April 2026. The report documents 6,324 unique incidents comprising 12,798 distinct attacks, based on 177 verified sources, including open-source reporting and HRA’s in-country network.

It is important to note that the report is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of the conflict. Rather, its findings are limited to incidents documented and verified within HRA’s dataset.

Methodology

HRA relies on two primary and parallel workflows to document the scale of destruction and associated civilian harm.

First, HRA systematically collects open-source information, which is cross-checked against credible external reporting and corroborated through its established in-country network.

Second, HRA receives direct reports from its network, which are independently verified through additional contacts or cross-referenced with open-source material. In all cases, inclusion requires corroboration from at least two independent sources, with consistency in key details such as time, location, and nature of the incident.

HRA also separately preserves official narratives and state-reported figures, which are not incorporated into verified casualty counts. Incident data and casualty figures presented in the report represent documented minimums only and do not capture the full scope of harm.

Key Findings

◾️HRA documented 6,324 unique incidents comprising 12,798 distinct attacks between 28 February and 8 April 2026. Within HRA’s dataset, 77 percent of incidents involved civilian harm or damage to civilian objects.
◾️Of HRA’s verified incidents, Tehran province accounted for 44.85 percent of documented incidents, followed by Isfahan (10.5 percent), Khuzestan (6.74 percent), and Alborz (6.23 percent), indicating that some of Iran’s most densely populated provinces experienced a disproportionate concentration of attacks and civilian harm.
◾️HRA documented at least 3,636 fatalities, including 1,701 civilians, 1,221 military personnel, and 714 individuals whose identity or status could not be confirmed. These figures should be understood as minimums.
◾️HRA verified the deaths of 307 children and injuries to 2,213 children as a result of the attacks. HRA documented attacks affecting schools, sports facilities, parks, and residential areas where children were present, a majority on the first day of the conflict.

The report identifies several patterns that raise serious concerns under international humanitarian law, including:

◽️apparent failures in target verification,
◽️use of artificial intelligence with minimal human oversight,
◽️inadequate and inaccessible warnings,
◽️the use of large explosive weapons in populated areas,
◽️Repeated or “double-tap” strikes,
◽️attacks targeting widespread civilian infrastructure

Public rhetoric by senior US and Israeli officials also raised concerns, particularly statements suggesting disregard for rules of engagement and direct threats directed at civilian infrastructure.

◾️HRA independently verified damage to the following (noncomprehensive):

▫️108 educational facilities
▫️50 healthcare facilities
▫️122 cultural and religious sites
▫️381 industrial and commercial facilities
▫️173 electricity generation and distribution sites
▫️191 judicial and law enforcement facilities

HRA additionally documented conduct by Iranian authorities that increased civilian exposure to harm.

At the same time, Iranians experienced a convergence of harm through increased domestic repression. At least 4,023 individuals were arrested on accusations including espionage, threats to national security, or sharing information related to the conflict. Conditions inside detention facilities sharply deteriorated, while authorities expanded checkpoints, intensified movement restrictions, and imposed a prolonged internet blackout that reduced national connectivity to approximately 1 percent of normal levels. Between 28 February and 13 May, HRA documented 50 executions, including 32 carried out on political and security-related grounds. HRA also documented increased child presence at Basij checkpoints following an IRGC recruitment campaign targeting children as young as 12 years old.

Annexes

The report annexes include:

◾️a detailed list and analysis of weapons and munitions documented during the conflict, prepared with the support of HRA’s internal weapons specialist,
◾️casualty documentation,
◾️detainee documentation,
◾️and a compilation of HRA’s ground reporting, open-source verification, and exclusive visual documentation

Click on the image to download the full report

Alarming Figures: 70% of Post-War Executions Involve Political Prisoners; A Comprehensive List of the Sentenced and Executed

Posted on by . .
Executions, Freedom of Expression, News, Publications
Abolfazl Salehi Siavashani, Ali Pishevarzadeh, Behrouz Zamani-Nejad, Bita Hemmati, Ehsan Hosseinipour Hesarlou, Erfan Amiri, Farzad Moradi, Kourosh Zamani-Nejad, Majid Nasiri, Maryam Hodavand, Masih Abbaskhani Davanlou, Matin Mohammadi, Mohammad Abbasi, Mohammadreza Majidi-Asl, Shahab Dadkhah
List of 16 protesters sentenced to death
1. Mohammad Abbasi
Arrest Date: January 22, 2026
Place of Arrest: Malard
Sentencing Judge: Abolghasem Salavati
Branch: Branch 15, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God)
Latest Case Status: Sentence upheld by the Supreme Court
Place of Detention: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
2. Abolfazl Salehi Siavashani
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Karaj
Sentencing Judge: Abolghasem Salavati
Branch: Branch 15, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh through participation in operational activities against national security, including collaboration with Israel, the United States, and opposition groups; entering classified military sites with intent to remove weapons and ammunition; destruction and arson of state property with intent to oppose the Islamic Republic
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
3. Bita Hemmati
Arrest Date: January 9, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Operational action in favor of a hostile state (United States) and hostile groups
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Unknown
4. Mohammadreza Majidi-Asl
Arrest Date: January 9, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Operational action in favor of a hostile state (United States) and hostile groups
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Unknown
5. Kourosh Zamani-Nejad
Arrest Date: January 9, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Operational action in favor of a hostile state (United States) and hostile groups
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Unknown
6. Behrouz Zamani-Nejad
Arrest Date: January 9, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Operational action in favor of a hostile state (United States) and hostile groups
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Unknown
7. Ehsan Hosseinipour Hesarlou
Arrest Date: January 2026 (Dey 1404)
Place of Arrest: Pakdasht County
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Acting against internal security through effective participation in unrest; assembly and collusion against national security; involvement in the murder of two individuals; intentional arson of Seyed al-Shohada Mosque; destruction of public property
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Khorin Prison
8. Matin Mohammadi
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Pakdasht County
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Acting against internal security through effective participation in unrest; assembly and collusion against national security; involvement in the murder of two individuals; intentional arson of Seyed al-Shohada Mosque; destruction of public property
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Khorin Prison
9. Erfan Amiri
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Pakdasht County
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Acting against internal security through effective participation in unrest; assembly and collusion against national security; involvement in the murder of two individuals; intentional arson of Seyed al-Shohada Mosque; destruction of public property
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Khorin Prison
10. Maryam Hodavand
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Pakdasht County
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Acting against internal security through effective participation in unrest; assembly and collusion against national security; involvement in the قتل of two individuals; intentional arson of Seyed al-Shohada Mosque; destruction of public property
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Evin Prison
Additional Info: 45 years old, mother of two
11. Masih Abbaskhani Davanlou
Arrest Date: February 2026
Place of Arrest: Sari
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Judicial authorities of Sari (unspecified)
Charge: Identified as a leader of protests and responsible for the death of a Basij member named Amin Ziaei on January 7, 2026 (18 Dey 1404)
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued at the initial trial (not final)
Place of Detention: Sari Prison
Additional Info: Forced confessions broadcast on state media
12. Farzad Moradi
Arrest Date: January 27, 2026
Place of Arrest: Izeh
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Ahvaz Revolutionary Court (unspecified)
Charge: Moharebeh and forming an armed group
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued
Place of Detention: Sheiban Prison, Ahvaz
13. Shahab Dadkhah
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Shiraz
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Shiraz Revolutionary Court (unspecified)
Charge: Setting fire to a base and killing a special forces officer
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued (not final)
Place of Detention: Adel-Abad Prison, Shiraz
14. Majid Nasiri
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Shiraz
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Shiraz Revolutionary Court (unspecified)
Charge: Setting fire to a base and killing a special forces officer
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued (not final)
Place of Detention: Adel-Abad Prison, Shiraz
15. Unidentified (co-defendant of Majid Nasiri and Shahab Dadkhah)
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Shiraz
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Shiraz Revolutionary Court (unspecified)
Charge: Setting fire to a base and killing a special forces officer
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued (not final)
Place of Detention: Adel-Abad Prison, Shiraz
16. Ali Pishevarzadeh
Arrest Date: January 8, 2026
Place of Arrest: Rasht
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Rasht Revolutionary Court (unspecified)
Charge: Moharebeh through setting fire to a mosque and the Rasht bazaar
Latest Case Status: Death sentence issued (not final)
Place of Detention: Lakan Prison, Rasht

 

 

List of 10 protesters who were executed
1. Mehdi Ghasemi
Arrest Date: mid-January 2026
Place of Arrest: Qom
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Judicial authorities of Qom
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through use of a cold weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the hostile government of the United States and affiliated actors; inciting people to war and murder with intent to disrupt national security
Execution Date: March 19, 2026
Place of Execution: Public execution in Qom
2. Saleh Mohammadi
Arrest Date: January 15, 2026
Place of Arrest: Qom
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Judicial authorities of Qom
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through use of a cold weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the hostile government of the United States and affiliated actors; inciting people to war and murder with intent to disrupt national security
Execution Date: March 19, 2026
Place of Execution: Public execution in Qom
3. Saeed Davoudi
Arrest Date: Late January 2026 (late Dey 1404)
Place of Arrest: Qom
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Judicial authorities of Qom
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through use of a cold weapon in unlawful gatherings leading to the killing of law enforcement agents; operational action for Israel and the hostile government of the United States and affiliated actors; inciting people to war and murder with intent to disrupt national security
Execution Date: March 19, 2026
Place of Execution: Public execution in Qom
4. Amirhossein Hatami
Arrest Date: January 8, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Abolghasem Salavati
Branch: Branch 15, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups; entering classified military sites to remove weapons; destruction and arson of state property
Execution Date: April 2, 2026
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
5. Mohammadamin Biglari
Arrest Date: January 8, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Abolghasem Salavati
Branch: Branch 15, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups; entering classified military sites to remove weapons; destruction and arson of state property
Execution Date: April 5, 2026
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
6. Shahin Vahedparast
Arrest Date: January 8, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Abolghasem Salavati
Branch: Branch 15, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups; entering classified military sites to remove weapons; destruction and arson of state property
Execution Date: April 5, 2026 (16 Farvardin 1405)
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
7. Ali Fahim
Arrest Date: January 8, 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Abolghasem Salavati
Branch: Branch 15, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through participation in operational activities against national security for Israel, the United States, and opposition groups; entering classified military sites to remove weapons; destruction and arson of state property
Execution Date: April 6, 2026
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
8. Amirali Mirjafari
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Judicial authorities of Tehran
Charge: Operational action for the Israeli regime and hostile governments; collaboration with Mossad-linked networks; arson of Qolhak Grand Mosque; destruction of public property; blocking roads; attacking security forces with cold weapons
Execution Date: April 21, 2026
Place of Execution: Unknown
9. Erfan Kiani
Arrest Date: January 2026
Place of Arrest: Isfahan
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Isfahan Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God) through use of a cold weapon (machete) to intimidate the public, create insecurity, incite violence, and participate in destruction of public property
Execution Date: April 25, 2026
Place of Execution: Unknown
10. Sasan Azadvar Junaqani
Arrest Date: January 1, 2026
Place of Arrest: Isfahan
Sentencing Judge: Seyed Mahmoud Kazemzadeh, with special advisor Mohammad Vakili
Branch: Branch 1 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court
Charge: Moharebeh (enmity against God)
Execution Date: April 30, 2026
Place of execution: Dastgerd Prison, Isfahan

 

Since January 2026, at least 12 other political or security prisoners have also been executed.
1. Kourosh Keyvani (Iranian-Swedish dual national)
Arrest Date: June 16, 2025 (26 Khordad 1404)
Place of Arrest: Savojbolagh
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Espionage for Israel
Execution Date: March 18, 2026 (27 Esfand 1404)
Place of Execution: Unknown
2. Akbar Daneshvarkar
Arrest Date: 2023
Place of Arrest: Unknown
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
Execution Date: March 30, 2026 (10 Farvardin 1405)
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
3. Seyed Mohammad Taghavi-Sangdehi
Arrest Date: March 2024 (Esfand 1402)
Place of Arrest: Chaldoran County
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
Execution Date: March 30, 2026 (10 Farvardin 1405)
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
4. Babak Alipour
Arrest Date: January 2024 (Dey 1402)
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
Execution Date: March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin 1405)
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
5. Pouya Ghabadi
Arrest Date: March 2024 (Esfand 1402)
Place of Arrest: Chaldoran County
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
Execution Date: March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin 1405)
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
6. Abolhassan Montazer
Arrest Date: January 2024 (Dey 1402)
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
Execution Date: April 4, 2026 (15 Farvardin 1405)
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
7. Vahid Baniamerian
Arrest Date: January 2024 (Dey 1402)
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Iman Afshari
Branch: Branch 26, Tehran Revolutionary Court
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) through membership in opposition groups (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran)
Execution Date: April 4, 2026 (15 Farvardin 1405)
Place of Execution: Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj
8. Mohammad Masoum Shahi
Date of arrest: May 13, 2025
Place of arrest: Tehran
Sentencing judge: Unknown
Branch: Karaj Revolutionary Court
Charges: Moharebeh (enmity against God), cooperation with a hostile state, assembly and collusion against national security, and membership in a group with the intent to disrupt national security
Date of execution: April 20, 2026
Place of execution: Unknown
9. Hamed Validi
Date of arrest: May 13, 2025
Place of arrest: Tehran
Sentencing judge: Unknown
Branch: Karaj Revolutionary Court
Charges: Moharebeh (enmity against God), cooperation with a hostile state, assembly and collusion against national security, and membership in a group with the intent to disrupt national security
Date of execution: April 20, 2026
Place of execution: Unknown
10. Mehdi Farid
Arrest Date: Winter 2023 (1401)
Place of Arrest: Tehran
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Unknown
Charge: Efsad-e fel-arz (corruption on earth) through cooperation with Israel
Execution Date: April 22, 2026 (2 Ordibehesht 1405)
Place of Execution: Unknown
11. Soltanali Shirzadi Fakhr
Arrest Date: Unknown
Place of Arrest: Unknown
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Unknown
Charge: Cooperation with Israel and Moharebeh (enmity against God)
Execution Date: April 23, 2026 (3 Ordibehesht 1405)
Place of Execution: Unknown
12. Amer Ramesh
Arrest Date: October 2024 (Mehr 1403)
Place of Arrest: Chabahar
Sentencing Judge: Unknown
Branch: Zahedan Revolutionary Court
Charge: Baghi (armed rebellion) and membership in an armed opposition group (Jaish al-Adl)
Execution Date: April 26, 2026 (6 Ordibehesht 1405)
Place of Execution: Zahedan Prison

 

Regarding the nationwide protests of January 2026

It should be noted that protests and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and within two days spread beyond markets and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests became one of the largest protest movements of recent years. Following the crackdown by security and law enforcement forces, thousands were killed or injured, and tens of thousands were arrested or summoned by security agencies. For more information, readers may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report titled “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days following the outbreak of Iran’s nationwide protests.