Past Seven Months: At Least 118 Baha’i Citizens Subjected to Security and Judicial Measures in Iran

HRANA – From March 21 to October 22, 2026, at least 118 Baha’i citizens, including 60 women and 58 men, have faced security and judicial measures across 11 provinces in Iran. These measures included arrests, prison sentences, property confiscations, home searches, business closures, and restrictions on access to education.

According to HRANA, data collected during the first seven months of the Iranian year 1405 (March 21–October 22, 2026) indicates that these measures extended beyond arrests and prison sentences. In several cases, they also affected the family lives, property, economic activities, and access to education of Baha’i citizens. The highest numbers of identified individuals affected were recorded in Fars and Yazd provinces, with 25 each, followed by Mazandaran Province, with 23.

Security and Judicial Measures at a Glance

In this report, figures referring to individuals are based on identified Baha’i citizens, unless explicitly described as “cases” or “incidents.” A single individual may appear in more than one category, such as arrest, home search, or sentencing.

Type of Measure or IndicatorNumber
Identified Baha’i citizens118 individuals
Women60
Men58
Initial arrests32 individuals
Court hearings27 individuals
Issuance or upholding of prison sentences30 individuals
Transfer to prison to serve prison sentences17 individuals
Identified citizens summoned or interrogated10 individuals
Home searches38 cases
Issuance of property confiscation orders4 individuals
Denial of access to education2 individuals

 

Geographic Distribution of Security and Judicial Measures Across 11 Provinces

The security and judicial measures documented during this period affected Baha’i citizens across 11 provinces in Iran. Fars and Yazd recorded the highest numbers of identified individuals, with 25 each, followed by Mazandaran with 23.

ProvinceNumber of Identified Citizens
Fars25
Yazd25
Mazandaran23
Isfahan14
Tehran10
Alborz8
Kerman7
Razavi Khorasan3
South Khorasan1
Semnan1
Sistan and Baluchestan1
Total118

 

In Fars Province, particularly in Shiraz, arrests and home searches were among the most frequently documented measures. In Yazd, in addition to arrests and prison sentences, reports documented group summonses, home searches, confiscation of mobile phones, and security interventions in private gatherings.

In Mazandaran, the collective case involving 12 residents of Qaem Shahr was among the most prominent judicial cases during this period. In Isfahan, documented measures included home searches, seizure of vehicles and property, confiscation of work equipment, and closure of businesses. In Tehran, prison sentences, deprivation of social rights, fines, and property confiscations were recorded.

Arrest of 32 Baha’i Citizens from March to October

During this period, HRANA documented the initial arrests of 32 Baha’i citizens. This figure does not include individuals who were arrested and transferred to prison solely to serve previously imposed prison sentences.

The first documented arrest during this period took place on March 21, involving Yasmin Rahmardeh in Yazd. Two days later, Shayan Abadi was arrested in Kerman.

In Fars Province, arrests of Baha’i citizens began in the first days of the Iranian calendar year. Behzad Yazdani and Romina Khazali, Mahsa Sotoudeh, Behzad Basiri and Mandana Sotoudeh, Anqa Siavashi, and Sara Sepehri were among those arrested in Shiraz during this month. In Mazandaran, Minou Andakhs, a Baha’i resident of Sari, was also arrested during this period.

In April and May, Vafa Kashefi was arrested in Mashhad, Riyaz Behrad in Karaj, and Romina Goli in Sari. Farideh Abdi Yazdi
was also arrested in Shahin Shahr, Isfahan Province. In May and June, the arrests of Parsa Najafi and Noyan Hejazi were documented.

In Yazd, Flora Samadani and Ahmad Naeimi were arrested in May and June, respectively. Both were subsequently released on bail, but legal proceedings against them continued, and prison sentences were issued against both in October.

On June 23, Sima Sabto, Nahid Falahati, and Saeed Hassani were arrested in Shiraz. Sima Sabto and Nahid Falahati were later released on bail.

On August 22, five Baha’i citizens, Soraya Manouchehrzadeh, Shima Sanaei, and Fakhereh Zahedi, along with Negar Badiei and Maral Roshani,were arrested in Sari. They were transferred to the Ministry of Intelligence’s detention facility in Sari, known as the “Keshouei” Detention Center.

During Soraya Manouchehrzadeh’s arrest, security agents also searched her family home and confiscated several books and electronic devices belonging to her and her family members. According to a source close to the family of one of the detainees, the warrants presented by the agents authorized only home searches and did not include arrest warrants.

Arrests of Baha’i citizens continued in Isfahan and Shiraz during August and September. On August 25, Sarir Mowghen was arrested in Isfahan and transferred to Dowlatabad Prison. At the same time, security agents searched his family home and confiscated personal belongings, electronic devices, cash, gold, and a piano.

During the same month, Elham Khalas was also arrested in Isfahan and later released after undergoing interrogation and being formally informed of the charges against her. On September 14, Sarina Zaeri, Barbad Sepehri, and Arshia Jaberi were arrested in Shiraz and transferred to the “Soroush” Detention Center.

In September and October, Zhila Sadeghi, also known as Mowghen, was arrested in Shiraz.

Court Hearings Held for Baha’i Citizens

According to data collected from March 21 to October 22, 2026, court hearings were documented in cases involving 27 Baha’i citizens. This figure represents the number of individuals whose cases involved court hearings, rather than the number of separate hearings, as several individuals may have been tried in a joint case, or a single individual’s case may have been heard over multiple sessions.

One of the most significant cases during this period involved court hearings for 12 Baha’i residents of Qaem Shahr at the Revolutionary Court of Sari. The hearings took place on August 1, 2, and 3, 2026, at Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court of Sari. The court subsequently issued its verdict on August 20. The defendants in this case were Raquel Ataeian, Keyumars Akbari, Sohrab Loghaei, Zahra Golabian, Banafsheh Asadian, Fouad Loghaei, Anahita Koushkbaghi, Nasim Samimi, Hossein Fanaeian, Emilia Fanaeian, Melody Samimi, and Soheil Haghdoost.

In Kerman, the court hearing for Borna Naeimi was held via video conference at the city’s Revolutionary Court on May 25, 2026. According to the published report, the charges against him included “acting against national security and forming a group with the intent to overthrow the government.” The collected data also documented a court hearing for Peyvand Naeimi on September 18.

In Tehran, a hearing in the case of Afshin Heyratian was held on July 18 at Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Iman Afshari. The final hearing in the case of Artin Ghazanfari, a Baha’i citizen held at the Greater Tehran Penitentiary, was also held on September 29 at Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court.

In Mashhad, a court hearing for Vafa Kashefi was held on August 29 at the city’s Revolutionary Court. He was subsequently sentenced to six years in prison, part of which was suspended.

Other documented cases involved court hearings for Mitra Bandi Amirabadi, Shideh Tavakoli, Amin Imanian, Arman Misaghian, Moein Mohammadi-Dehaj, Romina Goli, Noyan Hejazi, Barsa Maleki, Hengameh Sharifinia, and Payam Faridian. However, the exact dates of these hearings were not specified in the information available to HRANA and have therefore not been included in this report.

Prison Sentences Issued and Upheld: More Than 155 Years for 30 Baha’i Citizens

According to the collected data, prison sentences totaling 155 years, 10 months, and 9 days were issued or upheld against 30 Baha’i citizens. This figure represents the combined length of the documented sentences and does not necessarily reflect the actual prison time to be served. In some cases, portions of the sentences were suspended, while in others, legal provisions governing multiple offenses mean that only the most severe sentence is enforceable.

In addition to prison sentences, 20 Baha’i citizens received a combined total of 149 years and one day of deprivation of social rights. Other documented penalties included fines, property confiscation, travel bans, prohibitions on participation in groups and organizations, permanent dismissal from government and public service positions, and deprivation of certain social and civil rights.

Prison Sentences and Property Confiscations in Tehran

In Tehran, Afshin Heyratian was sentenced to a total of 31 years in prison by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Iman Afshari. The charges against him included “forming an illegal group,” “propaganda activities contrary to Islamic law,” “assembly and collusion,” and “unlawful acquisition of property.”

The court also imposed a fine of 330 million tomans. Additionally, on the charge of “unlawful acquisition of property,” the court sentenced him to two years in prison and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of $1,000 he had received, totaling $2,000. Under the provisions governing multiple offenses, if the verdict is upheld on appeal, only the most severe sentence of 12 years in prison will be enforceable.

In another case, Hengameh Sharifinia, Fouad Abdolghaffari, and Fahim Agahi were sentenced to 15, 10, and 10 years in prison, respectively, by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati.

In addition to imprisonment, the sentences imposed on these three Baha’i citizens included bans on participation in groups and organizations, travel bans, and property confiscation. Hengameh Sharifinia was also sentenced to 10 years of deprivation of social rights.

In the case of Shideh Tavakoli, another Baha’i resident of Tehran, Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati, imposed a total prison sentence of 11 years, a permanent ban on employment in government and public service positions, and a fine of 330 million tomans.

The court also ordered the confiscation of two properties belonging to her in Tehran, valued at 18.7 billion tomans, along with some of her personal belongings, including electronic devices, books, and religious jewelry.

In another case, Arman Misaghian was sentenced to two years of discretionary imprisonment by Branch 29 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Seyed Ali Mazloum. He was also prohibited from driving, signing commercial documents, and participating in groups for two years.

Collective Sentencing of Baha’i Citizens in Mazandaran

In Mazandaran, one of the most significant judicial cases during this period involved prison sentences issued against 12 Baha’i residents of Qaem Shahr.

According to the verdict issued on August 20, 2026, Raquel Ataeian, Keyumars Akbari, Sohrab Loghaei, Zahra Golabian, Banafsheh Asadian, Fouad Loghaei, Anahita Koushkbaghi, Nasim Samimi, Hossein Fanaeian, Emilia Fanaeian, Melody Samimi, and Soheil Haghdoost were convicted by Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court of Sari, presided over by Judge Ammar Ramezani.

Raquel Ataeian was sentenced to four years of discretionary imprisonment and 10 years of deprivation of social rights. Each of the other 11 Baha’i citizens received two years and 15 days of discretionary imprisonment and six years of deprivation of social rights. The combined sentences in this case amount to 26 years and 165 days of discretionary imprisonment and 76 years of deprivation of social rights.

In the same province, Faranak Zabihi was sentenced to two years and one day in prison and two years of deprivation of social rights by Judge Reza Majazi of the Revolutionary Court of Qaem Shahr.

Additionally, the Mazandaran Court of Appeals upheld the one-year prison sentence of Amin Imanian. Romina Goli, who had previously been arrested in April–May and whose home had been searched, was sentenced by Branch 2 of the Revolutionary Court of Sari to five years, seven months, and 16 days of discretionary imprisonment and 10 years of deprivation of social rights.

In Juybar, Noyan Hejazi was sentenced to seven months and 16 days in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime.” He was also sentenced to a fine of 122,501,000 tomans and 10 years and one day of deprivation of social rights for what authorities described as promoting the Baha’i faith.

Judicial Sentences in Yazd, Isfahan, and Mashhad

In Yazd, Moein Mohammadi-Dehaj was sentenced by Branch 1 of the city’s Revolutionary Court to a total of 16 years, seven months, and 18 days of discretionary imprisonment, 10 years of deprivation of social rights, and permanent dismissal from government and public service positions. Under Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code, only the most severe sentence of 12 years, six months, and one day in prison will be enforceable.

Mitra Bandi Amirabadi was also sentenced to five years in prison and 10 years of deprivation of social rights.

In the same province, Flora Samadani and Ahmad Naeimi, a Baha’i couple residing in Yazd, were sentenced to three years and one day and six months and one day in prison, respectively, under a verdict issued on October 12, 2026. Both had previously been arrested in April–May and May–June, respectively, and were later released on bail.

In Isfahan, the appeals court upheld the sentence against Roya Ostovar in full. She had been sentenced to a total of six years in prison, 15 years of deprivation of social rights, and a fine on charges related to educational and promotional activities and publishing content online. The amount of the fine was not specified in the available information.

In Mashhad, Barsa Maleki was sentenced to two years and one day in prison, a fine of 80 million tomans, and six years of deprivation of social rights.

Vafa Kashefi was also sentenced to six years in prison in the same city, with two years and six months of the sentence suspended.

In another case, the prison sentence of Payam Faridian, who had previously been sentenced to three years in prison, was reduced to two years on appeal.

Enforcement of Prison Sentences: 17 Baha’i Citizens Transferred to Prison

Alongside initial arrests and the issuance of new sentences, authorities continued to enforce previously imposed prison sentences against Baha’i citizens during the first seven months of the Iranian year 1405. According to the collected data, 17 Baha’i citizens were transferred to prison during this period to serve their sentences.

In April–May, Didar Ahmadi, Boshra Mostafavi, and Elena Naeimi were sent to prison in Rafsanjan to serve their sentences. Anisa Fanaeian and Nahaleh Shahidi Yazdi were also among the Baha’i citizens transferred to prison during this period to serve their sentences.

On August 22, Arsalan Yazdani was arrested in Karaj to serve a prison sentence imposed on him in December 2023. During his arrest, authorities also confiscated several of his personal belongings and electronic devices.

On August 23, Iman Rashidi was arrested after appearing at Branch 1 of the Sentence Enforcement Office of the Yazd Revolutionary Court and was transferred to prison to serve his sentence. He had previously been sentenced to three years, six months, and one day of discretionary imprisonment, 15 years of deprivation of social rights, and a fine of 371 million rials.

On August 31, Babak Zeinali, Sahba Taef, Fouad Taefi, Shervin Shabrokh, and Ali Bagherkashi were arrested in Karaj and transferred to prison to serve their one-year sentences.

In Tehran, Iraj Shakour and Pedram Abhar were sent to prison on September 6 to serve their respective five-year sentences. Four days later, Saba Safidi was transferred to Qarchak Prison in Varamin to serve her sentence.

Parisa Eslami in Karaj and Forough Ram in Zahedan were also transferred to prison to serve their sentences. Forough Ram was arrested and sent to prison on October 13 to begin serving her sentence.

Home Searches: Security Measures Extend to Family Members and Residences

Home searches were among the most frequently documented measures against Baha’i citizens during the first seven months of the Iranian year 1405. Individual records documented home searches involving 35 identified Baha’i citizens. In addition, reports indicated that authorities searched the homes of three unidentified Baha’i citizens in Yazd, as well as family properties and business premises.

In Fars Province, during April–May, authorities searched the homes of Faramarz Naddafian and Parivash Naddafian, a Baha’i couple residing in Shiraz, as well as the home of Afsaneh Jazzabi, also known as Rasekhi. In August–September, the homes of Rahmatollah Sabet and Parvaneh Sabet in Shiraz were also searched.

On September 20, security agents searched homes associated with Pejman Zare, Nazanin Nikoo-Seresht, Mina Zare, Mahshid Zare, Mahboubeh Zare, and Parham Zare in Shiraz. According to the documented information, these measures affected members of the same family, and in some cases, their separate residences were searched. Five of these individuals, Nazanin Nikouseresht, Mina Zare, Mahshid Zare, Mahboubeh Zare, and Parham Zare, were also summoned on September 23.

In Mazandaran Province, Romina Goli’s home was searched during her arrest in April–May. Authorities also searched Soraya Manouchehrzadeh’s home during her arrest in August. In August–September, the home of Parisa Naseri in Qaem Shahr was also searched.

In Isfahan, on August 24, authorities searched the homes of Amin Tabyanifard, Bahariyeh Askarinasab, and Nima Tabyanifard. These measures extended beyond residential properties to include the family’s business premises and work equipment.

On the same day, authorities searched the home of Keyhan Atefi and Fereshteh Atefi, a Baha’i couple residing in Isfahan, and seized some of their belongings and their vehicle.

On September 6, authorities also searched the homes of Sohrab Mazloumi, Rahman Aghababaei, and Keyvan Dehghani in Isfahan. Other documented cases in the province included searches of the home of Saeed Azimi and the home of Sarir Mowghen, which was searched during his arrest.

Group Security Measures and Pressure on Baha’i Citizens in Yazd

In Yazd Province, security measures during this period extended beyond arrests and prison sentences to include group summonses, home searches, confiscation of mobile phones, and interventions in private gatherings.

According to a detailed report on security and judicial measures against Baha’i citizens in Yazd, approximately 50 Baha’i citizens gathered on March 28, 2026, to share ash, a traditional Iranian soup, in keeping with a local custom. Agents from the Ministry of Intelligence arrived at the location and dispersed the gathering.

During the intervention, agents confiscated the attendees’ mobile phones. According to the published report, no judicial warrant was presented when the phones were seized. Despite follow-up efforts by those present, the devices had not been returned to their owners as of the publication of the detailed report.

In June–July, approximately 12 participants in the gathering were summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence for interrogation. Six additional instances of summonses and interrogations of Baha’i citizens were documented in August–September. Together, these amounted to approximately 18 instances of summonses. However, because the identities of all those involved were not known, the figure cannot be considered equivalent to 18 distinct individuals.

In addition to these group incidents, Sama Ghadirzadeh was summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence in Yazd on September 1, while Nava Bahamin was interrogated by the same agency the following day.

On August 26, authorities searched the home of Shahrokh Nasiri in Yazd and confiscated the mobile phones of six guests present at the residence.

Also in August–September, authorities searched the homes of three other Baha’i citizens in the city and confiscated several mobile phones and books found at the residences.

On September 13, security agents searched the home of Majid Ghane and confiscated several mobile phones, a laptop, books, pictures, and items associated with the Baha’i faith. The agents also took his personal vehicle.

According to the documented information, 10 young Baha’i individuals were present at the residence during the search and were engaged in a book-reading session. Agents confiscated their mobile phones as well.

One of those present was Parnia Basiri, who was taken to her own residence. After searching her home, agents confiscated mobile phones belonging to family members and items associated with the Baha’i faith.

The collected data also documented a search of Mehran Basiri’s home on the same date.

Searches of the Amiri Family’s Homes and Farm

On September 27, 2026, marking the tenth anniversary of the murder of Farhang Amiri, a Baha’i citizen from Yazd, approximately 40 security agents arrived at his family home. The agents searched the residence and confiscated mobile phones, personal belongings, and items associated with the Baha’i faith.

That same night, security agents also searched the homes of Payam Amiri, Neda Amiri, and Maziar Motahed, members of the same family, and confiscated some of their personal belongings. Four days later, on October 1, security agents also searched the family’s farm.

Continued Home Searches and Confiscation of Mobile Phones in October

On October 15, security agents searched the home of Soheil Rouhanifard in Yazd and confiscated some of his personal belongings.

On October 19, authorities searched the homes of Milad Aghdasi, Samieh Gholinejad, and Bahar Bahifar in Yazd. During the search of Bahar Bahifar’s home, agents damaged household items, causing damage to her personal property.

On the same day, security agents confronted a group of Baha’i citizens at a café in Yazd and confiscated their mobile phones. Among the identified individuals whose phones were seized were Shahin Daneshnia, Romina Pourmoradi, Kamyab Raei, Hania Talei, Altaf Ghane, and Parnia Basiri.

Parnia Basiri had previously been subjected to a home search and the confiscation of her family’s belongings in September.

Property Seizures, Confiscation of Work Equipment, and Economic Pressure

During home searches and other security operations, authorities confiscated or seized various items, including mobile phones, laptops, computers, books, documents, cash, foreign currency, gold and jewelry, vehicles, musical instruments, and work equipment. In some cases, the confiscations extended beyond the belongings of the homeowners, with agents also seizing mobile phones belonging to guests or other family members.

One notable example involved the Tabiani family in Isfahan. On August 24, security agents searched the homes of family members, emptied their musical instrument-making workshop, and confiscated tools, equipment, and machinery used to manufacture musical instruments.

Authorities also searched a musical instrument retail store belonging to the family and sealed the premises under a judicial order. In this case, the measures extended beyond personal belongings to include the tools and facilities used by family members for their professional activities.

In the case of Keyhan Atefi and Fereshteh Atefi, reports also documented the seizure of their vehicle and several personal belongings, in addition to the search of their home.

In Yazd Province, numerous cases of mobile phone confiscation were documented during home searches, private gatherings, and an incident at a café. These included the seizure of Majid Ghane’s vehicle and the confiscation of electronic equipment and personal belongings belonging to other Baha’i citizens.

This report distinguishes between the seizure of property during security operations and property confiscation ordered by a court. Accordingly, the seizure of mobile phones, vehicles, work equipment, or other belongings during searches does not, in itself, indicate that a judicial confiscation order has been issued.

By contrast, in the cases of Shideh Tavakoli and Hengameh Sharifinia, Fouad Abdolghaffari, and Fahim Agahi, property confiscation was documented as part of the judicial sentences imposed against them.

Denial of Access to Education

Kamyar Malaki, a Baha’i student in Birjand, was expelled from university and denied access to education on the grounds of “failure to meet general eligibility requirements.”

Similarly, Kamand Rouhi, a Baha’i student in Yazd, was barred from continuing her education and attending university. According to available information, university officials cited her adherence to the Baha’i faith as the reason for this restriction.

Methodology and Notes on the Statistics

In calculating the total number of individuals, each identified Baha’i citizen was counted only once among the 118 individuals, even if multiple security or judicial measures were documented against them. Group incidents in which the identities of all participants were not known were examined separately and were not added to the total number of individuals because of the possibility of overlap with individual reports.

The figure of 32 arrests includes only initial arrests during the reporting period. Individuals who were arrested and transferred to prison solely to serve previously imposed sentences were not included in this figure. Similarly, the figure of 27 individuals in the court hearings section represents the number of people whose cases involved documented court hearings, rather than 27 separate hearings.

The combined total of 155 years, 10 months, and 9 days of imprisonment represents the sentences issued or upheld during this period and does not necessarily correspond to the actual prison time to be served. In some cases, portions of sentences were suspended, while in others, legal provisions governing multiple offenses mean that only the most severe sentence is enforceable.

Regarding home searches, individual records documented searches involving 35 identified Baha’i citizens and three unidentified individuals in Yazd. Because a single operation may have involved several family members or multiple locations, each documented “case of a home search” should not necessarily be considered a separate operation. This report also distinguishes between the seizure or confiscation of belongings during security operations and property confiscation ordered by a court.

Human Rights Context

Despite its long-standing presence in Iran, the Baha’i community is not recognized as a religious minority under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. Laws and practices in Iran have subjected Baha’i citizens to restrictions on freedom of religion and belief, access to higher education, employment, and economic activities. Human rights organizations have repeatedly raised concerns about the arbitrary arrest and prosecution of Baha’i citizens, the confiscation of their property, and violations of their fundamental rights.

The measures documented in this report raise concerns regarding several fundamental rights, including freedom of religion and belief, the right to a fair trial, respect for private and family life, property rights, the right to work, and equal access to education. Prosecuting individuals for their religious activities, denying them educational opportunities because of their beliefs, and restricting their employment may constitute discrimination based on religion or belief.

According to HRA’s 2025 annual report, violations of Baha’i citizens’ rights accounted for 62.4% of all documented reports concerning religious minorities in Iran.

Peyvand and Borna Naeimi, Two Baha’i Citizens, Sentenced to a Combined Prison Term of More Than 20 Years

HRANA – Peyvand and Borna Naeimi, two Baha’i citizens held in Kerman Prison, have been sentenced to prison by Branch 5 of the Kerman Revolutionary Court. According to the verdicts, Peyvand Naeimi was sentenced to 12 years, six months, and one day in prison, while Borna Naeimi received an eight-year prison sentence.

According to HRANA, citing IranWire, Peyvand Naeimi and Borna Naeimi have been sentenced to a combined prison term of more than 20 years.

The report states that Branch 5 of the Kerman Revolutionary Court issued the sentences against the two Baha’i citizens, who are cousins. Under the verdicts, Peyvand Naeimi was sentenced to 12 years, six months, and one day in prison, while Borna Naeimi was sentenced to eight years.

No precise information is currently available regarding the charges that led to the prison sentences against these two citizens.

Previously, a source familiar with the situation of the two Baha’i citizens told HRANA that Peyvand Naeimi’s court hearing had been scheduled for September 18, 2026. Borna Naeimi was also tried via video conference by the Kerman Revolutionary Court on May 25, 2026, on charges including “acting against national security and forming a group with the intention of overthrowing the government.”

Peyvand Naeimi was arrested by security forces at his workplace on January 8, 2026, and transferred to Kerman Prison. He was held in solitary confinement at the prison and subjected to mock execution and torture in an effort to extract forced confessions. In response, the Baha’i International Community issued a statement expressing concern over his fate.

On February 1, 2026, a video showing Peyvand Naeimi’s forced confessions was broadcast on state television. The circumstances under which the video was recorded remain unclear. On February 26, he was also transferred to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) detention facility before being returned to Kerman Prison.

Borna Naeimi, a 29-year-old Baha’i citizen, father of a three-year-old child, and resident of Kerman, is Peyvand Naeimi’s cousin. He was arrested by IRGC intelligence agents on March 1, 2026.

Similarly, the Baha’i International Community expressed concern over his fate in a statement, reporting that Borna Naeimi had been subjected to mock executions on two occasions in an effort to extract forced confessions.

Over the past decade, the Baha’i community in Iran has been subjected to security and judicial crackdowns more than any other religious minority. A review of HRA’s annual reports shows that, over the past year, an average of 62.41% of reports concerning religious minorities documented violations of the rights of Baha’i citizens.

Appeals Court Upholds Prison Sentence and Other Penalties Against Baha’i Citizen Noyan Hejazi

HRANA – The sentence of Noyan Hejazi, a Baha’i citizen residing in Juybar, to seven months and 16 days in prison, a fine, and deprivation of social rights has been upheld in full by Branch 9 of the Mazandaran Province Court of Appeals.

According to HRANA, the prison sentence and other penalties imposed on Noyan Hejazi have been upheld on appeal.

According to the appellate court ruling, Hejazi’s conviction for what authorities described as “promoting the Baha’i faith” was upheld, along with a fine of 122 million and 501 thousand tomans and deprivation of social rights for 10 years and one day. His sentence of seven months and 16 days of discretionary imprisonment on the charge of “propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran through cyberspace” was also upheld. The appellate ruling was issued on October 5, 2026, and declared final.

The ruling was signed by Shoja Zoghi and Ebrahim Arab Kheradmardi, judicial advisers to Branch 9 of the Mazandaran Province Court of Appeals.

On May 26, 2026, Noyan Hejazi had been sentenced to the aforementioned penalties by Branch 102 of the Criminal Court II of Juybar.

In late June of this year, Hejazi was arrested after visiting the Ministry of Intelligence office in Sari to retrieve his confiscated personal belongings. According to an earlier HRANA report, he was beaten during his arrest and subsequently transferred to a hospital due to his injuries, where he was hospitalized under the supervision of security forces. He was eventually released after some time.

On June 25, 2025, Hejazi was arrested at his home by security forces without a judicial warrant. He was later released on bail on August 3 of the same year.

His wife, Lava Samimi, was also arrested when she visited Kachouei Detention Center in Sari to inquire about her husband’s situation. She was released on bail some time later.

Over the past decade, the Iranian Bahá’í community has been disproportionately targeted by Iran’s security forces and judiciary,more than any other minority group. In the past three years, an average of 72 percent of the reports on religious rights violations collected by HRANA have documented the Iranian regime’s repression of the Bahá’í community.

Six Sunni Citizens Arrested by IRGC Intelligence Forces in Shavur

HRANA – Yesterday, six Sunni citizens were arrested by IRGC intelligence agents in Shavur, Karkheh County, without judicial warrants and transferred to an undisclosed location.

According to HRANA, six Sunni citizens were arrested in Shavur on Thursday, October 29, 2026. Five of the detainees have been identified as Hossein Navaseri, 20, Ali Doshi, 25, Ali Shoveyhi, Amin Shoveyhi, 20, and Javad Kanani, 27. The identity of the sixth detainee remains under investigation.

According to information received by HRANA, IRGC intelligence agents raided the homes of these citizens at approximately 1:30 a.m. without presenting judicial warrants. After searching the premises, the agents arrested them.

During the raids, the agents reportedly used violence, creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation among family members. Several relatives of the detainees were also physically assaulted and beaten.

At the time of this report, no information has been obtained regarding the reasons for their arrests, the charges brought against them, or their whereabouts.

Shavur is located in Karkheh County, Khuzestan Province, approximately 15 kilometers from the city of Shush.

Artin Ghazanfari, Baha’i Citizen, Sentenced to 26 Years in Prison

HRANA – Artin Ghazanfari, a Baha’i citizen and photojournalist currently held in Greater Tehran Prison, has been sentenced to a total of 26 years in prison by Judge Abolghasem Salavati. Ghazanfari’s physical condition has also been reported as poor.

Under a verdict issued by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati, and communicated to him on Monday, Artin Ghazanfari was sentenced to a total of 26 years in prison.

An informed source close to Ghazanfari’s family told HRANA: “Mr. Ghazanfari was sentenced to 20 years in prison on the charge of ‘media-related activities,’ five years for ‘assembly and collusion against national security,’ and one year for ‘propaganda against the regime.’ Although the punishment for the first charge was stated to be 10 years in prison, the judge imposed a 20-year sentence by invoking the Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage.”

According to information obtained by HRANA, Ghazanfari’s physical condition has been reported as poor due to several medical conditions, including heart failure, asthma, and high blood pressure. Despite prison medical staff emphasizing the necessity of transferring him to medical facilities outside the prison, he continues to be denied access to specialized medical treatment outside the prison due to opposition from the judge overseeing his case.

The latest court hearing concerning the charges against Artin Ghazanfari was held on Tuesday, September 29, 2026, at Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court. The first hearing in his case had previously been held on July 29, 2026, at Branch 14 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court.

Ghazanfari was arrested on January 19, 2026, at his private residence in Tehran. At the same time, security agents searched his home and workplace and confiscated several electronic devices, books, and items of professional and personal equipment.

Artin Ghazanfari, a Baha’i citizen and photojournalist, has previously served a prison sentence in connection with his activities

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Baha’is in Yazd Face Widespread Raids, Interrogations, and Prison Sentences

HRANA – From March to October 2026, dozens of Baha’i citizens in Yazd faced security and judicial actions, including home searches, confiscation of personal belongings, summonses for interrogation, and judicial prosecution. During this period, a gathering attended by approximately 50 people was dispersed, 18 summonses for interrogation were reported, and three citizens were sentenced to prison. Additionally, one citizen was transferred to prison to serve a sentence. During these operations, agents confiscated mobile phones and other personal belongings belonging to citizens, their guests, and family members, some of which have yet to be returned. This report examines the details of these incidents.

According to HRANA, between March 28 and October 15, 2026, security and judicial actions against Baha’i citizens in Yazd extended beyond those facing legal proceedings, affecting participants in private gatherings, guests, and family members. During this period, security agents searched numerous homes and confiscated mobile phones, electronic devices, books, photographs, and religious items associated with the Baha’i Faith. In one case, agents also seized a citizen’s private vehicle.

A review of the incidents indicates that Shahrivar (23 August–September 22) saw the highest number of security-related actions. During that month, six residential homes were searched, and six citizens were summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence for interrogation. In Mehr (23 September–October 15, 2026), four residential homes and a farm were also searched. One of these operations took place on the tenth anniversary of the murder of a Baha’i citizen and involved approximately 40 security agents.

 

Type of ActionRecorded Figures
Total Recorded IncidentsApproximately 34
Searches of Premises11
Dispersal of Private Gathering1 gathering, approximately 50 attendees
Summonses for Interrogation18
Prison Sentences Issued3 individuals
Enforcement of Prison Sentences1 individual
Total Prison Sentences Imposed20 years, 1 month, and 20 days

 

Of the 11 recorded searches, 10 involved residential homes, while one involved a farm belonging to a Baha’i family. The approximately 18 reported summonses included around 12 in Tir (22 June–22 July) and six in Shahrivar . These figures do not necessarily indicate that 18 different individuals were summoned. Similarly, the total of approximately 34 incidents represents the combined number of actions listed in the table, rather than the number of individuals affected or separate operations carried out by security agents.

Dispersal of a Private Gathering and Summonses of Participants

The first incident in this series of security actions was reported on March 28, 2026. On that day, approximately 50 Baha’i citizens in Yazd had gathered to share ash, a traditional Iranian soup, in keeping with a local custom. Agents from the Ministry of Intelligence arrived at the location, dispersed the gathering, and confiscated the attendees’ mobile phones.

According to information received, the agents did not present a judicial warrant when confiscating the phones. Although most attendees approached the relevant legal authorities to recover their belongings, the phones have yet to be returned to their owners.

In Tir, approximately 12 participants in the gathering were summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence for interrogation. No information is available regarding the official reasons for these summonses or any potential charges brought against them.

Searches of Baha’i Citizens’ Homes and Confiscation of Personal Belongings

In Shahrivar, security agents searched six residential homes belonging to Baha’i citizens in Yazd. During these operations, they confiscated not only the homeowners’ belongings but also the mobile phones of their guests.

On August 26, security agents searched the home of Shahrokh Nasiri. During the operation, they confiscated the mobile phones of six guests present at his home.

On September 2 and 3, six Baha’i citizens were summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence in Yazd for interrogation. No further information is available regarding the reasons for their summonses or the outcomes of their interrogations.

On September 12, security agents searched the homes of three Baha’i citizens. During these operations, mobile phones and books found in the homes were confiscated. The identities of these three citizens have not yet been established.

One day later, on September 13, the home of Majid Ghaneh was searched. Agents confiscated mobile phones, a laptop, books, photographs, and items associated with the Baha’i Faith. They also seized his personal vehicle.

Approximately eight guests were present at the home during the search, and their mobile phones were also confiscated. One of the guests, Parnia Basiri, who did not have a mobile phone with her, was taken by the agents to her own residence.

After entering her home, the agents searched the premises and confiscated all mobile phones belonging to her family members, along with items associated with the Baha’i Faith.

These incidents demonstrate that the security operations were not limited to the homeowners. At two private gatherings, the mobile phones of approximately 14 guests were confiscated, and in one instance, a guest’s home was also searched.

Searches of a Family’s Homes on the Anniversary of Their Father’s Murder

In Mehr, security operations continued with searches of four residential homes and a farm. Three of these homes belonged to members of the family of Farhang Amiri, a Baha’i citizen who was murdered in Yazd.

On September 27, 2026, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of Farhang Amiri’s murder, approximately 40 security agents arrived at his family’s home.

According to information received, the agents conducted a prolonged search of the residence and confiscated mobile phones, personal belongings, and items associated with the Baha’i Faith.

That same evening, the home of Payam Amiri, Farhang Amiri’s son, as well as the home of his daughter Neda Amiri and son-in-law Maziar Mottahed, were searched. Agents also confiscated a number of their personal belongings.

According to information received, the psychological distress caused by the agents’ presence and the search of the home led to a deterioration in Ms. Amiri’s health, requiring her to be taken to an emergency medical facility.

An informed source told HRANA that the agents had visited the family members’ homes under the assumption that they had organized a ceremony to commemorate the anniversary of Farhang Amiri’s murder.

Four days later, on October 1, security agents arrived at a farm belonging to the Amiri family. After searching the property, they confiscated mobile phones and several items found on the premises.

Farhang Amiri, a 63-year-old Baha’i citizen, was stabbed to death outside his home in Yazd on September 26, 2016. Following their arrest, the two suspects in the case stated that his religious beliefs had motivated the murder.

Ten years after the incident, members of the Amiri family faced searches of their homes and confiscation of their personal belongings on the anniversary of their father’s murder.

Subsequently, on October 15, security agents arrived at the home of Soheil Rouhanifard, another Baha’i citizen residing in Yazd. After searching his home, they confiscated a number of his personal belongings.

Prison Sentences Issued and Enforced Against Baha’i Citizens

In addition to home searches and the confiscation of personal belongings, three Baha’i citizens in Yazd have been sentenced to prison, while another citizen has been transferred to prison to serve a sentence.

Flora Samadani and Ahmad Naeimi, a Baha’i couple residing in Yazd, were sentenced by Branch 1 of the Yazd Revolutionary Court to a combined total of three years, six months, and two days in prison.

According to a verdict issued on October 12, Flora Samadani was sentenced to three years and one day in prison on charges of “deviant propaganda activities contrary to the sacred law of Islam through the promotion of the Baha’i Faith.” Her husband was also sentenced to six months and one day in prison for aiding and abetting the same offense.

Ms. Samadani had previously been arrested on May 3 and released on bail on June 20. Ahmad Naeimi was also arrested on June 13 and released on bail on July 4.

In a separate case, Moein Mohammadi-Dehj, a 39-year-old Baha’i citizen, was sentenced in August by Branch 1 of the Yazd Revolutionary Court to a total of 16 years, seven months, and 18 days of discretionary imprisonment. He was also sentenced to a 10-year deprivation of social rights and a permanent ban from employment in government and public services.

Under Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code, the most severe sentence of 12 years, six months, and one day in prison will be enforceable against him.

Additionally, Iman Rashidi, a Baha’i citizen residing in Yazd, was summoned to prison on August 23 to begin serving his sentence. After reporting to the judicial authorities, he was arrested and transferred to prison.

Mr. Rashidi had previously served a prison sentence and was released from Yazd Prison in February 2018 after completing his earlier sentence.

Confiscation of Personal Belongings and Failure to Return Seized Property

The confiscation of mobile phones and personal belongings has been a recurring practice in security operations targeting Baha’i citizens in Yazd.

During the gathering in Farvardin (21 Match-20 April, 2026), the mobile phones of approximately 50 people were confiscated. In Shahrivar, the mobile phones of approximately 14 guests at two separate homes were also seized. In other incidents, agents confiscated electronic devices, books, photographs, items associated with the Baha’i Faith, and a private vehicle.

According to information received, despite repeated visits and follow-up efforts by some citizens with the relevant legal authorities, a significant portion of the confiscated property has yet to be returned to its owners. Furthermore, no clear information is available regarding the legal grounds for retaining these belongings or when they might be returned.

The prolonged confiscation of mobile phones and electronic devices can disrupt family communications, professional activities, and citizens’ access to essential information and services, particularly in cases where the communication devices of all members of a household have been seized.

Over the past decade, the Baha’i community in Iran has been subjected to more security and judicial actions than any other religious minority. An examination of annual reports published by HRA’s Department of Statistics and Publications indicates that, during the past year, an average of 62.41% of reports concerning religious minorities involved violations of the civil rights of Baha’is.

Escalating Armed Violence in Southeastern Iran: At Least 63 Armed Incidents in Six Months

HRANA – At least 63 armed incidents were recorded across Iran’s southeastern provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan and Kerman between March 31 and October 10, 2026, amid a sharp escalation in armed violence in the region. According to local and unofficial reports, the incidents left at least 94 people dead and 33 injured, while official sources reported 87 fatalities and 10 injuries. The pace of violence accelerated significantly in recent weeks, with 18 incidents recorded in just the final 18 days of the reporting period, surpassing the total for any previous full month. The escalation has also been accompanied by a shift in the nature of confrontations, from targeted shootings and attacks on patrol vehicles to coordinated ambushes, roadside bombings, and the reported use of rocket-propelled grenades and heavier weaponry.

According to HRANA, the pattern of events over the past six months indicates that southeastern Iran is entering a more volatile phase of armed confrontation. This shift has unfolded in a security environment profoundly affected since late winter 1404 by direct warfare between Iran, on one side, and the United States and Israel, on the other. During the same period, government concerns increased over the possibility that armed groups might become more active in border regions. Yet while much of the Iranian government’s public and security attention was focused on developments in the west and northwest, a quieter but sustained pattern of increasing attacks, security operations and armed clashes took shape in the southeast.

Most of the armed incidents were recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, while two were also reported in Faryab County, Kerman Province. Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr, and Rask emerged as the main centers of armed confrontation. Meanwhile, signs of growing coordination among some Baloch armed groups have emerged, particularly with the formation of the People’s Fighters Front (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi). However, many of the incidents remain unclaimed, and available evidence does not establish responsibility for a significant number of attacks.

Data Overview

GroupKilled (official)Killed (unofficial)Injured (official)Injured (unofficial)
Government forces (FARAJA, IRGC, Basij, intelligence agencies, Army)3953929
Fatemiyoun affiliated forces19UnknownUnknown
Armed individuals4625UnknownUnknown
Civilians1714
Total87941033

Armed Clashes Intensify in September and Early October

A chronological review of the events clearly illustrates how armed clashes have increased over time. After four incidents in Khordad (21 May -21 June), the number rose to 10 in Mordad (23 July-22 August) and 11 in Shahrivar (23 August-22 September). Shahrivar was the most incident-heavy complete month of the period, but that record was broken in the first half of the following month: from 1 to 18 Mehr (23 September-10 October), 18 armed incidents were recorded. In other words, the pace of clashes in Mehr not only exceeded that of previous months, but reached an unprecedented level within less than a full month.

The escalation is evident not only in the growing number of incidents but also in the increasing intensity of armed confrontations. Seven armed attacks were reported in the six days between 13 and 18 Mehr alone (5 -10 October). During the same period, attacks on patrol units, police facilities and multi-vehicle convoys increased, and power or internet outages were reported after clashes in some locations. Taken together, these indicators suggest a gradual shift from isolated attacks toward confrontations that, in some cases, have become longer in duration, heavier in weaponry and broader in geographic reach.

Monthly trend in armed incidents, March 31 to October 10, 2026

From Targeted Killings to Ambushes and Semi-Heavy Weapons

The most frequently recorded type of incident during this period was attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys, with 17 cases documented. Fourteen targeted shootings of individuals were also recorded; in seven cases, the attacks occurred outside the victims’ homes, workplaces, or along their regular travel routes. Targeted shootings were more common in the earlier months, but in the final weeks, both the weapons used and the nature of the operations changed.

On 10 Mehr (October 2), in the Rudmahi area of Zahedan, a vehicle attributed to Fatemiyoun forces was struck by a booby trap and then came under gunfire. Five days later, reports on the attack against the Law Enforcement Command headquarters in Jalq described the use of mines, RPGs and semi-heavy weapons. On October 9 (17 Mehr), a roadside bomb exploded along the route of a police convoy in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan. In total, at least seven incidents involved equipment such as drones, artillery, RPGs, armored vehicles or explosives.

Government forces also used drones, artillery, armored vehicles and heavy weapons in several operations. In operations in Jahadabad, Gharibabad and Monzalab, locations of clashes and homes targeted during the operations were destroyed, blown up or set on fire. Such developments, particularly when operations take place in residential settings, increase the risk of harm to civilians and their property and heighten the need for precise documentation of operational methods and their consequences.

Most frequent operational patterns in armed incidents

More Visible Emergence of Armed Opposition Groups

One notable development in recent weeks has been the growing number of armed clashes attributed to the People’s Fighters Front. The organization, which operates as an alliance of several Baloch armed groups, was linked to 11 recorded incidents in total. These include attacks for which it claimed responsibility, participation in certain clashes, and confirmation that some individuals killed in government operations were its members. Ten of those 11 incidents occurred on or after 21 Shahrivar (12 September).

Even so, the available data do not support attributing the overall increase in violence to a single group. Of the 42 incidents initiated by armed actors, a specific claim of responsibility was recorded for only seven attacks: six by the People’s Fighters Front and one by Ansar al-Furqan. A large share of attacks therefore remains unclaimed or cannot be reliably attributed. This makes it difficult to assess the actual capabilities of the groups, their chains of command, or the degree of operational coordination among them.

Fatemiyoun: Disputed Accounts of Presence and Casualties

Accounts involving the Fatemiyoun, a force operating under the IRGC Quds Force and composed primarily of Afghan nationals, have been disputed. While local sources and Baloch armed groups have identified personnel targeted in several incidents, including in Rudmahi, Zahedan, as Fatemiyoun members, Iranian officials and state media have either omitted any reference to the group or provided different accounts of the affiliation of the forces involved.

According to local reporting, at least nine personnel attributed to the Fatemiyoun were killed during this period – one of the principal factors behind the gap between official and unofficial casualty figures for government and affiliated forces. Four deaths were reported in the 20 Shahrivar (11 September) attack on a patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun in Rudmahi, and five more in the 10 Mehr ( 2 October) attack in the same area. Because there is no independent confirmation and the organizational affiliation of these forces is disputed, these cases should be treated as documented but contested claims rather than conclusive facts about the nature of their deployment or mission.

Two Different Narratives of Fatalities

The divergence between official and local accounts is not limited to the number of casualties. In several cases, the central dispute concerns who the person killed actually was and what role the person played. In local reporting, of 94 deaths, 62 were described as government or affiliated forces, 25 as armed individuals and seven as civilians. Official accounts, by contrast, reported 40 government and affiliated personnel, 46 armed individuals and only one civilian killed.

These two sets of figures should not be added together; they are parallel narratives of the same period. The gap is especially pronounced in two areas: first, a difference of 22 in the number of government and affiliated personnel reported killed; and second, 21 people whom officials described as armed or as perpetrators, but whose identities or deaths were not confirmed by local sources or related groups. In addition, local sources described at least five people whom official accounts labeled ‘armed’ or ‘attackers’ as civilians.

A specific dispute over the identity or affiliation of victims was documented in eight incidents. In 11 other incidents, casualties were reported but the precise number of dead or injured was unclear. Any aggregate casualty figure should therefore be read as the minimum that can be extracted from the available reporting, not as a definitive count of every victim.

Comparison of official and local accounts of fatalities

Civilians Caught Between the Two Sides

Civilian deaths and injuries are among the most serious aspects of the recent developments. On 2 Mehr (24 September), as clashes continued in Jahadabad, Saravan, a nine-year-old child, Mohammadamin Dehghan, and his father were shot while traveling in a vehicle carrying water; the child died several days later. On 17 Mehr (9 October) in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan, a passing civilian, Abdollah Ghanbarzehi, was killed by gunfire from forces present at the scene, while state media published a different account of his role.

There are other cases in which families or local sources rejected the official claim that those killed were armed, including two people killed in Rask on 2 Ordibehesht (22 April) and two people in Kahnoak village in Taftan. These disputes underscore the importance of publishing verifiable information on the identity of victims, whether they were armed, the precise circumstances in which lethal force was used, and the results of post-incident investigations.

Two abductions of government personnel were also recorded during this period, resulting in three deaths. Delays in returning the bodies of some of those killed were also reported, including the return of bodies from the Berenjinan operation after 30 to 48 days. In the case of Abuzar Hamli, who was killed in the Bidedlad clash, local sources alleged that 10 billion tomans were demanded in exchange for the return of his body. These allegations require independent investigation and transparent responses from the responsible authorities.

Geography of Violence: Concentration in Underserved Areas

Of 61 incidents for which the location is known, 37 occurred in four counties: Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr and Rask. Zahedan ranked first with 11 incidents, while Saravan and Iranshahr recorded nine each and Rask eight. Both incidents recorded in Kerman Province occurred in Faryab County. This concentration indicates that most of the violence is occurring within a defined geographic belt and in areas that have for years faced deep challenges in development, employment, infrastructure and access to public services.

This economic and social context matters for understanding the region’s security developments. A 2025 International Crisis Group report, citing official Iranian data, placed Sistan and Baluchestan near the bottom of national development indicators and noted that 12 of the province’s 26 counties were among the country’s 20 poorest counties. The same report cited a provincial unemployment rate of 12.4 percent in 1402, compared with a national average of 8.1 percent. The United Nations Development Programme also emphasized in 2025 the severe pressure of water scarcity and prolonged drought on livelihoods and community resilience in parts of the province.

Economic deprivation by itself does not explain armed violence, and the coexistence of the two does not establish a definitive causal relationship. However, neglect of development gaps and an exclusively security-centered approach to the region can deepen mistrust, social vulnerability and cycles of violence. In an area already facing unemployment, infrastructure shortages and environmental pressures, expanding armed operations have consequences beyond direct casualties: restrictions on movement, communication disruptions, property damage, intensified military presence and greater risks to local communities.

Geographic concentration of armed incidents in southeastern Iran

Arrests and the Need for Accountability

At least 19 arrests directly linked to incidents in this period were specifically documented: 16 on the basis of official statements and three in local reporting. This total does not include Fars News Agency’s aggregate claim on 26 Farvardin (15 April) that 55 people had been arrested, because the locations, precise timing and details of those arrests were not disclosed and may overlap with other documented cases.

When accounts differ so sharply over casualty figures and even the identities of those killed, establishing accountability requires more than aggregate statistics. Essential steps include disclosing the names and legal status of detainees, providing information about their whereabouts and the charges against them, ensuring families have access to information, and conducting independent investigations into reported deaths and injuries. Clarifying the circumstances surrounding the use of lethal force, investigating reports of homes being destroyed, and examining allegations that the return of victims’ bodies was delayed or made conditional are also necessary to establish the facts and ensure accountability.

Southeastern Iran Requires Attention Beyond a Security-Only Approach

The clashes of the past six months show that developments in southeastern Iran can no longer be viewed as a series of isolated and disconnected incidents. The rising number of events, their concentration in several counties, the introduction of heavier weapons into some confrontations, the more visible presence of an armed alliance, and the widening gap between official and local accounts of casualties together point to an escalating trend.

This trend is unfolding in one of Iran’s most underserved regions – an area that has long faced development gaps, unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, a water crisis and a sense of deprivation. Turning such an environment into an arena of increasingly armed confrontation risks once again placing the heaviest burden on local civilians: through loss of life, damage to homes and livelihoods, arrests and security restrictions, and deepening mistrust between society and state institutions.

Reducing that risk requires more than an expanded security presence. Independent and transparent documentation, effective protection of civilians, investigations into suspicious deprivations of life, accountability for operations in residential areas, protection of detainees’ rights, and serious attention to the region’s structural deprivation are among the measures that could help prevent the cycle of violence from deepening. The pattern documented through 18 Mehr (10 October) indicates that without such an approach, the risk of continued and escalating tensions in southeastern Iran remains serious.

Detailed Table of Incidents

The table below lists 63 armed incidents recorded from March 31 to October 10, 2026 (11 Farvardin to 18 Mehr 1405), including date, location, type of attack or clash, casualties, victim/attacker attribution and reporting sources. The information was compiled from local reporting and official statements; cases involving conflicting accounts or lacking independent confirmation are presented with those qualifications.

On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to view the full table.
#DateLocationType of attack / clashCasualtiesVictim / attacker attributionSummaryPrimary source
Farvardin 1405
1March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)Mirjaveh, outside the IRGC Intelligence buildingTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Lt. Col. Mohammadreza Rahdar); 1 civilian wounded, according to policeVictim: military officer. Assailants: unidentified armed individuals; no claim of responsibility.Rahdar was shot outside the IRGC Intelligence building in Mirjaveh and killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
2March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)Kalat, Sarbaz CountyShooting at police vehicle2 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Reza Roozgerd; 2nd Lt. Mohammadreza Aram)Victims: Kalat Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA). Assailant: unknown. Provincial police later claimed a suspect had been arrested in Rask.A Samand vehicle belonging to the Kalat police command came under fire; Roozgerd died at the scene and Aram later died in hospital.Documents Network / Haalvsh
3April 3, 2026 (14 Farvardin)Delgan County, one of the county villagesShooting at patrol2 killed (Hojatoleslam Hossein Abdollahi; Capt. Nasser Abdollahi)Victims: head of the Basij of Delgan seminary students and commander of the Mirem Basij sector. Assailant: unknown.The two Basij officials were shot while on patrol; the Delgan governor confirmed their deaths.Documents Network / Haalvsh
4April 9, 2026 (20 Farvardin)Iranshahr, urban areaTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mehran Shiheki)Victim: local Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Shiheki was shot in Iranshahr and killed; provincial police confirmed the incident.Documents Network / Haalvsh
5April 11, 2026 (22 Farvardin)Jalq, Golshan County, outside victim’s homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Madad Sepahi)Victim: local IRGC member. Assailants: two unidentified motorcyclists.Sepahi was shot outside his home while returning from a work shift; sources said he had been dissatisfied with his service in the IRGC.Haalvsh / Documents Network
6April 15, 2026 (26 Farvardin; date of announcement)Sistan and Baluchestan Province; locations not disclosedClaimed security operations (aggregate figure)13 killed and 55 arrested (official claim)According to Fars News Agency: members of “terrorist teams” linked to Israel and the United States.Fars reported that, since the start of the war, 13 people had been killed in operations and 55 arrested; no independent details were released.Documents Network
7April 16, 2026 (27 Farvardin)Saravan, urban areaShooting at patrol vehicle3 killed (2nd Lt. Mehdi Nasiri-Sedeh; Sgt. 1st Class Ahmad Sheikhi; Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Shagozaei)Victims: FARAJA Emergency Unit. Assailants: unknown; no claim of responsibility.Armed individuals opened fire on an Emergency Unit patrol vehicle in Saravan, killing three officers.Haalvsh / Documents Network
8April 19, 2026 (30 Farvardin; date of announcement)Iranshahr-Khash road, police-road checkpointClash at checkpoint1 killed and 1 arrested among vehicle occupants (police claim)Government side: tactical police unit. Vehicle occupants: unidentified; police account.The southern provincial police commander said occupants of a Peugeot ignored an order to stop and opened fire; weapons and ammunition were reportedly found.Documents Network
Ordibehesht 1405
9April 22, 2026 (2 Ordibehesht)Near Jakigur, Rask CountyIRGC shooting / claimed destruction of “terrorist team”2 killed (Mohammadakram Akhtari; Mohammad Eslam Saeidi)Official account: members of an armed team. Family account: ordinary civilians from Darchub, Sarbaz.An IRGC Land Cruiser opened fire on a vehicle carrying the two men without a stop; state media called it the destruction of a terrorist team, while their families rejected the claim.Documents Network / Haalvsh
10April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Rask CountyShooting at IRGC vehicleNo casualties reported, according to state mediaTarget: IRGC forces. Assailant: unknown.An IRGC vehicle was fired on at dawn in Rask; Tasnim called the attack unsuccessful and said the assailants fled.Haalvsh / Documents Network
11April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Zahedan, Baghri Street, ShirabadShooting at patrol vehicle3 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Nezamdoost; 1st Lt. Ali Momeni; Ali-Asghar Goldavi); 1 woundedVictims: FARAJA patrol. Assailant: Ansar al-Furqan, which claimed responsibility.A police patrol in Shirabad, Zahedan, was raked with gunfire; two of the wounded later died in hospital.Documents Network / Haalvsh
12April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Exit of Jakigur, Rask CountyAttack on military convoyCol. Mahmoud Baghbani and several companions woundedVictim: commander of the Rask IRGC/Basij Resistance District. Assailant: unknown.A three-vehicle convoy carrying the Rask IRGC commander was attacked; he was transferred to Zahedan for treatment.Documents Network
13May 20, 2026 (30 Ordibehesht)Saravan County, one of the connecting roadsShooting and clash after pursuit1 police officer killed (3rd Lt. Amirhossein Shahraki); 2 attackers killed, police claimVictim: FARAJA. Assailants: armed occupants of a vehicle; identities unknown.Police said vehicle occupants shot at officers; police claimed two attackers were killed and reported finding weapons, a Starlink terminal and a Peugeot.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Khordad 1405
14May 28, 2026 (7 Khordad)Iranshahr, Basij Square / Hafez intersectionTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (2nd Lt. Isa Abbasi)Victim: FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Abbasi was shot while traveling by motorcycle to work and died at the scene.Haalvsh / Documents Network
15June 5, 2026 (15 Khordad)Zabol border areaBorder clash (official claim)6 attackers killed (claim); death of border-service conscript Seyed Mostafa Hosseini also announced June 7, exact time unclear and possibly relatedGovernment side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”The border commander claimed an armed group intended to cross the border and attack border posts; no identities or evidence regarding the six reported dead were released.Documents Network / Haalvsh
16June 7, 2026 (17 Khordad)Berenjinan area, SaravanJoint IRGC/Intelligence operation using a drone4 group members killed (Jalil Nahtani; Mohammad Omar Nahtani; Yasin Mohammadzehi; Vahid Shahuzehi); 1 IRGC member killed (Mohammad Siahani); 1 woundedThose killed on the armed side: members of the People’s Fighters Front, later confirmed by the Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and intelligence forces.The clash lasted from about 2 to 8 a.m.; the IRGC reported weapons and a Starlink terminal. Bodies were returned to families after 30-48 days.Haalvsh / Documents Network
17June 19, 2026 (29 Khordad)KhashTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (3rd Lt. Abdolsalam Kord)Victim: Khash Law Enforcement Command. Assailant: unknown.A Khash police officer was targeted during a mission and killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Tir 1405
18June 29, 2026 (8 Tir)Saravan, near the IRGC building, opposite Imam Ali gas stationShooting at private vehicle2 killed (Amirhossein Arbabi; his wife, Fatemeh Bameripur)Victim: IRGC Intelligence officer. Tasnim described the assailants as a “terrorist group affiliated with the Zionist regime and the United States”; no group claimed responsibility.Arbabi was attacked minutes after leaving the IRGC building; his wife died in hospital the following day.Documents Network / Haalvsh
19June 30, 2026 (9 Tir)Naskand police station and district office, SarbazArmed attack on police station / exchange of fireNo casualties reportedTarget: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.Armed individuals fired on the Naskand police station at about 1 a.m. and withdrew after an exchange of fire; internet service in the area was cut.Haalvsh / Documents Network
20July 1, 2026 (10 Tir)Sib and SuranTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (3rd Lt. Mohammad Palangi)Victim: local Sunni Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Palangi was shot while traveling from home to work and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
21July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)Zabol, Mohammadabad industrial townAbduction and killing1 killed (Capt. Seyed Mehdi Abdollahi, 51)Victim: Zabol Border Regiment, Qaleh Rostam South post. Assailants: unidentified armed men.The border officer was abducted while traveling to duty; on 1 Mordad his family was informed that he had been killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
22July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)Kahnoak village, TaftanSecurity raid / claimed operation against “perpetrators”2 killed (Eqbal Rigi; Bilal Rastaroosh); 1 arrested (Meysam Rigi)Police: two were perpetrators of the killing of FARAJA personnel in Nukabad, Taftan. Local sources: civilians, with no armed clash.Dozens of military vehicles blocked the road and a Peugeot Pars carrying two civilians was reportedly fired on without warning; forces then raided the Rigi family home.Haalvsh / Documents Network
23July 4, 2026 (13 Tir; date of announcement)Zahedan, Chabahar, Iranshahr, Khash and TaftanClaimed security operation2 killed and 10 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)Official account: members of “operational cells” of an armed group; operation involved the Intelligence Ministry, IRGC and FARAJA.The Intelligence Ministry reported finding a machine gun, Kalashnikov rifles, 17 pistols, 14 grenades and Starlink equipment; identities and locations of the two deaths were not disclosed.Documents Network
24July 10, 2026 (19 Tir)Zahedan County; bodies later found about 5 km from a checkpointAbduction and killing2 killed (3rd Lt. Afshin Saadati-Kia; Reza Karimian)Victims: FARAJA tactical unit. Assailant: “an armed group,” according to relatives.Two tactical-unit officers were abducted while on duty and killed the same night; their bodies were found on 12 Mordad.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Mordad 1405
25July 23, 2026 (1 Mordad; date of announcement)Jakigur Border Regiment area, RaskBorder clash (official claim)2 attackers killed (claim)Government side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”The border commander claimed two members of an armed group were killed and weapons, fuse and explosive detonators were recovered; exact time and location were not disclosed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
26July 26, 2026 (4 Mordad)Sarzeh area, IranshahrShooting at private vehicle carrying personnel1 killed (Noorollah Narouei, died 13 Mordad); 1 wounded (Emamdadi)Victims: plainclothes FARAJA recruitment personnel. Assailant: unknown.A privately plated Samand carrying two FARAJA personnel was shot; Narouei died ten days later.Haalvsh / Documents Network
27July 29, 2026 (7 Mordad)Iranshahr, Khatam al-Anbiya 5 Street, outside homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Mehran Salarzadeh)Police: law-enforcement officer. Local sources: deputy director of the Iranshahr Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.Salarzadeh was shot several times outside his home at about 10:30 p.m. and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
28July 30, 2026 (8 Mordad)Abu al-Fazl Mosque checkpoint, Iranshahr-Delgan roadAttack on checkpoint1 confirmed killed (Sgt. 1st Class Meysam Karami Qaleh-Taki); local sources reported additional dead and woundedVictims: FARAJA. Assailants: armed vehicle occupants; police reported three vehicles, Haalvsh one.At about 1 a.m., the checkpoint came under heavy fire; the assailants fled after several minutes.Haalvsh / Documents Network
29August 6, 2026 (15 Mordad)Mirjaveh, near Behdasht Boulevard, site used by security forcesExplosion, cause unknownUnspecified number of personnel killed and wounded, according to sourcesLocation possibly linked to the Intelligence Department or IRGC Intelligence. Cause unknown; sources suggested a possible internal origin.A powerful explosion occurred at about 3:20 a.m. and wounded personnel were reportedly transferred to Zahedan; officials did not explain the incident and no group claimed responsibility.Haalvsh
30August 11, 2026 (20 Mordad)Khash, Morad Rigi Street near 22 Bahman SquareAttack on mobile checkpointUnspecified; initial reports said government forces suffered casualtiesTarget: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.A nighttime mobile checkpoint was fired on and an exchange of fire continued for several minutes.Haalvsh
31August 13, 2026 (22 Mordad; date of announcement)Khash CountyClaimed security operation2 killed and 4 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)Official account: two operational cells of armed groups that entered from abroad; operation involved IRGC Quds Headquarters and FARAJA.The Intelligence Ministry released video and claimed two cells had been dismantled; the claim was not independently confirmed.Documents Network
32August 15, 2026 (24 Mordad)Mirjaveh, near Behdasht BoulevardTargeted shooting / assassination attempt1 seriously wounded (Hossein Saadatian; the text also gives “Hassan”)Victim: head of IRGC Intelligence in Mirjaveh. Assailant: unknown.Saadatian was shot at about 7:30 p.m. and admitted to the intensive-care unit at Nabi Akram Hospital in Zahedan.Haalvsh
33August 20, 2026 (29 Mordad; announced 30 Mordad)Saravan border / Saravan Border Regiment areaBorder clash (official claim)1 attacker killed (claim)Government side: Border Guard. Assailants: an armed group allegedly attempting to enter Iran.Police said the remaining group members fled across the border; Haalvsh said video released in connection with the claim was actually from a 2025 clash in Zabol.Haalvsh / Documents Network
34August 22, 2026 (31 Mordad)Zahedan, Baghri Street, Shirabad, real-estate officeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Nader Sarani, 45)Victim: Basij member, confirmed by IRGC Quds Headquarters; local sources described him as an official at the Hemmatabad base. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.Armed men entered Sarani’s real-estate office and shot him dead.Haalvsh / Documents Network
Shahrivar 1405
35August 27, 2026 (5 Shahrivar)Mirjaveh-Zahedan roadShooting at patrol vehicle1 killed (2nd Sgt. Ali Heydari-Moghadam); 1 woundedVictims: FARAJA Border Guard. Assailant: unknown; no claim of responsibility.A privately plated border-patrol Hilux was raked with gunfire from the front; state media called the attack “terrorist.”Haalvsh / Documents Network
36September 3, 2026 (12 Shahrivar)Hasaruiyeh, ZahedanHouse raid / siege / clash2 killed (Yasin Narouei, 24; “Sajjad,” from Bam)Government side: military and security forces, reportedly about 25 vehicles. Those killed: armed individuals; affiliation not announced.A house was surrounded from about 6 a.m.; after a two-hour clash, two armed individuals were killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
37September 5, 2026 (14 Shahrivar)Vadgar village, Ashar District, MehrestanHouse raid / siege / clash2 armed individuals killed (Mohammad Delmoradi; Salman Derazehi); 1 arrested; reports of government-force casualties and several civilians woundedGovernment side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA. Affiliation of the dead not announced.A house was attacked from about 3 to 10 a.m. with a Goryunov machine gun and RPGs; homeowner Akhtar Sandakzehi was arrested.Haalvsh / Documents Network
38September 6, 2026 (15 Shahrivar)Dehak-Sarjangal road, Kourin, ZahedanShooting at vehicle2 killed (Abolfazl Oudi; Keyvan Ramroudi)Victims: personnel of the IRGC Shahid Mirhosseini Operational Headquarters. Assailant: unknown.An unplated Capra vehicle was fired on; both occupants were shot in the head and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
39September 8, 2026 (17 Shahrivar)Parud, Rask County, outside victim’s homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Abdolraouf Eshaghi)Victim: commander of the Parud Basij Resistance Base. Assailants: riders on two motorcycles.Motorcycle-borne gunmen opened fire on Eshaghi outside his home, killing him at the scene.Documents Network / Haalvsh
40September 10, 2026 (19 Shahrivar)Khash, Sarbaz Street opposite the governor’s officeAttack on mobile checkpointAt least 3 killed and several wounded, initial local reportingTarget: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.A nighttime checkpoint near Anar Square was attacked; it was the second attack on a mobile checkpoint in Khash within a month.Haalvsh
41September 11, 2026 (20 Shahrivar)Rudmahi, Kourin District, ZahedanAttack on patrol of affiliated force4 killed; one local source initially reported 12Victims: Hazara Fatemiyoun personnel reportedly deployed by the IRGC. Assailant: “Baloch fighters,” according to sources.A patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun came under fire and its vehicle was set ablaze.Documents Network / Haalvsh
42September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar)Bakhshan, SaravanRaid on group position / nine-hour clashIRGC: 3 government personnel killed (Misagh Sani, Mehdi Sarhadi, Moslem Fazeli) and 4 armed individuals killed, later 5. Front: 4 members killed, 9 government personnel killed, 21 wounded.Defenders/armed side: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and security agencies.The clash lasted from about 4 a.m. to noon and involved heavy weapons and quadcopters. Support teams from the Front broke the siege and six members reportedly escaped.Haalvsh / Documents Network
43September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar; source discrepancy with 20 Shahrivar)Saravan, Moallem Street, outside homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed; identity not releasedVictim: plainclothes security force member. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.A plainclothes security officer was shot outside his home at about 8 p.m. and later died at Razi Hospital.Haalvsh
44September 18, 2026 (27 Shahrivar)Zahedan, University and Daneshjoo streetsClash between patrol and vehicle occupants2 killed (Zakaria and Mehrallah Shahbakhsh); 1 wounded and 1 arrested; 3 government personnel and 2 female bystanders woundedGovernment side: IRGC Quds patrol. Vehicle occupants: police described them as armed; relatives denied any affiliation.The clash began around 12:30 a.m. and lasted about two hours; police announced two armed men killed and one person arrested.Haalvsh / Documents Network
45September 21, 2026 (30 Shahrivar)Bazman-Iranshahr roadAttack on police vehicle1 killed (Capt. Alireza Mehrabi); 3 woundedVictims: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.A police vehicle was attacked in the afternoon; police described the incident as a “terrorist act.”Haalvsh / Documents Network
Mehr 1405
46September 23, 2026 (1 Mehr)Jahadabad (“Dab”), SaravanRaid on alleged “safe house” / multi-hour clash2 IRGC personnel killed (Brig. Gen. Hossein Zarifi; Ahmad Herati Zeraati/Zerati); at least 5 wounded according to Documents Network, up to 13 according to Haalvsh; IRGC claimed 5 armed men killed and several arrests; Front said 4 members killed.Government side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA, including commander and intelligence official of Shahid Sajjad Headquarters. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.Forces surrounded the house, demolished it with a bulldozer and set it on fire; the commander of Shahid Sajjad Operational Headquarters in Saravan was killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
47September 24, 2026 (2 Mehr)Jahadabad, Saravan (Shushtari and Dabeh)Renewed clash / shooting by forces9-year-old Mohammadamin Dehghan wounded and later died on 5 Mehr; his father Eshaq woundedThe vehicle carrying the family was allegedly fired on by military and security forces.Gunfire and RPG fire continued in Jahadabad at dawn; forces reportedly fired on a family vehicle carrying water.Haalvsh / Documents Network
48September 25, 2026 (3 Mehr)Sarkahuran village, IranshahrHouse raid / clash1 killed (Obeid Zardkuhi); 1 arrested (Jasem Jamali)Government side: security forces. Affiliation of the person killed was not announced.A security raid on a house led to a clash; the reason for the raid was not disclosed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
49September 29, 2026 (7 Mehr)Gharibabad, IranshahrHouse siege / four-hour clash1 killed (Morteza Sotoudeh, 26)IRGC media: “armed robber.” Local sources rejected this characterization.Forces surrounded the house using an armored vehicle, quadcopter and RPG; Sotoudeh reportedly ended his own life after running out of ammunition.Documents Network / Haalvsh
50September 30, 2026 (8 Mehr)Near Magas police-road post, MehrestanShooting at military vehicleAt least 2 woundedVictims: military and law-enforcement personnel. Assailant: unknown.A vehicle carrying forces came under fire at about 1:30 p.m., coinciding with the anniversary of Zahedan’s “Bloody Friday.”Haalvsh
51October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)Entrance to Rask, Ahmadabad FARAJA checkpointAttack on checkpoint1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Alireza Sanchouli, 24)Victim: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.Armed individuals opened fire on the checkpoint at the entrance to Rask in the early morning.Documents Network / Haalvsh
52October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)Monzalab (Shahmoradabad township), ZahedanRaid on group position / clashIRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 6 armed individuals killed; People’s Fighters Front said 4 members were killed.Those killed: members of the People’s Fighters Front, according to the Front. Government side: FARAJA and IRGC Quds Headquarters.Forces raided a house with heavy weapons, artillery and a drone and blew it up after the clash; the IRGC said explosive packages were found.Documents Network / Haalvsh
53October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Nukabad, Taftan, Intelligence Department buildingArmed attack on government buildingUnknownTarget: Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.The building came under gunfire at dawn and an explosion, possibly a grenade, was heard.Haalvsh / Documents Network
54October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Rudmahi, Kalepadeh route, ZahedanBooby trap and gunfire against patrol vehicle5 killed according to local sources and the Front, including Ahmad Yaqoubi, an Afghan national; official account: at least 1 killedVictims: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A Fatemiyoun Land Cruiser equipped with a DShK heavy machine gun was hit by a booby trap and then gunfire; the official account omitted the Fatemiyoun name.Haalvsh / Documents Network
55October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Bidedlad and Shushgim heights, Parud District, RaskRaid on mountain base / ten-hour clashIRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 2 armed individuals killed; 1 death confirmed (Abuzar Hamli, 23)Defenders: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: forces from Rask, Sarbaz, Qasr Qand and Nikshahr using drones and artillery.The clash lasted from 5:30 a.m. to 3:20 p.m.; armed members escaped the encirclement, and the Front said 15 members left the area.Haalvsh / Documents Network
56October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)Bampur-Iranshahr road, before Salehin BrigadeAmbush against patrolOfficial: 2 killed (2nd Sgt. Amirhossein Qasemi; Sgt. 1st Class Nezam Dastgoshadeh), 1 wounded; witnesses: at least 3 killedVictims: FARAJA patrol from Nukjoub post. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A three-vehicle patrol was ambushed; one Hilux was hit by gunfire and another overturned.Haalvsh / Documents Network
57October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)Entrance to Jakigur bridge, RaskShooting at vehicle carrying personnel1 killed and 2 wounded (Morteza Sayyadi, Hamed Sayyadi, Morteza Bazi)Local sources: armed plainclothes personnel of the Jakigur Border Regiment. IRGC media: drivers on the Rimdan border route.A Peugeot 207 carrying three armed plainclothes personnel came under fire in the evening.Documents Network / Haalvsh
58October 7, 2026 (15 Mehr)Jalq, Law Enforcement Command headquarters, Golshan CountyAttack using mine, RPG and semi-heavy weaponsUnspecified number killed and wounded; Front claimed 6 officers were hitTarget: FARAJA. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.The police headquarters and a support Hilux were attacked in the evening; electricity and internet service in Jalq were cut.Haalvsh / Documents Network
59October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Lakhshak road, Nosratabad, ZahedanAttack on patrol vehicle2 killed (3rd Lt. Vahid Enayat; Sgt. 1st Class Abbas Aghaei); local sources reported 3 killed and 2 woundedVictims: FARAJA tactical unit. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A tactical-unit vehicle was fired on in the morning and a clash followed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
60October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Karinduk, Nikshahr, Nikshahr-Konarak roadPursuit and attack on two military vehiclesOfficial: 1 killed (Mohammadreza Okati), 3 wounded. Local sources: at least 5 confirmed wounded and heavy casualties.Official account: personnel of the Army’s 88th Armored Division. Haalvsh: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A Hilux and minibus leaving the Karinduk base were attacked; the wounded were transported by helicopter to Chabahar and Konarak.Haalvsh / Documents Network
61October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Faryab town center, Kerman ProvinceTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Maj. Mehdi Jamshidi)Victim: FARAJA officer; local sources said he had participated in repression of women protesters in Pashmuki. Assailant: unknown.Jamshidi’s private vehicle was raked with gunfire in the evening; he was struck by seven bullets and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
62October 9, 2026 (17 Mehr)Cheshmeh Ziarat, ZahedanRoadside bomb and clash2 killed (Col. Nosrat Eftekhari; Ehsan Dehmardeh) and several wounded; 1 civilian bystander (Abdollah Ghanbarzehi) killed by gunfire from forcesVictims: deputy cultural-social commander of the provincial Law Enforcement Command and security escort. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A booby trap exploded along a police convoy route; state media described the civilian who was killed as the bomber.Haalvsh / Documents Network
63October 10, 2026 (18 Mehr)Faryab County, Rudbar-e Zamin area, Kerman ProvincePolice operation against suspect in armed attack1 killed, according to officialsThe person was identified by authorities as the principal suspect in the attack on Mehdi Jamshidi; identity not released.The Faryab governor said the suspect’s hideout had been identified through intelligence work and police surveillance.IRNA

Methodology note: Figures for casualties, victim identities and the attribution of some forces are based on cross-checking official reporting, local sources and statements by parties to the clashes through 18 Mehr 1405 (October 10, 2026). Cases without independent confirmation or involving conflicting accounts are presented with those qualifications.

Report on the Arrest of Baha’i Citizen Zhila Sadeghi in Isfahan

HRANA – Zhila Sadeghi (Moghen), a Baha’i citizen residing in Isfahan, was arrested by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence on Tuesday, October 6, 2026. She is currently being held in solitary confinement at Dowlatabad Prison in the city.

According to HRANA, citing IranWire, Zhila Sadeghi, a Baha’i citizen, has been in detention for six days.

According to the report, Ms. Sadeghi was arrested at her home in Isfahan on Tuesday, October 6, 2026, by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence and transferred to Dowlatabad Prison in the city. She is currently being held in one of the prison’s solitary confinement cells.

The report further states that, in addition to arresting this Baha’i citizen, the agents confiscated her family’s vehicle.

At the time of this report, no information has been obtained regarding the reasons for Ms. Sadeghi’s arrest or the charges brought against her.

Zhila Sadeghi (Moghen), a Baha’i citizen residing in Isfahan, is the mother of , another Baha’i citizen imprisoned at Dowlatabad Prison. Sarir Moghen has also been held in solitary confinement at Dowlatabad Prison in Isfahan for more than a month and a half.

Over the past decade, the Baha’i community in Iran has been subjected to more security-related and judicial persecution than any other religious minority in the country. According to HRA’s annual reports, an average of 62.41% of all reported violations of the rights of religious minorities during the past calendar year involved violations of the rights of Baha’i citizens.

Three Baha’i Citizens Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison, Additional Punishments, and Property Confiscation

HRANA – Hengameh Sharifinia, Fouad Abdolghaffari, and Fahim Agahi, three Baha’i citizens, have been sentenced to a combined 35 years in prison by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court. They were also subjected to additional punishments, including travel bans, restrictions on participation in groups and organizations, and confiscation of their property.

According to HRANA, Baha’i citizens Hengameh Sharifinia, Fouad Abdolghaffari, and Fahim Agahi have been sentenced to prison and additional punishments.

The ruling was issued in late September by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati. Under the ruling, Ms. Sharifinia was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 10 years of deprivation of social rights on the charge of “deviant educational or proselytizing activities contrary to or disruptive of the sacred law of Islam,” under Article 500 bis of the Islamic Penal Code. She was also sentenced to five years in prison on the charge of “membership in groups and organizations aimed at disrupting national security,” under Article 499 of the Islamic Penal Code.

Fouad Abdolghaffari and Fahim Agahi were each sentenced to five years in prison on the charge of “proselytizing activities contrary to Islamic law” and an additional five years in prison, along with a fine of 80 million tomans, on the charge of “membership in groups and organizations aimed at disrupting national security.” In addition to these sentences, all three Baha’i citizens received supplementary punishments consisting of a two-year ban on participating in groups and organizations and a two-year travel ban.

Under the ruling, property belonging to the three citizens was also confiscated.

The three had previously been tried in a joint case before the same branch of the court.

HRANA previously reported their arrests in October 2025 amid a wave of security measures targeting Baha’i citizens. Hengameh Sharifinia and Fahim Agahi were arrested in Tehran, while security forces simultaneously searched the homes of several Baha’i citizens. Fouad Abdolghaffari was also arrested in Tehran as part of the same wave of actions, while his home was being searched.

Over the past decade, Iran’s Baha’i community has faced more security and judicial actions than any other religious minority in the country. A review of HRA’s annual reports shows that, over the past three years, an average of 72% of reports concerning religious minorities have involved violations of the civil rights of Baha’is.

Baha’i Citizen Romina Goli Sentenced to Prison and Social Restrictions

HRANA – Romina Goli, a Baha’i citizen residing in Sari, was sentenced by Branch 2 of the Sari Revolutionary Court to five years, seven months, and 16 days in prison, as well as 10 years of deprivation of social rights.

According to HRANA, Romina Goli, a Baha’i citizen, has been sentenced to prison and deprivation of social rights.

According to a verdict issued by Branch 2 of the Sari Revolutionary Court and communicated to Ms. Goli, she was sentenced to five years in prison and 10 years of deprivation of social rights on the charge of “deviant educational or proselytizing activity contrary to or disruptive of the sacred law of Islam,” under Article 500 bis of the Islamic Penal Code. She was also sentenced to seven months and 16 days in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime,” under Article 500 of the Islamic Penal Code.

Romina Goli was arrested by security forces in Sari on May 9, 2026. At the time of her arrest, her home was searched, and officers confiscated several personal digital devices and religious books related to the Baha’i Faith.

On May 10, Ms. Goli’s interrogation session was held at the Sari Prosecutor’s Office. She was subsequently released from prison on bail.

Over the past decade, Iran’s Baha’i community has faced more security and judicial actions than any other religious minority in the country. A review of HRA’s annual reports shows that, over the past three years, an average of 72% of reports concerning religious minorities have involved violations of the civil rights of Baha’is.