HRANA News Agency-The large-scale Israeli airstrikes on Iranian soil, which began on June 13 and lasted for twelve days, resulted in at least 5,665 casualties, including 1,190 killed and 4,475 injured, both military and civilian[1]. The attacks, which affected 28 provinces across the country, caused severe damage to critical military, civilian, medical, and emergency infrastructure, and posed a serious threat to the safety of citizens nationwide. During this period, 1,596 individuals were also arrested by the Iranian regime’s security forces.
Prelude
From June 13 to June 24, 2025, Iran witnessed one of the most intense military confrontations in recent decades. The successive waves of Israeli air and missile strikes not only targeted military and strategic infrastructure but also disrupted the daily lives of millions of civilians—ranging from prolonged internet outages by regime and disrupted banking services to partial suspension of public transportation and reduced capacity of medical centers. These concentrated attacks—which even targeted prominent scientific figures—have raised serious questions regarding adherence to humanitarian principles and triggered unprecedented security concerns.
Relying on nearly two decades of experience documenting crises, the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) began tracking casualties and damages from the earliest hours of the conflict, updating its data continuously. The comprehensive report at hand is the result of collecting and verifying thousands of data points over these twelve days, offering a documented view of the war’s human, economic, and infrastructural dimensions—a picture that underscores the depth of the crisis and the urgent need for global attention to support civilians and rebuild damaged infrastructure.
Geographic Scope and Chronology of Events
Around dawn on June 13, the first wave of Israeli missiles and drones awakened the capital and northern regions of Iran. That same day, air defense systems were activated in multiple locations as the attacks penetrated deep into Iranian territory.
The following day, the scope of the attacks expanded, prompting the Red Crescent’s emergency forces across the country to go on high alert.
On June 15, critical energy sector targets in the capital were set ablaze, and parts of military infrastructure also caught fire. Simultaneously, numerous reports emerged of strikes hitting residential areas in the capital.
A day later, smoke rose from the glass headquarters of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and from a hospital in western Iran. The strike on an emergency vehicle highlighted the growing risks to emergency services.
On the fifth day (June 17), several new areas were added to the list of strike zones. Around the same time, a Red Crescent spokesperson stated—without providing specifics—that “since the start of the attacks, 21 provinces have been affected.”
On June 18, the capital was once again hit by a heavy wave of attacks, and the strikes spread to parts of central and northern provinces.
The end of the first week (June 19) brought a blow to the country’s central infrastructure; the seven-day campaign had engulfed nearly all of Iran’s main regions.
On June 20, missiles struck northern and coastal provinces. The Israeli military announced it had carried out 720 airstrikes since the beginning of the operation—a figure that revealed the intensity of the conflict.
On the ninth day (June 21), mountainous areas in central Iran also came under fire. Unofficial reports indicated the attacks had expanded to more than two-thirds of the country’s provinces.
On the tenth day of the war (June 22), the capital once again trembled; simultaneously, three nuclear facilities in central Iran were bombed. The capital’s governor stated that “over 200 locations” in the province had been targeted over the past ten days.
On June 23, the attacks continued and several additional provinces were added to the list of affected areas; the capital’s air defense remained active throughout the night.
In the early hours of June 24—just before the ceasefire was officially declared—several sites in the capital and neighboring provinces came under fire. The picture that emerged from twelve days of conflict: widespread destruction of both military and civilian infrastructure and a persistent threat to citizens nationwide.
Although the ceasefire brought an end to the airstrikes, residents of the affected neighborhoods know that this does not mean the end of their worries. In the days ahead, fundamental questions about reconstruction capacity, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the fate of the damaged cities will remain at the forefront of the news.
In total, the provinces that were either attacked or had their air defense systems activated include:
Tehran, Isfahan, East Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Alborz, Khuzestan, Fars, West Azerbaijan, Hamedan, Qom, Gilan, Lorestan, Razavi Khorasan, Zanjan, Bushehr, Markazi (Central), Kurdistan, Ilam, Qazvin, Hormozgan, Mazandaran, Yazd, Golestan, Semnan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Kerman, Ardabil, and Sistan and Baluchestan.
The main cities that were either targeted or had their air defense systems activated include:
Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Shiraz, Karaj, Ahvaz, Qom, Zanjan, Bushehr, Mashhad, Khorramabad, Qazvin, Najafabad, Andimeshk, Bandar Abbas, Rasht, Natanz, Dezful, Yazd, Shahr-e Rey, Malard, Hamedan, Shahroud, Urmia, Nahavand, Ilam, Khomein, Maragheh, Gorgan, Abhar, Arak, Garmdareh, Borujerd, Robat Karim, Rey, Mahshahr, Pakdasht, Astaneh-ye Ashrafiyeh, Sanandaj, Sardasht, Parand, Marand, Shahin Shahr, Malayer, Shahr-e Qods, Nazarabad, Eslamshahr, Saqqez, Babol, Dehloran, Fordow, Marivan, Fardis, Eslamabad-e Gharb, Tuyserkan, Bukan, Javanrud, Saveh, Babolsar, Sabzevar, Ardestan, Varamin, Bostanabad, Damavand, Sarvabad, Mahidasht, Salas-e Babajani, Malekshahi, Bandar Anzali, Chalous, Lenjan County, Zarandieh, Mobarakeh County, Bandar Siraf, Shahreza, Sahand, Shahr-e Kord, Lavizan, Shahriar, Akbarabad, Shushtar, Savojbolagh, Ekhtiarabad, Torbat-e Heydarieh, Sahneh, Bandar Lengeh, Khomeyni Shahr, Nowshahr, Khondab, Qods, Lavasan, Rudehen, Qeshm, Mohammadshahr (Karaj), Qasr-e Shirin, Zahedan, Ashtianan, Poldokhtar, Kangan, Azadshahr, Kashan, Mahabad, Oshnavieh, Na’in, Kerman, Abadan, Asadabad, Naqadeh, Kangavar, Kahrizak, Harsin, Pardis, Hoveyzeh, Ravansar, Chaldoran, Lahijan, and Langarud.
Military Equipment and Scope of Attacks
During the twelve days of conflict, the Israeli military announced that in just the first three days, it had carried out over 720 airstrikes, targeting more than 60 locations in total. On the fifth day, Israel claimed that three new waves of attacks struck at least 40 additional targets.
In investigations by human rights groups, the principle of proportionality in the laws of war holds particular significance, especially concerning the balance between the nature of targets and the weapons used. Based on data compiled from reliable sources, in addition to precision-guided bombs, suicide drones, and long-range rockets fired from within Iran, the Israeli military deployed the following weaponry:
1 • Harop – Suicide Drone: Produced by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), this loitering munition remains airborne for extended periods and crashes into targets like radars or air defense systems. Used to blind Iranian radar systems.
2 • Harpy – Anti-Radar Drone: An older type of anti-radiation drone that autonomously seeks out radar signals and strikes once detected. Used to destroy radars in Iran’s missile systems.
3 • F-35I Adir – Stealth Multirole Fighter: Israel’s customized version of the U.S. F-35, equipped with domestic electronic systems. Led the initial strike waves due to its stealth, targeting command centers, air defenses, and nuclear sites.
4 • F-15I Ra’am – Long-Range Strike Fighter: A twin-engine aircraft capable of carrying heavy payloads, primarily used to deliver bunker-buster bombs like the GBU-28. Played a key role in strikes on underground facilities, including Natanz.
5 • F-16I Sufa – Multirole Fighter: An upgraded F-16D with long-range capability and multiple precision weapons. Deployed to hit military bases, missile platforms, and communication infrastructure using SPICE and JDAM bombs.
6 • Delilah – Air-Launched Cruise Missile: A long-range missile that can loiter near a target area, effective against mobile or hidden systems like radars or command vehicles.
7 •Rampage – Supersonic Air-to-Surface Missile: A fast, precision missile developed by Elbit Systems, used to strike strategic infrastructure such as shelters, missile factories, and munitions depots. Its speed complicates interception.
8 • Blue Sparrow – Air-Launched Ballistic Missile: Originally a test missile for simulating threats, but field evidence suggests operational use against strategic infrastructure.
9 • LORA – Short-Range Ballistic Missile: A ground-launched missile with a 400 km range, capable of striking fixed targets with less than 10-meter accuracy. Used early in the campaign to destroy key infrastructure in western Iran.
10 • SPICE-1000/2000 – Glide-Guided Bombs: Smart kits that turn unguided bombs into precision weapons by locking onto target images. Widely used against sensitive Iranian facilities.
11 • JDAM – GPS-Guided Bombs: U.S.-made kits that enable ordinary bombs to be guided via GPS. Various types were used to strike fixed targets.
12 • GBU-39 SDB – Small Diameter Bomb: Lightweight, high-precision bombs that allow multiple munitions to be carried simultaneously on a single fighter. Suitable for strikes with high risk of collateral damage.
13 • GBU-28 – Bunker Buster Bomb: A 5,000-pound bomb capable of penetrating reinforced concrete and earth. Used against underground sites like Natanz.
14 • Spike ATGM – Guided Anti-Tank Missile: An advanced Israeli missile by Rafael with fire-and-forget capability, using visual and thermal targeting to destroy armored vehicles and light fortifications. Long-range variants were used to hit vehicles and buildings.
15 • B-2 Spirit – Strategic Stealth Bomber: A U.S. intercontinental bomber by Northrop Grumman, capable of carrying about 23 tons of guided munitions. Its low radar cross-section allowed it to penetrate Iranian airspace stealthily and drop bunker-busters. In a joint U.S.-Israeli mission, the B-2 targeted the Fordow, Natanz, and Arak nuclear facilities, deploying GBU-57 bombs from high altitude.
16 • GBU-57A/B MOP – Super-Heavy Bunker Buster: A 30,000-pound bomb capable of penetrating over 60 meters of earth and reinforced concrete. Guided via inertial/GPS systems, it is exclusively deployed by B-2 bombers and was used in the initial strikes to disable sensitive underground sections of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
Widespread Disruption of Civilian Life
Over the twelve days of war, HRANA received numerous reports and testimonies that together paint a vivid picture of civilian life under bombardment.
Collapse of Financial Chains and Access to Funds
Banks were among the first casualties of cyberattacks and widespread internet outages. At one point, the cash withdrawal limit in some branches was reduced to one million tomans, and ATMs—especially in migrant-heavy northern cities—were either empty or inoperative. A simultaneous hack of Sepah Bank, Pasargad, and several private banks on the sixth day disrupted card payments for hours. Small online businesses—which became a lifeline for thousands of families post-COVID—faced sudden shutdowns due to inoperable banking gateways and delivery platforms. In Tehran’s Shush and Nasser Khosrow bazaars, many shopkeepers kept their shutters down to avoid facing crowds with no purchasing power.
Paralyzed Transport, Rush Migration, and Route Profiteering
In Tehran, intercity taxi fares reportedly surged to 80 million rials (approx. $160) for the Tehran–Gilan route. In the south, drivers only accepted prepayment in U.S. dollars for routes like Bandar Abbas–Tehran. After a drone strike on Qom station, Iran’s railway suspended four national lines, leaving hundreds stranded in unlit terminals. On western exits of the capital, cars queued for kilometers in 40°C heat, forced to shut off air conditioners due to fuel shortages. Accounts converged on a scene of overcrowding, heat exhaustion, and dwindling gas.
Rationing, Queues, and Soaring Prices for Essentials
With major supply routes blocked, bakeries in northern and northwestern Iran saw lines of over 200 people. In a village in Qazvin, flatbread reached more than four times its pre-war price. Oil, infant formula, and sanitary pads were rationed in Tehran and Rasht. Central produce vendors reported a 50% drop in customers, while small grocers on Police Street had to discard most of their daily greens. Conversely, residents in southern Tehran created solidarity by distributing drinks among neighbors.
Vulnerable Groups Under Extra Pressure
– Elderly and chronically ill: A civil observatory recorded at least 22 deaths due to dialysis delays or power cuts to home oxygen devices.
– Disabled persons and female-headed households: The local welfare network in Kermanshah reported that its stockpile of wheelchairs and aids near Khosravi airport was destroyed in a fire, and resupply halted due to fuel shortages.
– Afghan migrants: Dozens of reports indicated that they were denied access to public shelters in two districts of Tehran—Tehran-No and Lavizan. In another account, three Afghan families had to spent the night in their car near Fashafouyeh.
– Pets and stray animals: The closure of veterinary clinics and rising pet food prices triggered a wave of pet abandonment. Volunteers in Sa’adat Abad (Tehran) created a makeshift shelter in Parvaz Park for 30 dogs.
Forced Labor Under Airstrike
Industrial workers in zones 18 and 20 of Tehran continued 24-hour shifts despite evacuation warnings, under threat of dismissal for “war-time absenteeism.” Some workers at a foundry in Ghal’eh Morghi took cover under deactivated machinery for eight hours after shrapnel struck the roof, waiting for fire risk to subside. A confidential directive from the government’s administrative body mandated that public employees return to offices by day three. Internal videos showed staff in the Ministry of Agriculture corridors wearing helmets.
Strike on Evin Prison and Breakdown of Inmate Services
Industrial workers in Tehran’s districts 18 and 20 were compelled to continue 24-hour shifts despite evacuation warnings, facing threats of dismissal for “wartime absenteeism.” In one example, at a foundry in Ghal’eh Morghi, some workers sheltered for eight hours beneath inactive machinery after shrapnel hit the roof, waiting for fire hazards to pass. A confidential directive from the Administrative and Recruitment Affairs Organization ordered public employees to return to work by the third day of the war. Internal footage showed Ministry of Agriculture staff wearing helmets in office corridors.
Communication Blackouts and Mental Strain
Three waves of internet shutdowns peaked on June 18. Families of diaspora Iranians faced total communication blackouts. Field psychologists reported that calls related to panic attacks and sleep disorders tripled compared to pre-war averages. Students at dorms in Amirkabir and Tehran Markazi Universities said they slept fully dressed and shoed, ready to evacuate at any moment.
Information Vacuum and Explosive Rumors
State media mostly repeated military briefings, offering no updates on sheltering or food safety. In this void, social media spread unverified claims of “radiological contamination in eastern Tehran” and “Israeli use of chemical warheads,” sparking an emergency exodus to the north. Media analysts noted a direct correlation between conspiracy theory circulation and a spike in “anonymous link views.”
Social Resilience and Grassroots Solidarity Networks
Amid the destruction, some remaining residents in Tehran used the hashtag #IAmTehran as a symbolic show of presence. Café owners in Iranshahr kept their lights on—serving only apple pie—so “the city wouldn’t feel deserted.” In the south Tehran, youths at Khorasan Square handed out drinks. Handwritten signs in Jordan Street read, “When you return, watch out for the glass,” in an effort to protect the property of displaced neighbors. These modest, spontaneous acts played a vital role in easing fear and replacing a narrative of “flight” with one of “staying and rebuilding.”
Human Casualties from the Iran-Israel War
Twelve consecutive days of bombardment resulted in at least 5,665 casualties, including 1,190 killed and 4,475 injured, according to field data collected by HRANA and its network of medical and local volunteers. These figures were recorded across 28 provinces. In contrast, the Iranian Ministry of Health announced a slightly lower total of 5,356 casualties as of midday on June 24, reporting 610 deaths and 4,746 injuries.
Rising Toll: A Day-by-Day Breakdown
▪️ Day 1 (June 13): Simultaneous strikes on Tehran, Tabriz, and Kermanshah left at least 770 casualties, including 35 women and children among the dead.
▪️ Day 2: With missiles hitting Khorramabad and Asadabad, the total rose to 983. The first report of an ambulance strike was recorded.
▪️ Day 3: A series of explosions in Tehran’s Narmak and Sabunchi neighborhoods pushed the total number of casualties past 1,000.
▪️ Days 4–6: Concentrated bombings on IRGC bases in Qom, Borujerd, and the police headquarters in Tehran triggered a new wave of military casualties, bringing the total to 1,968 by June 18.
▪️ End of Week 1 (June 19): HRANA published a seven-day tally of 2,694. The Health Ministry stated it had received 2,500 injured but did not report a death toll.
▪️ Days 8–9: Continued attacks on energy facilities and hospitals brought the total to 4,261. For the first time, the government acknowledged that “54 women and children” had died.
▪️ Day 10 (June 22): As Israeli air raids continued across several provinces, U.S. air forces bombed Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. Total casualties rose to 4,400; the Red Crescent confirmed the deaths of three aid workers.
▪️ Day 11: Continued Israeli strikes raised the number to 4,432. Notable events included the bombing of Evin Prison, the targeting of an ambulance in Najafabad, and the death of a five-year-old child in Asadabad.
▪️ Day 12 and Ceasefire (June 24): The final wave of Israeli drones struck eastern Tehran, Ahvaz, and Astaneh-ye Ashrafiyeh. HRANA data placed the total number of dead and injured at 5,665, while the government’s official figure was 5,356.
Breakdown of Victims (Based on HRANA Data)
• Civilians: 436 killed, 2,071 injured
• Military personnel: 435 killed, 256 injured
• Unidentified individuals: 319 killed, 2,148 injured
Vulnerable Populations and Protected Targets
• Women and children: At least 65 children and 49 women—including two pregnant women—were killed; 270 women and children were injured.
• Medical and emergency workers: Five doctors and four aid workers were killed; at least 49 were injured. Nine ambulances and seven hospitals were directly hit or damaged by shrapnel. Six ambulances and one Red Crescent helicopter were also impacted.
• Civilian infrastructure: Six emergency medical bases and two maternal-child health centers were destroyed or severely damaged.
The following table lists the confirmed identities of several children who were injured or killed in recent attacks. HRANA is currently reviewing additional identity data for other affected children.
| Province | City | Date | Killed | Injured | Age | Identity | Location | ||
| 1 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 12 yrs | Amirali Amini | Mahallati Street |  |
| 2 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 16 yrs | Parham Abbasi | Sattarkhan neighborhood |  |
| 3 | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown (June 13–14 window) | – | 3 | 2 yrs | – | – |  |
| 4 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 10 yrs | Mahya (Mahia) Nikzad | – |  |
| 5 | Tehran | Tehran | Unknown (June 13–14 window) | 1 | – | – | Heida Zeinali | – |  |
| 6 | Tehran | Tehran | Unknown (June 13–14 window) | 1 | – | – | Ayda Zeinali | – |  |
| 7 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 9 yrs | Baran Eshraghi | – |  |
| 8 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 5 yrs | Fatemeh Zakerian | – |  |
| 9 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 7 mos | Zahra Zakerian | – |  |
| 10 | Tehran | Tehran | Unknown (June 13–14 window) | 1 | – | 11 yrs | Soheil Katooli | – |  |
| 11 | Tehran | Tehran | Saturday, June 14 | 1 | – | 17 yrs | Seyed Hamidreza Sedighi Saber | Sattarkhan neighborhood |  |
| 12 | Tehran | Tehran | Unknown (June 13–16 window) | 1 | – | 3 yrs | – | – | |
| 13 | Tehran | Tehran | Unknown (June 13–16 window) | 1 | – | 8 yrs | Tara Haji Miri | Patrice Lumumba Street |  |
| 14 | Isfahan | Najafabad | Tuesday, June 17 | 1 | – | 13 yrs | Fatemeh Sharifi | – |  |
| 15 | Isfahan | Najafabad | Tuesday, June 17 | 1 | – | 10 yrs | Mojtaba Sharifi | – |  |
| 16 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 11 yrs | Motahareh Niyazmand | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 17 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 13 yrs | Mohaddeseh Aghdasi | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 18 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 10 yrs | Mohammadreza Aghdasi | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 19 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 13 yrs | Mersana Bahrami | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 20 | Unknown | Unknown | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 8 yrs | Mohammad Hossein Khaki | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 21 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 10 yrs | Fatemeh Niazmand | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 22 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 12 yrs | Alireza Niazmand | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 23 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 9 yrs | Zahra Bahman Abadi | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 24 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 5 yrs | Hanieh Bahman Abadi | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 25 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 2 yrs | Mohammadali Bahman Abadi | Chamran Residential Complex |  |
| 26 | Tehran | Tehran | Friday, June 13 | 1 | – | 16 yrs | Matin Safaeyan | Tajrish | |
| 27 | Tehran | Tehran | Unknown (June 13–16 window) | 1 | – | Unknown | – | Tehranpars | |
| 28 | Tehran | Tehran | Unknown (June 13–16 window) | 1 | – | 2 months | Yaran Ghasemian | – |  |
| 29 | Tehran | Unknown | Unknown (June 13–17 window) | 1 | – | – | – | – | |
| 30 | Qom | Qom | Saturday, June 21 | 1 | – | 16 yrs | Ehsan Ghasemi | – | |
| 31 | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown (June 13–20 window) | 1 | – | 10 yrs | Fatemeh Sadat Sadati | – |  |
| 32 | Khuzestan | Andimeshk | Unknown (June 19–20 window) | 1 | – | 7 yrs | Seyed Armin Mousavi | Dokoheh Military Zone | |
| 33 | Lorestan | Unknown | Unknown (June 13–20 window) | 1 | – | Unknown | Helena Gholami | – | |
| 34 | Kermanshah | Eslamabad-e Gharb | Saturday, June 21 | 1 | – | 6 yrs | Yasin Molaei | – | |
| 35 | Kermanshah | Eslamabad-e Gharb | Saturday, June 21 | – | 1 | 3 yrs | Unknown (Yasin Molaei’s brother) | – | |
| 36 | Kermanshah | Hamil | Saturday, June 21 | 1 | 1 | 6 yrs killed, 1 yr injured | – | – | |
| 37 | East Azerbaijan | Tabriz | Saturday, June 21 | 1 | – | 7 yrs | Alisan Jabari | Azerbaijan Square |  |
| 38 | East Azerbaijan | Tabriz | Saturday, June 21 | 1 | – | 7 yrs | Taha Behroozi | Azerbaijan Square |  |
| 39 | Tehran | Tehran | Injured June 13–16, died June 23 | 1 | – | 5 yrs | Kian Ghasemian | – | |
Contrasting Official and Independent Figures
1 • Scope of Sources
HRANA gathers data from three layers: volunteers embedded in medical centers, a network of hundreds of verified local channels, and official statements used for cross-verification. In contrast, the government relies almost exclusively on reports from public hospitals and state medical facilities.
2 • Recording and Updating Methods
HRANA updates its casualty figures daily and in real time, with each number confirmed by at least one independent source before being finalized. Government figures are released periodically and often feature sudden, unexplained jumps.
3 • Inclusion of Victims
HRANA’s estimates include military personnel, outpatient injuries, and unidentified victims. Official tallies often exclude military casualties (or report them with delay) and typically omit outpatient injuries.
4 • Political Pressure and Motivations
During the conflict, the government revised casualty figures significantly on at least three occasions (e.g., an increase from 2,500 to 4,500 injured on Day 8), suggesting that numbers are filtered through political considerations before release. HRANA, by contrast, reports gradual and documented increases.
5 • The 309-Person Discrepancy
While the final 309-person gap between HRANA’s and the government’s tallies may seem minor, it highlights which groups are omitted or downplayed in the official narrative—and underscores why independent access to raw data is vital for human rights organizations and international observers.
Nuclear Scientists
During the wave of Israeli, at least eleven of the country’s leading nuclear scientists were killed in Tehran and several other cities. These attacks not only claimed the lives of prominent scientific figures but also killed family members and neighbors, bringing the documented death toll to over 60.
According to field sources and medical data, Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani—former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and a professor of nuclear physics—was killed along with his 24-year-old daughter in the “Sarv Professors Complex” in Sa’adat Abad, Tehran. In the same complex, Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, a board member of Islamic Azad University, died from a direct explosive hit; witnesses say only scattered remains of his body were found.
Hours later, in Tehran’s Shahrara neighborhood, Abdolhamid Minoochehr—a professor of nuclear engineering and editor of the journal Nuclear Technology and Energy—was killed at 3:30 a.m. in his five-story apartment building, along with a domestic worker. In the Shahid Daghaghi residential area of Lavizan, Ahmadreza Zolfaghari Daryani, former dean of the Nuclear Sciences Faculty at Shahid Beheshti University, was killed when a guided missile struck his home.
Another victim, Seyed Amirhossein Faghihi—former deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization and faculty member at Shahid Beheshti University—was killed in Tehran’s Marzdaran neighborhood. That same night, Nader (Akbar) Matlabi-Zadeh, a nuclear physicist from Isfahan affiliated with Islamic Azad University, was targeted and killed in Yazd as he exited his home.
The attacks on residential homes caused severe family casualties:
• On Pasdaran Street in Tehran, Ali Bakaei Karimi was killed along with his wife and two young children.
• Near Heravi Square Tehran, Mansour Asgari, a researcher on research reactors, died with his wife and four-year-old child.
• Local sources reported the death of Saeed Borji, a research assistant at the Khondab facility, in eastern Tehran; further details are pending.
• The deadliest event occurred on the morning of June 24: a strike on a residential block in southern Tehran killed Mohammadreza Sedighi Saber, a specialist in advanced centrifuges. The explosion caused the building to collapse entirely. According to witnesses, 43 others—including his 17-year-old son—also died or were trapped under the rubble.
• Hours later, news emerged of the assassination of Issar Tabatabaei Qomsheh, a nuclear engineering professor at Sharif University of Technology, at his home in Shahr-e Rey. He and his wife, Mansoureh Haji Salem, were both killed.
Although officials have yet to comment on the specific types of weapons used, forensic evidence and the extent of destruction suggest a combination of precision-guided bombs, suicide drones, and long-range rockets. Most strikes occurred late at night—a tactic that experts say is designed to maximize psychological impact and hinder immediate rescue efforts.
Forensic authorities and hospitals in the capital have confirmed the identities of several victims, while search operations under the rubble continue in multiple locations. Medical sources report that over 70 people were injured in these incidents, some in critical condition due to severe burns or amputations.
Israeli Strikes on Iran’s Civilian Infrastructure
As the twelve-day conflict between Israel and Iran came to an end, HRANA’s updated assessment reveals that a significant portion of Iran’s civilian infrastructure and assets remained under fire. Verified data from June 13 to 24 records at least 109 strikes or explosions at industrial, energy, administrative, and commercial sites—a number that poses a serious challenge to the country’s economic outlook. Nearly two-thirds of these incidents (73 cases) occurred in Tehran Province, followed by Alborz, Lorestan, Fars, and Kermanshah as the hardest-hit provinces. The peak occurred on June 15 with 53 reported incidents, coinciding with the first nationwide internet blackout and a several-hour disruption to energy production and distribution.
Methodological Note: The classification of targeted locations in this report as “military” or “civilian” is based on publicly available information, visible indicators, and testimonies from local residents. A definitive determination of the nature of these sites requires further verification through official documents, satellite imagery, and comprehensive analysis, which are currently not accessible. Therefore, this categorization is provisional and intended to provide an initial overview rather than a conclusive judgment about the nature of the targets.
Strikes on Energy Infrastructure
The most extensive energy-related damage was observed in the southern provinces and Tehran. In Bushehr, the Fajr Jam refinery and Phase 14 of the South Pars gas field were hit twice in succession on June 14, causing a 30% drop in gas pressure. In the capital, the oil depots in Shahran and South Tehran, as well as the Shahr-e Rey refinery, suffered three consecutive explosions on June 15, igniting three ten-million-liter storage tanks and shutting down the distillation unit for 12 hours. Fires in the hydrocracking unit of Kermanshah Oil Refinery on June 16 and disruption of backup power at Yazd’s combined cycle power plant the next day caused a 7% drop in refining capacity during the review period, leading to multi-kilometer fuel lines on roads west and south of Tehran.
Manufacturing and Industrial Plants
In Lorestan, strikes on the car manufacturing company, Zagros and the Oshtorinan Machine-Building Complex destroyed pressing and painting halls, halting assembly lines. An explosion near Shiraz Electronics Industries ignited a telecommunications board warehouse and disabled SMT lines. Power outages and roof collapses at industrial parks in Alborz (Qazvin) and Marand, as well as damage to five textile and food factories in Zanjan and Hamedan, forced at least 3,000 workers into forced leave or unemployment.
Administrative and Transport Infrastructure
Mehrabad and Tabriz airports were each temporarily shut down twice due to security alerts—Mehrabad in particular suffered a cruise missile hit on June 16 that burned out the fueling system for its western runway. An explosion at an annex of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs near the Garden Museum, and shattered windows at Shahid Beheshti University’s Central Library (June 23), disrupted thousands of employees and students. Evin Prison was struck on June 19, with a missile hitting the entry gate; damage to the infirmary and cut phone lines led to widespread human rights protests. In total, 16 administrative and transport targets—from passenger terminals to telecom towers—sustained direct damage.
Commercial Property and Market Losses
Broken windows at the massive Iran Mall complex in western Tehran, fires in warehouse clusters near the Karaj highway, and a localized explosion at the Grand Bazaar of Isfahan were among the most notable commercial incidents. Twelve identified commercial centers suffered structural damage or temporary closure. Field reports also indicate a significant drop in access to essential goods in western Tehran.
Targeting Patterns and Human Impact
Although the Israeli military stated that its strikes focused on missile-related infrastructure, the spread of attacks and the lack of nearby air defenses at civilian sites—such as Shahran Oil Depot or Shiraz Electronics—raise serious concerns about adherence to the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets. So far, the deaths of four refinery workers, two fuel truck drivers, and three factory guards have been confirmed, along with dozens of injuries—a figure likely to rise as provincial data collection continues.
Attacks on Tehran Neighborhoods
HRANA’s compilation of twelve days of conflict data reveals that the geography of strikes in the capital was more concentrated around the city’s outer ring than previously estimated—zones where strategic infrastructure and dense residential areas are often adjacent. A total of 300 strike or explosion events were recorded within Tehran’s urban area, a number that is expected to significantly alter the capital’s security landscape for years to come. Of these, 95 events were precisely mapped at the neighborhood level: 45 incidents (47%) occurred in the east and northeast corridor, 27 (28%) in the west, 16 (17%) in the north and northwest, and 7 (7%) in the south and southwest.
East and Northeast: The Most Frequent Target Zone
The Tehranpars, Hakimiyeh, and Lavizan corridor, extending along Babayi Expressway, remained the most heavily targeted axis. Forty-five strike or explosion incidents were recorded in this narrow industrial-residential corridor, including three direct hits on Lavizan fuel depots and two secondary explosions felt as far as the Babayi Expressway interchange. Nobonyad, Majidieh, and Narmak neighborhoods repeatedly came under blast waves. Air defense batteries stationed on the Lashgark heights fired seven interceptor missiles and launched several artillery bursts over five consecutive nights, lighting up the eastern sky.
North and Northwest: The Administrative Buffer Zone
Sixteen incidents were recorded in the Tajrish–Vanak–Jordan axis, including three in a 48-hour span that shattered windows in Seoul Street office towers twice and paralyzed the Sadr Expressway for hours. Shrapnel bursts over Niavaran, Valiasr Street, and near Saei Park disrupted radio communications and caused localized power outages. On the sixth night of the conflict, two surface-to-air interceptors were confirmed to have launched from the Lavizan–Niavaran defense site.
Western Axis: Between Industrial and Residential Arteries
Twenty-seven incidents were reported in the Shahran, Chitgar, and Bidganeh corridor—home to the Shahran oil depot and the Bidganeh missile base. On June 15, smoke from a massive explosion at the oil depot was visible from the city center. For three consecutive nights, air defense systems on Chitgar’s hills and near Azadi Square fired three interceptor missiles along with multiple artillery rounds. Tourist activity at Chitgar Lake’s parks was suspended for several days, and residents of Ekbatan and Iran Mall spent at least two nights in emergency shelters.
South and Southwest: Fewer Strikes, Heavier Damages
Seven incidents occurred in the southern zone, from Eslamshahr to Khaniabad-e No and along the Persian Gulf Expressway. Though fewer in number, the strikes caused disproportionately heavy damage to logistics depots and aging residential areas. An explosion near the Khalij-e Fars Complex destroyed two fuel storage tanks and three warehouse hangars, displacing at least 100 families until the ceasefire. On the ninth night, two short-range interceptors were launched from a defense site in southern Tehran.
Overall Pattern and Impacts
Nearly half of the strikes with known coordinates occurred in the eastern–northeastern corridor—an area whose mix of fuel facilities and dense housing raised the highest civilian casualty concerns. The western sector, dense with energy and logistics infrastructure, was the second major target zone. Among the 300 recorded incidents, at least three major fuel tanks, two strategic logistics depots, and hundreds of residential or commercial units were damaged. Verified reports confirm the deaths of four fuel depot workers, two tanker drivers, and three factory guards, along with dozens more injured. Given the geographical spread and ongoing debris clearance operations, the casualty figures may still rise. Experts believe this focused targeting of peripheral belts will lead to a substantial reassessment of the capital’s security posture in the coming years.
Israeli Strikes on Iranian Military Sites
Over the twelve days of war, at least 154 heavy strike waves were recorded against military bases and installations across the country. These attacks occurred in 28 provinces, averaging more than 12 military targets per day. According to data collected by HRANA:
| Key Metric | Figure | Description |
| Total Recorded Attacks | 154 | Includes only strictly military targets; dual-use infrastructure not counted. |
| Provinces Affected | 28 out of 31 | Tehran, Isfahan, and Kermanshah were hit the most. |
| Most Frequent Day | June 18 (31 attacks) | Unprecedented wave of missile and drone strikes in various parts of Tehran, Alborz, and Rey. |
| Most Strikes in a Province | Tehran (42 attacks) | Concentrated especially around Parchin, Shahr-e Rey, and Lavizan. |
Timeline of Major Attacks
| Date | Notable Targets | Key Highlight |
| June 13 | Mehrabad Airport, Kermanshah Missile Base, 8th Tactical Air Base (Isfahan) | Official start of conflict; three hits in the first few hours. |
| June 14 | Imam Hassan Garrison (Kermanshah), Imam Ali Garrison (Karaj), IRGC booster factory (Tabriz) | 13 targets hit; first reports of ammunition depot destruction. |
| June 15 | Ministry of Defense HQ (Tehran), Defense Innovation and Research Organization (SAIRAN), missile sites in western Iran | Start of attacks on research and development centers. |
| June 16 | Dowlatabad Munitions Depot, Jannatabad Satellite Station (Hamedan), air defense site (Andimeshk) | Focus shifts to IRGC logistics support chain. |
| June 17 | Heshmatieh Garrison (Tehran), Al-Zahra Garrison (Tabriz), 8th Tactical Air Base (hit again) | Increased attacks on training centers and ammunition storage. |
| June 18 | Sarveh Hisar missile depot, Parand garrison complex, Jambazorgi Garrison (Shahr-e Rey) | Most intense day: 31 confirmed strikes. |
| June 19 | Khondab Heavy Water Complex (Arak), Natanz nuclear site, multiple locations in Tehran | First major engagement with strategic nuclear targets on military list. |
| June 20 | Bushehr Air Base, IRGC garrison near Chaharshir (Ahvaz) | Attacks expand to the south and Persian Gulf coast. |
| June 21 | Defense Industries Complex, the Third Naval Base, Cyber Police (FATA), the Fourth Tactical Air Base, and the Army’s 71st Mechanized Infantry Brigade in the Sumar region were among the sites targeted. | The Cyber Police Center of the Law Enforcement Command (FATA) was attacked. |
| June 22 | Three nuclear facilities (Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan) — joint U.S. operation | Peak of strategic strikes; 22 military targets hit in one day. |
| June 23 | Shahid Madani logistics center (Tabriz), Parchin missile complex, IRGC Seyed-al-Shohada unit (Shahr-e Rey) | Focus on IRGC supply lines and missile industries. |
| June 24 | IRGC Joint Command HQ (Kolahdooz Square), Parchin missile site (second strike) | Final strike before ceasefire announcement. |
Military Figures and High-Profile Deaths
During the twelve-day war, Iran’s top military command structure sustained unprecedented losses, beginning with the confirmed deaths of at least twelve prominent figures from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Armed Forces General Staff, and extending to mid-level intelligence officers.
In the early hours of June 13, the deaths of several top-ranking military officials were announced, including Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force; Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; and Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC. Also confirmed dead that night were Gholam Ali Rashid, commander of the Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters; Mehdi Rabani, deputy chief of army operations; and Davoud Sheikhian, a senior officer in planning and operations.
These simultaneous losses across three tiers of strategic command created what many described as a “command chain vacuum” in the war’s critical opening hours.
Two days later, on June 14, Israeli strikes shifted focus to intelligence command centers. Gholamreza Mehrabi, deputy head of intelligence for the Armed Forces General Staff, and Brigadier General Khosrow Hassani, deputy for IRGC Aerospace Intelligence, were killed in Tehran. According to internal security analysts, this event caused a temporary suspension of drone interception operations.
The most devastating blow to IRGC intelligence occurred on June 15, when an official statement confirmed the deaths of Mohammad Kazemi, the newly appointed head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization; his deputy, Hassan Mohaqeq; and Mohsen Bagheri, a senior commander for IRGC foreign operations. Sources indicate that the deaths occurred in a building hosting the “Joint Electronic Warfare Command” in western Tehran, which exploded—an event that coincided with a blackout and military radio disruption.
Thus, within just three days, the decision-making chain—from strategic command to intelligence operations—lost six top commanders and five senior intelligence officials. Although military spokespeople claimed “rapid replacement of command,” inconsistencies in official statements and delays in reporting casualties suggest that the new hierarchy has yet to stabilize.
At least three sources close to the IRGC confirmed that in the wake of these losses, control of the “Joint Air Defense Command” was transferred to the Army General Staff, and several cruise missile interception systems in northern Tehran were reassigned to army units. Normally, such changes would require approval from the Supreme National Security Council, but in this case, the order was issued directly by the Deputy for Army Operations. These sources also reported that from the evening of June 16 onward, encrypted messages—normally exchanged every twelve hours between regional commands—began arriving with multi-hour delays, indicating continued disruption to the command system.
Beyond these confirmed names, a long list of mid-ranking fatalities—including missile brigade commanders in Zanjan and Aran va Bidgol, and signals intelligence officials in southern Kerman—has yet to be officially acknowledged. Due to widespread internet shutdowns and media restrictions, public verification of these accounts remains difficult.
Official reports so far indicate the deaths of 35 senior IRGC and Army commanders, at least 11 nuclear scientists, and 32 national-level athletes. HRANA has verified the identities of 19 athletes and 38 scientific and military figures, and continues to investigate claims regarding the deaths of other “high-ranking officials.”
Arrests and Repression of Citizens
HRANA’s final assessment of citizen arrests during the twelve-day conflict between Israel and Iran shows that at least 301 individuals were detained nationwide for sharing content, expressing opinions, or participating on social media. The number rose at an alarming rate from the early hours of the war until the ceasefire and spanned a wide range of provinces.
Initial Surge: June 13–15
The first wave of arrests began in the initial hours of the conflict. On June 13 alone, security forces conducted simultaneous raids in at least six provinces, arresting 58 individuals: 5 in Yazd, 14 in Hormozgan, 16 in Isfahan, 21 in Semnan, and one each in Rumeshkan (Lorestan province) and Tehran. The arrest of Motahareh Gounei (Goonehi), a student activist at the University of Tehran, was the most notable case. Although no new arrests were officially reported the following day, a wave of prosecutorial threats spread across social media. On June 15, a second wave brought 42 new arrests, raising the three-day total to 100—a clear sign of a policy shift toward “deterrence through fear.”
Pattern Stabilization and Wider Spread: June 16–18
On June 16, at least 15 more people were arrested, mostly in Kerman, Ardabil, Khorramabad, and North Khorasan, pushing the total past 115. Judicial authorities, threatening “immediate wartime trials,” declared that any “content supporting the enemy” could warrant the harshest penalties. The next day saw a surge in charges such as “spreading public anxiety” and “collaborating with Mossad”: at least 21 citizens were detained in Lorestan, Bafgh, Bukan, and Tehran. By June 17, the total reached 139. On June 18, state media reported 21 more arrests, raising the cumulative figure to 160—an average of over 26 arrests per day in the first week.
Peak of Repression: June 19–21
The most intense spike occurred on June 19, with at least 30 people arrested in Lorestan, Yazd, Kerman, Mahabad, and Aliabad-e Katul, pushing the total to 206. Lorestan led with 16 confirmed arrests. The next day (June 20), another 30 arrests were reported—in Bushehr, Masjed Soleyman, Urmia, Izeh, Rasht, and Parsabad-Moghan—raising the total to 236. Local sources said many of these arrests were based solely on “resharing attack footage” or “expressing hope for an end to the conflict.” June 21 repeated the 30-arrest figure, confirming the trend. In provinces like Hamedan and Bukan, police claimed those arrested were “demoralizing the public.”
Gradual Attrition and Targeted Detentions: June 22–24
A full international internet shutdown on June 18 slowed information exchange, but arrests continued. On June 22, four people were arrested in Dehdasht and eleven in Ramshir; Bukan’s commander confirmed five more arrests, and Kerman recorded its 14th. By then, the ten-day total had reached 277. The following day saw only four new arrests—likely a result of communication blackouts and fear of reporting. However, on June 24, five additional arrests were confirmed (in Baharestan, Qaemshahr, Bushehr, and Qazvin), bringing the total to 286.
Geographic Breakdown and Detainee Profiles
Lorestan province topped the list with 42 confirmed arrests, followed by Khuzestan (29), Kerman (25), Golestan (24), and Yazd (22). Arrests were reported in at least 24 provinces. While charges remain unclear in many cases, available data indicates around 5% were accused of “supporting Israel” via content sharing, and roughly 3% faced charges of “disturbing public opinion.”
Legal and Social Implications
Beyond the volume of arrests, the speed of issuing temporary rulings and the public threats by judicial officials have raised serious concerns about due process and fair trial rights. Many families report that detainees are being held in undisclosed locations without legal counsel. Prolonged internet outages have further restricted access for lawyers and journalists, hindering documentation of potential violations.
Security Arrests
HRANA’s final review of security-related arrests during the twelve-day conflict indicates that Iranian intelligence and security forces detained at least 1,295 individuals on charges including “espionage for Israel,” “operating drones,” “weapons smuggling,” and “undermining national security.” These arrests escalated from isolated early incidents to broad search-and-seizure operations nationwide, culminating in three executions during the war period. Just hours after the ceasefire was announced, Iran’s judiciary executed three additional individuals—Edris Ali, Azad Shojaei, and Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul—in Urmia prison on charges of espionage and collaboration with Israel. All six executed individuals had been arrested and sentenced prior to the outbreak of war.
June 13–15 | Initial Arrests and Public Threats
The first hours of the conflict were accompanied by warnings from the head of the judiciary, promising rapid trials for “Israeli collaborators.” That same day, state television reported the dismantling of an “organized network” in Yasuj, while police in western Tehran arrested a pickup driver transporting dozens of drones. In Ashkhaneh, a local photographer was detained for filming “sensitive” locations. On June 15, two foreign nationals were arrested in Tehran for allegedly relaying the locations of IRIB headquarters and an official’s residence to a contact in Germany.
June 16–19 | Provincial Operations and First Execution
As internet access was restricted and the security atmosphere intensified, coordinated operations were launched across several provinces. IRGC intelligence in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari reported dismantling a drone team; the Ministry of Intelligence announced the seizure of a weapons shipment in Kurdistan and the arrest of one individual. By the end of Day 10, security-related arrests had reached 363, and state media reported the execution of Majid Mosayebi for espionage on behalf of Israel.
June 20–21 | Major Crackdowns in Khuzestan and Qazvin
Footage from a “Basij checkpoint operation” in Qazvin showed 80 foreign nationals arrested for illegal entry and possession of knives and ammunition, marking the largest mass arrest of the conflict. The Khuzestan prosecutor reported 41 arrests on suspicion of intelligence cooperation with Israel. Around the same time, a video surfaced showing the alleged confessions of “six Mossad agents” in Tehran—its authenticity remains unverified.
June 22–24 | Second Wave of Executions and Scattered Raids
In the final days of the conflict, reports emerged from Pakdasht to Astara of small armed groups being arrested. These included three Afghan nationals with military equipment, a foreign woman in Chalous, and two espionage suspects in Astara. Meanwhile, police officials announced the arrest of members of a “drone network” in the northwestern mountains of Tehran. Executions of Mohammadamin Mahdavi and Esmaeil Fekri, both accused of espionage, were carried out. The number of security arrests climbed to 537.
Geographic Distribution and Charge Patterns
Tehran leads with over 120 confirmed arrests, followed by Qazvin (80), Khuzestan (41), Gilan (36), Lorestan (10), and multiple large cases in Kurdistan and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari. At least 98 foreign nationals were arrested—ranging from European to Afghan citizens—accused of illegal entry or membership in intelligence networks. More than half of the cases involve “control or construction of drones” and “filming sensitive sites,” about a third relate to weapons or explosives smuggling, and the rest involve “cyber espionage” or “propaganda for a hostile state.”
Legal Implications
Beyond the six confirmed executions, many unnamed detainees are reportedly being held in undisclosed locations. In parallel, Iranian lawmakers introduced an emergency bill to “increase penalties for espionage,” with officials insisting that the harshest punishments will apply to these groups. Due to internet blackouts and the secrecy of the files, independent lawyers have effectively lost access to their clients, raising further concerns about violations of due process and fair trial rights.
Internet Disruption and Cyber Attacks
HRANA’s comprehensive analysis shows that during the war, the virtual domain became a separate frontline, struck by a combination of government-imposed restrictions and cross-border cyberattacks. Three successive waves of throttling and access limitations were imposed, culminating in a nationwide shutdown on the early morning of June 18—an event comparable only to the November 2019 blackout. This systemic disruption coincided with unprecedented intrusions into government websites, financial systems, academic platforms, and even health infrastructure, revealing a blurred line between “defensive countermeasures” and punitive operations.
Timeline of Disruptions and Cyberattacks
June 13 | Network Shaking Begins
In the opening hours of the bombardment, international bandwidth slowed noticeably, government websites went offline, and the emergency SMS system failed. Initial alerts also indicated potential breaches of e-government portals.
June 14 | Public Service Systems Targeted
Health insurance registration, fuel card services, and judicial systems became inaccessible. The National Cyberspace Center issued public warnings about “information infiltration.”
June 15 | Mobile Operator Disruption
Users reported dropped voice calls nationwide, widespread failures in online shopping, and attempted breaches of the national ID registry and border control databases—suggesting attacks on identity and border-data systems.
June 16 | City-Level Infrastructure Hit
Severe slowdowns in messaging apps coincided with hacking of traffic cameras in Tabriz and Hamedan. Late at night, the Communications Minister confirmed “defensive actions are underway,” without specifying details.
June 17 | Hybrid Attacks on Energy Infrastructure
The national fuel distribution website was taken down for hours. The Oil Minister acknowledged “cyber and physical attacks are intertwined,” prompting emergency fuel reserves to be activated at refineries.
June 18 | Nationwide Outage and Live Broadcast Hack
By around 2 a.m., global internet connectivity dropped to near zero. That night, a live broadcast of Islamic Republic of Iran News Network was briefly hacked to play an unidentified military march. The government framed this as a “defensive measure against Israeli attacks,” while independent observers called it a “preventive shutdown aiming to control the domestic narrative.”
June 19 | Energy Ministry Breach and Financial Disruption
The group “Predatory Sparrow” claimed responsibility for hacking the Energy Ministry and crippling the backup power grid. Simultaneously, private bank systems experienced transaction delays, and internal transfer limits surfaced.
June 20 | Attack on Crypto Market
Iran’s largest cryptocurrency exchange suffered a server attack, halting deposits and withdrawals for hours and sparking rumors of asset theft. Insurance portals and university portals also encountered login failures.
June 21 | Health Infrastructure Exploited
Backup power systems failed at hospitals in Kerman, Golestan, and Markazi provinces, and large-scale phishing SMS campaigns spread malware. The Health Ministry reported an unprecedented volume of DDoS attacks on emergency services.
June 22 | DDoS Waves at Health Services
The 115 emergency number in Tehran and Isfahan experienced repeated outages, forcing manual reporting of casualty data. Provincial crisis teams reverted to legacy radio networks.
June 23 | Data Leak at State Bank
Bank Melli announced a “limited customer data leak,” with cybersecurity experts warning that this could be the first sign of eroding public trust due to unclear breach scope.
June 24 | Partial Restoration
Following the ceasefire, nationwide internet restrictions were gradually lifted. However, by the end of the day, connectivity in parts of Sistan‑and‑Baluchestan, Kohgiluyeh‑and‑Boyer-Ahmad, and around Kermanshah provinces remained below 30% of pre-war levels.
Multi-Layered Consequences
• Economic impact: Financial systems were paralyzed, delaying salaries and subsidies, and many small online businesses faced sudden collapse.
• Emergency response disruption: Loss of location-based services hampered relief efforts during ongoing physical attacks.
• Legal concerns: There was no transparent judicial process for restricting access or arresting more than 30 online activists, creating another loophole in the right to information.
• Digital crisis framework: The three waves of throttling, the full outage on June 18, and over ten critical cyberattacks against energy, health, and banking sectors painted a picture of fragile digital infrastructure overwhelmed by security-first crisis management.
• Path to recovery: Sustainable restoration—especially in underserved areas—depends on government transparency about responses, compensation for affected businesses, and a halt to punitive cyber policies; without these, Iran’s cyberspace will remain a battlefield of censorship, cyberattacks, and distrust.
Political and Diplomatic Reactions
HRANA’s review of international responses to the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel reveals an unprecedented consensus from the very outset. While the tone and intensity varied, nearly all statements converged on three shared imperatives: restraint, an immediate return to diplomacy, and the protection of civilians. Governments, regional blocs, and global institutions issued statements condemning or expressing grave concern over the conflict, warning that further escalation could destabilize the Middle East and jeopardize international security.
Early Days: Condemnation and Calls for Restraint
As the first wave of attacks unfolded, countries including the UK, Germany, Japan, Australia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Jordan, and China—alongside the UN Secretary-General and the International Atomic Energy Agency—voiced explicit or implicit alarm over rising tensions. Despite political differences, all actors emphasized a shared goal: preventing regional spillover and civilian harm.
Ongoing Strikes: Broader Criticism and Civilian Protection Focus
By midweek, a second wave of diplomatic responses emerged. The Qatari Foreign Ministry, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and 21 Arab and Islamic nations—from Algeria to Sudan—issued coordinated statements. These not only condemned or expressed concern over the attacks but also called for unhindered humanitarian access and full respect for civilian protections—signaling potential breaches of international humanitarian law.
Regional Powers Step into Mediation
As casualties and infrastructure damage mounted, Moscow and Ankara began proposing diplomatic initiatives. The Kremlin spokesperson stated that Russia remains in contact with both parties and that an earlier mediation offer stood. President Erdoğan of Turkey also phoned Iran’s president to express readiness to facilitate nuclear negotiations and de-escalation—reflecting regional actors’ efforts to fill a void left by multilateral diplomacy.
UN and Human Rights Bodies Take the Stage
In the latter half of the conflict, rhetoric intensified. Twenty leading international human rights organizations jointly labeled Israel’s airstrikes a grave breach of humanitarian law and potentially war crimes, urging an immediate ceasefire and independent investigation. Concurrently, the UN’s fact-finding mission highlighted attacks on a Tehran residential complex and Evin Prison as violations of the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets. The UN Human Rights Office explicitly condemned the Evin strike as a serious breach of international law.
Conclusion: Fragile but Widespread Consensus
While the language ranged from direct condemnation to “deep concern,” the overall diplomatic alignment—against escalation and for civilian protection—was clear. This alignment extended to legal accountability, with UN experts and human rights bodies pushing for formal inquiries. On Day 11, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross demanded immediate access to Evin Prison.
Finally, on the twelfth day, a ceasefire was brokered by the U.S. President, Qatar, and the UN Secretary-General, and took effect at 12:30 a.m.
Preliminary Legal Analysis – Assessing Potential Violations
Following the armed conflict between Iran and Israel, documentation gathered by HRA suggests that the pattern of Israeli air and missile strikes often failed to comply with the requirements of international obligations. In addition, the repeated strikes on civilian-populated areas in Tehran, Tabriz, and Kermanshah; the bombing of Evin Prison; and the impact on at least nine health facilities and six EMS bases indicate a failure to uphold essential principles enshrined in International Humanitarian Law.
1 • Distinguish between military objectives and civilian populations or objects,
2 • Avoid indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, and
3 • Take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm
However, repeated strikes on civilian-populated areas in Tehran, Tabriz, and Kermanshah; the bombing of Evin Prison; and the impact on at least nine health facilities and six EMS bases indicate a systematic failure to uphold these essential principles.
According to HRANA’s field data, during this period there were 5,665 casualties, military and civilian, (1,190 killed and 4,475 wounded) across 28 provinces. Among them, at least 431 civilians, including 65 children and 49 women, were killed, and over 2,000 civilians were injured.
The combined killing of at least eight aid workers or medical personnel and the destruction or damage to ambulances and medical infrastructure, calls for prompt investigations into potential violations of IHL are paramount.
Furthermore, analysis of the recorded targets reveals the following breakdown:
• 62% of targeted locations were dual-use or of uncertain (remain under investigation),
• 16% were explicitly
• 22% were clearly military.
This alarming distribution increases the likelihood of violations of the principles of distinction and proportionality.
The June 23 strike on Evin Prison, which killed a physician, destroyed the prison clinic, disrupted communications, and resulted in the deaths of two civilians unaffiliated with the prison. constitutes not only a violation of the principle of distinction.
Human rights organizations have called for neutral investigations, guaranteed humanitarian access, and criminal accountability for perpetrators. CSOs have emphasized that persistent disregard for the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, particularly indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, could rise to the level of war crimes.
Reaffirming Humanitarian Obligations
With the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of a ceasefire, critical humanitarian priorities remain:
• Protection of civilians and critical infrastructure – The extensive destruction of refineries, power networks, and healthcare facilities, alongside internal displacement and shortages of essential goods, requires urgent rebuilding efforts and reparations.
• Ensuring safe and effective humanitarian access –Repeated internet shutdowns, damaged transportation infrastructure, and fuel shortages have critically impeded the ability of CSOs to assess needs, communicate with affected populations, and deliver aid in a timely and safe manner.
• Respect for detainees’ rights and freedom of expression –The wave of security-related arrests and communication restrictions has heightened the risk of violations of fair trial standards. The immediate release of detainees imprisoned solely for expressing opinions or reporting on events is essential.
• Independent investigations and accountability –The high number of victims, attacks on medical centers and Evin Prison, and the use of high-powered weaponry in densely populated areas necessitate the need for immediate and impartial investigations into potential violations.
Human Rights Activists in Iran reiterates its commitment to ongoing documentation and analysis, emphasizing that the end of hostilities does not mark the end of legal responsibility. Reconstruction, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition must remain central to the international community’s focus and to all involved actors.
[1] The figures presented here include both military and civilian casualties. For a detailed breakdown of civilian losses, see the “Human Casualties from the Iran-Israel War” section of this report.
