Escalating Armed Violence in Southeastern Iran: At Least 63 Armed Incidents in Six Months

HRANA – At least 63 armed incidents were recorded across Iran’s southeastern provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan and Kerman between March 31 and October 10, 2026, amid a sharp escalation in armed violence in the region. According to local and unofficial reports, the incidents left at least 94 people dead and 33 injured, while official sources reported 87 fatalities and 10 injuries. The pace of violence accelerated significantly in recent weeks, with 18 incidents recorded in just the final 18 days of the reporting period, surpassing the total for any previous full month. The escalation has also been accompanied by a shift in the nature of confrontations, from targeted shootings and attacks on patrol vehicles to coordinated ambushes, roadside bombings, and the reported use of rocket-propelled grenades and heavier weaponry.

According to HRANA, the pattern of events over the past six months indicates that southeastern Iran is entering a more volatile phase of armed confrontation. This shift has unfolded in a security environment profoundly affected since late winter 1404 by direct warfare between Iran, on one side, and the United States and Israel, on the other. During the same period, government concerns increased over the possibility that armed groups might become more active in border regions. Yet while much of the Iranian government’s public and security attention was focused on developments in the west and northwest, a quieter but sustained pattern of increasing attacks, security operations and armed clashes took shape in the southeast.

Most of the armed incidents were recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, while two were also reported in Faryab County, Kerman Province. Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr, and Rask emerged as the main centers of armed confrontation. Meanwhile, signs of growing coordination among some Baloch armed groups have emerged, particularly with the formation of the People’s Fighters Front (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi). However, many of the incidents remain unclaimed, and available evidence does not establish responsibility for a significant number of attacks.

Data Overview

GroupKilled (official)Killed (unofficial)Injured (official)Injured (unofficial)
Government forces (FARAJA, IRGC, Basij, intelligence agencies, Army)3953929
Fatemiyoun affiliated forces19UnknownUnknown
Armed individuals4625UnknownUnknown
Civilians1714
Total87941033

Armed Clashes Intensify in September and Early October

A chronological review of the events clearly illustrates how armed clashes have increased over time. After four incidents in Khordad (21 May -21 June), the number rose to 10 in Mordad (23 July-22 August) and 11 in Shahrivar (23 August-22 September). Shahrivar was the most incident-heavy complete month of the period, but that record was broken in the first half of the following month: from 1 to 18 Mehr (23 September-10 October), 18 armed incidents were recorded. In other words, the pace of clashes in Mehr not only exceeded that of previous months, but reached an unprecedented level within less than a full month.

The escalation is evident not only in the growing number of incidents but also in the increasing intensity of armed confrontations. Seven armed attacks were reported in the six days between 13 and 18 Mehr alone (5 -10 October). During the same period, attacks on patrol units, police facilities and multi-vehicle convoys increased, and power or internet outages were reported after clashes in some locations. Taken together, these indicators suggest a gradual shift from isolated attacks toward confrontations that, in some cases, have become longer in duration, heavier in weaponry and broader in geographic reach.

Monthly trend in armed incidents, March 31 to October 10, 2026

From Targeted Killings to Ambushes and Semi-Heavy Weapons

The most frequently recorded type of incident during this period was attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys, with 17 cases documented. Fourteen targeted shootings of individuals were also recorded; in seven cases, the attacks occurred outside the victims’ homes, workplaces, or along their regular travel routes. Targeted shootings were more common in the earlier months, but in the final weeks, both the weapons used and the nature of the operations changed.

On 10 Mehr (October 2), in the Rudmahi area of Zahedan, a vehicle attributed to Fatemiyoun forces was struck by a booby trap and then came under gunfire. Five days later, reports on the attack against the Law Enforcement Command headquarters in Jalq described the use of mines, RPGs and semi-heavy weapons. On October 9 (17 Mehr), a roadside bomb exploded along the route of a police convoy in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan. In total, at least seven incidents involved equipment such as drones, artillery, RPGs, armored vehicles or explosives.

Government forces also used drones, artillery, armored vehicles and heavy weapons in several operations. In operations in Jahadabad, Gharibabad and Monzalab, locations of clashes and homes targeted during the operations were destroyed, blown up or set on fire. Such developments, particularly when operations take place in residential settings, increase the risk of harm to civilians and their property and heighten the need for precise documentation of operational methods and their consequences.

Most frequent operational patterns in armed incidents

More Visible Emergence of Armed Opposition Groups

One notable development in recent weeks has been the growing number of armed clashes attributed to the People’s Fighters Front. The organization, which operates as an alliance of several Baloch armed groups, was linked to 11 recorded incidents in total. These include attacks for which it claimed responsibility, participation in certain clashes, and confirmation that some individuals killed in government operations were its members. Ten of those 11 incidents occurred on or after 21 Shahrivar (12 September).

Even so, the available data do not support attributing the overall increase in violence to a single group. Of the 42 incidents initiated by armed actors, a specific claim of responsibility was recorded for only seven attacks: six by the People’s Fighters Front and one by Ansar al-Furqan. A large share of attacks therefore remains unclaimed or cannot be reliably attributed. This makes it difficult to assess the actual capabilities of the groups, their chains of command, or the degree of operational coordination among them.

Fatemiyoun: Disputed Accounts of Presence and Casualties

Accounts involving the Fatemiyoun, a force operating under the IRGC Quds Force and composed primarily of Afghan nationals, have been disputed. While local sources and Baloch armed groups have identified personnel targeted in several incidents, including in Rudmahi, Zahedan, as Fatemiyoun members, Iranian officials and state media have either omitted any reference to the group or provided different accounts of the affiliation of the forces involved.

According to local reporting, at least nine personnel attributed to the Fatemiyoun were killed during this period – one of the principal factors behind the gap between official and unofficial casualty figures for government and affiliated forces. Four deaths were reported in the 20 Shahrivar (11 September) attack on a patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun in Rudmahi, and five more in the 10 Mehr ( 2 October) attack in the same area. Because there is no independent confirmation and the organizational affiliation of these forces is disputed, these cases should be treated as documented but contested claims rather than conclusive facts about the nature of their deployment or mission.

Two Different Narratives of Fatalities

The divergence between official and local accounts is not limited to the number of casualties. In several cases, the central dispute concerns who the person killed actually was and what role the person played. In local reporting, of 94 deaths, 62 were described as government or affiliated forces, 25 as armed individuals and seven as civilians. Official accounts, by contrast, reported 40 government and affiliated personnel, 46 armed individuals and only one civilian killed.

These two sets of figures should not be added together; they are parallel narratives of the same period. The gap is especially pronounced in two areas: first, a difference of 22 in the number of government and affiliated personnel reported killed; and second, 21 people whom officials described as armed or as perpetrators, but whose identities or deaths were not confirmed by local sources or related groups. In addition, local sources described at least five people whom official accounts labeled ‘armed’ or ‘attackers’ as civilians.

A specific dispute over the identity or affiliation of victims was documented in eight incidents. In 11 other incidents, casualties were reported but the precise number of dead or injured was unclear. Any aggregate casualty figure should therefore be read as the minimum that can be extracted from the available reporting, not as a definitive count of every victim.

Comparison of official and local accounts of fatalities

Civilians Caught Between the Two Sides

Civilian deaths and injuries are among the most serious aspects of the recent developments. On 2 Mehr (24 September), as clashes continued in Jahadabad, Saravan, a nine-year-old child, Mohammadamin Dehghan, and his father were shot while traveling in a vehicle carrying water; the child died several days later. On 17 Mehr (9 October) in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan, a passing civilian, Abdollah Ghanbarzehi, was killed by gunfire from forces present at the scene, while state media published a different account of his role.

There are other cases in which families or local sources rejected the official claim that those killed were armed, including two people killed in Rask on 2 Ordibehesht (22 April) and two people in Kahnoak village in Taftan. These disputes underscore the importance of publishing verifiable information on the identity of victims, whether they were armed, the precise circumstances in which lethal force was used, and the results of post-incident investigations.

Two abductions of government personnel were also recorded during this period, resulting in three deaths. Delays in returning the bodies of some of those killed were also reported, including the return of bodies from the Berenjinan operation after 30 to 48 days. In the case of Abuzar Hamli, who was killed in the Bidedlad clash, local sources alleged that 10 billion tomans were demanded in exchange for the return of his body. These allegations require independent investigation and transparent responses from the responsible authorities.

Geography of Violence: Concentration in Underserved Areas

Of 61 incidents for which the location is known, 37 occurred in four counties: Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr and Rask. Zahedan ranked first with 11 incidents, while Saravan and Iranshahr recorded nine each and Rask eight. Both incidents recorded in Kerman Province occurred in Faryab County. This concentration indicates that most of the violence is occurring within a defined geographic belt and in areas that have for years faced deep challenges in development, employment, infrastructure and access to public services.

This economic and social context matters for understanding the region’s security developments. A 2025 International Crisis Group report, citing official Iranian data, placed Sistan and Baluchestan near the bottom of national development indicators and noted that 12 of the province’s 26 counties were among the country’s 20 poorest counties. The same report cited a provincial unemployment rate of 12.4 percent in 1402, compared with a national average of 8.1 percent. The United Nations Development Programme also emphasized in 2025 the severe pressure of water scarcity and prolonged drought on livelihoods and community resilience in parts of the province.

Economic deprivation by itself does not explain armed violence, and the coexistence of the two does not establish a definitive causal relationship. However, neglect of development gaps and an exclusively security-centered approach to the region can deepen mistrust, social vulnerability and cycles of violence. In an area already facing unemployment, infrastructure shortages and environmental pressures, expanding armed operations have consequences beyond direct casualties: restrictions on movement, communication disruptions, property damage, intensified military presence and greater risks to local communities.

Geographic concentration of armed incidents in southeastern Iran

Arrests and the Need for Accountability

At least 19 arrests directly linked to incidents in this period were specifically documented: 16 on the basis of official statements and three in local reporting. This total does not include Fars News Agency’s aggregate claim on 26 Farvardin (15 April) that 55 people had been arrested, because the locations, precise timing and details of those arrests were not disclosed and may overlap with other documented cases.

When accounts differ so sharply over casualty figures and even the identities of those killed, establishing accountability requires more than aggregate statistics. Essential steps include disclosing the names and legal status of detainees, providing information about their whereabouts and the charges against them, ensuring families have access to information, and conducting independent investigations into reported deaths and injuries. Clarifying the circumstances surrounding the use of lethal force, investigating reports of homes being destroyed, and examining allegations that the return of victims’ bodies was delayed or made conditional are also necessary to establish the facts and ensure accountability.

Southeastern Iran Requires Attention Beyond a Security-Only Approach

The clashes of the past six months show that developments in southeastern Iran can no longer be viewed as a series of isolated and disconnected incidents. The rising number of events, their concentration in several counties, the introduction of heavier weapons into some confrontations, the more visible presence of an armed alliance, and the widening gap between official and local accounts of casualties together point to an escalating trend.

This trend is unfolding in one of Iran’s most underserved regions – an area that has long faced development gaps, unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, a water crisis and a sense of deprivation. Turning such an environment into an arena of increasingly armed confrontation risks once again placing the heaviest burden on local civilians: through loss of life, damage to homes and livelihoods, arrests and security restrictions, and deepening mistrust between society and state institutions.

Reducing that risk requires more than an expanded security presence. Independent and transparent documentation, effective protection of civilians, investigations into suspicious deprivations of life, accountability for operations in residential areas, protection of detainees’ rights, and serious attention to the region’s structural deprivation are among the measures that could help prevent the cycle of violence from deepening. The pattern documented through 18 Mehr (10 October) indicates that without such an approach, the risk of continued and escalating tensions in southeastern Iran remains serious.

Detailed Table of Incidents

The table below lists 63 armed incidents recorded from March 31 to October 10, 2026 (11 Farvardin to 18 Mehr 1405), including date, location, type of attack or clash, casualties, victim/attacker attribution and reporting sources. The information was compiled from local reporting and official statements; cases involving conflicting accounts or lacking independent confirmation are presented with those qualifications.

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#DateLocationType of attack / clashCasualtiesVictim / attacker attributionSummaryPrimary source
Farvardin 1405
1March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)Mirjaveh, outside the IRGC Intelligence buildingTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Lt. Col. Mohammadreza Rahdar); 1 civilian wounded, according to policeVictim: military officer. Assailants: unidentified armed individuals; no claim of responsibility.Rahdar was shot outside the IRGC Intelligence building in Mirjaveh and killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
2March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)Kalat, Sarbaz CountyShooting at police vehicle2 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Reza Roozgerd; 2nd Lt. Mohammadreza Aram)Victims: Kalat Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA). Assailant: unknown. Provincial police later claimed a suspect had been arrested in Rask.A Samand vehicle belonging to the Kalat police command came under fire; Roozgerd died at the scene and Aram later died in hospital.Documents Network / Haalvsh
3April 3, 2026 (14 Farvardin)Delgan County, one of the county villagesShooting at patrol2 killed (Hojatoleslam Hossein Abdollahi; Capt. Nasser Abdollahi)Victims: head of the Basij of Delgan seminary students and commander of the Mirem Basij sector. Assailant: unknown.The two Basij officials were shot while on patrol; the Delgan governor confirmed their deaths.Documents Network / Haalvsh
4April 9, 2026 (20 Farvardin)Iranshahr, urban areaTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mehran Shiheki)Victim: local Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Shiheki was shot in Iranshahr and killed; provincial police confirmed the incident.Documents Network / Haalvsh
5April 11, 2026 (22 Farvardin)Jalq, Golshan County, outside victim’s homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Madad Sepahi)Victim: local IRGC member. Assailants: two unidentified motorcyclists.Sepahi was shot outside his home while returning from a work shift; sources said he had been dissatisfied with his service in the IRGC.Haalvsh / Documents Network
6April 15, 2026 (26 Farvardin; date of announcement)Sistan and Baluchestan Province; locations not disclosedClaimed security operations (aggregate figure)13 killed and 55 arrested (official claim)According to Fars News Agency: members of “terrorist teams” linked to Israel and the United States.Fars reported that, since the start of the war, 13 people had been killed in operations and 55 arrested; no independent details were released.Documents Network
7April 16, 2026 (27 Farvardin)Saravan, urban areaShooting at patrol vehicle3 killed (2nd Lt. Mehdi Nasiri-Sedeh; Sgt. 1st Class Ahmad Sheikhi; Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Shagozaei)Victims: FARAJA Emergency Unit. Assailants: unknown; no claim of responsibility.Armed individuals opened fire on an Emergency Unit patrol vehicle in Saravan, killing three officers.Haalvsh / Documents Network
8April 19, 2026 (30 Farvardin; date of announcement)Iranshahr-Khash road, police-road checkpointClash at checkpoint1 killed and 1 arrested among vehicle occupants (police claim)Government side: tactical police unit. Vehicle occupants: unidentified; police account.The southern provincial police commander said occupants of a Peugeot ignored an order to stop and opened fire; weapons and ammunition were reportedly found.Documents Network
Ordibehesht 1405
9April 22, 2026 (2 Ordibehesht)Near Jakigur, Rask CountyIRGC shooting / claimed destruction of “terrorist team”2 killed (Mohammadakram Akhtari; Mohammad Eslam Saeidi)Official account: members of an armed team. Family account: ordinary civilians from Darchub, Sarbaz.An IRGC Land Cruiser opened fire on a vehicle carrying the two men without a stop; state media called it the destruction of a terrorist team, while their families rejected the claim.Documents Network / Haalvsh
10April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Rask CountyShooting at IRGC vehicleNo casualties reported, according to state mediaTarget: IRGC forces. Assailant: unknown.An IRGC vehicle was fired on at dawn in Rask; Tasnim called the attack unsuccessful and said the assailants fled.Haalvsh / Documents Network
11April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Zahedan, Baghri Street, ShirabadShooting at patrol vehicle3 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Nezamdoost; 1st Lt. Ali Momeni; Ali-Asghar Goldavi); 1 woundedVictims: FARAJA patrol. Assailant: Ansar al-Furqan, which claimed responsibility.A police patrol in Shirabad, Zahedan, was raked with gunfire; two of the wounded later died in hospital.Documents Network / Haalvsh
12April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Exit of Jakigur, Rask CountyAttack on military convoyCol. Mahmoud Baghbani and several companions woundedVictim: commander of the Rask IRGC/Basij Resistance District. Assailant: unknown.A three-vehicle convoy carrying the Rask IRGC commander was attacked; he was transferred to Zahedan for treatment.Documents Network
13May 20, 2026 (30 Ordibehesht)Saravan County, one of the connecting roadsShooting and clash after pursuit1 police officer killed (3rd Lt. Amirhossein Shahraki); 2 attackers killed, police claimVictim: FARAJA. Assailants: armed occupants of a vehicle; identities unknown.Police said vehicle occupants shot at officers; police claimed two attackers were killed and reported finding weapons, a Starlink terminal and a Peugeot.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Khordad 1405
14May 28, 2026 (7 Khordad)Iranshahr, Basij Square / Hafez intersectionTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (2nd Lt. Isa Abbasi)Victim: FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Abbasi was shot while traveling by motorcycle to work and died at the scene.Haalvsh / Documents Network
15June 5, 2026 (15 Khordad)Zabol border areaBorder clash (official claim)6 attackers killed (claim); death of border-service conscript Seyed Mostafa Hosseini also announced June 7, exact time unclear and possibly relatedGovernment side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”The border commander claimed an armed group intended to cross the border and attack border posts; no identities or evidence regarding the six reported dead were released.Documents Network / Haalvsh
16June 7, 2026 (17 Khordad)Berenjinan area, SaravanJoint IRGC/Intelligence operation using a drone4 group members killed (Jalil Nahtani; Mohammad Omar Nahtani; Yasin Mohammadzehi; Vahid Shahuzehi); 1 IRGC member killed (Mohammad Siahani); 1 woundedThose killed on the armed side: members of the People’s Fighters Front, later confirmed by the Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and intelligence forces.The clash lasted from about 2 to 8 a.m.; the IRGC reported weapons and a Starlink terminal. Bodies were returned to families after 30-48 days.Haalvsh / Documents Network
17June 19, 2026 (29 Khordad)KhashTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (3rd Lt. Abdolsalam Kord)Victim: Khash Law Enforcement Command. Assailant: unknown.A Khash police officer was targeted during a mission and killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Tir 1405
18June 29, 2026 (8 Tir)Saravan, near the IRGC building, opposite Imam Ali gas stationShooting at private vehicle2 killed (Amirhossein Arbabi; his wife, Fatemeh Bameripur)Victim: IRGC Intelligence officer. Tasnim described the assailants as a “terrorist group affiliated with the Zionist regime and the United States”; no group claimed responsibility.Arbabi was attacked minutes after leaving the IRGC building; his wife died in hospital the following day.Documents Network / Haalvsh
19June 30, 2026 (9 Tir)Naskand police station and district office, SarbazArmed attack on police station / exchange of fireNo casualties reportedTarget: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.Armed individuals fired on the Naskand police station at about 1 a.m. and withdrew after an exchange of fire; internet service in the area was cut.Haalvsh / Documents Network
20July 1, 2026 (10 Tir)Sib and SuranTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (3rd Lt. Mohammad Palangi)Victim: local Sunni Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Palangi was shot while traveling from home to work and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
21July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)Zabol, Mohammadabad industrial townAbduction and killing1 killed (Capt. Seyed Mehdi Abdollahi, 51)Victim: Zabol Border Regiment, Qaleh Rostam South post. Assailants: unidentified armed men.The border officer was abducted while traveling to duty; on 1 Mordad his family was informed that he had been killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
22July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)Kahnoak village, TaftanSecurity raid / claimed operation against “perpetrators”2 killed (Eqbal Rigi; Bilal Rastaroosh); 1 arrested (Meysam Rigi)Police: two were perpetrators of the killing of FARAJA personnel in Nukabad, Taftan. Local sources: civilians, with no armed clash.Dozens of military vehicles blocked the road and a Peugeot Pars carrying two civilians was reportedly fired on without warning; forces then raided the Rigi family home.Haalvsh / Documents Network
23July 4, 2026 (13 Tir; date of announcement)Zahedan, Chabahar, Iranshahr, Khash and TaftanClaimed security operation2 killed and 10 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)Official account: members of “operational cells” of an armed group; operation involved the Intelligence Ministry, IRGC and FARAJA.The Intelligence Ministry reported finding a machine gun, Kalashnikov rifles, 17 pistols, 14 grenades and Starlink equipment; identities and locations of the two deaths were not disclosed.Documents Network
24July 10, 2026 (19 Tir)Zahedan County; bodies later found about 5 km from a checkpointAbduction and killing2 killed (3rd Lt. Afshin Saadati-Kia; Reza Karimian)Victims: FARAJA tactical unit. Assailant: “an armed group,” according to relatives.Two tactical-unit officers were abducted while on duty and killed the same night; their bodies were found on 12 Mordad.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Mordad 1405
25July 23, 2026 (1 Mordad; date of announcement)Jakigur Border Regiment area, RaskBorder clash (official claim)2 attackers killed (claim)Government side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”The border commander claimed two members of an armed group were killed and weapons, fuse and explosive detonators were recovered; exact time and location were not disclosed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
26July 26, 2026 (4 Mordad)Sarzeh area, IranshahrShooting at private vehicle carrying personnel1 killed (Noorollah Narouei, died 13 Mordad); 1 wounded (Emamdadi)Victims: plainclothes FARAJA recruitment personnel. Assailant: unknown.A privately plated Samand carrying two FARAJA personnel was shot; Narouei died ten days later.Haalvsh / Documents Network
27July 29, 2026 (7 Mordad)Iranshahr, Khatam al-Anbiya 5 Street, outside homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Mehran Salarzadeh)Police: law-enforcement officer. Local sources: deputy director of the Iranshahr Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.Salarzadeh was shot several times outside his home at about 10:30 p.m. and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
28July 30, 2026 (8 Mordad)Abu al-Fazl Mosque checkpoint, Iranshahr-Delgan roadAttack on checkpoint1 confirmed killed (Sgt. 1st Class Meysam Karami Qaleh-Taki); local sources reported additional dead and woundedVictims: FARAJA. Assailants: armed vehicle occupants; police reported three vehicles, Haalvsh one.At about 1 a.m., the checkpoint came under heavy fire; the assailants fled after several minutes.Haalvsh / Documents Network
29August 6, 2026 (15 Mordad)Mirjaveh, near Behdasht Boulevard, site used by security forcesExplosion, cause unknownUnspecified number of personnel killed and wounded, according to sourcesLocation possibly linked to the Intelligence Department or IRGC Intelligence. Cause unknown; sources suggested a possible internal origin.A powerful explosion occurred at about 3:20 a.m. and wounded personnel were reportedly transferred to Zahedan; officials did not explain the incident and no group claimed responsibility.Haalvsh
30August 11, 2026 (20 Mordad)Khash, Morad Rigi Street near 22 Bahman SquareAttack on mobile checkpointUnspecified; initial reports said government forces suffered casualtiesTarget: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.A nighttime mobile checkpoint was fired on and an exchange of fire continued for several minutes.Haalvsh
31August 13, 2026 (22 Mordad; date of announcement)Khash CountyClaimed security operation2 killed and 4 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)Official account: two operational cells of armed groups that entered from abroad; operation involved IRGC Quds Headquarters and FARAJA.The Intelligence Ministry released video and claimed two cells had been dismantled; the claim was not independently confirmed.Documents Network
32August 15, 2026 (24 Mordad)Mirjaveh, near Behdasht BoulevardTargeted shooting / assassination attempt1 seriously wounded (Hossein Saadatian; the text also gives “Hassan”)Victim: head of IRGC Intelligence in Mirjaveh. Assailant: unknown.Saadatian was shot at about 7:30 p.m. and admitted to the intensive-care unit at Nabi Akram Hospital in Zahedan.Haalvsh
33August 20, 2026 (29 Mordad; announced 30 Mordad)Saravan border / Saravan Border Regiment areaBorder clash (official claim)1 attacker killed (claim)Government side: Border Guard. Assailants: an armed group allegedly attempting to enter Iran.Police said the remaining group members fled across the border; Haalvsh said video released in connection with the claim was actually from a 2025 clash in Zabol.Haalvsh / Documents Network
34August 22, 2026 (31 Mordad)Zahedan, Baghri Street, Shirabad, real-estate officeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Nader Sarani, 45)Victim: Basij member, confirmed by IRGC Quds Headquarters; local sources described him as an official at the Hemmatabad base. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.Armed men entered Sarani’s real-estate office and shot him dead.Haalvsh / Documents Network
Shahrivar 1405
35August 27, 2026 (5 Shahrivar)Mirjaveh-Zahedan roadShooting at patrol vehicle1 killed (2nd Sgt. Ali Heydari-Moghadam); 1 woundedVictims: FARAJA Border Guard. Assailant: unknown; no claim of responsibility.A privately plated border-patrol Hilux was raked with gunfire from the front; state media called the attack “terrorist.”Haalvsh / Documents Network
36September 3, 2026 (12 Shahrivar)Hasaruiyeh, ZahedanHouse raid / siege / clash2 killed (Yasin Narouei, 24; “Sajjad,” from Bam)Government side: military and security forces, reportedly about 25 vehicles. Those killed: armed individuals; affiliation not announced.A house was surrounded from about 6 a.m.; after a two-hour clash, two armed individuals were killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
37September 5, 2026 (14 Shahrivar)Vadgar village, Ashar District, MehrestanHouse raid / siege / clash2 armed individuals killed (Mohammad Delmoradi; Salman Derazehi); 1 arrested; reports of government-force casualties and several civilians woundedGovernment side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA. Affiliation of the dead not announced.A house was attacked from about 3 to 10 a.m. with a Goryunov machine gun and RPGs; homeowner Akhtar Sandakzehi was arrested.Haalvsh / Documents Network
38September 6, 2026 (15 Shahrivar)Dehak-Sarjangal road, Kourin, ZahedanShooting at vehicle2 killed (Abolfazl Oudi; Keyvan Ramroudi)Victims: personnel of the IRGC Shahid Mirhosseini Operational Headquarters. Assailant: unknown.An unplated Capra vehicle was fired on; both occupants were shot in the head and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
39September 8, 2026 (17 Shahrivar)Parud, Rask County, outside victim’s homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Abdolraouf Eshaghi)Victim: commander of the Parud Basij Resistance Base. Assailants: riders on two motorcycles.Motorcycle-borne gunmen opened fire on Eshaghi outside his home, killing him at the scene.Documents Network / Haalvsh
40September 10, 2026 (19 Shahrivar)Khash, Sarbaz Street opposite the governor’s officeAttack on mobile checkpointAt least 3 killed and several wounded, initial local reportingTarget: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.A nighttime checkpoint near Anar Square was attacked; it was the second attack on a mobile checkpoint in Khash within a month.Haalvsh
41September 11, 2026 (20 Shahrivar)Rudmahi, Kourin District, ZahedanAttack on patrol of affiliated force4 killed; one local source initially reported 12Victims: Hazara Fatemiyoun personnel reportedly deployed by the IRGC. Assailant: “Baloch fighters,” according to sources.A patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun came under fire and its vehicle was set ablaze.Documents Network / Haalvsh
42September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar)Bakhshan, SaravanRaid on group position / nine-hour clashIRGC: 3 government personnel killed (Misagh Sani, Mehdi Sarhadi, Moslem Fazeli) and 4 armed individuals killed, later 5. Front: 4 members killed, 9 government personnel killed, 21 wounded.Defenders/armed side: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and security agencies.The clash lasted from about 4 a.m. to noon and involved heavy weapons and quadcopters. Support teams from the Front broke the siege and six members reportedly escaped.Haalvsh / Documents Network
43September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar; source discrepancy with 20 Shahrivar)Saravan, Moallem Street, outside homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed; identity not releasedVictim: plainclothes security force member. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.A plainclothes security officer was shot outside his home at about 8 p.m. and later died at Razi Hospital.Haalvsh
44September 18, 2026 (27 Shahrivar)Zahedan, University and Daneshjoo streetsClash between patrol and vehicle occupants2 killed (Zakaria and Mehrallah Shahbakhsh); 1 wounded and 1 arrested; 3 government personnel and 2 female bystanders woundedGovernment side: IRGC Quds patrol. Vehicle occupants: police described them as armed; relatives denied any affiliation.The clash began around 12:30 a.m. and lasted about two hours; police announced two armed men killed and one person arrested.Haalvsh / Documents Network
45September 21, 2026 (30 Shahrivar)Bazman-Iranshahr roadAttack on police vehicle1 killed (Capt. Alireza Mehrabi); 3 woundedVictims: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.A police vehicle was attacked in the afternoon; police described the incident as a “terrorist act.”Haalvsh / Documents Network
Mehr 1405
46September 23, 2026 (1 Mehr)Jahadabad (“Dab”), SaravanRaid on alleged “safe house” / multi-hour clash2 IRGC personnel killed (Brig. Gen. Hossein Zarifi; Ahmad Herati Zeraati/Zerati); at least 5 wounded according to Documents Network, up to 13 according to Haalvsh; IRGC claimed 5 armed men killed and several arrests; Front said 4 members killed.Government side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA, including commander and intelligence official of Shahid Sajjad Headquarters. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.Forces surrounded the house, demolished it with a bulldozer and set it on fire; the commander of Shahid Sajjad Operational Headquarters in Saravan was killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
47September 24, 2026 (2 Mehr)Jahadabad, Saravan (Shushtari and Dabeh)Renewed clash / shooting by forces9-year-old Mohammadamin Dehghan wounded and later died on 5 Mehr; his father Eshaq woundedThe vehicle carrying the family was allegedly fired on by military and security forces.Gunfire and RPG fire continued in Jahadabad at dawn; forces reportedly fired on a family vehicle carrying water.Haalvsh / Documents Network
48September 25, 2026 (3 Mehr)Sarkahuran village, IranshahrHouse raid / clash1 killed (Obeid Zardkuhi); 1 arrested (Jasem Jamali)Government side: security forces. Affiliation of the person killed was not announced.A security raid on a house led to a clash; the reason for the raid was not disclosed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
49September 29, 2026 (7 Mehr)Gharibabad, IranshahrHouse siege / four-hour clash1 killed (Morteza Sotoudeh, 26)IRGC media: “armed robber.” Local sources rejected this characterization.Forces surrounded the house using an armored vehicle, quadcopter and RPG; Sotoudeh reportedly ended his own life after running out of ammunition.Documents Network / Haalvsh
50September 30, 2026 (8 Mehr)Near Magas police-road post, MehrestanShooting at military vehicleAt least 2 woundedVictims: military and law-enforcement personnel. Assailant: unknown.A vehicle carrying forces came under fire at about 1:30 p.m., coinciding with the anniversary of Zahedan’s “Bloody Friday.”Haalvsh
51October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)Entrance to Rask, Ahmadabad FARAJA checkpointAttack on checkpoint1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Alireza Sanchouli, 24)Victim: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.Armed individuals opened fire on the checkpoint at the entrance to Rask in the early morning.Documents Network / Haalvsh
52October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)Monzalab (Shahmoradabad township), ZahedanRaid on group position / clashIRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 6 armed individuals killed; People’s Fighters Front said 4 members were killed.Those killed: members of the People’s Fighters Front, according to the Front. Government side: FARAJA and IRGC Quds Headquarters.Forces raided a house with heavy weapons, artillery and a drone and blew it up after the clash; the IRGC said explosive packages were found.Documents Network / Haalvsh
53October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Nukabad, Taftan, Intelligence Department buildingArmed attack on government buildingUnknownTarget: Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.The building came under gunfire at dawn and an explosion, possibly a grenade, was heard.Haalvsh / Documents Network
54October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Rudmahi, Kalepadeh route, ZahedanBooby trap and gunfire against patrol vehicle5 killed according to local sources and the Front, including Ahmad Yaqoubi, an Afghan national; official account: at least 1 killedVictims: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A Fatemiyoun Land Cruiser equipped with a DShK heavy machine gun was hit by a booby trap and then gunfire; the official account omitted the Fatemiyoun name.Haalvsh / Documents Network
55October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Bidedlad and Shushgim heights, Parud District, RaskRaid on mountain base / ten-hour clashIRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 2 armed individuals killed; 1 death confirmed (Abuzar Hamli, 23)Defenders: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: forces from Rask, Sarbaz, Qasr Qand and Nikshahr using drones and artillery.The clash lasted from 5:30 a.m. to 3:20 p.m.; armed members escaped the encirclement, and the Front said 15 members left the area.Haalvsh / Documents Network
56October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)Bampur-Iranshahr road, before Salehin BrigadeAmbush against patrolOfficial: 2 killed (2nd Sgt. Amirhossein Qasemi; Sgt. 1st Class Nezam Dastgoshadeh), 1 wounded; witnesses: at least 3 killedVictims: FARAJA patrol from Nukjoub post. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A three-vehicle patrol was ambushed; one Hilux was hit by gunfire and another overturned.Haalvsh / Documents Network
57October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)Entrance to Jakigur bridge, RaskShooting at vehicle carrying personnel1 killed and 2 wounded (Morteza Sayyadi, Hamed Sayyadi, Morteza Bazi)Local sources: armed plainclothes personnel of the Jakigur Border Regiment. IRGC media: drivers on the Rimdan border route.A Peugeot 207 carrying three armed plainclothes personnel came under fire in the evening.Documents Network / Haalvsh
58October 7, 2026 (15 Mehr)Jalq, Law Enforcement Command headquarters, Golshan CountyAttack using mine, RPG and semi-heavy weaponsUnspecified number killed and wounded; Front claimed 6 officers were hitTarget: FARAJA. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.The police headquarters and a support Hilux were attacked in the evening; electricity and internet service in Jalq were cut.Haalvsh / Documents Network
59October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Lakhshak road, Nosratabad, ZahedanAttack on patrol vehicle2 killed (3rd Lt. Vahid Enayat; Sgt. 1st Class Abbas Aghaei); local sources reported 3 killed and 2 woundedVictims: FARAJA tactical unit. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A tactical-unit vehicle was fired on in the morning and a clash followed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
60October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Karinduk, Nikshahr, Nikshahr-Konarak roadPursuit and attack on two military vehiclesOfficial: 1 killed (Mohammadreza Okati), 3 wounded. Local sources: at least 5 confirmed wounded and heavy casualties.Official account: personnel of the Army’s 88th Armored Division. Haalvsh: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A Hilux and minibus leaving the Karinduk base were attacked; the wounded were transported by helicopter to Chabahar and Konarak.Haalvsh / Documents Network
61October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Faryab town center, Kerman ProvinceTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Maj. Mehdi Jamshidi)Victim: FARAJA officer; local sources said he had participated in repression of women protesters in Pashmuki. Assailant: unknown.Jamshidi’s private vehicle was raked with gunfire in the evening; he was struck by seven bullets and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
62October 9, 2026 (17 Mehr)Cheshmeh Ziarat, ZahedanRoadside bomb and clash2 killed (Col. Nosrat Eftekhari; Ehsan Dehmardeh) and several wounded; 1 civilian bystander (Abdollah Ghanbarzehi) killed by gunfire from forcesVictims: deputy cultural-social commander of the provincial Law Enforcement Command and security escort. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A booby trap exploded along a police convoy route; state media described the civilian who was killed as the bomber.Haalvsh / Documents Network
63October 10, 2026 (18 Mehr)Faryab County, Rudbar-e Zamin area, Kerman ProvincePolice operation against suspect in armed attack1 killed, according to officialsThe person was identified by authorities as the principal suspect in the attack on Mehdi Jamshidi; identity not released.The Faryab governor said the suspect’s hideout had been identified through intelligence work and police surveillance.IRNA

Methodology note: Figures for casualties, victim identities and the attribution of some forces are based on cross-checking official reporting, local sources and statements by parties to the clashes through 18 Mehr 1405 (October 10, 2026). Cases without independent confirmation or involving conflicting accounts are presented with those qualifications.

Annual Report on Execution in Iran; Marking the World Day Against the Death Penalty

HRANA – Marking the World Day Against the Death Penalty, the Statistics Center of Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) has released its annual report on the use of capital punishment in Iran. The findings point to a sharp intensification in executions, continued secrecy surrounding implementation of death sentences, and an increase in political and security-related executions.

Between October 10, 2025 and October 8, 2026, HRANA documented at least 2,003 executions across Iran on the basis of 1,857 reports, an increase of approximately 29% compared with the previous reporting period. During the same period, 230 people were documented as having been sentenced to death. The full report also includes detailed statistical analysis, profiles of political and security-related executions, and documentation concerning judicial officials involved in issuing or upholding death sentences.

Executions in Iran: Key Figures

IndicatorData
Total executions documented2,003
Change from previous periodApproximately 29% increase
Average frequency of executionApproximately one person every 4.35 hours
Death sentences issued230
Women executed47
Juvenile offenders executed4
Public executions9
Political and security-related executions69
Executions unannounced by official sourcesApproximately 95%

Rising Executions and the Monthly Pattern

The 2,003 executions documented during the current reporting period represent the highest total recorded across the ten reporting periods examined in the report. Compared with 1,553 executions in 2024–2025, the total increased by approximately 29%. The current figure is also more than 182% above the ten-period average of 710 executions.

Monthly data show that executions peaked in December 2025. By contrast, March 2026 recorded the lowest total among complete months. The October 2026 figure covers only the first seven days of the month and therefore should not be compared directly with full-month totals.

CHART 1 — Monthly Executions

Charges: Murder and Drug Offenses Dominate

The distribution of charges resulting in execution shows a notable shift from the previous period. According to HRANA documentation, 57.56% of those executed were convicted of murder and 36.25% of drug-related offenses. Political and security-related moharebeh or baghi charges accounted for 2.40%; other or unknown charges for 1.10%; security charges including espionage, assassination or bombing for 0.90%; rape for 0.80%; non-political moharebeh for 0.80%; efsad-e fel-arz (corruption on earth) for 0.15%; and economic crimes for 0.05%.

Taken together, murder and drug-related offenses account for more than 93% of all documented executions. At the same time, the increase in political and security-related executions, and the connection of a significant number of those cases to protests, stands out as a defining feature of the current reporting period.

CHART 2 — Executions by Charge

Geography of Executions: Concentration in Several Provinces and Prisons

By location of execution, Razavi Khorasan recorded the highest number with 200 executions, followed by Isfahan with 164 and Alborz with 123. Fars recorded 119, Khuzestan 112 and Lorestan 102. These figures are calculated on the basis of prison location and do not necessarily reflect the place of residence or alleged offense of the person executed.

Per-capita figures provide a different picture, particularly in smaller provinces. The report cautions that prisoner transfers and executions carried out outside a prisoner’s province of origin can inflate provincial rates. Tehran is not included in the per-capita table because no executions were recorded there, and 30 executions with an unknown province were excluded from that calculation.

At the prison level, Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan and Adelabad Prison in Shiraz recorded the highest numbers of executions. The spread of executions across dozens of prisons, alongside clear concentration in several facilities, illustrates both the nationwide scope and localized intensity of the death penalty.

CHART 3 — Executions by Province

Secrecy, Public Executions and Gender

One of the report’s most significant findings is the continued lack of official transparency. Approximately 95% of documented executions were carried out secretly or without announcement in official or domestic media, while only about 5% were reported through official or domestic sources. This pattern sharply limits public oversight and independent assessment of execution practices.

Of the 2,003 executions documented, 9 were carried out in public, representing about 0.4% of the total. Forty-seven women were executed during the reporting period. Four people whose identities and case histories were verified were under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged offense. Overall, 2.3% of those executed were women, 88.8% were men, and the gender of 8.9% remained unknown in the available data.

In relation to sentencing, HRA documented 230 people sentenced to death. At least 16 of those sentenced were women, 6 were sentenced to public execution, and 74 death sentences were upheld by the Supreme Court.

Ten-Year Trend: The Highest Recorded Level

A review of ten reporting periods shows that, after executions declined from 505 in 2016–2017 to 238 in 2018–2019, the trend turned upward from 2019–2020 onward. The totals then rose through 249, 272, 528, 664, 823 and 1,553 before reaching 2,003 in 2025–2026.

This trajectory places the current one-year increase within a longer pattern of escalation. Continued restrictions on access to official information, together with the very high share of unannounced executions, mean that the documented figures should be understood as the minimum that could be independently verified rather than necessarily the complete number of executions carried out.

CHART 4 — Ten-Year Execution Trend

69 Political and Security-Related Executions

During the reporting period, HRANA documented 69 people executed on political and security-related charges. Of these, 35 people — approximately 51% — were executed in connection with the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests. Twenty-nine people were executed in April and May 2026 alone, with 14 in April and 15 in May, marking the peak of executions in this category.

Among these 69 cases, 29 people were executed on charges of moharebeh, either alone or alongside other charges. Where the province was known, Alborz accounted for the largest share with 19 cases, followed by Isfahan with 10. The province was unknown in 20 cases.

The full report provides an individual case card for each of the 69 people, setting out the charge, date of execution, case background, province or city, and prison where available. This case-level documentation allows the aggregate figures to be examined in greater detail and shows the diversity of charges and case backgrounds included within the political and security-related category.

Judicial Actors Involved in Issuing or Upholding Death Sentences

For the first time in this format of the annual report, a dedicated section documents judges and courts identified in death-penalty cases. This research covers October 10, 2025 through September 26, 2026, meaning that its documentation window ends twelve days before the October 8, 2026 cutoff used for the report’s main statistical sections.

HRA’s review found that several judges identified during the current period had also appeared in earlier political, security-related or protest cases involving death sentences. Among the examples examined are Abolghasem Salavati of Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, Iman Afshari of Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, Vahid Hemmatnejad of Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, Ahmad Darvish-Goftar of Branch 1 of the Rasht Revolutionary Court, Reza Najafzadeh of Branch 3 of the Urmia Revolutionary Court, and Seyed Mahmoud Sadati of Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court.

The report emphasizes that this list is not exhaustive. Iranian authorities routinely withhold information about capital proceedings, and public reporting often fails to identify the presiding judge or even the relevant branch. Accordingly, the absence of a judge’s name from the report should not be read as evidence that the judge was not involved; rather, it reflects the limits of independently verifiable information.

A separate section also addresses Supreme Court review and distinguishes between issuing a death sentence at trial and later upholding or reviewing that sentence. The available documentation identifies judges from Branches 9, 20, 39 and 41 of the Supreme Court in connection with specific death-penalty cases.

Methodology and Data Limitations

HRA’s Statistics Center relies on HRANA reporting, a nationwide volunteer network, verified open-source material, and official judicial announcements. Because independent human rights groups cannot operate freely in Iran, access to prisons and courts is restricted, and many executions are deliberately concealed, a margin of error is unavoidable.

The figures in this report therefore reflect the capacity of civil society to document and independently verify executions rather than a claim to a flawless count of every execution carried out. The fact that approximately 95% of executions were not announced by official sources underscores the importance of independent monitoring and verification in assessing the true scale of capital punishment in Iran.

Access the Full Report

The full report contains detailed statistical tables, charts, provincial and prison-level data, profiles of all 69 people executed on political and security-related charges, and the section documenting judicial officials. For case details, sources and supporting data, download and read the complete report.

Download the full PDF report here

HRA Investigation Exposes How Digital Matchmaking Platforms Facilitate Child Marriage in Iran

HRANA News Agency – A new investigation by Human Rights Activists (HRA) documents how Iran’s “Adam and Eve” matchmaking platform allows minors to be presented as prospective spouses, while operating within a broader system of state licensing, promotion, financial incentives, and institutional support. The report also examines the role of international technology companies—including Google and Meta—in distributing and promoting services that may expose children to marriage, exploitation, and other forms of harm.

Human Rights Activists (HRA) has published a new investigative report, Child Marriage in the Digital Age, examining how digital matchmaking services in Iran are creating new pathways through which child marriage can be facilitated and normalized.

The investigation focuses on Adam and Eve (Adam va Hava), a government-licensed Iranian matchmaking platform, but places the service within a much wider legal, political, financial, and technological ecosystem. The report examines Iran’s marriage laws and demographic policies, the state system for licensing and monitoring matchmaking services, state-media promotion, financial support for marriage initiatives, institutional links surrounding the platform, and the role played by international technology companies in providing access to and visibility for the service.

The investigation comes amid the rapid expansion of officially authorized matchmaking platforms in Iran. Iranian authorities reported only one licensed matchmaking platform in 2020. By 2023, the number had risen to 33, and by early 2025 more than 200 such services were reportedly operating with government authorization. This growth has taken place alongside state policies intended to encourage earlier marriage, higher fertility, and population growth.

Children Displayed as Prospective Spouses

Among the report’s most significant findings is evidence that minors can enter—and be publicly displayed within—the Adam and Eve matchmaking system.

Although the platform’s terms state that female users must be over 15 and male users over 18 to create accounts, HRA found that the system accepted a birth year corresponding to an age as low as 12, without presenting an age-specific warning or barrier. The platform also permits parents to establish matchmaking profiles for their children, creating another avenue through which minors can be entered into the system.

The platform’s search system allows users to filter prospective spouses beginning at age 13. When HRA searched for girls between 13 and 17 on October 5, 2026, the search returned the platform’s maximum display limit of 100 profiles, suggesting that additional profiles may exist beyond those shown. The results included girls as young as 13 and 14. The report also documents a marriage announcement published by Adam and Eve involving a 16-year-old bride and a 23-year-old groom.

The concerns extend beyond age eligibility. Users complete extensive questionnaires containing information about their location, education, religious beliefs, political views, dress and physical appearance, lifestyle, interactions with the opposite sex, and expectations for a future spouse. The platform also includes self-assessment questions addressing characteristics including physical appearance and sexual desire.

HRA found that information relating to minors could be browsed without logging in and observed no apparent distinction between how the platform displayed information belonging to children and adults. The report further documents how abbreviated matchmaking profiles—including information relating to minors—have been disseminated through messaging channels as advertisements for prospective spouses.

A Broader State Policy Framework

HRA’s investigation argues that the concerns surrounding Adam and Eve cannot be understood solely as the conduct of a private matchmaking company.

Iranian law itself permits marriage below 18. Article 1041 of the Civil Code permits marriage from age 13 for girls and 15 for boys, while marriages below those ages can also take place with guardian consent and court approval. Iran therefore has no absolute minimum age below which marriage is prohibited.

At the same time, the 2021 Law on the Protection of the Family and Youthful Population established a regulatory framework for licensing spouse-selection services and forms part of a broader pronatalist policy intended to reduce the average age of marriage and encourage childbirth.

The report documents several dimensions of state involvement: legal authorization of matchmaking platforms; regulatory monitoring of their activities; promotion through state media; and financial incentives supporting marriage and population policies.

Licensed spouse-finding platforms reportedly submit monthly information to the Ministry of Sports and Youth concerning new registrations, including applicants’ ages and marriages facilitated. According to the report, this means authorities are positioned to receive information concerning the ages of individuals using licensed services—an especially important issue where children are being displayed as prospective spouses.

State television has also actively promoted Adam and Eve. The report documents multiple appearances on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), including calls encouraging young people to register with the platform.

Financial support forms another component of this framework. The report notes that government bodies are required to allocate portions of their budgets to organizations pursuing objectives such as facilitating marriage, encouraging childbirth, and strengthening families. According to figures cited in the investigation, a related 2025 budget line totaled approximately 180 billion tomans, while Adam and Eve reportedly received 17 billion tomans in March 2025 through registrations and marriages involving under-20 and under-15 age groups.

Institutional and Security Connections

The investigation also traces the organizational networks surrounding Adam and Eve.

The platform operates as an initiative of the Imam Reza Society, founded and led by Hossein Yekta, whom the report identifies as a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander. Yekta has publicly supported the platform and appeared in promotional material connected to it. He has also been sanctioned by the European Union and several European countries in relation to serious human rights violations.

The report goes on to document personnel and organizational connections involving the Imam Reza Society, Astan Quds Razavi-linked institutions, members of Adam and Eve’s leadership and academic structures, and other individuals with backgrounds in state and security institutions.

Taken together, HRA concludes that the facilitation of child marriage through Adam and Eve should not be viewed merely as an isolated failure of private-sector regulation. Rather, the platform functions within an environment of legal authorization, government oversight, state-media promotion, financial incentives, and institutional connections that collectively encourage earlier marriage and family formation.

The Role of Google and Meta

A major part of the report concerns the responsibilities of international technology companies whose services help distribute or promote Adam and Eve.

The Android application has been distributed through Google Play, where the report states it has received more than 100,000 downloads. Despite its matchmaking function and the evidence concerning minors, the application was listed with an “Everyone”/PEGI 3 rating, indicating suitability for all age groups.

The report notes that Google’s policies impose heightened child-protection requirements on dating and matchmaking applications and include mechanisms intended to restrict minors from age-inappropriate functionality. HRA therefore calls on Google to assess whether Adam and Eve complies with its policies concerning age verification, minor access, child safety, profile visibility, and content ratings.

The investigation also examines Meta, because Adam and Eve uses Instagram and Threads to promote its services and direct users toward the matchmaking platform. As of October 2026, its Instagram account had approximately 192,000 followers and nearly 800 posts, while its Threads account had almost 10,000 followers.

The report documents social-media posts explaining how to download and use the matchmaking service, as well as marriage announcements involving minors—including one involving a 17-year-old girl and a 30-year-old man.

The report argues that Google, Meta, and other technology providers should conduct enhanced human-rights and child-safeguarding due diligence where their products distribute, host, advertise, or otherwise facilitate access to services involving minors as prospective spouses.

It also calls for scrutiny of relevant ownership and institutional connections where sanctions-related concerns may arise.

From Domestic Reform to Corporate Accountability

The report concludes with recommendations directed at the Iranian government, United Nations mechanisms, international technology companies, and civil society.

Among them, HRA calls on Iran to establish 18 as the absolute minimum age of marriage, without exceptions; prohibit minors from being publicly displayed as prospective spouses; introduce meaningful age verification and child-safeguarding requirements; and suspend matchmaking services that register, display, or promote children.

The report urges UN mechanisms—including the Committee on the Rights of the Child—to examine the relationship between Iran’s marriage laws, pronatalist policies, and state oversight of digital matchmaking platforms. It also recommends examining child marriage within broader patterns of gender-based discrimination and potential gender persecution.

For technology companies, the recommendations include suspending distribution of matchmaking services pending child-safety review where credible evidence shows that minors are being presented as prospective spouses; independently reviewing age ratings; strengthening age verification and access controls; examining promotional activity; and conducting enhanced human-rights, child-safety, ownership, and sanctions due diligence.

Ultimately, the investigation argues that addressing child marriage in Iran requires looking beyond individual marriages or individual platforms. The issue increasingly intersects with state policy, digital infrastructure, corporate distribution systems, social media, and technology governance.

The report’s central warning is that digital systems through which children can be made visible and accessible as prospective spouses must themselves become part of efforts to end child marriage. Where credible evidence shows that children are being presented for marriage, governments, international institutions, civil society organizations, and technology companies all have responsibilities to examine the systems enabling that harm.

download and read the full report

Justice Beyond Borders: HRA Files Criminal Complaint and Holds Event in Berlin

Berlin — On September 3, 2026, as Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) filed a criminal complaint with Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor General concerning the crackdown on Iran’s nationwide protests, prominent lawyers, activists, and human rights experts gathered in Berlin to examine legal avenues for pursuing accountability for serious human rights violations committed during the protests.

The event, held at betahaus in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, was hosted by Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) and UpRights.

The panel was moderated by Skylar Thompson, Deputy Director at HRA, and featured Jennifer Connet, Legal Advisor at HRA; Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights; and Sina Yousefi, an Iranian human rights lawyer and former Deputy Chair of the Human Rights Commission of the East Azerbaijan Bar Association.

Panelists examined HRA’s investigation into the crackdown, including more than 60 interviews conducted with victims and witnesses, as well as extensive perpetrator mapping. They also discussed why Germany was chosen as a jurisdiction in which to pursue accountability and HRA’s plans to continue supporting judicial action against individuals allegedly responsible for abuses committed during the crackdown, including through accountability efforts across Europe.

Skylar Thompson outlined efforts by HRA and UpRights to pursue legal action in Germany in connection with the crackdown and discussed plans to continue this work through cooperation with investigative and prosecutorial efforts across Europe. As victims and witnesses continue to leave Iran while alleged perpetrators remain shielded by impunity, Thompson emphasized the importance of sustained documentation and international coordination.

Thompson stressed that documentation provides the foundation for both present and future accountability efforts and has been fundamental to HRA’s filing in Germany.

Sina Yousefi reflected on his experience practicing law in Iran in the aftermath of the 2022 nationwide protests and described patterns of repression targeting protesters. He emphasized that those experiences have not occurred in a vacuum and are in fact relevant to our understanding of recent events. 

Jennifer Connet discussed HRA’s months of documentation and engagement with victims and witnesses. Connet emphasized that the courage and trust of victims and witnesses have been essential to documenting alleged violations and creating opportunities to pursue judicial avenues at the international level.

Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights, addressed the complaint filed by HRA and UpRights with German prosecutors, stating:

“Since the crimes committed in Iran are not linked to a single suspect or an isolated incident, but rather to a state-backed system that has been operating for several decades, requesting a structural investigation [within the German judicial system] makes sense, as such an investigation can establish a framework that supports future criminal accountability [of the Iranian government].”

The event concluded with questions from participants and a broader discussion of the legal strategies, challenges, and opportunities associated with pursuing accountability beyond Iran’s borders.

Criminal Complaint Filed in Germany

The Berlin event followed HRA’s filing of a criminal complaint with Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor General on September 3, 2026, seeking the opening of a structural investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed in Iran under Section 7 of Germany’s Code of Crimes against International Law (VStGB). The complaint draws on extensive documentation and evidence collected by HRA. Further details on the filing, its legal basis, and the underlying evidence are available in HRA’s report on the criminal complaint.

HRA Files Criminal Complaint in Germany Seeking Investigation into Crimes Against Humanity in Iran

HRANA- The 109-page submission presents evidence from the December 2025-January 2026 crackdown, including information from more than 60 victim and witness interviews and information concerning suspected perpetrators

3 September 2026

BERLIN, Germany — Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA), with legal support from UpRights and in conjunction with German counsel, has submitted a criminal complaint to Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General requesting the opening of a structural investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Iranian State authorities under Section 7 of the German Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, or VStGB).

Download the Executive Summary of the September 2026 Submission to the German Federal Prosecutor.

The 109-page submission is the result of months of intensive investigation by dedicated HRA teams. It draws on more than 60 interviews with victims, witnesses, and family members inside Iran, in Turkey, and across Europe and North America, together with extensive documentary and digital evidence. HRA also conducted a detailed analysis of weapons used, injury analysis, suspected perpetrators, relevant institutions, and the command structures allegedly involved in the crackdown.

The submission also identifies suspected perpetrators, mapping their roles, institutional affiliations, connections to documented incidents, and positions within the command structures that HRA alleges were responsible for the crackdown.

The filing presents selected incidents that HRA argues indicate that crimes against humanity were committed in Iran between December 2025 and January 2026. It also addresses specific suspected perpetrators and sets out HRA’s analysis of what it describes as a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, a contextual element required for crimes against humanity.

Why Germany

HRA recognizes that calls for German prosecutors to investigate international crimes committed in Iran have been made before. This submission builds on those efforts with substantial new evidence concerning the December 2025–January 2026 crackdown and a detailed legal and factual case for why Germany is particularly well placed to act now.

Germany is not removed from the consequences of repression in Iran. It is home to a significant Iranian diaspora, including victims, witnesses, human rights defenders, journalists, and others who have fled persecution. The effects of repression can extend beyond Iran’s borders, as Iranian authorities seek to intimidate, threaten, or otherwise exert pressure on critics and diaspora communities abroad.

The complaint specifically sets out connections between the documented crimes and Germany and the wider European Union, including witnesses and injured persons with whom HRA is in contact.

The filing asks the Federal Prosecutor General to assess both the opening of a structural investigation and the potential initiation of proceedings against individual suspects. A structural investigation does not depend on having a particular suspect immediately available for prosecution. It can enable German authorities to systematically collect, preserve, and analyze evidence concerning alleged international crimes, identify responsible structures and individuals, and prepare for future individual proceedings when jurisdictional opportunities arise.

The filing therefore asks the Federal Prosecutor General to assess both the opening of a structural investigation and the potential initiation of proceedings against individual suspects. German counsel states that the Federal Prosecutor General has jurisdiction under the VStGB in conjunction with the relevant provisions of Germany’s Courts Constitution Act.

A structural investigation does not depend on having a particular suspect immediately available for prosecution. It can enable German authorities to systematically collect, preserve, and analyze evidence concerning alleged international crimes, identify responsible structures and individuals, and prepare for future individual proceedings when jurisdictional opportunities arise.

Germany’s experience demonstrates the practical importance of this approach. Structural investigations into crimes committed in Syria laid important groundwork for subsequent German cases against individual perpetrators ongoing today. Similar investigative mechanisms have also been used in relation to international crimes committed in Ukraine. For Iran, opening such an investigation now would provide a mechanism for preserving evidence, engaging witnesses who are already in Europe, and building cases that can be acted upon should suspected perpetrators come within reach of German authorities.

For victims and witnesses, the significance is equally concrete: evidence gathered today may determine whether accountability becomes possible tomorrow.

Building on Months of Investigation

What HRA is making public today is a heavily redacted, illustrative overview of its findings, intended to provide an accessible account of the evidence and analysis contained in the criminal complaint while protecting witnesses, investigative methods, and other sensitive information.

HRA would like to acknowledge that this work would not have been possible without the extraordinary courage and trust of the victims, witnesses, family members, and experts—including those inside Iran—who shared their experiences, evidence, and expertise with HRA over the past six months.

Their testimony and cooperation form the foundation of this effort to preserve evidence, identify those who may bear responsibility, and pursue accountability through available international and domestic legal mechanisms.


For media inquiries on the action taken, please contact Jennifer Connet, HRA Legal Advisor, at jennifer @ hramail.com

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Between Missiles and Repression; HRA Releases New Report on US/Israeli Operations in Iran

HRANA – Today, Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) released a new report examining the US and Israeli military campaign in Iran between 28 February and 8 April 2026. The report documents 6,324 unique incidents comprising 12,798 distinct attacks, based on 177 verified sources, including open-source reporting and HRA’s in-country network.

It is important to note that the report is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of the conflict. Rather, its findings are limited to incidents documented and verified within HRA’s dataset.

Methodology

HRA relies on two primary and parallel workflows to document the scale of destruction and associated civilian harm.

First, HRA systematically collects open-source information, which is cross-checked against credible external reporting and corroborated through its established in-country network.

Second, HRA receives direct reports from its network, which are independently verified through additional contacts or cross-referenced with open-source material. In all cases, inclusion requires corroboration from at least two independent sources, with consistency in key details such as time, location, and nature of the incident.

HRA also separately preserves official narratives and state-reported figures, which are not incorporated into verified casualty counts. Incident data and casualty figures presented in the report represent documented minimums only and do not capture the full scope of harm.

Key Findings

◾️HRA documented 6,324 unique incidents comprising 12,798 distinct attacks between 28 February and 8 April 2026. Within HRA’s dataset, 77 percent of incidents involved civilian harm or damage to civilian objects.
◾️Of HRA’s verified incidents, Tehran province accounted for 44.85 percent of documented incidents, followed by Isfahan (10.5 percent), Khuzestan (6.74 percent), and Alborz (6.23 percent), indicating that some of Iran’s most densely populated provinces experienced a disproportionate concentration of attacks and civilian harm.
◾️
HRA documented at least 3,636 fatalities, including 1,701 civilians, 1,221 military personnel, and 714 individuals whose identity or status could not be confirmed. These figures should be understood as minimums.
◾️
HRA verified the deaths of 307 children and injuries to 2,213 children as a result of the attacks. HRA documented attacks affecting schools, sports facilities, parks, and residential areas where children were present, a majority on the first day of the conflict.

The report identifies several patterns that raise serious concerns under international humanitarian law, including:

◽️apparent failures in target verification,
◽️use of artificial intelligence with minimal human oversight,
◽️
inadequate and inaccessible warnings,
◽️
the use of large explosive weapons in populated areas,
◽️
Repeated or “double-tap” strikes,
◽️
attacks targeting widespread civilian infrastructure

Public rhetoric by senior US and Israeli officials also raised concerns, particularly statements suggesting disregard for rules of engagement and direct threats directed at civilian infrastructure.

◾️HRA independently verified damage to the following (noncomprehensive):

▫️108 educational facilities
▫️50 healthcare facilities
▫️122 cultural and religious sites
▫️381 industrial and commercial facilities
▫️173 electricity generation and distribution sites
▫️191 judicial and law enforcement facilities

HRA additionally documented conduct by Iranian authorities that increased civilian exposure to harm.

At the same time, Iranians experienced a convergence of harm through increased domestic repression. At least 4,023 individuals were arrested on accusations including espionage, threats to national security, or sharing information related to the conflict. Conditions inside detention facilities sharply deteriorated, while authorities expanded checkpoints, intensified movement restrictions, and imposed a prolonged internet blackout that reduced national connectivity to approximately 1 percent of normal levels. Between 28 February and 13 May, HRA documented 50 executions, including 32 carried out on political and security-related grounds. HRA also documented increased child presence at Basij checkpoints following an IRGC recruitment campaign targeting children as young as 12 years old.

Annexes

The report annexes include:

◾️a detailed list and analysis of weapons and munitions documented during the conflict, prepared with the support of HRA’s internal weapons specialist,
◾️casualty documentation,
◾️
detainee documentation,
◾️
and a compilation of HRA’s ground reporting, open-source verification, and exclusive visual documentation

Click on the image to download the full report

The Crimson Winter: A 50 Day Record of Iran’s 2025–2026 Nationwide Protests

HRANA- Published today, this comprehensive report examines developments during the first fifty days following the eruption of nationwide protests in Iran on December 28, 2025, providing a detailed account of the unfolding events and the state response from December 2025 through February 2026.

Compiled through a coordinated, multi team documentation effort across HRA’s news agency HRANA, Spreading Justice, the Pasdaran Documentation Project, and the Statistics Department, the roughly 1,350 page report preserves a structured record of the opening phase of Iran’s 2025–2026 nationwide protests and the state response.

The findings are derived from more than 143,330 HRANA reports drawn from confidential and open sources, collected, verified, and analyzed during the 50-day window.

Download the full report in PDF format.

Why this report, and why now?

Large scale protest cycles generate two parallel dynamics: an unprecedented volume of documentation and a coordinated effort by state authorities to restrict communications, shape narratives, and intimidate sources. In this environment, the central risk is not only undercounting violations, but losing the ability to verify identities, locations, dates, and patterns while evidence remains recoverable.

This report adopts a disciplined human rights methodology centered on documenting minimum verifiable cases rather than publishing maximal estimates. It presents findings that can be substantiated through corroborated evidence, even where the broader scale of violations likely exceeds what can be confirmed in real time. The publication is intended both as a public record and as an archival foundation for legal analysis and future accountability processes.

What the report contains

The report maps the first fifty days of protests by addressing core accountability questions:

1. How did protests evolve and spread geographically

2. How did state forces respond, and through what structures

3. What forms of harm occurred

4. How did blackout conditions affect the availability, quality, and verification of information

5. How was content authenticated and cross checked in an environment shaped by surveillance, source risk, and restricted access

6. How were risks from manipulated, fabricated, or AI generated content identified and mitigated within the verification process

7. How can documented patterns be legally characterized

8. How can records, especially identities of victims and detainees, be preserved without increasing risk

Sections analyze protest trends and geography, university mobilization, slogans, the structure and tools of repression, patterns of violations including killings, injuries, arrests, coerced confessions, pressure on families, and attacks on medical neutrality, as well as legal analysis, international responses, and how HRA documentation initiatives mobilized.

At the center of the report are two core pillars: the verified accounting of those killed, including children, and the documented accounting of detainees, including minors, students, and individuals subjected to group arrests.

Key Findings

Geographic scope

• Total protest locations: 682

• Unique cities: 203

• Unique provinces: 31

The geographic distribution demonstrates that both protest activity and state response were nationwide in scope.

Student mobilization

• University protests documented: 55

• Protesting universities: 36

Universities emerged as central civic spaces within the broader protest movement and the state response.

Fatalities: scale and composition

Across the first fifty days covered by this report, consolidated documentation records:

• Protesters killed: 6,488

• Children killed, counted separately and not included among protesters: 236

• Civilians killed, non-protester: 76

• Military and government forces killed: 207

• Total fatalities: 7,007

An additional 11,744 cases remain under review and are not included in confirmed totals. Separately, HRA documented eight civilian deaths resulting from clashes between civilians in public. The categorical separation is deliberate. Distinguishing protesters, children, non-protester civilians, and government or pro-government fatalities prevents analytical conflation and enables clearer legal and statistical interpretation. The figures reflect a minimum verifiable record compiled under conditions where comprehensive access is not possible.

Injuries

• Injured military and security forces: 4,884

• Injured civilians: 25,846

These figures contextualize the breadth of harm beyond confirmed fatalities and illustrate the overall magnitude of violence.

Arrests

• Total arrests: 53,777

• Children, teenagers, and school students arrested: 555

• University students arrested: 147

Arrest figures include both individually identified cases and verified group arrests, reflecting documentation realities in which names are often unavailable or unsafe to publish.

Forced confessions

• Documented forced confessions: 369

The report treats coerced confessions as a systematic instrument of intimidation and narrative control within a heavily surveilled and restricted media environment.

Summonses

• Documented summonses: 11,053

Summonses function as a parallel mechanism of legal pressure, extending state control beyond those formally detained.

The List of the Deceased: Methodology and Protection

Appendix A contains the list of the deceased. Publication decisions are governed by a protection centered framework that weighs the public interest in disclosure against the risk of retaliation for relatives, witnesses, and HRANA’s network.

Where names are published, they are paired, where possible, with core identifiers including age, location, and documentation anchors used in verification. Entries are also paired with sources. Where a third-party source is listed as the primary source, HRANA has independently verified the information through its reporting network.

Where publication would create unacceptable risk, cases are reflected in verified totals and preserved within secure documentation systems for accountability purposes.

The list is the product of a structured, cross-checked verification methodology designed to preserve an accurate public record without increasing danger to those inside the country.

Legal Assessment and Accountability Relevance

The report includes a preliminary legal assessment, framing documented patterns as potential violations of international human rights law and, where applicable thresholds are met, international criminal law.

Patterns of lethal force, mass arrests, coerced confessions, and related violations are analyzed against legal standards governing the right to life, due process, freedom of expression and assembly, and protections against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

By grounding its legal analysis with verified names, dates, locations, and corroborated patterns, the report connects documentation to concrete pathways for accountability.

 

Annual Statistical Report of Human Rights Conditions in Iran 2025

Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA), through the dedicated efforts of its Department of Statistics and Publications, publishes its annual Gregorian calendar-based analytical and statistical report on the human rights situation in Iran for the one-year period (January 1, 2025, to January 1, 2026). This report is the culmination of the organization’s daily endeavors in recent years, forming part of a daily statistical project that began in 2009. It provides an analytical-statistical overview of human rights in Iran.

This annual report on human rights violations in Iran represents a synthesis of 11,192 human rights reports, gathered from 122 legal and news sources within the past calendar year. HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) contributed 50.79% of the reports utilized in this publication, with 23.94% originating from official or government-affiliated Iranian sources, and the remaining 25.28% from other news or human rights sources.

Download the full version of the report in PDF format

In this 83-page report, various aspects such as women’s rights, workers’ rights, children’s rights, prisoners’ rights, etc., are briefly examined and statistically analyzed, accompanied by relevant charts for enhanced reader comprehension. According to this report, the focus of human rights monitoring in Iran, in comparison between the capital and other areas, remains unequal. This long-standing inequality shows that in the last year, reporting from non-central areas has decreased by 16.4% compared to the capital. This situation continues to indicate the lack of adequate monitoring of other areas of the country relative to the center by civil society.

Although this report predominantly reflects the extensive efforts of courageous human rights defenders in Iran, who bear significant costs in pursuit of their humanitarian ideals, it inevitably has limitations. These include restrictions on the activities of human rights organizations by the Iranian government and governmental impediments to the free flow of information. Consequently, while this report strives for accuracy, it cannot be considered entirely error-free or a complete reflection of the human rights situation in Iran. Nevertheless, it stands as one of the most precise, comprehensive, and well-documented reports on human rights violations in Iran, offering valuable insights for organizations and defenders of human rights to better understand the human rights situation in Iran, its challenges, and potential opportunities.

Monitoring Overview

The following information reflects the scope, geographic distribution, and sources of human rights reporting in Iran during the reporting period. These findings illustrate the relationship between reporting volume and civil society capacity across provinces.

Reporting Volume and Sources

  • The highest number of reports was published in May
  • The lowest number of reports was published in April


Sources of Reports

  • • 50.79 percent of reports were produced by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA)
  • • 23.94 percent originated from official Iranian government sources or sources close to the government
  • • 25.28 percent were collected from other human rights news agencies


Protests, Gatherings, and Collective Action

  • • At least 2,294 protest gatherings were held across all 31 provinces
    • • 986 professional union protests
    • • 855 labor-related gatherings
    • • 257 protests by victims of financial or investment fraud
    • • 93 protests related to freedom of thought and expression
    • • 51 student union protests
    • • 50 environmental protests
    • • 1 women’s rights protest
    • • 1 children’s rights protest
  • In addition:
    • • 424 labor strikes were recorded
    • • 39 professional strikes were documented
    • • 49 protest attempts were prevented by authorities


Geographic Distribution of Reporting

  • A significant disparity exists between Tehran and the rest of the country in terms of reporting volume
  • According to the 2024 census:
    • • Tehran population: 14,425,000
    • • Population outside Tehran: 71,536,000
  • Reporting distribution indicates:
    • • 13.36 percent of reporting focused on Tehran
    • • 86.64 percent of reporting originated from other parts of the country

 

Ethnic Rights Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred on the basis of ethnic or national minority status. These figures are drawn from 264 verified reports collected throughout the reporting period.

Key Findings

Arrests and Detention

  • • 304 individuals were arrested on the basis of ethnic or national minority status
  • • 188 arrests were carried out without a judicial warrant
  • • 275 individuals were arrested on charges that remain unknown or undisclosed
  • • 2 instances of imprisonment sentences were carried out during the reporting period
  • • 7 interrogations took place inside security or judicial institutions
  • • 47 individuals were summoned by security or judicial authorities for questioning


Judicial Proceedings

  • • 20 cases went to trial
    • • 7 individuals were sentenced to imprisonment
    • Sentences issued to these individuals totaled 287 months of discretionary imprisonment, as follows:
      • 189 months issued by preliminary courts
      • 74 months issued by appellate courts
      • 24 months upheld by the Supreme Court


Searches and Other Violations

  • • 29 home searches were reported
  • • 1 case of physical assault was documented


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Arrests of ethnic minority citizens increased by 16 percent compared to 2024
  • Prison sentences issued relative to the number of individuals tried decreased by 65 percent
  • The overall issuance of prison sentences declined by 39 percent compared to 2024


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in January
  • The steepest decline in reported violations occurred in April

 

Tolerance and Religious Freedoms Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred on the basis of religious belief or affiliation. These figures are based on 210 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Arrests and Detention

  • • 183 individuals were arrested on the basis of religious belief or affiliation
  • • 7 arrests were carried out without a judicial warrant
  • • 142 individuals were summoned to security or judicial institutions for questioning
  • • 50 interrogations took place inside security or judicial institutions
  • • 54 instances of sentence enforcement were carried out
  • • 33 travel bans were imposed


Judicial Proceedings

  • • 48 cases went to trial
  • • 88 individuals were sentenced to imprisonment
    • Sentences issued to these individuals totaled 8,015 months of imprisonment, as follows:
      • 7,277 months of discretionary imprisonment
      • 798 months of suspended imprisonment
      • 3,876 months of imprisonment were issued by the appellate courts
  • • 14 individuals were fined a total of 5.27 billion tomans
  • • 35 individuals were sentenced to deprivation of social rights
  • • 5 individuals were sentenced to 96 months of exile


Searches, Property Violations, and Other Abuses

  • • 128 home searches were reported
  • • 33 cases of property or home confiscation were documented
  • • 5 cases of obstruction of economic activity were recorded
  • • 1 case involving the destruction of a cemetery was documented
  • • 4 cases of physical assault were reported


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Arrests related to religious minority rights increased by 101 percent compared to the previous year
  • Prison sentences issued relative to the number of individuals tried increased by 8.6 percent
  • The total length of prison sentences increased by 68.7 percent compared to the previous year


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in June
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in August


Distribution by Religious Group

  • • Baha’is accounted for 62.41 percent of all reported violations
  • • Christians accounted for 17.73 percent
  • • Jews accounted for 7.45 percent
  • • Other religious groups accounted for 6.21 percent
  • • Sunni Muslims accounted for 6.21 percent

 

Freedom of Thought and Expression Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to freedom of thought and expression. These figures are based on 1,509 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Arrests and Detention

  • • 22,062 individuals were arrested in connection with freedom of thought and expression
  • • At least 180 arrests were carried out without a judicial warrant
  • • 394 individuals were summoned to security or judicial authorities for questioning
  • • 62 interrogations were conducted by security agencies
  • • 97 instances of sentence enforcement were carried out
  • • 25 travel bans were imposed


Judicial Proceedings

  • • 175 individuals were tried in judicial institutions
  • • 405 individuals were sentenced to imprisonment
    • Sentences issued to these individuals totaled 14,799 months of imprisonment, as follows:
      • 13,931 months of discretionary imprisonment
      • 868 months of suspended imprisonment
      • 3,005 months were issued by appellate courts
      • 816 months were issued by the Supreme Court
  • • 66 individuals were fined a total of 3,088,600,000 tomans
  • • 19 individuals were sentenced to 938 lashes
  • • At least 3 individuals had corporal punishment sentences of 142 lashes carried out
  • • 12 individuals were sentenced to a total of 444 months of exile
  • • 47 individuals were sentenced to deprivation of social rights


Censorship, Searches, and Other Violations

  • • 15 publications were declared criminal
  • • 61 home searches were reported
  • • 2 cases of property confiscation were documented
  • • 27 cases of internet filtering were recorded
  • • 1 case of communication disruption was documented
  • • 40 cases of physical assault against citizens were reported
  • • 1 instance of forced retirement was recorded
  • • 3 cases of dismissal or downsizing were documented
  • • 7 incidents of preventing speeches or public events were reported
  • • 93 gatherings were held
  • • 28 gatherings were obstructed by authorities


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Arrests related to freedom of thought and expression increased by 1286.6 percent compared to the previous year
  • Prison sentences issued relative to the number of individuals tried decreased by 33.6 percent
  • The total length of prison sentences declined by 44.7 percent compared to the previous year


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in June
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in September

 

Rights of Trade Unions and Associations Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to labor, trade union, and professional association rights. These figures are based on 1,178 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Arrests and Detention

  • • 44 labor and union activists were arrested
  • • 55 individuals were summoned to security or judicial authorities for questioning
  • • 4 interrogations were conducted by security agencies
  • • 6 instances of sentence enforcement were carried out
  • • 3 travel bans were imposed


Judicial Proceedings

  • • 20 cases went to trial
  • • 30 individuals were sentenced to imprisonment
    • Sentences issued to these individuals totaled 743 months of imprisonment, as follows:
      • 740 months of discretionary imprisonment
      • 3 months of suspended imprisonment
      • 61 months were issued by appellate courts
  • • 2 individuals were sentenced to 120 months of exile
  • • 2 individuals were sentenced to 148 lashes
  • • 9 individuals were fined a total of 679,100,000 tomans


Workplace and Economic Rights Violations

  • • 219 cases of workplace closures were documented
  • • 21 cases of dismissal or layoffs were reported
  • • 407 cases of forced retirement were documented
  • • At least 66 months of delayed wage payments were reported
  • • 1 case of license revocation was documented
  • • 2 case of physical assault was reported
  • • 1 case of self-immolation was documented
  • • 4 home searches were carried out


Protests and Collective Action

  • • At least 986 labor or professional protests were recorded
  • • 39 strikes were documented
  • • 6 cases of protest obstruction were reported


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Arrests of labor and union activists increased by 91.3 percent compared to 2024
  • The total issuance of prison sentences decreased by 16.5 percent
  • Prison sentencing relative to the number of individuals tried declined by 60 percent compared to 2024


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in May
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in July

 

Right to Education Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to the right to education. These figures are based on 132 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Arrests, Discipline, and Institutional Actions

  • • 15 individuals were arrested in connection with education-related activities
  • • 1 student was denied admission to postgraduate studies
  • • 1 case of expulsion from university was documented
  • • 51 protest gatherings related to educational issues were recorded
  • • 4 protests were obstructed by authorities


Violence, Abuse, and Health-Related Violations

  • • 3 cases of physical assault were documented
  • • 32 cases of corporal punishment against students were reported
  • • At least 9 male elementary school students were subjected to physical and sexual abuse by a teacher
  • • 141 cases of food poisoning were documented
  • • Over 167 cases of student poisoning were reported


Systemic Deprivation of Education

  • • At least one million students were deprived of continuing their education
  • The highest school dropout rates were reported in:
    • • Sistan and Baluchestan Province
    • • Golestan Province
    • • Razavi Khorasan Province


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in October
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in July

 

Right to Life (Death Penalty) Overview

The following statistics reflect documented violations of the right to life assessed by HRA as having occurred through the issuance and implementation of the death penalty. These figures are based on 1,743 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Death Sentences and Executions

  • • 172 individuals were sentenced to death
  • • 2,063 individuals were executed
  • • 11 executions were carried out in public
  • • 57 death sentences were upheld by the Supreme Court


Demographic Breakdown

  • Of those executed whose gender was identified:
    • • 1,807 men
    • • 61 women
  • • 2 individuals were under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged offense
  • Of the recorded death sentences:
    • • 155 were issued against men
    • • 14 were issued against women
    • • 5 death sentences were issued for public execution
    • • 2 death sentences were issued against child offenders


Charges Leading to Execution

  • • 49.01% for murder
  • • 44.93% for drug-related offenses
  • • 1.65% for sexual offenses
  • • 1.55% for unspecified charges
  • • 1.26% for moharebeh–baghi (political–security charges)
  • • 0.73% for security-related charges (including espionage, terrorism, or bombing)
  • • 0.63% for moharebeh (non-political)
  • • 0.50% for economic crimes
  • • 0.50% for armed robbery
  • • 0.15% for corruption on earth


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • The implementation of death sentences increased by 119 percent compared to 2024
  • The issuance of death sentences decreased by 19.6 percent compared to 2024


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in December
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in March


Geographic and Institutional Distribution

  • • Alborz Province accounted for 10.52 percent of executions
  • • Razavi Khorasan Province accounted for 8.53 percent of executions
  • • Qezel Hesar Prison (Karaj) and Dastgerd Prison (Isfahan) recorded the highest number of executions


Transparency of Executions

  • • 95 percent of executions were carried out in secret or without public announcement


Long-Term Trends

  • After a relative decline between 2018 and 2020, executions have shown a sustained upward trend since 2021
  • In 2025, 2,063 executions were recorded, marking the highest annual figure over the past eleven years

 

Cultural Rights Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to cultural rights. These figures are drawn from 19 verified reports collected throughout the reporting period.

Key Findings


Censorship, Restrictions, and Administrative Actions

  • • 7 cases of obstruction of cultural programs or public speeches were documented
  • • 2 individuals were summoned to judicial authorities
  • • 2 cases of censorship or prevention of publication were recorded
  • • 7 professional bans were imposed
  • • 1 case of neglect was documented
  • • 1 case involving the destruction of a historical site was recorded


Judicial Proceedings

  • • 6 cases went to trial
  • • 4 individuals were sentenced to suspended imprisonment
    • Sentences issued to these individuals totaled 131 months of suspended imprisonment, of which:
      • • 64 months were issued by appellate courts
  • • 6 individuals were fined a total of 515 million tomans


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Verdicts issued relative to the number of individuals tried increased by 20 percent compared to the previous year
  • The issuance of imprisonment sentences decreased by 31.7 percent compared to the previous year


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in April and December
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in June, August, and September

 

Labor Rights Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to labor rights. These figures are based on 1,996 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Arrests, Detention, and Judicial Actions

  • • 23 individuals were arrested in connection with labor-related activities
  • • 11 individuals were summoned to judicial or security institutions
  • • 3 cases went to trial
  • • 7 interrogations were conducted by judicial or security entities
  • • 1 instance of imprisonment enforcement was recorded
  • • 2 travel bans were imposed
  • • 3 cases of self-immolation were documented
  • • 1 case of a worker being physically assaulted was reported


Judicial Proceedings

  • • 2 individuals were sentenced to imprisonment
    • Sentences issued to these individuals totaled 75 months of imprisonment, of which:
      • • 72 months were issued by appellate courts
  • • 1 individual was fined 30 million tomans


Employment, Wages, and Social Protection

  • • At least 638 months of delayed wage payments were reported across 182 industrial and service units
  • • 2,458 cases of dismissal or downsizing were documented
  • • 550 cases of unemployment were reported
  • • 663 months of lack of insurance coverage were recorded
  • • 10 factory closures were documented
  • • 3,761 workers were reported as being in limbo


Workplace Safety and Accidents

  • • At least 1,232 worker deaths were recorded due to workplace incidents
  • • 7,328 cases of physical injury to workers were documented


Protests and Collective Action

  • • At least 855 labor protests were recorded
  • • 424 labor strikes were documented
  • • 4 cases of protest obstruction were reported


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Arrests of workers increased by 109 percent compared to the previous year
  • Verdicts issued relative to the number of individuals tried decreased by 77.7 percent
  • The issuance of imprisonment sentences declined by 75 percent compared to the previous year


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in May
  • The most significant decline in reports occurred in April

 

Children’s Rights Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to children’s rights. These figures are based on 595 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Violence, Abuse, and Loss of Life

  • • At least 38 cases of child rape or sexual abuse were documented
  • • 45 child murders were reported
  • • 4 cases of so-called honor killings involving children were recorded
  • • 19 child suicides were documented
  • • At least 23,000 cases of child abuse were reported
  • • 5 abandoned infants were documented
  • • 5 deaths and 10 injuries among child laborers were recorded
  • • 21 deaths and 385 injuries due to official negligence were documented


Child Labor and Exploitation

  • • Over 70,000 cases of child labor were reported


Child Marriage and Early Motherhood

  • • At least 27,448 girls under the age of 15 were married between winter 2021 and fall 2022
  • • 31,646 girls under 15 were married in 2020
  • • 32,655 girls under 15 were married in 2021
  • In fall 2022, marriages of girls under 15 increased by 933 cases compared to the previous season
  • In fall 2022, over 5,500 girls aged 15 to 19 were married compared to summer 2022
  • • 69,103 babies were born in 2021 to mothers aged 10 to 19
  • • 1,474 babies were born to mothers aged 10 to 14


Deprivation of Education

  • • At least one million students were deprived of continuing their education
  • Contributing factors included poverty, early marriage, lack of access to virtual education, geographic dispersion, and cultural barriers


Use of Children in State-Organized Activities

  • • At least 105,425 children under 18 were sent to “Rahian-e Noor” camps in former war zones
  • The highest participation was recorded in Isfahan, Bushehr, Qom, Markazi, and Razavi Khorasan provinces


Arrests and Executions of Children

  • • At least 35 individuals under 18 were detained by security institutions
  • • At least 2 juvenile offenders were executed during the reporting period


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in November
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in June

 

Women’s Rights Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to women’s rights. These figures are based on 190 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Violence, Abuse, and Gender-Based Killings

  • • At least 63 cases of rape or sexual abuse were documented
  • • 118 cases of femicide were reported
  • • 11 cases of so-called honor killings were recorded, including the killing of 5 men
  • • 1 case of self-immolation was documented
  • • 11 cases of physical assault were reported
  • • At least 179 instances of domestic violence were documented
  • • 8 acid attacks were reported


Arrests, Judicial Actions, and Punishments

  • • 13 women were arrested for non-compliance with mandatory hijab laws
  • • 11 individuals were summoned to judicial or security bodies
  • • 7 interrogations were conducted by security agencies
  • • 4 individuals were sentenced to imprisonment
    • Sentences issued to these individuals totaled 80 months of imprisonment, of which:
      • • 31 months were issued by appellate courts
  • • 1 individual was sentenced to 178 lashes
  • • 7 million tomans in fines were imposed


Enforcement of Mandatory Hijab and Discrimination

  • • 24 cases of enforcement actions were carried out under the pretext of “improper hijab”
  • • 193 commercial establishments were shut down for failure to enforce mandatory hijab regulations
  • • 1 case of discrimination in a public setting was documented


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in April
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in October

 

Prisoners’ Rights Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to the treatment of prisoners and detainees. These figures are based on 1,112 verified reports collected during the reporting period.

Key Findings

Physical Abuse, Health, and Conditions of Detention

  • • 30 cases of physical assault against prisoners were documented
  • • 225 cases of denial of or failure to provide medical care to prisoners and detainees were recorded
  • • 2,513 cases of prisoners being held in inappropriate conditions were reported
  • • 9 cases of psychological or physical torture were documented
  • • 18 deaths of prisoners due to illness were recorded
  • • 23 suicides among prisoners were documented
  • • 5 cases of prisoners being killed were reported


Solitary Confinement, Transfers, and Coercion

  • • 368 cases of unlawful transfer to solitary confinement were recorded
  • • 43 forced transfers of prisoners were documented
  • • 224 cases of threats or pressure exerted on prisoners were reported
  • • 30 cases of forced confessions were documented
  • • 3 cases involving the use of handcuffs or shackles were recorded


Due Process and Legal Rights

  • • 104 cases of denial of access to legal counsel were documented
  • • 55 cases of denial of visitation rights were reported
  • • 263 cases of denial of the right to make phone calls were recorded
  • • 19 cases of denial of medical leave were documented
  • • 18 cases of failure to separate prisoners based on the nature of their crimes were recorded
  • • 7 cases of failure to separate defendants from convicted prisoners were documented


Protests, Hunger Strikes, and Collective Actions

  • • 190 hunger strikes by prisoners or detainees were reported
  • • 5 sit-ins by prisoners were documented


Detainee-Specific Violations

  • • 19 cases of failure to address detainee complaints were recorded
  • • 689 cases of enforced disappearance or lack of information regarding detainees were documented
  • • 1,189 cases of detainees being held in legal limbo were reported


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in July
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in June
Environmental Rights Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred in relation to environmental rights. These figures are drawn from 1,728 verified reports collected throughout the reporting period.

Key Findings

Environmental Damage and Mismanagement

  • • 1,621 reports of environmental pollution were documented, including air pollution and contamination of surface and groundwater
  • • 13 cases of failure to protect natural resources were recorded
  • • 17 cases of improper exploitation of natural resources were documented
  • • 9 cases of animal abuse were reported

Protests and Collective Action

  • • 50 environmental protest gatherings were recorded
  • • 2 protest gatherings were obstructed

Harm to Environmental Protection Personnel

  • • 55 environmental protection officers were involved in reported incidents, including:
    • • 7 park rangers killed
    • • 37 park rangers injured
    • • 1 wildlife warden injured
    • • 10 forest rangers injured


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in May
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in June

 

Sexual and Gender Minorities Overview

The following information reflects documented violations and structural conditions affecting the rights of sexual and gender minorities in Iran. Due to severe underreporting, cultural taboos, and legal barriers, available data represents only a limited portion of actual violations.

Key Findings

Structural and Legal Discrimination

  • Same-sex relationships are criminalized under Iranian law
  • Gender identity is not legally recognized for transgender individuals prior to gender reassignment surgery
  • State policies and legal frameworks blur the distinction between sexual or gender identity and so-called “moral corruption”
  • Hate speech and incitement against sexual and gender minorities occur openly and with impunity
  • Civil society monitoring of violations against sexual and gender minorities remains severely limited due to fear, stigma, and repression

Harassment and Abuse by Authorities

  • Security and law enforcement agencies have, in some instances, acknowledged the detention and harassment of individuals based on sexual orientation or gender identity

Lethal Violence

  • In 2025, Sogand Pakdel, a transgender woman approximately 25 years old, was shot and killed by her uncle in Kavar, Fars Province
  • The killing occurred during a family wedding and was reportedly carried out under a so-called “honor” motive

 

Unlawful Use of Force and Lethal Force Overview

The following statistics reflect documented rights violations assessed by HRA as having occurred through the unlawful or excessive use of force by military or security forces, as well as related state actions affecting civilian safety. These figures are drawn from verified reports collected throughout the reporting period.

Key Findings

Death and Injury of Civilians by Security Forces

  • • 193 civilians were shot by military or security forces
    • • 93 individuals were killed, including:
      • • 19 kolbars
      • • 21 fuel carriers
      • • 53 other civilians
    • • 100 individuals were injured, including:
      • • 26 kolbars
      • • 13 fuel carriers
      • • 61 other civilians


Kolbar-Related Incidents

  • • 9 kolbars were harmed due to harsh geographical or climatic conditions
    • • 3 deaths
    • • 6 injuries

Fuel Carrier Incidents

  • • 82 fuel carriers were involved in incidents related to military chases or road accidents
    • • 74 deaths
    • • 8 injuries

Victims of Landmines and Explosions

  • • 20 civilians were killed by landmines in border areas
  • • 22 civilians were injured due to landmine explosions

Floggings, Amputation, and Corporal Punishment

  • • 96 individuals were sentenced to a total of 5,041 lashes
  • • 6 individuals had amputation sentences carried out
  • • 5 individuals were sentenced to limb retribution (qisas)
  • • At least 3 individuals had corporal punishment sentences of 142 lashes carried out


Intervention in Personal Affairs

  • • 76 individuals were arrested for organizing or attending private gatherings


Protests by Victims of Financial and Investment Loss

  • • 257 protest actions were organized by victims of financial or investment fraud
  • In 5 cases, their attempts to hold a gathering were prevented.
  • Protests took place across 31 provinces
  • The highest number of protests occurred in Tehran, Khuzestan, and Qazvin


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported violations occurred in August
  • The lowest number of reported violations occurred in June

 

Judicial Sentences Overview

The following statistics reflect publicly documented judicial sentences issued by Iranian courts, including primary and appellate courts, across multiple rights categories. These figures are based solely on cases in which specific details of verdicts were made public.

Key Findings

Imprisonment Sentences by Category

  • • 24,190 total months of imprisonment were issued across all documented categories, including:
    • • 287 months related to ethnic minority cases
    • • 8,075 months related to religious minority cases
    • • 14,799 months related to freedom of thought and expression
    • • 743 months related to trade unions and associations
    • • 75 months related to labor rights
    • • 80 months related to women’s rights
    • • 131 months related to cultural rights

Corporal Punishment and Financial Penalties

  • • 5,041 lashes were issued by judicial authorities
  • • 5 sentences of limb retribution (qisas) were issued
  • • 932.47 million tomans in fines were imposed


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Overall convictions of activists and citizens decreased by 27.9 percent compared to the previous year
  • Convictions related to religious minorities increased by 68.7 percent
  • Convictions related to ethnic minorities decreased by 39 percent
  • Convictions related to freedom of thought and expression declined by 44.7 percent
  • Convictions related to trade unions decreased by 16.5 percent
  • Convictions in the labor sector declined by 75 percent
  • Convictions related to cultural rights declined by 31.7 percent
  • Convictions related to women’s rights increased by 40.35 percent


Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported convictions occurred in January
  • The lowest number of reported convictions occurred in June
  • • December data is not included in this comparison

 

Arrests Overview

The following statistics reflect documented arrests of citizens in connection with civil, ideological, political, or rights-related activities. These figures are drawn from verified reports collected throughout the reporting period.

Key Findings

Arrests by Category

  • • 22,755 individuals were arrested during the reporting period
    • • 22,062 arrests related to freedom of thought and expression
    • • 304 arrests involving ethnic and national minorities
    • • 183 arrests related to religious minorities
    • • 44 arrests related to trade unions and professional associations
    • • 23 arrests related to labor rights
    • • 15 arrests related to student activities
    • • 35 arrests involving children

Arrests Related to Lifestyle and Personal Activities

  • • 13 women were subjected to judicial prosecution due to their activities or lifestyle
  • • 76 individuals were arrested for organizing or participating in private gatherings


Trends and Comparative Analysis

  • Arrests of activists and citizens increased by 717.6 percent compared to the previous year
  • Category-specific changes compared to 2024 include:
    • • Ethnic minority arrests increased by 16 percent
    • • Religious minority arrests increased by 101 percent
    • • Trade and union sector arrests increased by 91.3 percent
    • • Women’s rights–related arrests decreased by 97.9 percent
    • • Lifestyle-related arrests decreased by 33.3 percent
    • • Children’s rights–related arrests increased by 2.9 percent
    • • Labor rights–related arrests increased by 109 percent
    • • Freedom of thought and expression–related arrests increased by 1286.6 percent

Monthly Trends

  • The highest number of reported arrests occurred in June
  • The sharpest decline in reported arrests occurred in April

 

Individuals Involved in Human Rights Violations Overview

The following information reflects documented cases in which identifiable individuals or institutions were implicated in human rights violations in Iran. These findings are based on reports jointly compiled by Spreading Justice and HRA’s Statistics Department and cover the period from January 1, 2025, to January 1, 2026.

Key Findings

Distribution by Branch of Power

  • Out of 2,967 reports in which perpetrators were identifiable:
    • • 2,366 cases were attributed to the Judiciary
    • • 436 cases were attributed to the Executive branch
    • • 165 cases were attributed to the Leadership Authority

Human Rights Violating Entities

In reports containing information on responsible institutions, 480 legal entities were identified. The ten institutions with the highest number of documented violations were:

Individuals Involved in Human Rights Violations

A total of 106 individuals were identified as being directly involved in human rights violations. The ten individuals with the highest number of documented cases—all affiliated with the Judiciary as judges—are listed below:

Institutional Patterns

  • Revolutionary courts accounted for a significant share of judicially attributed violations
  • Intelligence and security bodies, including the Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC Intelligence Organization, were repeatedly identified across multiple categories
  • Prison authorities, particularly in facilities such as Evin Prison, were implicated in a substantial number of reported violations

 

Reflection on the year

In 2025, HRA continued to advance strategic international advocacy aimed at securing accountability for serious human rights violations and violations of international law in Iran through a wide range of legal, diplomatic, and policy tools. While HRA sustained its advocacy for targeted human rights sanctions, it also emphasized that sanctions are only one component of a broader accountability ecosystem. Throughout the year, HRA identified more than twenty judicial and quasi-judicial pathways to accountability and worked with international partners and policymakers to elevate these mechanisms as viable and complementary routes to justice.

HRA engaged directly with member states and policymakers across Europe, Asia, and North and South America, emphasizing the need for coordinated, evidence-based approaches to accountability. These engagements focused on addressing jurisdictional gaps, strengthening cooperation between states, and ensuring that accountability efforts are informed by rigorous documentation and legal analysis in collaboration with civil society. HRA consistently underscored the critical role of civil society in supporting these processes, particularly in providing verified information, contextual analysis, and victim-centered perspectives.

As part of this effort, HRA met with members of prosecution teams in multiple jurisdictions, providing evidence, analysis, and information to support ongoing and prospective accountability efforts. These engagements aimed to facilitate the use of existing legal frameworks, including universal jurisdiction and other domestic and international mechanisms, to advance investigations into crimes under international law.

HRA’s contributions were grounded in its extensive documentation work and long-term analysis of patterns of abuse and chains of responsibility that, while took place in 2025, are a product of more than 20 years of organizational expertise.

Advocacy on behalf of victims remained central to HRA’s international engagement in 2025, including sustained efforts to amplify the experiences of women and others disproportionately impacted by state repression at the United Nations, in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in the European Parliament.

During the twelve-day Israel-Iran conflict, HRA was the first organization to document the impacts on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath, HRA was present with European policymakers, providing expert insights and concrete recommendations on civilian harm, legal implications, and accountability considerations at a critical moment when reliable information was limited. This engagement reinforced HRA’s role as a trusted interlocutor during periods of heightened regional escalation.

HRA continued to work closely with international partners to strengthen accountability efforts across jurisdictions, contributing to more coherent and strategic responses to human rights violations. Through collaboration with NGOs, legal experts, and policymakers, HRA supported approaches that move beyond symbolic measures and toward concrete, enforceable outcomes grounded in documentation.

Download the full version of the report in PDF format

HRA’s Spreading Justice initiative continued to document individuals and institutions responsible for human rights violations, supporting advocacy for targeted accountability measures and informing international policy discussions. In parallel, the Pasdaran Documentation Project (PDP) continued to document transnational repression perpetrated by the IRGC, while regularly updating its analysis of the IRGC’s chain of command. This work further strengthened the evidentiary foundation for sanctions, judicial proceedings, and other accountability pathways, efforts that remain ongoing.

Through sustained international engagement, comprehensive documentation, and strategic collaboration, HRA continued in 2025 to advance realistic and impactful pathways to accountability for human rights violations in Iran.

 


The initial version of this report, covering statistical data from January 1, 2025 to December 20, 2025, was published on December 26, 2025, and was replaced on January 3, 2026 with the full version covering January 1, 2025 to January 1, 2026. 


Human Rights Activists in Iran
Department of Statistics and Publications
26 December 2025
info @ hra-iran.org

Annual Analytical and Statistical Report on Human Rights in Iran for the year 2024

HRANA – The following report is the result of collecting, analyzing, and documenting 9,487 reports on the state of human rights published by news sources over the past calendar year (January 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024). The initial version of this report was released on December 20, 2024. In this updated report, which is being published in two versions —concise and comprehensive (accompanied by charts and graphs)—provides analyses, including the issuance of more than 33,574 months of prison sentences for critics and the sentencing of citizens to 9957 lashes, despite the inhumane nature of this punishment. Additionally, at least 883 citizens have been executed. This report, reflecting a summary of published information on the state of human rights in Iran, along with its extensive statistical data, can be read in full below.

Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA), through the dedicated efforts of its Department of Statistics and Publications, publishes its annual Gregorian calendar-based analytical and statistical report on the human rights situation in Iran for the one-year period (January 1, 2024, to January 1, 2025). This report is the culmination of the organization’s daily endeavors in recent years, forming part of a daily statistical project that began in 2009. It provides an analytical-statistical overview of human rights in Iran.

This annual report on human rights violations in Iran represents a synthesis of 9,487 human rights reports, gathered from 116 NGOs and news sources within the past calendar year. HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) contributed 38.91% of the reports utilized in this publication, with 26.63% originating from official or government-affiliated Iranian sources, and the remaining 34.47% from other news or human rights sources.

In this 86-page report, various aspects such as women’s rights, workers’ rights, children’s rights, prisoners’ rights, etc., are briefly examined and statistically analyzed, accompanied by relevant charts for enhanced reader comprehension. According to this report, the focus of human rights monitoring in Iran, in comparison between the capital and other areas, remains unequal. This long-standing inequality shows that in the last year, reporting from non-central areas has decreased by 8.8% compared to the capital. This situation continues to indicate the lack of adequate monitoring of other areas of the country relative to the center by civil society.

Although this report predominantly reflects the extensive efforts of courageous human rights defenders in Iran, who bear significant costs in pursuit of their humanitarian ideals, it inevitably has limitations. These include restrictions on the activities of human rights organizations by the Iranian government and governmental impediments to the free flow of information. Consequently, while this report strives for accuracy, it cannot be considered entirely error-free or a complete reflection of the human rights situation in Iran. Nevertheless, it stands as one of the most precise, comprehensive, and well-documented reports on human rights violations in Iran, offering valuable insights for organizations and defenders of human rights to better understand the human rights situation in Iran, its challenges, and potential opportunities.

Click on the image to download the full version of the report.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

▪️ MONITORING 
▪️ ETHNIC RIGHTS 
▪️ RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
▪️ FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
▪️ TRADE UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS
▪️ ACADEMIA/ RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
▪️ RIGHT TO LIFE (DEATH PENALTY) 
▪️ CULTURAL RIGHTS 
▪️ WORKERS’ RIGHTS
▪️ CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
▪️ WOMEN’S RIGHTS
▪️ PRISONERS’ RIGHTS
▪️ SECURITY FORCES’ VIOLENCE AND CITIZENS’ SAFETY
▪️ SENTENCES
▪️ ARRESTS
▪️ ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
▪️ SEXUAL AND GENDER MINORITIES
▪️ HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS
▪️ HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATING ENTITIES
▪️ INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS 
▪️ REFLECTION ON THE YEAR
▪️ UNITED NATIONS ADVOCACY
▪️ TWO-YEAR AFTER “WOMAN, LIFE, FREEDOM” PROTESTS
▪️ MEMBER STATES AND TARGETED HUMAN RIGHTS SANCTIONS
▪️ INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY
▪️ THE PASDARAN DOCUMENTATION PROJECT (PDP)

MONITORING

To observe the extent of reporting by human rights organizations and media from different provinces of the country, which directly correlates with the capabilities of civil society, refer to the map below.

The highest number of reports were published in January, while the lowest number of reports published occurred in December.

38.91% of reports analyzed came from sources gathered and reported by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), while 26.63% came from official Iranian government sources or sources close to the government. 34.47% of reports came from other human rights news agencies.

In 2024, there were at least 2,298 instances of protest gatherings organized by citizen groups across all 31 provinces due to unmet demands and claims. Of these, 1,260 were union gatherings, 725 were workers’ rallies, 145 times involved citizens primarily known as market or stock market losers, 94 were related to the realm of thought and expression, 36 were student union gatherings, 1 was in the cultural field, 1 were religious minority gatherings, and 36 were environmental gatherings. In addition to these gatherings, there were also 1378 labor strikes, and 62 union strikes. It is worth noting that in 23 cases, gatherings have been prevented.

As indicated in the distribution map, there exists a major discrepancy between the capital Tehran, and other parts of the country in terms of the number of published reports. This is while the census of 2023 reported a population of 14,425,000 in Tehran, compared to a population of 69,075,000 in the rest of the country.

Statistics indicate that the focus or ability to report of the human rights reporters has been 19.2% in Tehran and 81.8% in the other parts of the country.

Categories of human rights violations based on the number of reports in 2024

To study categories of human rights violations in Iran, it is important to initially compare the categories based on the number of reports made in each category in the past year.

ETHNIC RIGHTS

In the category of ethnic and national rights in 2024, a total of 255 reports were recorded by the Department of Statistics and Publications of the Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA). According to these reports, 262 citizens were documented as being arrested, with 109 of these arrests occurring without a judicial warrant. Although the charges against 208 of the arrested individuals remain unclear, signs and past actions of the security institutions in the referred areas suggest that these arrests fall under the classification of ethnic rights violations. Furthermore, 20 individuals were sentenced to a total of 471 months of imprisonment, comprising 465 months of actual imprisonment and 6 months of suspended imprisonment. Additionally, 5 individuals were fined Seven hundred and fifty-six million Iranian Rials. Also, 32 people were summoned to security-judicial institutions.
Apart from these, there were 22 court trials and 13 interrogations in security-judicial institutions, 43 cases of assault, 28 house searches, 5 instances of civil registry offices opposing the naming and identity registration of children, and 4 instances of imprisonment sentences being carried out.
In the area of national minorities, the arrest of citizens decreased by 19.1%, sentences of imprisonment based on the number of people tried by the judiciary increased by 5.2%, and the issuance of prison sentences compared to 2023 decreased by 53%.

The monthly comparison of violations of ethnic-national rights shows that the highest number of violations reports in this category were published in January, with the most significant decline in the number of reports observed in December.

TOLERANCE AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

In this category, in the past year, 162 reports were registered by the Department of Statistics of the Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA). According to these reports, 91 citizens were arrested, of which 16 arrests were made without a judicial warrant. Additionally, there were 66 summonses to security and judicial institutions. Also, there were 36 instances of house raids, 10 cases of economic activity obstruction, 2 cases of destruction of cemeteries, 1 case of house and property confiscation, 1 case of withholding a body. 2 instances of prevention of body burial, 8 cases of imprisonment execution, 41 travel bans, 3 instances of assault, 1 gathering, 84 trials, and 23 interrogations in security-judicial institutions recorded.

Notably, 82 individuals from religious minorities were sentenced by judicial institutions to a total of 4,786 months of imprisonment. This includes 4,270 months of actual imprisonment and 516 months of suspended imprisonment, with 1,061 months of these sentences being issued by appellate courts. Furthermore, 52 individuals were fined Twenty-six billion, seven hundred six million and sixty thousand Iranian Rials, and 54 individuals were deprived of social rights. In addition, 1 person was sentenced to 60 months of exile.

In the realm of religious minorities, the arrest of citizens decreased by 35.9%, the issuance of prison sentences by the judiciary dropped by 29.5%, and there was an overall 6.6% decrease in prison sentences compared to the previous year.

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION

In the category of freedom of thought and expression in 2024, a total of 1,505 reports were registered by the Department of Statistics. Based on the analysis of these reports, 1,591 individuals were arrested, with at least 143 of these arrests made without a judicial warrant. There were 646 summonses to judiciary and security authorities, 1 instance of publication bans, and 30 publications being declared criminal. Additionally, reports of trials of a total of 316 individuals in judicial institutions were published. Also, there were 42 instances of interrogations in security institutions, 58 travel bans, 181 imprisonment sentence executions, 39 house searches, 1 instance of communication disruption, 2 cases of social media filtering, 56 citizen beatings, 1 case of forced retirements, 9 dismissals and layoffs, 4 sealings of organizations and offices, 6 instances of speech or event disruptions, 94 gatherings, and 5 instances of gathering prevention in the area of thought and expression.

In 2024, for this domain, at least 26,769 months of prison sentences were issued for 610 individuals by judicial bodies. This includes 24,833 months of actual imprisonment and 1,936 months of suspended imprisonment. It is noteworthy that 5,215 months of these sentences were issued by appellate courts and 444 months by the Supreme Court. Moreover, 94 individuals were fined Sixty-five billion two hundred forty million seven hundred thirty thousand Iranian Rials, 63 individuals received 6,901 lashes, 32 individuals were sentenced to 1,728 months of exile, and 104 individuals were deprived of social rights.

In the realm of thought and expression, reports of citizen arrests decreased by 41.9%, while the issuance of prison sentences by the judiciary increased by 6.5%, and the number of people tried rose by 9.7% compared to the previous year.

TRADE UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

In 2024, a total of 1,523 reports were registered by the Department of Statistics and Publications concerning the rights of trade unions and associations. From these reports, 23 trade union activists were arrested. Additionally, there were 124 summonses to judiciary-security institutions, 639 cases of closures of facilities, 5 cases of assault,1 instance of Sealing of business premises, 1 revocation of business licenses, 27 trials in judicial institutions, 19 interrogations in security-judicial institutions, 15 dismissals and layoffs, 3 forced retirements, at least 362 months of deferred wages for 3,309 people, 16 suicide, 2 house searches, and 5 instances of imprisonment.

Furthermore, 75 individuals were sentenced to 890 months of imprisonment, including 780 months of actual imprisonment and 110 months of suspended imprisonment., 267 months of these sentences were issued by appellate courts. Additionally, two individuals were sentenced to 48 months of exile, one person to 29 lashes, and 27 individuals to a total fine of Three billion fifty-four million Iranian Rials.

In 2024, there were at least 1,260 trade union protests, 8 instances of protest suppression, and 62 union strikes. These protests are primarily related to wage demands, poor economic conditions, and ineffective management of government institutions. Reports in this domain showed an 25.08% decrease in arrests and a 47.05% increase in sentences issued by the judiciary compared to the previous year, with a 60% decrease in prison sentences.

The accompanying graph illustrates that the highest number of rights violations in this area occurred in January, while the lowest was in December.

ACADEMIA/ RIGHT TO EDUCATION

In 2024, the Department of Statistics and Publications of Human Rights Activists in Iran registered 108 reports related to academic rights violations. This total includes 3 instances of prevention of higher education. Additionally, at least 31 individuals were sentenced to 54 terms of suspension from studies. There were 3 cases of expulsion from universities, 1 summons to university disciplinary committees, 2 cases of gender discrimination in universities, 110 cases of food poisoning, 1 student exiles and 36 student gatherings.

Regarding student rights, there were 10 cases of physical punishment and over 80 cases of poisoning. Last year, at least 2,000,000 students were unable to continue their education. It should be noted that the three provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan, Golestan and Khorasan Razavi have the highest dropout rates in the country.

Specifically, in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan, 47.6% of students do not receive a certificate of completion of secondary education.

The monthly comparison of violations of basic rights in academic environments, as shown in the graph below, indicates that the highest number of rights violations in this area occurred in October, while the lowest number of reports was observed in June.

RIGHT TO LIFE (DEATH PENALTY)

In 2024, the Department of Statistics and Publication of Human Rights Activists in Iran registered 812 reports concerning the right to life. This encompassed the sentencing of 214 individuals to death, and the execution of 930 individuals. Out of these, 4 were carried out in public. Among the executed individuals whose genders were identified, 818 were male and 27 were female. Additionally, 5 juvenile offenders, defined as individuals under the age of 18 at the time of their alleged crimes, were also executed. Additionally, the verdicts of 54 individuals who had previously been sentenced to the death penalty were confirmed by the Supreme Court.

According to these reports, 52.69% of the executions were related to drug-related charges. Furthermore, 40% of the executions were for murder charges, 2.37% for sexual crimes, and 1.72% were executed with unknown charges. Additionally, 0.75% were executed on charges of Moharebeh (non-political), another 0.75% for Corruption on Earth,0.65% on charges of armed robbery, 0.54% for security-related offenses (espionage, terrorism, bombing) and another 0.54% were executed on charges of Moharebeh-Baghi (political-security).

The execution of death sentences across Iran’s provinces in 2024, Alborz province with 20.54% of all the cases that is due to its two populated and important prisons., followed by Fars ranking with 10.22% of all the death sentences issued,

Of those executed in 2024, 3% were female, and 88% were male, while the gender of the other 9% is unknown.

The following diagram is directly related to the secret executions of prisoners. These executions are reported by independent sources and human rights associations, indicating that 94% of executions are carried out in secret or without any public notice.

Executions carried out in 2024 compared to 2023 increased by 24.06%. The number of death sentences issued increased by 38%.

CULTURAL RIGHTS

In 2024, the Department of Statistics and Publication of Human Rights Activists in Iran recorded 12 reports related to violations of cultural rights. These reports included the arrest of 2 individuals. Additionally, there were 2 instances of preventing the execution of a program or speech, 2 travel ban, 1 case of house and property confiscation, 1 summon to judicial institutions, 1 gathering and 2 cases of judicial sentences being carried out. Moreover, 5 individuals were sentenced to 192 months of suspended imprisonment, with 144 months of these sentences issued by appellate courts.

In the realm of cultural rights, there was an 86.06% decrease in citizen arrests compared to the previous year.

The monthly comparison of cultural rights violations, as illustrated in the graph below, shows that the highest number of violations reports in this category occurred in January, September and November. The lowest number of reports was observed in June, July and December.

WORKERS’ RIGHTS

In 2024, a total of 1,650 reports were collected in the field of workers’ rights, according to statistical analyses by the Department of Statistics of Human Rights Activists in Iran. Based on these reports, a total of 11 individuals were arrested. Additionally, 9 labor activists or defenders of workers’ rights were sentenced to 301 months of actual imprisonment, with 8 months of these sentences being issued by appellate courts. Moreover, 1 person has been deprived of social rights and one person was also sentenced to 24 months of exile.

Furthermore, there were 28 summonses to judicial and security authorities, along with 10 court trials and 10 interrogations in security-judicial institutions, 8 worker suicides and 4 cases of self-immolation by workers have been recorded. There was also 1 case of confiscation of property and homes, 1 travel ban, 2 house searches and 5 imprisonment executions.

In the fiscal year 2024, reports of delayed or unpaid wages to workers amounted to at least 263 months for 33619 person, 4,562 layoffs or dismissals, 605 instances of unemployment, 399 months of lack of work-related insurance for 600027 workers, 11 factory closures, and 1,720 workers left in limbo regarding their employment status. Additionally, at least 721 individuals were killed in work-related accidents, and 4,830 cases of physical injuries to workers on the job were reported. Iran ranks 102nd globally in terms of workplace safety standards, which is considered a very low ranking.

The monthly comparison of violations of workers’ rights, as observed in the forthcoming chart, shows that the highest number of rights violations reports in this domain were published in October, with the most significant decrease in reports occurring in December.

According to the reports gathered by the Department of Statistics of Human Rights Activists in Iran, in 2024, 15.42% of work-related accidents were due to traffic accidents, 15.36% were fire incidents, 14.99% were poisonings, 14.25% occurred in factories, 10.37% were falls from heights, 8.56% happened in mines, 4.57% were construction accidents, 4.47% were gas poisonings, 3.88% were caused by hard object impacts, 2.76% were drilling (well) accidents, 2.39% were due to electrocution, 1.38% occurred in petrochemical and refinery industries, 0.53% were explosions, 0.37% were drownings, 0.32% were agricultural accidents, 0.21% were beating and 0.16% were heat strokes.

In 2024, there were at least 725 worker protests, 3 instances of suppression of assembly, and 1378 worker strikes. Most of these protests were related to wage demands. The reports indicate 82.08% decrease in the arrest of workers and a 68.09% decrease in the issuance of judicial sentences based on the number of people tried, compared to the previous year. Additionally, the issuance of prison sentences decreased by 53.09% compared to the previous year.

CHILDREN’S RIGHTS

In 2024, the Department of Statistics gathered 482 reports related to children’s rights violations. Due to the silence of families and governmental institutions, accurate statistics on child abuse cases are not available. However, at least 5 cases of rape and sexual abuse of children, 39 child murders, 2 cases of honor killings, 1 cases of child self-immolation, 63 child suicides, at least 577 cases of child abuse, 4 cases of abandoned infants, 11 cases of death, and 18 cases of injuries to child laborers, 10 cases of death, and 135 cases of injuries due to negligence by officials, as well as over 70,000 instances of economic activity were

In 2024, the Department of Statistics gathered 490 reports related to children’s rights violations. Due to the silence of families and governmental institutions, accurate statistics on child abuse cases are not available. However, at least 5 cases of rape and sexual abuse of children, 40 child murders, 2 cases of honor killings, 1 cases of child self-immolation, 64 child suicides, at least 577 cases of child abuse, 4 cases of abandoned infants, 11 cases of death, and 18 cases of injuries to child laborers, 10 cases of death, and 135 cases of injuries due to negligence by officials, as well as over 70,000 instances of economic activity were reported.

Additionally, 4 individuals under the age of 18 have been sentenced to a total of 96 months of imprisonment. Of this, 48 months were issued by the Appellate Courts. Furthermore, 2 cases of summons to security agencies, 1 case of house search, and 2 imprisonment executions were recorded.

In recent years, the publication of statistics and reports on the rise of child marriage in Iran has raised significant concerns about this issue and its harmful consequences. According to official statistics from the Iranian Statistical Center in 2019, about 16.8% of girls aged 15 to 19 in Iran were married. Among the limited government data available on this matter, a report from the Iranian Statistical Center indicated that from the winter of 2021 to the end of the fall of 2022, at least 27,448 girls under the age of 15 were married in Iran.

Despite the downward trend in the marriage of girls under 15 observed from 2017, the numbers returned to previous levels in 2019 and began to rise again. Reports indicate that in 2020 and 2021, respectively, 31,646 and 32,655 girls under 15 were married in Iran. The number of marriages involving girls under 15 increased by 933 cases in the fall of 2022 compared to the summer of the same year.

Additionally, in the fall of 2022, more than 5,500 girls aged 15 to 19 were married compared to the previous season (summer 2022). According to the report, most child brides become mothers at a young age. For example, based on data from the Civil Registry Organization in May 2022, at least 69,103 babies were born in 2021 to mothers aged 10 to 19, and 1,474 babies were born to mothers aged 10 to 14.

In September 2024, the Etemad newspaper reported on the cessation of publishing statistics and information regarding child marriage and the number of children born to underage mothers in Iran. According to the newspaper, an official from the Civil Registry Organization stated that “an order has been issued” prohibiting the release of these statistics.

More than two million children were documented as being deprived of education during this year, according to collected reports. It is noteworthy that the provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan, Golestan, and Razavi Khorasan have the highest dropout rates in the country. Specifically, in Sistan and Baluchestan, 47.6% of students do not receive a high school diploma. Many students in the country are deprived of their right to education due to a lack of access to virtual learning resources, early marriages, poverty, cultural issues, population dispersion, and other factors.

Last year, contrary to Iran’s international commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, specifically the section prohibiting the use of children in military activities, at least 115,859 individuals under the age of 18 were sent to camps known as “Rahian-e Noor” in the country’s operational zones. The provinces of Kermanshah, Razavi Khorasan, Bushehr, Alborz, and Khuzestan recorded the highest number of participants in these camps.

Additionally, at least 20,500 individuals under the age of 18 were sent to shooting ranges for firearms training and weapons use instruction.

It’s noteworthy that this year, the Welfare Organization or relevant statistical authorities have not published data on child abuse. As mentioned in the execution section of this report, at least 5 juvenile offenders were executed in Iran last year. Precise statistics on the arrest of children are not available, but according to accessible reports, at least 34 individuals under 18 years old were detained by security institutions.

The monthly comparison of violations of children’s rights shows the highest number of violations reports in November and the lowest in June.

WOMEN’S RIGHTS

In 2024, a total of 238 reports were collected in the category of women’s rights, as per the Department of Statistics of Human Rights Activists in Iran. These reports included at least 26 cases of rape and sexual assault, 114 instances of women’s murders, 37 cases of honor killings including 23 men, 1 case of self-immolation, 3 suicides, at least 16,264 cases of domestic violence, 10 cases of assault, 4 acid attacks, 14 summonses to judicial and security institutions, 30,629 instances of improper hijab, 3 travel bans, 2 court trials and 5 instances of discrimination in social settings. It is worth mentioning that at least 365 business units were sealed by the Public Places Supervision Office due to non-compliance with the mandatory hijab.

According to the report, 644 women were arrested for improper veiling. Of these, 618 cases were related to the so-called “Noor” operation, which was started in the spring of 2024 by the Iranian police. Additionally, at least 10 activists were sentenced to a total of 57 months of imprisonment and fined One hundred and forty million Iranian Rials. This includes 43 months of actual imprisonment and 14 months of suspended imprisonment, with 7 months of these sentences issued by appellate courts. Furthermore, 2 individuals were sentenced to 148 lashes.

The monthly comparison of violations of women’s rights shows that the highest number of rights violations reports in this domain were published in January and April, with the most significant decrease in reports observed in December.

PRISONERS’ RIGHTS

In 2024, a total of 1,290 reports of violations of prisoners’ rights were registered. These included 15 cases of physical assault on prisoners, 412 instances of denial or neglect of medical care, 284 illegal transfers to solitary confinement, 66 attempted hunger strikes, 31 cases of forced transfer or exile of prisoners, 435 instances of threats and pressure on prisoners, 141 cases of denying prisoner visitation rights, 18 cases of psychological and physical torture, 4 deaths due to illness, 21 suicides, 2 case of self-immolation, 7 murders of prisoners, 155 instances of lack of access to legal counsel, 777 reports of prisoners being kept in unsuitable conditions, 28 cases of forced confession, 8 instances of denial of outdoor time, 3 cases of deprivation of access to media and books, 79 instances of non-segregation of crimes, 3 cases of ailure to segregate pre-trial detainees from convicted prisoners, 4 instances of using handcuffs or shackles on prisoners, 129 denials of medical leave, and 124 denials of the right to contact.

Additionally, in the realm of detainee rights, 81 cases of failure to process the lawsuit, 309 cases of uncertainty and 938 cases of indefinite detention were reported. Furthermore, a sentence of 26 lashes was executed on 2 individuals in prison.

The monthly comparison of violations of prisoners’ rights, as shown in the graph below, indicates that the highest number of reports occurred in February, while the lowest number of reports was observed in December.

SECURITY FORCES’ VIOLENCE AND CITIZENS’ SAFETY

Death of civilians

In 2024, there were a total of 484 incidents involving civilians being shot by military forces. Out of these incidents, 163 civilians lost their lives, including 40 Kolbars (border carriers), 43 fuel carriers, and 80 other civilians. Additionally, 321 people were injured due to indiscriminate military fire, which comprised 222 Kolbars, 50 ordinary civilians, and 49 fuel carriers.
Furthermore, 30 Kolbars were affected by environmental factors such as extreme cold and falls from heights, resulting in 21 injuries and 9 deaths. Also, 20 fuel carriers were involved in accidents following pursuits by military forces, leading to 7 deaths and 13 injuries.
Furthermore, in the past year, two deadly explosions occurred during the fourth anniversary ceremony of Qassem Soleimani in Kerman, resulting in 103 deaths and 211 injuries.

Victims of landmines and explosions

The landmines left from the war threaten the lives of civilians living in border cities each year. The Iranian government continues to manufacture and plant anti-personnel mines against international agreements, arguing that the use of these type of landmines is the only effective way to keep its vast borders safe.

Based on reports, at least 14 civilians in the past year have lost their lives to landmines in border areas, while 33 other civilians have been injured

Floggings

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) strictly prohibits inhuman or degrading punishments, such as flogging and amputation. However, in 2024, flogging sentences were executed for at least 3 accused, amounting to a total of 106 lashes. Additionally, at least 131 individuals were sentenced to a total of 9,957 lashes by the Iranian judiciary. Moreover, the hand amputation sentences of 4 defendants were executed, and 4 more individuals were sentenced to amputation.

Intervention in personal affairs of civilians

In 2024, at least 114 citizens in Semnan and Qazvin provinces were arrested on the night of the traditional national celebration “Chaharshanbeh Souri” under the title of “norm breaker”.

Financial Loser Protests

In 2024, groups of citizens organized protests on at least 144 occasions. These individuals, primarily victims of financial and investment frauds, held protests in 31 provinces due to unmet demands and claims. The provinces of Tehran, Qazvin, and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari saw the highest number of these protests.

The monthly comparison of reports related to violence from security forces and citizens’ safety, as depicted in the graph below, indicates that the highest number of reports occurred in March, while the lowest number was in December.

JUDICIAL SENTENCES IN VARIOUS CATEGORIES

In the past year, the Iranian judiciary, encompassing both primary and appellate courts, issued a total of 33,574 months of imprisonment. The breakdown of these sentences across various categories is as follows: 471 months for ethnic minorities, 4786 months for religious minorities, 26,769 months for freedom of expression, 890 months for trade unions, 301 months for workers, 57 months for women’s rights, 96 months for children’s rights, 12 months for environmental rights and 192 months for cultural rights. (It is important to note that these statistics only include sentences where specific details or information about the verdicts were made public.)

Additionally, these citizens were collectively fined Ninety-five billion eight hundred ninety-six million seven hundred ninety thousand Iranian Rials and sentenced to a total of 9,957 lashes.

The monthly comparison of these convictions, as shown in the graph above, indicates that the highest number of reports was published in June, while the lowest number was observed in December.

In 2024, the number of convictions of citizens and activists increase by 0.7%. Accordingly, there was a 6.6% decrease in the religious minority category, 52.6% decrease in the ethnic minority, 6.5% increase in thought and expression, 27.6% decrease in of trade unions and associations, a 53.6% decrease in the labor, 300% increase in the children’s category, 700% increase in the cultural and a 68.6% decrease in the women’s category.

ARRESTS

In the past year, security forces in Iran arrested 2,783 citizens due to their engagement in civil, ideological, or political activities. The breakdown of these arrests across various categories is as follows: 23 arrests in trade unions, 262 in ethnic minorities, 91 in religious minorities, 1,591 in freedom of expression, 34 in children’s rights, 11 in environmental rights, 2 in cultural rights, and 11 in labor rights.

Additionally, 644 women were subjected to legal prosecution due to their activities and the promotion of their lifestyle choices. Furthermore, 114 citizens were arrested for organizing or participating in private gatherings.

The monthly comparison of these arrests, as depicted in the graph below, indicates that the highest number of reports occurred in May, while the lowest number was in December.

In 2024, there was an overall decrease of 38.5% in the number of arrests related to civil activities compared to the previous year. However, the pattern varied significantly across different categories:

  • ▫️Ethnic Minorities: Arrests decreased by 19.1%
  • ▫️Cultural Sector: Arrests decreased by 25.9%
  • ▫️Religious Minorities: Arrests decreased by 35.9%
  • ▫️Trade Unions: Arrests decreased by 25.8%.
  • ▫️Women’s Rights Arrests: A significant increase of 1363.6%
  • ▫️Lifestyle-related: Arrests decreased by 74.1%
  • ▫️Environmental Rights: Arrests decreased by 67.6%
  • ▫️Children’s Rights: Arrests decreased by 73.8%
  • ▫️Workers’ Rights: Arrests decreased by 82.8%
  • ▫️Freedom of Expression: Arrests decreased by 41.9%.

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ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

In 2024, 765 reports were gathered related to environmental rights, leading to the arrest of 11 activists in this field. Additionally, there was 3 summonses to security institutions, 1 house search, 1 court trial, 95 instances of failure to protect natural resources, at least 551 reports of various types of environmental pollution including air, surface water, and groundwater pollution, 10 cases of improper exploitation of natural resources, 411 instances of animal abuse, 36 protests and 3 instances of Preventing protest gatherings recorded.

In addition, two activists in this field have been sentenced to a total of 12 months of actual imprisonment

It is also noteworthy that in the past year, 563 officers from the Natural Resources Protection Unit were involved in accidents.

This includes 151 death and 408 injuries of park rangers, as well as injuries to 1 forest warden and 3 forest rangers.

In the environmental sector, there was a 67.6% decrease in the arrest of citizens compared to the previous year.

Based on the number of reports per month, the highest number of reports in the environmental sector occurred in November, and the lowest in March.

SEXUAL AND GENDER MINORITIES

Prior to 2021, reports concerning the rights of sexual and gender minorities in Iran were processed under other categories in the annual reports of Human Rights Activists in Iran. The primary reason for this was the limited number of reports available in this area, which did not facilitate detailed analysis.

Creating an independent category, despite the small number of reports, signifies an effort to enhance the monitoring of the status of these community members. The rights of sexual and gender minorities in the country are systematically violated in various ways.

Criminalization of same-sex relationships and non-recognition of transgender individuals’ gender identity prior to gender reassignment surgery are two examples. These violations occur irrespective of the blatant spreading of hatred against members of this community.

Cultural taboos, legal barriers, and the weakness of civil institutions in monitoring and reporting violations against them have become serious problems. The government’s policy towards sexual minorities in Iran has blurred the line between being a sexual minority and moral corruption, exacerbating the vulnerability and oppressive atmosphere for these individuals.

In some instances, security and law enforcement agencies themselves admit to detaining and harassing members of this community. For example, in March this year (March 2024), a transgender citizen in Gonbad-e Kavus was arrested by the city’s police commander, who described the reason as “promoting immorality and indecency.” Additionally, a 17-year-old transgender teenager in Tabriz was murdered by their father. Upon arrest, the accused stated that his son’s same-sex relationships were among the reasons for the killing.

Contrary to popular belief, transgender citizens face legal issues in addition to cultural ones when changing their identification documents or obtaining exemption from mandatory military service. This situation arises from the pathologization of transgender identity in the laws of the National Conscription Organization, at a time when the World Health Organization, in its latest 2019 guidelines (ICD-11), classified transgender status under sexual health conditions, moving away from its previous classification as a disorder.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS

In a detailed and alarming report prepared by the Spreading Justice and the Human Rights Activists Statistics Center in Iran, a widespread pattern of human rights violations in Iran has been documented over a one-year period (from January 1, 2024, to January 1, 2025). The data, carefully categorized, emphasize the severity and extent of these violations across various sectors of the government.

From the perspective of their position in the power structure and the direct chain of command, the reports are divided among three main actors based on the available information: the Judiciary, the Executive, and the Leadership Authority.

Out of a total of 1,885 reported cases gathered, there were identifiable officials or entities involved in the human rights violations related to the report. Among these reports, the Judiciary leads with 1,318 cases, followed by the Executive with 441 cases, and the Leadership with 126 cases.

For a better understanding, refer to the adjacent pie chart, which represents the distribution of human rights violations based on the number of reports in the last year

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATING ENTITIES

In the collected reports that contained information about human rights violators, 498 legal entities (institutions) from various branches of the government were identified. The following list names the top ten institutions with the most human rights violation reports in the past year:

1- Ministry of Intelligence: 238 cases of human rights violation reports

2- FARAJA Intelligence Organization: 165 cases

3- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: 120 cases

4- Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court: 84 cases

5- Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court: 55 cases

6- Branch 10 of the Criminal Court 1 of Tehran: 30 cases

7- Branch 36 of the Tehran Appeals Court: 26 cases

8- Cyber Police (FATA): 21 cases

9- Branch 15 of the Karaj Revolutionary Court: 15 cases

10- Branch 11 of the Criminal Court 1 of Tehran: 15 cases

INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS 

Furthermore, 108 individuals have demonstrated behavior considered as direct human rights violations.

The top ten individuals, all affiliated with the Judiciary, had the most human rights violation cases based on individual performance. 9 judges and a prosecutor are main individuals responsible for human rights violations, as detailed below:

1Iman Afshari– Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Tehran – Number of Reported Cases: 81 cases
2Abolghasem Salavati– Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Tehran – Number of Reported Cases: 55 cases
3Abbasali Houzan – Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 36 of the Court of Appeals – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Tehran – Number of Reported Cases: 22 cases
4Seyed Musa Asef-Alhosseini – Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Karaj – Number of Reported Cases: 15 cases
5Mehdi Rasekhi – Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 3 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Rasht – Number of Reported Cases: 15 cases
6Mohammad-Reza Tavakoli – Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Isfahan – Number of Reported Cases: 14 cases
7Ali Salehi – Position: Prosecutor -Institution: Prosecutor’s Office – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Tehran – Number of Reported Cases: 14 cases
8Mehdi Rasekhi – Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Sanandaj – Number of Reported Cases: 13 cases
9Mohammadreza Amouzad– Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 28 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Tehran – Number of Reported Cases: 11 cases
10Seyed Ali Mozloom– Position: Judge -Institution: Branch 29 of the Revolutionary Court – Affiliation: Judiciary – Place of Activity: Tehran – Number of Reported Cases: 43 cases

The legal and human rights implications of the documented cases indicate a systematic pattern of human rights violations at different levels of the Iranian government. The high number of cases attributed to judicial authorities, especially in revolutionary courts, raises serious concerns about justice and impartiality in the judicial process. Extensive intervention by intelligence and security organizations, including the Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC Intelligence Organization, reflects a coordinated approach to suppress opposition and control the population.

Prison management, especially in prominent centers like Evin and Rajai Shahr, shows disregard for the rights and welfare of prisoners. Individual accountability of high-ranking judicial officials like Iman Afshari questions the role of specific actors in perpetuating these violations.

For a better understanding of the published reports on human rights violations, refer to the following chart which categorizes them according to their affiliation in the division of powers.

Reflection on the year

As evidenced by the alarming statistics outlined in this report, the year 2024 underscored the gravity of Iran’s escalating human rights crisis. The country witnessed its highest number of executions in a decade, with over 883 cases reported—amounting to a staggering 75% of all executions globally.

In the face of these challenges, HRA has remained unwavering in its commitment to exposing injustices, documenting abuses, preserving critical evidence, and advocating for meaningful change. Through direct engagement with policymakers and ongoing support to victims and their families, we continue to shine a light on these pressing issues. Below is a concise overview of our key efforts over the past year.

United Nations Advocacy

In December 2023, HRA, alongside UpRights, submitted evidence and legal analysis on the crimes against humanity of gender and political persecution to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), urging the mission to recognize such crimes. HRA documented violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, enforced disappearances, and gender-based persecution, underscoring the urgent need for accountability and justice for victims and survivors. In March 2024, HRA welcomed the FFMI’s findings, which recognized the crime against humanity of gender persecution in their final report. This comprehensive report emphasized the need for immediate action to address the systemic impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights violations and crimes under international law. HRA continues to encourage member States to act on these findings and investigate perpetrators directly involved.

This year, HRA also participated in the 55th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council. HRA was proud to stand in solidarity with Iranians and amplify their voices on the international stage. During this session, Dr. Javaid Rehman, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, presented his final report as mandate holder. HRA welcomed his analysis, particularly his focus on the alarming prevalence of death penalty charges, including those for drug-related offenses and juvenile offenders. His report also highlighted the mistreatment of women and girls, human rights defenders, lawyers, and minorities, detailing instances of forced confessions, unfair trials, and discriminatory practices. These are themes HRA has diligently documented and shared with the mandate throughout the reporting period. HRA continues to share valuable information with the United Nations on human rights violations in Iran, particularly on the number of executions taking place.

Additionally, On 16 July 2024, HRA submitted a comprehensive report to the Universal Public Review on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The information contained within the report covers five key thematic areas. The submission contains information drawn from investigations, interviews, and reports published by HRA.

1- LGBTQ+ Rights Violations

2- Prohibition of Torture and Prison Conditions

3- Right to Life and the Death Penalty

4- Labor Rights Violations

5- The Right to Health with special attention to Sexual and Reproductive Rights of Women

The Two-Year Anniversary of the Death of Mahsa Zhina Amini and the Outbreak of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” Protests

On September 16, 2022, Mahsa Zhina Amini died in detention following her encounter with the morality police over alleged hijab non-compliance. Her death triggered nationwide protests that lasted 82 consecutive days in many areas. This year marked the second anniversary of her death and the subsequent outbreak of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. HRA examined the surge in women’s activism in Iran and the government’s increasingly repressive responses. Despite efforts to suppress their voices, women in Iran remain resilient. This resilience has led to severe repercussions, including death sentences, harsh prison terms, and violent arrests for non-compliance with hijab laws.

Through conversations with women in Iran, including those imprisoned, HRA gained valuable insights into their conditions. One prisoner recounted, “They tried to break us with isolation and deprivation, but our resolve only grew stronger.” In facilities like Evin Prison, women are subjected to solitary confinement, cut off from the outside world, denied basic rights such as medical care, and prevented from contacting their families.

Additionally, this year, HRA published a report on sexual and reproductive rights. Women in Iran face severe restrictions on their reproductive autonomy, largely influenced by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s push for population growth. Measures such as the 2015 Bill 446 and the 2021 Population Rejuvenation and Family Support Act have limited access to contraception and abortion while reinforcing traditional gender roles. Recent legislation, like the 2023-2024 Population Youth Bill, has further criminalized abortion, imposed discriminatory workplace practices, and restricted prenatal screenings, disproportionately affecting rural and marginalized women. These systemic violations endanger women’s health, autonomy, and human rights, prompting calls for international intervention to address Iran’s deepening gender inequality.

In collaboration with 15 other human rights organizations, HRA released a joint statement urging the international community and human rights activists to condemn Iran’s restrictive policies on sexual and reproductive rights. The statement called for diplomatic efforts to demand the abolition of discriminatory laws and the reinstatement of comprehensive family planning programs, including access to contraception and abortion.

Member States and Targeted Human Rights Sanctions

HRA continued its advocacy for targeted human rights sanctions, emphasizing the effectiveness of Magnitsky-style sanctions as a tool for addressing human rights violations. These sanctions publicly identify perpetrators of abuses in Iran, acknowledging victims and raising global awareness of such actions. They also impose tangible consequences, such as freezing assets and enforcing travel bans.

This year HRA cross-referenced around 400 names across five jurisdictions—the USA, EU, Canada, Australia, and the UK over the past 5 years. This allowed HRA to effectively recommend individuals who should be sanctioned and to continue to encourage coordinated efforts between states.

In August, HRA submitted recommendations to the Dutch Government regarding its new sanctions legislation. The submission emphasized the strategic implementation of human rights sanctions through collaboration with NGOs and coordinated efforts with international allies. It highlighted discrepancies in sanctions across jurisdictions and advocated for targeting “Low-Level High-Impact Individuals” (LLHI) who play critical roles in human rights abuses. HRA underscored the importance of coordination among EU member states and allies like the USA, UK, and Canada, as well as the inclusion of NGOs in consultation processes to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions.

In November, HRA’s Deputy Director traveled to London for discussions with key members of parliament, including Sir William Browder, a leading figure behind the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign. These discussions centered on the continued application of targeted human rights sanctions. The Deputy Director also engaged with members of the UK Foreign Affairs Select Committee, emphasizing the importance of prioritizing accountability for human rights violations and breaches of international law in Iran. Furthermore, in collaboration with REDRESS, HRA briefed the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Magnitsky Sanctions and Reparations, chaired by Rt Hon Sir Iain Duncan Smith. This briefing explored strategic and coordinated approaches for implementing Magnitsky-style sanctions to address human rights violations in Iran.

HRA’s Spreading Justice continues to extensively review human rights violations. In September, HRA welcomed the coordinated actions taken by the United States and its allies to impose targeted sanctions on Iranian officials implicated in human rights violations. These sanctions also specifically target officials in Iranian prison systems who are responsible for human right abuses in prison, including the use of torture and sexual assaults against prisoners, the denial of medical care to political prisoners, the violent suppression of protesters protesting their conditions, and the kidnapping of regime critics abroad.

International Advocacy

This year HRA joined two new coalitions. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), a global civil society network focused on the fight for global justice through the framework of the Rome Statute and the ICC. HRA also joined CIVICUS, a global alliance of civil society organisations and activists working to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world.

23rd Assembly of States Parties (ASP23) 

Together with the CICC, HRA participated in the ASP23 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. HRA observed the general debate among state parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), and other stakeholders on the future of the Court. While Iran is not a state party to the Rome Statute, attending such events also allows for discussions and potential avenues for other international legal mechanisms that can hold perpetrators accountable, such as pursuing cases through national courts or states invoking universal jurisdiction.

Throughout the week, HRA observed several side events, including:

1- Gender Persecution: Co-hosted by the United Kingdom and the Office of the Prosecutor, this event explored the principles of gender persecution, strategies to enhance prevention, and the importance of ensuring the protection and participation of survivors.

2- Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity at the ICC: Collaborating to End Impunity: Hosted by the Clooney Foundation for Justice and Legal Action Worldwide (LAW) and sponsored by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, this session highlighted the role of domestic investigations in complementing international criminal investigations to achieve accountability for atrocities

3- Financial Accountability of the Court: Organized by Redress and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), this event examined the ICC’s powers to seize perpetrators’ assets and deliver reparations for survivors.

These discussions underscored the importance of collective efforts in advancing justice and accountability on a global scale.

Additionally, in December, HRA went to Berlin to discuss the human rights situation in Iran with Parliamentarians and EU member states. During this session, HRA advocated for a renewed commitment to targeted human rights sanctions and continued involvement with CSO’s on their Iran human rights policy to ensure Do No Harm principles are applied.

The Pasdaran Documentation Project (PDP)

This year, HRA launched its PDP database—an unparalleled resource aimed at bringing transparency to the IRGC’s activities. This project marks the culmination of extensive work involving thousands of documents and the identification of key IRGC units and personnel alongside a legal analysis of incidents attributed to them. The project’s core objective is to identify the IRGC’s personnel, units, and key players as a step toward dismantling the regime’s power structure. By exposing the individuals and entities involved in abuses across decades, the project helps create a roadmap for judicial and quasi-judicial accountability, including international targeted sanctions and state-led prosecution under international law.

One of the incidents explored in the PDP Database is Bloody Friday, on Friday, 30 September 2022, Zahedan, a city in Sistan and Baluchistan province, witnessed the deadliest incident of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, which came to be known as “Bloody Friday.” The database has identified several violations, including some of which could trigger individual criminal accountability.

This is the brief version and the full report is available for download in PDF format.

Woman Arrested in Iran After Being Assaulted by Motorcyclist

HRANA is closely following reports of increased street violence. Iranian women face not only legal repercussions when it comes to mandatory hijab in Iran but also mounting personal safety risks, as incidents of harassment and intimidation by private individuals have surged.

Reports received by HRANA detail disturbing trends in harassment aimed at women who reject hijab mandates in favor of personal choice, suggesting a coordinated campaign to enforce compliance through fear. This report examines critical incidents, revealing the full scope of pressure exerted on Iranian women in the name of enforcing hijab and societal norms.

In recent months, Iran’s streets have become an even more dangerous environment for women resisting the country’s mandatory hijab laws. HRANA reports indicate a troubling trend: women who choose not to wear the hijab now face increased hostility and threats from individuals on the street, often on motorcycles.

Government campaigns, including the enactment of the “Noor” plan, the new so-called Hijab and Chastity bill and penalties for those opposing mandatory hijab, and the organization of street monitors under names like “Hijab Watchs,” together appear to have emboldened harassers, turning public spaces into areas of fear for women who dare to defy the dress code.

In recent months, HRANA has documented numerous cases of women narrowly escaping what seem to be premeditated, organized scare tactics aimed at enforcing hijab compliance. One young woman recounted her encounter with a motorcyclist who sped toward her on the sidewalk, swerving away only at the last moment. In another case, taxi drivers advised a harassed woman to wear a hijab “for her safety.”

These incidents are not isolated. They represent a broader, systematic effort to instill fear and deter resistance to hijab within the framework of government-led campaigns for mandatory hijab enforcement. While those committing these acts may not be government officials, the timing of these attacks with the recent wave of hijab enforcement raises serious questions about the State’s complicity.

The brazen harassment climaxed on October 31, when a woman on Africa Street in Tehran became the victim of unwelcome sexual harassment by a motorcyclist.

Despite her clear distress, authorities opted to treat her not as a victim, but as a criminal. Tehran’s police swiftly announced charges against both the motorcyclist and the woman herself—for “failing to observe mandatory hijab” and for the motorcyclist’s “driving on the sidewalk,” downplaying his harassment and refusing to highlight her suffering.

This response underscores the judiciary’s priorities: enforcing dress codes over addressing gender-based violence, signaling that women’s safety is secondary to their compliance.

By framing the victim of intimidation as a criminal, the Iranian justice system reveals its allegiance to repressive standards that disregard basic principles of safety and dignity. Such actions not only degrade women

but also reinforce a culture of impunity, where abusers—be they state officials or civilians—operate with confidence, knowing that the law is on their side.

The pattern is unmistakable: when the state’s agenda prioritizes control over compassion, women bear the brunt, and society is deprived of a basic measure of justice.