Two Women Sentenced to Prison, Flogging, and Internal Exile in Qorveh

HRANA – Neda Dadehjani and Setayesh (Behnoosh) Sarabi, two residents of Qorveh who were arrested in connection with the January 2026 protests, have been sentenced by the Revolutionary and Criminal Courts of Qorveh to a combined total of six years in prison, 62 lashes, and four years of internal exile to Nik Shahr County.

According to HRANA, citing Kolbar News, two citizens in Qorveh have been sentenced to prison, flogging, and internal exile.

According to the report, Branch 102 of the Qorveh Criminal Court convicted Neda Dadehjani and Setayesh (Behnoosh) Sarabi on the charge of “disrupting public order and peace.” Each was sentenced to one year in prison, 31 lashes, and two years of internal exile to Nik Shahr County.

In a separate part of their case, Branch One of the Qorveh Revolutionary Court convicted both women of “assembly and collusion to commit crimes against national security,” sentencing each to an additional two years in prison.

Based on the final ruling, each woman received a sentence of three years’ imprisonment, 31 lashes, and two years of internal exile. Under the final judgment, two years of each prison sentence are enforceable.

The two women were arrested by security forces in connection with the nationwide protests held in January 2026.

Neda Dadehjani, who is active in theater, had previously won an award at a regional theater festival for persons with disabilities. Setayesh (Behnoosh) Sarabi is a resident of Qorveh.

January 2026 Protests: Supreme Court Overturns Death Sentence of Ali Fattah

HRANA – The death sentence issued against Ali Fattah (Kamali), arrested during the January 2026 protests, has been overturned by the Supreme Court. He had previously been sentenced to death by Judge Iman Afshari.

According to HRANA, the Supreme Court has overturned the death sentence imposed on Ali Fattah (Kamali), one of the detainees arrested during the January 2026 protests.

Based on information received by HRANA, the Supreme Court overturned the political prisoner’s death sentence some time ago.

A source familiar with the case told HRANA: “Following the onset of serious mental health issues, Ali Fattah (Kamali) is currently hospitalized at Razi Psychiatric Teaching and Treatment Hospital (Aminabad). He had previously been transferred to the same facility once before to receive medical treatment.”

Ali Fattah (Kamali) was arrested in Tehran on January 12, 2026, during the nationwide protests. Holding a Malaysian student residence permit, he had returned to Iran only a few days before his arrest.

Following his arrest, he was held at Greater Tehran Penitentiary before being transferred to Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj in late June.

In May of this year, Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Iman Afshari, sentenced him to death on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh).

It should be noted that protests and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and within two days spread beyond markets and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests became one of the largest protest movements of recent years. Following the crackdown by security and law enforcement forces, thousands were killed or injured, and tens of thousands were arrested or summoned by security agencies. For more information, readers may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report titled “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days following the outbreak of Iran’s nationwide protests.

Baha’i Citizen Shideh Tavakkoli Sentenced to Prison and Additional Punishments

HRANA – Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court has sentenced Baha’i citizen Shideh Tavakkoli to 11 years in prison, permanent deprivation of employment in government and public service, and a monetary fine. The court also ordered the confiscation of part of her property.

According to HRANA, Shideh Tavakkoli has been sentenced to imprisonment and additional punishments.

According to the ruling issued by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati, Ms. Tavakkoli was sentenced to 10 years in prison, permanent deprivation of employment in government and public service, and a fine of 3.3 billion rials (330 million tomans) on charges of membership in anti-state groups and propaganda activities contrary to Islamic law. She was also sentenced to one additional year in prison on the charge of propaganda against the state.

The court further ordered the confiscation of two properties belonging to her in Tehran, valued at 18.7 billion tomans, as well as part of her personal belongings, including electronic devices, books, and religious items.

The verdict was issued by the court on May 20, 2026, and served on Ms. Tavakkoli on May 26, 2026.

Shideh Tavakkoli was arrested by security forces at her home in Tehran on May 27, 2025. After the completion of interrogations, she was temporarily released from prison on bail.

Over the past decade, Iran’s Baha’i community has been subjected to more security-related and judicial persecution than any other religious minority in the country. According to annual reports published by HRA, 62.41% of all reported violations of the rights of religious minorities during the past calendar year involved Baha’is, on average.

Six Prisoners Executed in Prisons in Tabriz and Shushtar Prisons

HRANA – The death sentences of six prisoners previously convicted on drug-related and murder charges have been carried out in Tabriz and Shushtar prisons.

According to the Iran Human Rights Organization, a prisoner was executed at Shushtar Prison in the early hours of Wednesday, July 15. He has been identified as Amin Khodari Mirghaed, 28.

According to the report, Mr. Mirghaed had been arrested approximately four and a half years ago on murder charges and was subsequently sentenced to death by the judiciary.

The death sentences of five other prisoners were also carried out at Tabriz Prison. The prisoners have been identified as:

• Javad Abolfathi, 36, from Tabriz;
• Ezzat Khosrownejad, approximately 30, from Hashtrud;
• Sohrab Nourmohammadi, 40, from Jolfa;
• Sajjad Alizadeh, 31, from Varzaqan; and
• Fardin Barnal, 31, from Tabriz.

According to the report, Nourmohammadi, Alizadeh, and Bernal were executed in the early hours of Tuesday, July 14, at Tabriz Prison. They had been arrested in separate cases on drug-related charges and later sentenced to death by Revolutionary Courts.

Additionally, Javad Abolfathi and Ezzat Khosrownejad were executed at Tabriz Prison in the early hours of Monday, July 13. Abolfathi had been arrested nine years ago and Khosrownejad two years ago, in separate murder cases, and were subsequently sentenced to death by judicial authorities.

It should be noted that three other prisoners, Abdolreza Heydari, Mehdi Latifi, and Salman Kakehkhani, who had also previously been sentenced to death in separate cases involving drug-related and murder charges, were executed during the same two-day period. Including the five prisoners named above, the total number of executions carried out at Tabriz Prison over those two days has risen to eight.

At the time of publication, prison officials and the relevant authorities had not officially announced these executions.

According to HRA’s Annual Report, in 2025 at least 2,063 citizens, including 61 women and 2 juvenile offenders, were executed. Of these, the sentences of 11 individuals were carried out in public. During the same period, 172 other individuals were sentenced to death.

Concerns Mount Over Possible Executions as Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi Remain in Solitary Confinement

HRANA – Alireza Sepahi and Abolfazl Sepahi, two death row prisoners in the case known as the “Alikhani Square case” in Isfahan, have been held in solitary confinement at Dastgerd Prison since the early hours of Saturday. Their transfer to solitary confinement, a family visit that relatives believe was a “final visit,” and the execution of two other defendants in the same case at dawn today have intensified concerns that their death sentences may be carried out imminently. Information received by HRANA also indicates that the defendants and their lawyer were denied effective access to the case file, that the court failed to consider exculpatory evidence, and that allegations of coercion and torture during the investigation were never examined.

According to HRANA, Alireza Sepahi, aged approximately 25, and Abolfazl Sepahi, aged approximately 23, were taken from the general ward of Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan at 5:00 a.m. on Saturday, July 18, 2026, and transferred to solitary confinement.

The two prisoners are first cousins. One is married to the other’s sister, making them both cousins and brothers-in-law. They were arrested on January 10, 2026, in connection with the nationwide January protests.

According to information received by HRANA, the death sentences against Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi were recently upheld by Iran’s highest judicial authority. However, their families remain unaware of the full details of the charges, the evidence in the case, and the judicial proceedings, while their lawyer has also been denied full access to the case file.

A source close to the families told HRANA:

“The lawyer said that after the death sentence was issued, an appeal was filed, and the verdict was later upheld by the Supreme Court. But even the lawyer was never given full access to the case file or a meaningful opportunity to pursue the case. Everywhere we go, no one provides any answers.”

According to the source, the lawyer was not permitted to photograph or obtain a copy of the verdict and was only allowed to take handwritten notes from portions of the ruling. As a result, the families remain unaware of the precise charges, the evidence relied upon by the court, and the details of the judgments issued against all defendants in the case.

The trial hearings for Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi were held inside the prison via videoconference. According to the family source, the court failed to consider exculpatory evidence submitted by the defendants and their families during the proceedings.

The source said that CCTV footage and other evidence show that Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi were not present at Alikhani Square at the time of the incident cited in the case and were elsewhere. Nevertheless, the presiding judge, Morteza Barati, issued death sentences against them, ordering Alireza to be executed four times and Abolfazl three times,without conducting an effective examination of this evidence.

The source added:

“There is video footage showing that they were somewhere else at that date and time, but Judge Morteza Barati ignored it. During family visits, Alireza repeatedly said, ‘We didn’t do anything. We weren’t there.'”

According to information received by HRANA, several other defendants in the same case have stated that they were subjected to pressure and torture during interrogations to force them to confirm that Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi had been present at Alikhani Square.

The family source said that several defendants currently held in Dowlatabad Prison claimed investigators presented them with a pre-written statement and instructed them to confirm Alireza Sepahi’s presence at the scene. According to the source, they stated that they had been pressured to falsely identify both Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi as being at the location of the incident.

Although these allegations were raised during the judicial proceedings, information received by HRANA indicates that no independent or effective investigation was conducted into the allegations of torture, ill-treatment, or coerced statements. The court also failed to conduct any transparent review of the reliability of the disputed statements or the circumstances under which they were obtained.

Under fair trial standards, any allegation of torture or ill-treatment must be investigated promptly, independently, and impartially, and any statement obtained through torture or coercion must not be admitted as evidence against a defendant. The lack of effective access to legal counsel and the case file, the court’s failure to consider exculpatory evidence, and the absence of any investigation into torture allegations have raised serious concerns regarding the defendants’ fundamental rights, particularly given that the sentences imposed carry the death penalty.

Meanwhile, according to information received by HRANA, Somayeh, the mother of one of the prisoners, who is herself serving a five-year prison sentence in the women’s ward of Isfahan Prison, was transferred to the men’s prison to visit her son and son-in-law. The circumstances of the visit, combined with the prisoners’ transfer to solitary confinement, have led their families to fear that it was arranged as a final visit before the executions.

The families’ last regular visit with Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi took place approximately one month ago.

Unconfirmed reports received by HRANA also indicate that Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi are among the first prisoners whose death sentences may be carried out. HRANA has not been able to independently verify these reports. However, their transfer to solitary confinement, together with the execution of two other defendants in the same case, has significantly heightened the families’ concerns.

At dawn today, Erfan Esfandiari and Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi, two other defendants sentenced to death in the Alikhani Square case, were executed in Isfahan. Their executions, carried out shortly after Alireza and Abolfazl Sepahi were transferred to solitary confinement, have intensified fears that the remaining death sentences in the case may soon be carried out.

At the trial court stage, 15 defendants in this case were sentenced to death. According to information provided by the defense lawyer, the death sentence of one defendant was overturned by the higher judicial authority, while the death sentences of the remaining 14 defendants were upheld.

In addition to Alireza Sepahi, Abolfazl Sepahi, Erfan Esfandiari, and Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi, HRANA has confirmed the identities of eight other individuals sentenced to death in this case: Ghaem Hosseini, Shervin Bagherian, Amirhossein Safari, Amirhossein Maleki, Ali Dashti, Abolfazl Ebrahimi, Alireza Raeisi, and Amirhossein Ebrahimi Analoucheh.

HRANA is continuing to investigate the case, including the identities of the remaining three defendants sentenced to death.

The family source also described the circumstances of Alireza Sepahi’s arrest, stating that security forces fired numerous rounds as they entered the family home, causing extensive damage to the building and its contents.

According to the source, bullet marks remain visible on the house, in the alley, and on the rooftop. Several months later, only the shattered windows have been replaced. Due to financial hardship, Alireza’s family has been unable to fully repair the home or replace the damaged belongings. Alireza’s father is a municipal employee.

It should be noted that protests and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and within two days spread beyond markets and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests became one of the largest protest movements of recent years. Following the crackdown by security and law enforcement forces, thousands were killed or injured, and tens of thousands were arrested or summoned by security agencies. For more information, readers may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report titled “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days following the outbreak of Iran’s nationwide protests.

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Shiraz Revolutionary Court Sentences Fariba Hosseini to Prison and Additional Punishments

HRANA – Fariba Hosseini, a resident of Shiraz, has been sentenced by Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court to nine years and nine months of discretionary imprisonment, along with additional punishments.

According to HRANA, Fariba Hosseini has been sentenced to imprisonment.

According to a ruling issued on July 7, 2026, by Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Sadati, and recently served on Ms. Hosseini, she was sentenced to six years in prison on the charge of “assembly and collusion to commit a crime against national security through supporting calls issued by groups opposed to the regime,” 30 months in prison for “insulting the Supreme Leader,” and 15 months in prison for “propaganda against the regime.” She was also sentenced to a two-year ban on leaving the country, including the revocation of her passport, as well as a two-year ban on online activities.

Notably, in this case, the court imposed sentences up to one-quarter above the maximum penalties prescribed by law for each charge. The ruling cites Articles 134 and 137 of the Islamic Penal Code, under which a judge may increase the statutory maximum sentence for each offense by up to one-quarter. The court also ruled that, among the sentences imposed, only the harshest sentence is enforceable.

Ms. Hosseini had previously stood trial before the Revolutionary Court earlier this year. After the initial ruling was issued and the case was referred to the Legal Medicine Organization for evaluation, she declined to appear for the required examination. The case was subsequently reheard by the Shiraz Revolutionary Court, resulting in the issuance of the recent ruling.

Ms. Hosseini was arrested in January 2026 in Shiraz and was released from Adelabad Prison in March 2026 after posting bail.

Fariba Hosseini, a resident of Shiraz, has previously been arrested and convicted on other occasions.

Paria Dadgar Safa Sentenced to Prison by Appeals Court

HRANA – Paria Dadgar Safa, one of the defendants in connection with the January 2026 nationwide protests, has been sentenced to 10 years in prison by the Tehran Province Court of Appeals. Four years of the sentence have been suspended.

According to HRANA, Paria Dadgar Safahas been sentenced to imprisonment.

Based on information received by HRANA, Branch 36 of the Tehran Province Court of Appeals sentenced Ms. Dadgar Safa to 10 years in prison, with four years of the sentence suspended. She had previously been sentenced to 10 years in prison in the initial trial by Branch 28 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Mohammad-Reza Amouzad.

Ribwar Marabi, another defendant in the same case, was also handed a similar sentence. The cases of both defendants have been referred to the Evin Prosecutor’s Office Enforcement of Judgments Branch for implementation of the sentences.

The case against Ms. Dadgarsafa stems from the January 2026 protests.

It should be noted that protests and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and within two days spread beyond markets and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests became one of the largest protest movements of recent years. Following the crackdown by security and law enforcement forces, thousands were killed or injured, and tens of thousands were arrested or summoned by security agencies. For more information, readers may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report titled “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days following the outbreak of Iran’s nationwide protests.

Former Political Prisoner Ehsan Ghadiri Sentenced to One Year in Prison

HRANA  – Ehsan Ghadiri, a former political prisoner, has been sentenced to one year in prison by Branch 7 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court.

According to HRANA, Ehsan Ghadiri has been sentenced to imprisonment.

According to a ruling issued by Branch 7 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court on July 12, 2026, and formally served on Mr. Ghadiri yesterday, he was sentenced to one year in prison on the charge of propaganda against the regime.

The court hearing on Mr. Ghadiri’s case was held on July 11, 2026, before the same branch.

Mr. Ghadiri was violently arrested at a checkpoint in Tehran on April 2, 2026, and transferred to Greater Tehran Penitentiary. He was ultimately released on April 25, 2026, after posting bail.

Ehsan Ghadiri was previously released from Evin Prison in September 2024 after completing a one-year prison sentence.

January 2026 Protests:Execution of Erfan Esfandiari and Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi

HRANA – The Iranian Judiciary’s Media Center has announced the execution of Erfan Esfandiari and Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi, two individuals arrested during the January 2026 protests in Isfahan. The two had been tried in a case referred to as the “Alikhani Square case” and sentenced to death.

According to HRANA, citing Mizan, the executions of Erfan Esfandiari and Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi, both detained during the January 2026 protests in Isfahan, were carried out at dawn on Sunday, July 19, 2026.

The Judiciary’s Media Center claimed that during the protests on January 8, 2026, in Alikhani Square in Isfahan, four law enforcement officers were killed. It further alleged that a number of protesters attacked police forces using firearms, bladed weapons, and incendiary materials, while also damaging public property and facilities. The judiciary additionally claimed that, after attacking the officers, the defendants committed acts of violence, including setting the victims’ bodies on fire, mutilating them, and filming the scenes.

However, HRANA has not been able to independently verify these allegations. Moreover, no official or transparent information has been released regarding the judicial proceedings, including the defendants’ access to legal counsel of their own choosing, the conduct of the trial the evidence presented before the court, or their ability to mount an effective defense. Given the documented record of the Islamic Republic’s security and judicial authorities in relying on forced confessions, torture, and other forms of ill-treatment in security-related cases, there are serious concerns regarding compliance with fair trial standards and the defendants’ rights in this case.

The Judiciary’s Media Center stated that death sentences had been issued for several defendants in this case and that the sentences of two of them were carried out at dawn today.

Yesterday, Voice of America (VOA) claimed that Erfan Esfandiari and Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi, along with ten other death row prisoners, had been transferred from the general ward of Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan to solitary confinement. VOA also reported that 59 individuals were tried in connection with the case, 12 of whom were sentenced to death. According to VOA, the identities of the remaining ten death row prisoners are: Alireza Sepahi, Abolfazl Sepahi, Ghaem Hosseini, Shervin Bagherian, Amirhossein Safari, Amirhossein Maleki, Ali Dashti, Abolfazl Ebrahimi, Alireza Raisi, and Amirhossein Ebrahimi Analoucheh. The report further stated that Erfan Esfandiari and Gol-Mohammad Mohammadi were 18 and 23 years old, respectively.

HRANA has not yet been able to independently verify the information published by VOA regarding the identities of those sentenced to death, the total number of defendants, their ages, or other details of the case. HRANA is continuing to investigate and verify additional information. Further reports will be published if independent and reliable information becomes available.

It should be noted that protests and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and within two days spread beyond markets and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests became one of the largest protest movements of recent years. Following the crackdown by security and law enforcement forces, thousands were killed or injured, and tens of thousands were arrested or summoned by security agencies. For more information, readers may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report titled “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days following the outbreak of Iran’s nationwide protests.

Ten-Day Report on the New Wave of Attacks on Iran: Human Casualties and Disruption of Critical Infrastructure

HRANA – From the beginning of the new wave of U.S. attacks on Iran on July 8 through July 17, HRANA documented at least 376 incidents related to these attacks across 54 locations in 15 provinces nationwide.

The collected data indicates that a significant portion of the attacks has been concentrated in southern Iran, particularly along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Military bases and defense facilities have been among the announced or reported targets. However, ports, piers, fishing vessels, bridges, railway lines, airports, telecommunications towers, and a number of infrastructures related to water, food, communications, transportation, and local economies have also been targeted or damaged as a result of the attacks.

Based on the cases that HRANA has documented and verified as of the time of publication, at least 48 people have been reported killed and 68 injured. In one of the most severe reported incidents, a one-year-old child in Bandar Abbas lost one hand after being struck by shrapnel, and the child’s condition has been reported as critical.

The head of the Ministry of Health’s Public Relations and Information Center has also announced that the number of people injured in the attacks has exceeded 400, while 38 people have lost their lives. The official did not specify whether these figures include military personnel, civilians, or both groups, nor whether they represent all casualties or only those registered at medical facilities. The discrepancy between HRANA’s figures and the official statistics underscores the challenges of verification under the current circumstances. Given the ongoing attacks and restrictions on access to information, the actual number of casualties may be higher than the documented figures.

This report does not assess the competing claims made by the parties regarding the nature or use of the targeted sites, nor does it evaluate the legal legitimacy of the military operations. Instead, it focuses on the documented consequences of these attacks for the civilian population, including access to essential services, transportation, communications, livelihoods, and the economic security of local communities.

About the Data and Counting Methodology

All documented incidents, including attacks, projectile impacts, explosions, and other events related to aerial operations, have been included in the overall incident count. Therefore, the registration of 376 incidents does not necessarily mean that 376 separate attacks or military operations took place. Multiple incidents may correspond to different waves of a single attack, multiple impacts within the same area, or separate reports concerning the same operation.

Because the attacks are ongoing, access to some affected areas remains restricted, communications have been disrupted, and information continues to emerge gradually, the figures presented in this report represent minimum confirmed counts and remain subject to revision. In cases where there was a possibility of overlap, duplicate counting, or insufficient information, HRANA refrained from reporting definitive figures and included only those cases that could be verified to a reasonable degree.

Key Findings

Between July 8 and July 17 :

• At least 376 incidents related to the attacks were documented across 15 provinces.

• These incidents were reported in 54 geographic locations, including 45 cities and urban areas, four counties, one district, and four islands.

• At least 48 people have been reported killed and 68 injured.

• Among the victims documented by HRANA, 20 civilians have been reported killed and 46 civilians injured.

• At least 40 fishing vessels were damaged or completely destroyed.

• A number of bridges, railway lines, airports, telecommunications towers, piers, water facilities, and food storage centers sustained damage.

• The highest concentration of reported incidents was recorded in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Bushehr, Sirik, Chabahar, Choghadak, and Konarak.

Geographic Distribution and Concentration of Attacks in Southern Iran

An analysis of the collected data indicates that the provinces of Hormozgan, Bushehr, Khuzestan, and Sistan and Baluchestan have been among the principal geographic focal points of this new wave of attacks.

Bandar Abbas recorded the highest number of reported incidents. It was followed by Qeshm, Bushehr, Sirik, Chabahar, Choghadak, and Konarak among the most frequently affected locations. The concentration of incidents in cities, ports, islands, and coastal areas indicates that the coastlines of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman have been among the primary operational theaters of these attacks.

The high concentration of naval, air, and air defense bases in southern Iran may be one factor behind the focus of the attacks in these areas. At the same time, the presence of civilian populations, commercial ports, fishing piers, industrial facilities, transportation routes, and public service infrastructure has meant that the consequences of the attacks have extended well beyond military installations.

The attacks have not been confined to southern Iran. Incidents have also been documented in the provinces of Tehran, Isfahan, Semnan, Lorestan, Ilam, and several other provinces.

Casualties and Human Impact

According to data documented and verified by HRANA, at least 48 people have been reported killed in the course of the attacks. Of these, 20 were civilians and 28 were military personnel.

In addition, at least 68 people have been reported injured, including 46 civilians and 22 military personnel.

Among the documented cases, the injury of a one-year-old child in Bandar Abbas stands out as one of the most alarming humanitarian consequences reported. The child lost one hand after being struck by shrapnel, and the child’s condition has been reported as critical.

In several other cases, deaths or injuries have been confirmed, but insufficient information was available regarding the exact number of victims, their identities, or whether they were civilians or military personnel. These cases have not been included in HRANA’s final statistics pending further verification.

Meanwhile, the head of the Ministry of Health’s Public Relations and Information Center announced that, as of 6:30 a.m. on July 17 (Europe time), more than 400 people had been injured as a result of the attacks, while 38 people had lost their lives.

According to these official figures, the injured included 22 women and 9 individuals under the age of 18, while the fatalities included three women and one person under the age of 18. The official also stated that 37 of the injured remained hospitalized.

The Ministry of Health did not specify whether these figures refer solely to civilians or also include military casualties. It is also unclear whether the reported numbers represent all casualties or only those who were transported to medical facilities.

Accordingly, the official figures and HRANA’s findings should be regarded as two separate datasets, likely based on different methodologies and scopes, and should not be combined without additional corroborating information.

Major Targets and Damaged Infrastructure

The documented targets during this reporting period can be classified into four main categories:

1. Military and Defense Facilities

A significant portion of the documented incidents involved military bases and defense installations. Reported targets included Army naval and air force bases, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters and command centers, air defense systems, military garrisons, barracks, troop deployment sites, and coastal control centers.

Notable documented examples include:

• The First Naval District of the Army;

• Shahid Abdolkarimi Base;

• Bandar Abbas Air Base;

• The Konarak Naval Military Zone;

• An IRGC headquarters in Saravan;

• A number of IRGC command centers and facilities;

• Naein Military Base;

• Military and air defense facilities in the provinces of Bushehr, Hormozgan, Tehran, Isfahan, and Sistan and Baluchestan.

Independent and comprehensive information is not yet available regarding the extent of the damage, the operational status of these facilities following the attacks, or the number of personnel present at the time.

2. Ports, Piers, and the Maritime Economy

One of the most prominent patterns documented during this period is the damage inflicted on infrastructure associated with maritime activities and the coastal economy.

Reportedly affected infrastructure includes:

• Sirik Commercial Pier;

• Fishing piers in Sirik and Bandar Abbas;

• Bonood Pier in Asaluyeh;

• Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar;

• Shahid Kalantari Port in Chabahar;

• Sirik Commercial Port;

• A Maritime Traffic Control Center;

• Fishing boats and traditional fishing vessels operating along the southern coastline.

Based on the information collected, at least 40 fishing vessels were burned, severely damaged, or sunk.

The damage to piers and fishing vessels extends far beyond the destruction of property. It may disrupt the livelihoods of fishermen, port workers, truck drivers, local merchants, vessel repair workers, and families whose incomes depend on the maritime economy for an extended period.

A comprehensive assessment of the number of people who have lost their jobs or sources of income, the financial cost of the damage, and the duration of disruptions to port and pier operations is not yet available.

3. Transportation and Communications

A number of transportation and communications infrastructure sites were also damaged during the attacks. Documented cases include:

• Iranshahr Airport;

• Semnan Airport;

• The Aq-Tappeh Khan Railway Bridge on the Tehran–Mashhad railway line;

• The Bandar Abbas railway junction;

• Several bridges in Khamir County;

• Telecommunications towers in eastern Hormozgan Province;

• Several additional telecommunications towers in other parts of the country.

Damage to bridges, railways, and airports can disrupt the movement of civilians, the transport of patients, emergency response efforts, the delivery of food and medicine, and broader supply chains.

Even where a transportation route or facility also serves a military function, civilian populations and the distribution networks for essential goods may depend on the same infrastructure. The destruction or closure of these routes can restrict public access to food, medicine, healthcare services, hygiene supplies, and other basic necessities.

In the city of Veysian, in Lorestan Province, one of the attacks disrupted landline telephone, mobile phone, and internet services in the Veysian District and Mamulan County. In Bandar Abbas, damage to a telecommunications tower was also accompanied by a power outage in the Tappeh Allah Akbar area.

Disruptions to communications can affect more than daily life. They may also limit people’s ability to contact emergency services, receive security warnings, check on the safety of family members, and document conditions in affected areas.

4. Water, Food, and Industrial Facilities

Some infrastructure related to essential needs and economic activity was also among the documented sites damaged during the attacks, including:

• Hendijan Water Pumping Station;

• Hoveyzeh Wheat Storage Silo;

• Souza Fish Meal Factory on Qeshm Island;

• A bottled water factory in Dehloran.

Damage to water facilities may disrupt local residents’ access to drinking water and municipal water services. Damage to wheat storage silos may also affect the storage and distribution of food supplies, particularly if transportation routes and supply chains are disrupted at the same time.

Factories and processing facilities are also major sources of employment for local workers. The suspension of their operations may result in reduced production, temporary or prolonged unemployment, and loss of household income.

At present, there is insufficient information regarding the extent of the damage, the duration of operational disruptions, the number of affected workers, or the potential environmental consequences.

Impact of the Attacks on Civilians’ Daily Lives

The humanitarian consequences of the attacks extend beyond the number of people killed and injured. Damage to or the disruption of critical infrastructure can affect a broad range of people’s everyday needs.

Damage to roads, bridges, and railway lines may slow or halt the transportation of food, medicine, fuel, medical supplies, and other essential goods. The destruction of piers and fishing vessels may threaten the livelihoods and food security of coastal communities. Disruptions to telecommunications may make it more difficult to contact emergency services and access information. Damage to water facilities and food storage infrastructure may also have more direct consequences for public health and well-being.

Damage to homes, vehicles, vessels, businesses, and other private property may also impose significant financial burdens on families through the loss of assets and the reduction or loss of income.

These consequences may persist even after the attacks have ended, particularly in areas where rebuilding infrastructure, replacing equipment, and restoring economic activity will require substantial time and resources.

The Need to Distinguish Military Claims from Humanitarian Consequences

The United States has stated that some of the targeted sites served dual-use functions, were being used for military purposes, or played a role in Iran’s military logistics network. Iranian officials have likewise presented differing accounts and claims regarding the nature of the targets and the consequences of the attacks.

In this report, HRANA is not in a position to confirm or reject the operational or military claims made by either party. Nor does the report reach conclusions regarding the legality or illegality of any specific attack.

Nevertheless, regardless of the parties’ competing claims, it is essential to examine the actual impact of the attacks on civilian life. A road, bridge, airport, port, or telecommunications network may, irrespective of any alleged military use, also be indispensable for the movement of civilians, the distribution of food and medicine, access to healthcare facilities, and the continuation of economic activity.

For this reason, documenting damage to infrastructure should be accompanied by an assessment of its consequences for local populations, public services, and access to essential needs.

Conclusion

The data documented by HRANA between July 8 and July 17 indicates that the latest wave of U.S. attacks on Iran has affected a broad geographic area, with its primary concentration in the country’s south, particularly along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Bushehr, Sirik, Chabahar, Choghadak, and Konarak were among the locations with the highest number of reported incidents. In these areas, in addition to military bases and facilities, damage was documented to piers, fishing vessels, port infrastructure, maritime traffic control facilities, and communications, transportation, and public service infrastructure.

According to HRANA’s current data, at least 48 people have been reported killed and 68 injured. Among them, 20 civilians have been reported killed and 46 civilians injured. The Ministry of Health has also reported more than 400 injuries and 38 fatalities, although insufficient detail has been released to allow a direct comparison between the official figures and HRANA’s data.

The available findings indicate that the consequences of the attacks have extended beyond direct casualties and damage to military facilities, affecting transportation, communications, water and food supply, the maritime economy, local industries, and the livelihoods of civilians.

Given the continuation of the attacks, restricted access to affected areas, and the lack of complete information regarding some incidents, the figures and findings presented in this report should be regarded as minimum documented counts as of July 17. A more comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian, economic, and infrastructural consequences will require continued verification, greater access to local information, and independent assessment of the condition of public services and affected communities.

The current wave of attacks forms part of the broader conflict that began on February 28, 2026, with the start of U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory attacks. Following mediation by Pakistan, Iran and the United States reached a temporary memorandum of understanding on June 17, providing for a cessation of military operations and the start of a 60-day process aimed at continuing negotiations and reaching a final agreement. However, the arrangement remained in effect for less than a month. Over the past ten days, with both sides accusing the other of violating the agreement, military attacks and tensions have resumed on a sustained basis.

This report focuses on the incidents and humanitarian consequences of this latest phase of the conflict following the temporary agreement. HRANA has previously published a comprehensive report examining the course of the war since February 28, the scope of the attacks, and their humanitarian and infrastructural consequences. Readers seeking a fuller background on the conflict may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report on the war.