Escalating Armed Violence in Southeastern Iran: At Least 63 Armed Incidents in Six Months

HRANA – At least 63 armed incidents were recorded across Iran’s southeastern provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan and Kerman between March 31 and October 10, 2026, amid a sharp escalation in armed violence in the region. According to local and unofficial reports, the incidents left at least 94 people dead and 33 injured, while official sources reported 87 fatalities and 10 injuries. The pace of violence accelerated significantly in recent weeks, with 18 incidents recorded in just the final 18 days of the reporting period, surpassing the total for any previous full month. The escalation has also been accompanied by a shift in the nature of confrontations, from targeted shootings and attacks on patrol vehicles to coordinated ambushes, roadside bombings, and the reported use of rocket-propelled grenades and heavier weaponry.

According to HRANA, the pattern of events over the past six months indicates that southeastern Iran is entering a more volatile phase of armed confrontation. This shift has unfolded in a security environment profoundly affected since late winter 1404 by direct warfare between Iran, on one side, and the United States and Israel, on the other. During the same period, government concerns increased over the possibility that armed groups might become more active in border regions. Yet while much of the Iranian government’s public and security attention was focused on developments in the west and northwest, a quieter but sustained pattern of increasing attacks, security operations and armed clashes took shape in the southeast.

Most of the armed incidents were recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, while two were also reported in Faryab County, Kerman Province. Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr, and Rask emerged as the main centers of armed confrontation. Meanwhile, signs of growing coordination among some Baloch armed groups have emerged, particularly with the formation of the People’s Fighters Front (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi). However, many of the incidents remain unclaimed, and available evidence does not establish responsibility for a significant number of attacks.

Data Overview

GroupKilled (official)Killed (unofficial)Injured (official)Injured (unofficial)
Government forces (FARAJA, IRGC, Basij, intelligence agencies, Army)3953929
Fatemiyoun affiliated forces19UnknownUnknown
Armed individuals4625UnknownUnknown
Civilians1714
Total87941033

Armed Clashes Intensify in September and Early October

A chronological review of the events clearly illustrates how armed clashes have increased over time. After four incidents in Khordad (21 May -21 June), the number rose to 10 in Mordad (23 July-22 August) and 11 in Shahrivar (23 August-22 September). Shahrivar was the most incident-heavy complete month of the period, but that record was broken in the first half of the following month: from 1 to 18 Mehr (23 September-10 October), 18 armed incidents were recorded. In other words, the pace of clashes in Mehr not only exceeded that of previous months, but reached an unprecedented level within less than a full month.

The escalation is evident not only in the growing number of incidents but also in the increasing intensity of armed confrontations. Seven armed attacks were reported in the six days between 13 and 18 Mehr alone (5 -10 October). During the same period, attacks on patrol units, police facilities and multi-vehicle convoys increased, and power or internet outages were reported after clashes in some locations. Taken together, these indicators suggest a gradual shift from isolated attacks toward confrontations that, in some cases, have become longer in duration, heavier in weaponry and broader in geographic reach.

Monthly trend in armed incidents, March 31 to October 10, 2026

From Targeted Killings to Ambushes and Semi-Heavy Weapons

The most frequently recorded type of incident during this period was attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys, with 17 cases documented. Fourteen targeted shootings of individuals were also recorded; in seven cases, the attacks occurred outside the victims’ homes, workplaces, or along their regular travel routes. Targeted shootings were more common in the earlier months, but in the final weeks, both the weapons used and the nature of the operations changed.

On 10 Mehr (October 2), in the Rudmahi area of Zahedan, a vehicle attributed to Fatemiyoun forces was struck by a booby trap and then came under gunfire. Five days later, reports on the attack against the Law Enforcement Command headquarters in Jalq described the use of mines, RPGs and semi-heavy weapons. On October 9 (17 Mehr), a roadside bomb exploded along the route of a police convoy in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan. In total, at least seven incidents involved equipment such as drones, artillery, RPGs, armored vehicles or explosives.

Government forces also used drones, artillery, armored vehicles and heavy weapons in several operations. In operations in Jahadabad, Gharibabad and Monzalab, locations of clashes and homes targeted during the operations were destroyed, blown up or set on fire. Such developments, particularly when operations take place in residential settings, increase the risk of harm to civilians and their property and heighten the need for precise documentation of operational methods and their consequences.

Most frequent operational patterns in armed incidents

More Visible Emergence of Armed Opposition Groups

One notable development in recent weeks has been the growing number of armed clashes attributed to the People’s Fighters Front. The organization, which operates as an alliance of several Baloch armed groups, was linked to 11 recorded incidents in total. These include attacks for which it claimed responsibility, participation in certain clashes, and confirmation that some individuals killed in government operations were its members. Ten of those 11 incidents occurred on or after 21 Shahrivar (12 September).

Even so, the available data do not support attributing the overall increase in violence to a single group. Of the 42 incidents initiated by armed actors, a specific claim of responsibility was recorded for only seven attacks: six by the People’s Fighters Front and one by Ansar al-Furqan. A large share of attacks therefore remains unclaimed or cannot be reliably attributed. This makes it difficult to assess the actual capabilities of the groups, their chains of command, or the degree of operational coordination among them.

Fatemiyoun: Disputed Accounts of Presence and Casualties

Accounts involving the Fatemiyoun, a force operating under the IRGC Quds Force and composed primarily of Afghan nationals, have been disputed. While local sources and Baloch armed groups have identified personnel targeted in several incidents, including in Rudmahi, Zahedan, as Fatemiyoun members, Iranian officials and state media have either omitted any reference to the group or provided different accounts of the affiliation of the forces involved.

According to local reporting, at least nine personnel attributed to the Fatemiyoun were killed during this period – one of the principal factors behind the gap between official and unofficial casualty figures for government and affiliated forces. Four deaths were reported in the 20 Shahrivar (11 September) attack on a patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun in Rudmahi, and five more in the 10 Mehr ( 2 October) attack in the same area. Because there is no independent confirmation and the organizational affiliation of these forces is disputed, these cases should be treated as documented but contested claims rather than conclusive facts about the nature of their deployment or mission.

Two Different Narratives of Fatalities

The divergence between official and local accounts is not limited to the number of casualties. In several cases, the central dispute concerns who the person killed actually was and what role the person played. In local reporting, of 94 deaths, 62 were described as government or affiliated forces, 25 as armed individuals and seven as civilians. Official accounts, by contrast, reported 40 government and affiliated personnel, 46 armed individuals and only one civilian killed.

These two sets of figures should not be added together; they are parallel narratives of the same period. The gap is especially pronounced in two areas: first, a difference of 22 in the number of government and affiliated personnel reported killed; and second, 21 people whom officials described as armed or as perpetrators, but whose identities or deaths were not confirmed by local sources or related groups. In addition, local sources described at least five people whom official accounts labeled ‘armed’ or ‘attackers’ as civilians.

A specific dispute over the identity or affiliation of victims was documented in eight incidents. In 11 other incidents, casualties were reported but the precise number of dead or injured was unclear. Any aggregate casualty figure should therefore be read as the minimum that can be extracted from the available reporting, not as a definitive count of every victim.

Comparison of official and local accounts of fatalities

Civilians Caught Between the Two Sides

Civilian deaths and injuries are among the most serious aspects of the recent developments. On 2 Mehr (24 September), as clashes continued in Jahadabad, Saravan, a nine-year-old child, Mohammadamin Dehghan, and his father were shot while traveling in a vehicle carrying water; the child died several days later. On 17 Mehr (9 October) in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan, a passing civilian, Abdollah Ghanbarzehi, was killed by gunfire from forces present at the scene, while state media published a different account of his role.

There are other cases in which families or local sources rejected the official claim that those killed were armed, including two people killed in Rask on 2 Ordibehesht (22 April) and two people in Kahnoak village in Taftan. These disputes underscore the importance of publishing verifiable information on the identity of victims, whether they were armed, the precise circumstances in which lethal force was used, and the results of post-incident investigations.

Two abductions of government personnel were also recorded during this period, resulting in three deaths. Delays in returning the bodies of some of those killed were also reported, including the return of bodies from the Berenjinan operation after 30 to 48 days. In the case of Abuzar Hamli, who was killed in the Bidedlad clash, local sources alleged that 10 billion tomans were demanded in exchange for the return of his body. These allegations require independent investigation and transparent responses from the responsible authorities.

Geography of Violence: Concentration in Underserved Areas

Of 61 incidents for which the location is known, 37 occurred in four counties: Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr and Rask. Zahedan ranked first with 11 incidents, while Saravan and Iranshahr recorded nine each and Rask eight. Both incidents recorded in Kerman Province occurred in Faryab County. This concentration indicates that most of the violence is occurring within a defined geographic belt and in areas that have for years faced deep challenges in development, employment, infrastructure and access to public services.

This economic and social context matters for understanding the region’s security developments. A 2025 International Crisis Group report, citing official Iranian data, placed Sistan and Baluchestan near the bottom of national development indicators and noted that 12 of the province’s 26 counties were among the country’s 20 poorest counties. The same report cited a provincial unemployment rate of 12.4 percent in 1402, compared with a national average of 8.1 percent. The United Nations Development Programme also emphasized in 2025 the severe pressure of water scarcity and prolonged drought on livelihoods and community resilience in parts of the province.

Economic deprivation by itself does not explain armed violence, and the coexistence of the two does not establish a definitive causal relationship. However, neglect of development gaps and an exclusively security-centered approach to the region can deepen mistrust, social vulnerability and cycles of violence. In an area already facing unemployment, infrastructure shortages and environmental pressures, expanding armed operations have consequences beyond direct casualties: restrictions on movement, communication disruptions, property damage, intensified military presence and greater risks to local communities.

Geographic concentration of armed incidents in southeastern Iran

Arrests and the Need for Accountability

At least 19 arrests directly linked to incidents in this period were specifically documented: 16 on the basis of official statements and three in local reporting. This total does not include Fars News Agency’s aggregate claim on 26 Farvardin (15 April) that 55 people had been arrested, because the locations, precise timing and details of those arrests were not disclosed and may overlap with other documented cases.

When accounts differ so sharply over casualty figures and even the identities of those killed, establishing accountability requires more than aggregate statistics. Essential steps include disclosing the names and legal status of detainees, providing information about their whereabouts and the charges against them, ensuring families have access to information, and conducting independent investigations into reported deaths and injuries. Clarifying the circumstances surrounding the use of lethal force, investigating reports of homes being destroyed, and examining allegations that the return of victims’ bodies was delayed or made conditional are also necessary to establish the facts and ensure accountability.

Southeastern Iran Requires Attention Beyond a Security-Only Approach

The clashes of the past six months show that developments in southeastern Iran can no longer be viewed as a series of isolated and disconnected incidents. The rising number of events, their concentration in several counties, the introduction of heavier weapons into some confrontations, the more visible presence of an armed alliance, and the widening gap between official and local accounts of casualties together point to an escalating trend.

This trend is unfolding in one of Iran’s most underserved regions – an area that has long faced development gaps, unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, a water crisis and a sense of deprivation. Turning such an environment into an arena of increasingly armed confrontation risks once again placing the heaviest burden on local civilians: through loss of life, damage to homes and livelihoods, arrests and security restrictions, and deepening mistrust between society and state institutions.

Reducing that risk requires more than an expanded security presence. Independent and transparent documentation, effective protection of civilians, investigations into suspicious deprivations of life, accountability for operations in residential areas, protection of detainees’ rights, and serious attention to the region’s structural deprivation are among the measures that could help prevent the cycle of violence from deepening. The pattern documented through 18 Mehr (10 October) indicates that without such an approach, the risk of continued and escalating tensions in southeastern Iran remains serious.

Detailed Table of Incidents

The table below lists 63 armed incidents recorded from March 31 to October 10, 2026 (11 Farvardin to 18 Mehr 1405), including date, location, type of attack or clash, casualties, victim/attacker attribution and reporting sources. The information was compiled from local reporting and official statements; cases involving conflicting accounts or lacking independent confirmation are presented with those qualifications.

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#DateLocationType of attack / clashCasualtiesVictim / attacker attributionSummaryPrimary source
Farvardin 1405
1March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)Mirjaveh, outside the IRGC Intelligence buildingTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Lt. Col. Mohammadreza Rahdar); 1 civilian wounded, according to policeVictim: military officer. Assailants: unidentified armed individuals; no claim of responsibility.Rahdar was shot outside the IRGC Intelligence building in Mirjaveh and killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
2March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)Kalat, Sarbaz CountyShooting at police vehicle2 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Reza Roozgerd; 2nd Lt. Mohammadreza Aram)Victims: Kalat Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA). Assailant: unknown. Provincial police later claimed a suspect had been arrested in Rask.A Samand vehicle belonging to the Kalat police command came under fire; Roozgerd died at the scene and Aram later died in hospital.Documents Network / Haalvsh
3April 3, 2026 (14 Farvardin)Delgan County, one of the county villagesShooting at patrol2 killed (Hojatoleslam Hossein Abdollahi; Capt. Nasser Abdollahi)Victims: head of the Basij of Delgan seminary students and commander of the Mirem Basij sector. Assailant: unknown.The two Basij officials were shot while on patrol; the Delgan governor confirmed their deaths.Documents Network / Haalvsh
4April 9, 2026 (20 Farvardin)Iranshahr, urban areaTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mehran Shiheki)Victim: local Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Shiheki was shot in Iranshahr and killed; provincial police confirmed the incident.Documents Network / Haalvsh
5April 11, 2026 (22 Farvardin)Jalq, Golshan County, outside victim’s homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Madad Sepahi)Victim: local IRGC member. Assailants: two unidentified motorcyclists.Sepahi was shot outside his home while returning from a work shift; sources said he had been dissatisfied with his service in the IRGC.Haalvsh / Documents Network
6April 15, 2026 (26 Farvardin; date of announcement)Sistan and Baluchestan Province; locations not disclosedClaimed security operations (aggregate figure)13 killed and 55 arrested (official claim)According to Fars News Agency: members of “terrorist teams” linked to Israel and the United States.Fars reported that, since the start of the war, 13 people had been killed in operations and 55 arrested; no independent details were released.Documents Network
7April 16, 2026 (27 Farvardin)Saravan, urban areaShooting at patrol vehicle3 killed (2nd Lt. Mehdi Nasiri-Sedeh; Sgt. 1st Class Ahmad Sheikhi; Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Shagozaei)Victims: FARAJA Emergency Unit. Assailants: unknown; no claim of responsibility.Armed individuals opened fire on an Emergency Unit patrol vehicle in Saravan, killing three officers.Haalvsh / Documents Network
8April 19, 2026 (30 Farvardin; date of announcement)Iranshahr-Khash road, police-road checkpointClash at checkpoint1 killed and 1 arrested among vehicle occupants (police claim)Government side: tactical police unit. Vehicle occupants: unidentified; police account.The southern provincial police commander said occupants of a Peugeot ignored an order to stop and opened fire; weapons and ammunition were reportedly found.Documents Network
Ordibehesht 1405
9April 22, 2026 (2 Ordibehesht)Near Jakigur, Rask CountyIRGC shooting / claimed destruction of “terrorist team”2 killed (Mohammadakram Akhtari; Mohammad Eslam Saeidi)Official account: members of an armed team. Family account: ordinary civilians from Darchub, Sarbaz.An IRGC Land Cruiser opened fire on a vehicle carrying the two men without a stop; state media called it the destruction of a terrorist team, while their families rejected the claim.Documents Network / Haalvsh
10April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Rask CountyShooting at IRGC vehicleNo casualties reported, according to state mediaTarget: IRGC forces. Assailant: unknown.An IRGC vehicle was fired on at dawn in Rask; Tasnim called the attack unsuccessful and said the assailants fled.Haalvsh / Documents Network
11April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Zahedan, Baghri Street, ShirabadShooting at patrol vehicle3 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Nezamdoost; 1st Lt. Ali Momeni; Ali-Asghar Goldavi); 1 woundedVictims: FARAJA patrol. Assailant: Ansar al-Furqan, which claimed responsibility.A police patrol in Shirabad, Zahedan, was raked with gunfire; two of the wounded later died in hospital.Documents Network / Haalvsh
12April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)Exit of Jakigur, Rask CountyAttack on military convoyCol. Mahmoud Baghbani and several companions woundedVictim: commander of the Rask IRGC/Basij Resistance District. Assailant: unknown.A three-vehicle convoy carrying the Rask IRGC commander was attacked; he was transferred to Zahedan for treatment.Documents Network
13May 20, 2026 (30 Ordibehesht)Saravan County, one of the connecting roadsShooting and clash after pursuit1 police officer killed (3rd Lt. Amirhossein Shahraki); 2 attackers killed, police claimVictim: FARAJA. Assailants: armed occupants of a vehicle; identities unknown.Police said vehicle occupants shot at officers; police claimed two attackers were killed and reported finding weapons, a Starlink terminal and a Peugeot.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Khordad 1405
14May 28, 2026 (7 Khordad)Iranshahr, Basij Square / Hafez intersectionTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (2nd Lt. Isa Abbasi)Victim: FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Abbasi was shot while traveling by motorcycle to work and died at the scene.Haalvsh / Documents Network
15June 5, 2026 (15 Khordad)Zabol border areaBorder clash (official claim)6 attackers killed (claim); death of border-service conscript Seyed Mostafa Hosseini also announced June 7, exact time unclear and possibly relatedGovernment side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”The border commander claimed an armed group intended to cross the border and attack border posts; no identities or evidence regarding the six reported dead were released.Documents Network / Haalvsh
16June 7, 2026 (17 Khordad)Berenjinan area, SaravanJoint IRGC/Intelligence operation using a drone4 group members killed (Jalil Nahtani; Mohammad Omar Nahtani; Yasin Mohammadzehi; Vahid Shahuzehi); 1 IRGC member killed (Mohammad Siahani); 1 woundedThose killed on the armed side: members of the People’s Fighters Front, later confirmed by the Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and intelligence forces.The clash lasted from about 2 to 8 a.m.; the IRGC reported weapons and a Starlink terminal. Bodies were returned to families after 30-48 days.Haalvsh / Documents Network
17June 19, 2026 (29 Khordad)KhashTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (3rd Lt. Abdolsalam Kord)Victim: Khash Law Enforcement Command. Assailant: unknown.A Khash police officer was targeted during a mission and killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Tir 1405
18June 29, 2026 (8 Tir)Saravan, near the IRGC building, opposite Imam Ali gas stationShooting at private vehicle2 killed (Amirhossein Arbabi; his wife, Fatemeh Bameripur)Victim: IRGC Intelligence officer. Tasnim described the assailants as a “terrorist group affiliated with the Zionist regime and the United States”; no group claimed responsibility.Arbabi was attacked minutes after leaving the IRGC building; his wife died in hospital the following day.Documents Network / Haalvsh
19June 30, 2026 (9 Tir)Naskand police station and district office, SarbazArmed attack on police station / exchange of fireNo casualties reportedTarget: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.Armed individuals fired on the Naskand police station at about 1 a.m. and withdrew after an exchange of fire; internet service in the area was cut.Haalvsh / Documents Network
20July 1, 2026 (10 Tir)Sib and SuranTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (3rd Lt. Mohammad Palangi)Victim: local Sunni Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.Palangi was shot while traveling from home to work and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
21July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)Zabol, Mohammadabad industrial townAbduction and killing1 killed (Capt. Seyed Mehdi Abdollahi, 51)Victim: Zabol Border Regiment, Qaleh Rostam South post. Assailants: unidentified armed men.The border officer was abducted while traveling to duty; on 1 Mordad his family was informed that he had been killed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
22July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)Kahnoak village, TaftanSecurity raid / claimed operation against “perpetrators”2 killed (Eqbal Rigi; Bilal Rastaroosh); 1 arrested (Meysam Rigi)Police: two were perpetrators of the killing of FARAJA personnel in Nukabad, Taftan. Local sources: civilians, with no armed clash.Dozens of military vehicles blocked the road and a Peugeot Pars carrying two civilians was reportedly fired on without warning; forces then raided the Rigi family home.Haalvsh / Documents Network
23July 4, 2026 (13 Tir; date of announcement)Zahedan, Chabahar, Iranshahr, Khash and TaftanClaimed security operation2 killed and 10 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)Official account: members of “operational cells” of an armed group; operation involved the Intelligence Ministry, IRGC and FARAJA.The Intelligence Ministry reported finding a machine gun, Kalashnikov rifles, 17 pistols, 14 grenades and Starlink equipment; identities and locations of the two deaths were not disclosed.Documents Network
24July 10, 2026 (19 Tir)Zahedan County; bodies later found about 5 km from a checkpointAbduction and killing2 killed (3rd Lt. Afshin Saadati-Kia; Reza Karimian)Victims: FARAJA tactical unit. Assailant: “an armed group,” according to relatives.Two tactical-unit officers were abducted while on duty and killed the same night; their bodies were found on 12 Mordad.Documents Network / Haalvsh
Mordad 1405
25July 23, 2026 (1 Mordad; date of announcement)Jakigur Border Regiment area, RaskBorder clash (official claim)2 attackers killed (claim)Government side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”The border commander claimed two members of an armed group were killed and weapons, fuse and explosive detonators were recovered; exact time and location were not disclosed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
26July 26, 2026 (4 Mordad)Sarzeh area, IranshahrShooting at private vehicle carrying personnel1 killed (Noorollah Narouei, died 13 Mordad); 1 wounded (Emamdadi)Victims: plainclothes FARAJA recruitment personnel. Assailant: unknown.A privately plated Samand carrying two FARAJA personnel was shot; Narouei died ten days later.Haalvsh / Documents Network
27July 29, 2026 (7 Mordad)Iranshahr, Khatam al-Anbiya 5 Street, outside homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Mehran Salarzadeh)Police: law-enforcement officer. Local sources: deputy director of the Iranshahr Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.Salarzadeh was shot several times outside his home at about 10:30 p.m. and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
28July 30, 2026 (8 Mordad)Abu al-Fazl Mosque checkpoint, Iranshahr-Delgan roadAttack on checkpoint1 confirmed killed (Sgt. 1st Class Meysam Karami Qaleh-Taki); local sources reported additional dead and woundedVictims: FARAJA. Assailants: armed vehicle occupants; police reported three vehicles, Haalvsh one.At about 1 a.m., the checkpoint came under heavy fire; the assailants fled after several minutes.Haalvsh / Documents Network
29August 6, 2026 (15 Mordad)Mirjaveh, near Behdasht Boulevard, site used by security forcesExplosion, cause unknownUnspecified number of personnel killed and wounded, according to sourcesLocation possibly linked to the Intelligence Department or IRGC Intelligence. Cause unknown; sources suggested a possible internal origin.A powerful explosion occurred at about 3:20 a.m. and wounded personnel were reportedly transferred to Zahedan; officials did not explain the incident and no group claimed responsibility.Haalvsh
30August 11, 2026 (20 Mordad)Khash, Morad Rigi Street near 22 Bahman SquareAttack on mobile checkpointUnspecified; initial reports said government forces suffered casualtiesTarget: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.A nighttime mobile checkpoint was fired on and an exchange of fire continued for several minutes.Haalvsh
31August 13, 2026 (22 Mordad; date of announcement)Khash CountyClaimed security operation2 killed and 4 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)Official account: two operational cells of armed groups that entered from abroad; operation involved IRGC Quds Headquarters and FARAJA.The Intelligence Ministry released video and claimed two cells had been dismantled; the claim was not independently confirmed.Documents Network
32August 15, 2026 (24 Mordad)Mirjaveh, near Behdasht BoulevardTargeted shooting / assassination attempt1 seriously wounded (Hossein Saadatian; the text also gives “Hassan”)Victim: head of IRGC Intelligence in Mirjaveh. Assailant: unknown.Saadatian was shot at about 7:30 p.m. and admitted to the intensive-care unit at Nabi Akram Hospital in Zahedan.Haalvsh
33August 20, 2026 (29 Mordad; announced 30 Mordad)Saravan border / Saravan Border Regiment areaBorder clash (official claim)1 attacker killed (claim)Government side: Border Guard. Assailants: an armed group allegedly attempting to enter Iran.Police said the remaining group members fled across the border; Haalvsh said video released in connection with the claim was actually from a 2025 clash in Zabol.Haalvsh / Documents Network
34August 22, 2026 (31 Mordad)Zahedan, Baghri Street, Shirabad, real-estate officeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Nader Sarani, 45)Victim: Basij member, confirmed by IRGC Quds Headquarters; local sources described him as an official at the Hemmatabad base. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.Armed men entered Sarani’s real-estate office and shot him dead.Haalvsh / Documents Network
Shahrivar 1405
35August 27, 2026 (5 Shahrivar)Mirjaveh-Zahedan roadShooting at patrol vehicle1 killed (2nd Sgt. Ali Heydari-Moghadam); 1 woundedVictims: FARAJA Border Guard. Assailant: unknown; no claim of responsibility.A privately plated border-patrol Hilux was raked with gunfire from the front; state media called the attack “terrorist.”Haalvsh / Documents Network
36September 3, 2026 (12 Shahrivar)Hasaruiyeh, ZahedanHouse raid / siege / clash2 killed (Yasin Narouei, 24; “Sajjad,” from Bam)Government side: military and security forces, reportedly about 25 vehicles. Those killed: armed individuals; affiliation not announced.A house was surrounded from about 6 a.m.; after a two-hour clash, two armed individuals were killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
37September 5, 2026 (14 Shahrivar)Vadgar village, Ashar District, MehrestanHouse raid / siege / clash2 armed individuals killed (Mohammad Delmoradi; Salman Derazehi); 1 arrested; reports of government-force casualties and several civilians woundedGovernment side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA. Affiliation of the dead not announced.A house was attacked from about 3 to 10 a.m. with a Goryunov machine gun and RPGs; homeowner Akhtar Sandakzehi was arrested.Haalvsh / Documents Network
38September 6, 2026 (15 Shahrivar)Dehak-Sarjangal road, Kourin, ZahedanShooting at vehicle2 killed (Abolfazl Oudi; Keyvan Ramroudi)Victims: personnel of the IRGC Shahid Mirhosseini Operational Headquarters. Assailant: unknown.An unplated Capra vehicle was fired on; both occupants were shot in the head and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
39September 8, 2026 (17 Shahrivar)Parud, Rask County, outside victim’s homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Abdolraouf Eshaghi)Victim: commander of the Parud Basij Resistance Base. Assailants: riders on two motorcycles.Motorcycle-borne gunmen opened fire on Eshaghi outside his home, killing him at the scene.Documents Network / Haalvsh
40September 10, 2026 (19 Shahrivar)Khash, Sarbaz Street opposite the governor’s officeAttack on mobile checkpointAt least 3 killed and several wounded, initial local reportingTarget: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.A nighttime checkpoint near Anar Square was attacked; it was the second attack on a mobile checkpoint in Khash within a month.Haalvsh
41September 11, 2026 (20 Shahrivar)Rudmahi, Kourin District, ZahedanAttack on patrol of affiliated force4 killed; one local source initially reported 12Victims: Hazara Fatemiyoun personnel reportedly deployed by the IRGC. Assailant: “Baloch fighters,” according to sources.A patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun came under fire and its vehicle was set ablaze.Documents Network / Haalvsh
42September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar)Bakhshan, SaravanRaid on group position / nine-hour clashIRGC: 3 government personnel killed (Misagh Sani, Mehdi Sarhadi, Moslem Fazeli) and 4 armed individuals killed, later 5. Front: 4 members killed, 9 government personnel killed, 21 wounded.Defenders/armed side: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and security agencies.The clash lasted from about 4 a.m. to noon and involved heavy weapons and quadcopters. Support teams from the Front broke the siege and six members reportedly escaped.Haalvsh / Documents Network
43September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar; source discrepancy with 20 Shahrivar)Saravan, Moallem Street, outside homeTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed; identity not releasedVictim: plainclothes security force member. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.A plainclothes security officer was shot outside his home at about 8 p.m. and later died at Razi Hospital.Haalvsh
44September 18, 2026 (27 Shahrivar)Zahedan, University and Daneshjoo streetsClash between patrol and vehicle occupants2 killed (Zakaria and Mehrallah Shahbakhsh); 1 wounded and 1 arrested; 3 government personnel and 2 female bystanders woundedGovernment side: IRGC Quds patrol. Vehicle occupants: police described them as armed; relatives denied any affiliation.The clash began around 12:30 a.m. and lasted about two hours; police announced two armed men killed and one person arrested.Haalvsh / Documents Network
45September 21, 2026 (30 Shahrivar)Bazman-Iranshahr roadAttack on police vehicle1 killed (Capt. Alireza Mehrabi); 3 woundedVictims: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.A police vehicle was attacked in the afternoon; police described the incident as a “terrorist act.”Haalvsh / Documents Network
Mehr 1405
46September 23, 2026 (1 Mehr)Jahadabad (“Dab”), SaravanRaid on alleged “safe house” / multi-hour clash2 IRGC personnel killed (Brig. Gen. Hossein Zarifi; Ahmad Herati Zeraati/Zerati); at least 5 wounded according to Documents Network, up to 13 according to Haalvsh; IRGC claimed 5 armed men killed and several arrests; Front said 4 members killed.Government side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA, including commander and intelligence official of Shahid Sajjad Headquarters. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.Forces surrounded the house, demolished it with a bulldozer and set it on fire; the commander of Shahid Sajjad Operational Headquarters in Saravan was killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
47September 24, 2026 (2 Mehr)Jahadabad, Saravan (Shushtari and Dabeh)Renewed clash / shooting by forces9-year-old Mohammadamin Dehghan wounded and later died on 5 Mehr; his father Eshaq woundedThe vehicle carrying the family was allegedly fired on by military and security forces.Gunfire and RPG fire continued in Jahadabad at dawn; forces reportedly fired on a family vehicle carrying water.Haalvsh / Documents Network
48September 25, 2026 (3 Mehr)Sarkahuran village, IranshahrHouse raid / clash1 killed (Obeid Zardkuhi); 1 arrested (Jasem Jamali)Government side: security forces. Affiliation of the person killed was not announced.A security raid on a house led to a clash; the reason for the raid was not disclosed.Documents Network / Haalvsh
49September 29, 2026 (7 Mehr)Gharibabad, IranshahrHouse siege / four-hour clash1 killed (Morteza Sotoudeh, 26)IRGC media: “armed robber.” Local sources rejected this characterization.Forces surrounded the house using an armored vehicle, quadcopter and RPG; Sotoudeh reportedly ended his own life after running out of ammunition.Documents Network / Haalvsh
50September 30, 2026 (8 Mehr)Near Magas police-road post, MehrestanShooting at military vehicleAt least 2 woundedVictims: military and law-enforcement personnel. Assailant: unknown.A vehicle carrying forces came under fire at about 1:30 p.m., coinciding with the anniversary of Zahedan’s “Bloody Friday.”Haalvsh
51October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)Entrance to Rask, Ahmadabad FARAJA checkpointAttack on checkpoint1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Alireza Sanchouli, 24)Victim: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.Armed individuals opened fire on the checkpoint at the entrance to Rask in the early morning.Documents Network / Haalvsh
52October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)Monzalab (Shahmoradabad township), ZahedanRaid on group position / clashIRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 6 armed individuals killed; People’s Fighters Front said 4 members were killed.Those killed: members of the People’s Fighters Front, according to the Front. Government side: FARAJA and IRGC Quds Headquarters.Forces raided a house with heavy weapons, artillery and a drone and blew it up after the clash; the IRGC said explosive packages were found.Documents Network / Haalvsh
53October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Nukabad, Taftan, Intelligence Department buildingArmed attack on government buildingUnknownTarget: Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.The building came under gunfire at dawn and an explosion, possibly a grenade, was heard.Haalvsh / Documents Network
54October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Rudmahi, Kalepadeh route, ZahedanBooby trap and gunfire against patrol vehicle5 killed according to local sources and the Front, including Ahmad Yaqoubi, an Afghan national; official account: at least 1 killedVictims: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A Fatemiyoun Land Cruiser equipped with a DShK heavy machine gun was hit by a booby trap and then gunfire; the official account omitted the Fatemiyoun name.Haalvsh / Documents Network
55October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)Bidedlad and Shushgim heights, Parud District, RaskRaid on mountain base / ten-hour clashIRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 2 armed individuals killed; 1 death confirmed (Abuzar Hamli, 23)Defenders: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: forces from Rask, Sarbaz, Qasr Qand and Nikshahr using drones and artillery.The clash lasted from 5:30 a.m. to 3:20 p.m.; armed members escaped the encirclement, and the Front said 15 members left the area.Haalvsh / Documents Network
56October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)Bampur-Iranshahr road, before Salehin BrigadeAmbush against patrolOfficial: 2 killed (2nd Sgt. Amirhossein Qasemi; Sgt. 1st Class Nezam Dastgoshadeh), 1 wounded; witnesses: at least 3 killedVictims: FARAJA patrol from Nukjoub post. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A three-vehicle patrol was ambushed; one Hilux was hit by gunfire and another overturned.Haalvsh / Documents Network
57October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)Entrance to Jakigur bridge, RaskShooting at vehicle carrying personnel1 killed and 2 wounded (Morteza Sayyadi, Hamed Sayyadi, Morteza Bazi)Local sources: armed plainclothes personnel of the Jakigur Border Regiment. IRGC media: drivers on the Rimdan border route.A Peugeot 207 carrying three armed plainclothes personnel came under fire in the evening.Documents Network / Haalvsh
58October 7, 2026 (15 Mehr)Jalq, Law Enforcement Command headquarters, Golshan CountyAttack using mine, RPG and semi-heavy weaponsUnspecified number killed and wounded; Front claimed 6 officers were hitTarget: FARAJA. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.The police headquarters and a support Hilux were attacked in the evening; electricity and internet service in Jalq were cut.Haalvsh / Documents Network
59October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Lakhshak road, Nosratabad, ZahedanAttack on patrol vehicle2 killed (3rd Lt. Vahid Enayat; Sgt. 1st Class Abbas Aghaei); local sources reported 3 killed and 2 woundedVictims: FARAJA tactical unit. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A tactical-unit vehicle was fired on in the morning and a clash followed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
60October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Karinduk, Nikshahr, Nikshahr-Konarak roadPursuit and attack on two military vehiclesOfficial: 1 killed (Mohammadreza Okati), 3 wounded. Local sources: at least 5 confirmed wounded and heavy casualties.Official account: personnel of the Army’s 88th Armored Division. Haalvsh: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A Hilux and minibus leaving the Karinduk base were attacked; the wounded were transported by helicopter to Chabahar and Konarak.Haalvsh / Documents Network
61October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)Faryab town center, Kerman ProvinceTargeted shooting / assassination1 killed (Maj. Mehdi Jamshidi)Victim: FARAJA officer; local sources said he had participated in repression of women protesters in Pashmuki. Assailant: unknown.Jamshidi’s private vehicle was raked with gunfire in the evening; he was struck by seven bullets and killed.Haalvsh / Documents Network
62October 9, 2026 (17 Mehr)Cheshmeh Ziarat, ZahedanRoadside bomb and clash2 killed (Col. Nosrat Eftekhari; Ehsan Dehmardeh) and several wounded; 1 civilian bystander (Abdollah Ghanbarzehi) killed by gunfire from forcesVictims: deputy cultural-social commander of the provincial Law Enforcement Command and security escort. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.A booby trap exploded along a police convoy route; state media described the civilian who was killed as the bomber.Haalvsh / Documents Network
63October 10, 2026 (18 Mehr)Faryab County, Rudbar-e Zamin area, Kerman ProvincePolice operation against suspect in armed attack1 killed, according to officialsThe person was identified by authorities as the principal suspect in the attack on Mehdi Jamshidi; identity not released.The Faryab governor said the suspect’s hideout had been identified through intelligence work and police surveillance.IRNA

Methodology note: Figures for casualties, victim identities and the attribution of some forces are based on cross-checking official reporting, local sources and statements by parties to the clashes through 18 Mehr 1405 (October 10, 2026). Cases without independent confirmation or involving conflicting accounts are presented with those qualifications.

Vakilabad Prison: Identification of 30 Women Arrested During Protests and Security Developments Concurrent with the War

HRANA – At least 30 women were arrested in Razavi Khorasan Province during the January 2026 protests and the security developments concurrent with the war, and were transferred to the so-called “Aramesh” ward and the quarantine section of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

According to HRANA, the identities of 30 women arrested in Razavi Khorasan Province have been confirmed, and the list of their names is included later in this report.

Based on information received by HRANA, these citizens were arrested during the January 2026 protests as well as the security developments concurrent with the war, and 25 of them remain imprisoned. HRANA has also confirmed the identities of five detainees who were recently released from the prison.

According to information received by HRANA, these women were primarily arrested in connection with participation in the January 2026 protests, activity on social media, communication with foreign media outlets, providing aid to injured protesters, or involvement in symbolic protest actions. Some of these women were arrested over recent months by security bodies including the IRGC Intelligence Organization, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA). Several are facing serious charges such as “enmity against God” (moharebeh), “collaboration with Israel,” “insulting the Prophet,” and “assembly and collusion against national security.”

Among these women, 18 are being held in the so-called “Aramesh” ward and seven others in the quarantine section of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad. A number of them have remained in legal limbo for months, with no court sessions held to address the charges against them. Some of these prisoners have also been denied telephone calls and family visits, while their families have faced extensive restrictions and uncertainty in attempts to follow up on their cases or seek temporary release.

The report goes on to separately examine the situation of the detained women in the Aramesh ward and the quarantine section of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad, followed by details regarding those who have been released. According to received information by HRANA the Aramesh ward suffers from poor detention conditions and inadequate basic facilities. Poor ventilation, lack of sanitary facilities, malfunctioning heating and cooling systems, and limited access to medical services are among the problems faced by women held in this ward. According to one former prisoner, the physical conditions and confined environment of the ward were such that she compared it to an “ant nest.”

The identities of 18 women imprisoned in the Aramesh ward of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad are as follows:

1- Maryam Nouri

Maryam Nouri was arrested five days after her husband, Ashkan Torabzadeh, was killed during the nationwide protests of January 2026. So far, no information is available regarding the reasons for her arrest or the charges brought against her.

2- Arezou Dehghan

Arezou Dehghan, 18 years old, is among the detainees currently held in the Aramesh ward of the prison. She was arrested for participating in the nationwide protests of January 2026.

3- Nadia Sedgh-Ali

She was arrested for placing flowers on the graves of those killed during the protests at Behesht Reza Cemetery in Mashhad and for sending images to foreign media outlets, including Iran International. Bail was set at 5 billion tomans. Due to her family’s inability to provide the bail amount, her temporary release has not been possible.

4- Soheila Hosseini

Along with her husband Dr. Ahmad Rahimi, she was arrested at their home in Mashhad on March 18, 2026. According to information received by HRANA, they were identified due to possessing and using a Starlink device and are accused of helping those injured during the January 2026 protests.

5- Najmeh Amini

The 22-year-old accounting student has been detained for approximately 89 days. Charges against her include moharebeh (“enmity against God”), collaboration with Israel, insulting the Supreme Leader, insulting the Prophet, and clashing with officers. She was arrested with violence by security forces on January 31, 2026, at Ferdowsi Shopping Center in Mashhad.

6- Mahdieh Afghahi

Mahdieh Afghahi, along with her husband Abolghasem Ali-Moradi, was arrested for communicating with foreign media outlets. Bail orders have been issued for them, but they remain detained due to inability to pay the bail amount.

7- Hadiseh Morvaridi

Morvaridi, 24 years old, was arrested in Fariman on January 8, 2026, and remains in legal limbo. According to informed sources, she faces the risk of being charged with insulting the Prophet of Islam.

8- Shahrzad Zamiri

Following her arrest, Shahrzad Zamiri spent 43 days in solitary confinement in the Ministry of Intelligence’s detention facility and is now being held in the Aramesh ward of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad. No information is available regarding the charges against her.

9- Tahereh Dehghan

She was arrested in Chenaran for participating in the January 2026 protests and sentenced by the Revolutionary Court to one year in prison. She has been imprisoned for approximately 110 days.

10- Asieh Naeimi

Asieh Naeimi was arrested for communicating with Persian-language media outlets abroad.

11- Adeleh Naeimi

Adeleh Naeimi, the sister of Asieh Naeimi, was also arrested in connection with this case.

12- Mahsa Behdari

Mahsa Behdari was arrested on March 20 for lighting candles during a mourning ceremony for those killed in the protests at Behesht Reza Cemetery. The charges against her include assembly and collusion and propaganda against the regime.

13- Zahra Mousavi

Zahra Mousavi, 21 years old, has been imprisoned for approximately 98 days. She was the head of her household and worked as a cashier at a restaurant in Fariman. Charges against her include participation in protests, forming groups, training in and manufacturing and using Molotov cocktails, and encouraging others to disrupt public order and national security. She holds both Iranian and Afghan citizenship, and according to informed sources, she has lost her Iranian birth certificate as a result of this case and faces the threat of exile.

14- Azar Yahoo

Azar Yahoo, aged approximately 38, was arrested in Mashhad on March 4, 2026, by IRGC intelligence forces and is currently held in the Aramesh ward of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad. The charge against her is “collaboration with Israel,” an accusation reportedly linked to her online activities, including the use of stickers. Her presence in the streets and dancing on the day of Ali Khamenei’s death were also cited as reasons for her arrest.

15- Mahboubeh Shabani

She was arrested in Mashhad on February 2, 2026, and is currently held in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad. A hearing regarding her charges has been held at the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad. No information is available about the charges against her.

16- Marzieh Mashhadi

She was arrested for participating in the January 2026 protests and communicating with Persian-language media outlets abroad. She remains detained in an uncertain legal status.

17- Sima Anbaei Farimani

Sima Anbaei Farimani, originally from Fariman and born in 1992, was arrested by FARAJA forces on March 16, 2026, and is currently held in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad. Charges against her include “links with Israel,” “assembly and collusion against national security,” and “insulting the former and current leaders.” According to HRANA’s reports, Ms. Anbaei Farimani is currently denied visitation and phone contact with her family, and her case is subject to severe restrictions on information disclosure.

18- Faezeh Salehabadi

Faezeh Salehabadi has been held in legal limbo in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad for approximately 78 days. According to informed sources, her arrest was related to posting a story on social media.

Further details regarding the detained women held in the quarantine section of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad are provided below.

HRANA had previously received reports indicating that the quarantine unit of this prison suffers from poor conditions in terms of facilities and sanitation, and that prisoners lack adequate access to basic necessities and standard accommodation conditions. According to an informed source, the constant smell of sewage in this section continuously causes distress to prisoners, while the lack of proper ventilation has made detention conditions even more difficult.

1- Masoumeh Yaghoubi

Masoumeh Yaghoubi, known by the alias “Azadeh,” was arrested by security forces in Mashhad on January 24, 2026. So far, no information has been obtained regarding the charges brought against her.

2- Fatemeh Rezvanifar

Fatemeh Rezvanifar, known by the alias “Samira,” was arrested on January 17, 2026. No court hearing has yet been held to address the charges against her, and no information is available regarding the details of her case or the accusations against her. According to an informed source, her family’s efforts to secure her temporary release have so far been unsuccessful.

3- Seyedeh Zeinab Mousavi

Seyedeh Zeinab Mousavi, known by the alias “Aban,” was arrested on February 24, 2026. The court hearing regarding the charges against her and her brother, Seyed Hassan Mousavi, was held on April 26, 2026, and they are facing charges of moharebeh (“enmity against God”).

4- Melika Khavari Khorasani

She, 21 years old, was arrested on March 1, 2026, and is currently being held in legal limbo in the quarantine section of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

5- Mina Zarei

According to informed sources, she was transferred to prison in poor physical condition. She was arrested on March 1, 2026, and the reason for her arrest was stated to be “dancing for Khamenei’s death.”

6- Reyhaneh Kafsh-Kanan

Reyhaneh Kafsh-Kanan has been detained for 48 days and has been denied visitation and phone contact. She appeared in an interrogation session on April 26, and according to informed sources, she was threatened with torture and execution.

7- Hadiseh Babazadeh

Hadiseh Babazadeh is among the detained women being held in the quarantine section of this prison. Investigations into the details of her case are ongoing.

In recent days, five inmates of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad were released on bail. The names of these individuals and the status of their cases are as follows:

1- Samira Bayat

She, 35 years old, was arrested by security forces on January 24, 2026. She was the head of her household and worked as a cashier at a restaurant in Mashhad. Her arrest was related to participation in the January protests. She was recently released from the prison after posting bail.

2- Elnaz Eghbali

Ms. Eghbali, along with her husband Saeed Samiei, was arrested in late February 2026 for participating in the protests. They were released in recent days after posting bail.

3- Negar Farahmand

She was arrested at her home in Mashhad on March 29, 2026, by IRGC intelligence agents. The charge brought against her was sending videos and images to foreign media outlets. She was eventually released from Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad after posting bail.

4- Najmeh Ruhand

Najmeh Ruhand was arrested on the evening of March 20 during the Persian New Year celebration ceremony at Ferdowsi’s tomb in Mashhad by security agents. She was initially transferred to the quarantine ward of Vakilabad Prison and, after interrogation, moved to the Aramesh ward of the prison. She faced charges of acting against national security. She was ultimately released from prison after posting bail.

5- Fatemeh Eram

Fatemeh Eram, 28 years old and from Fariman, was arrested by security forces in connection with participation in the January 2026 protests. She faced charges of leading protests. She was recently released after posting bail.

A Prisoner Executed in Alborz Province

HRANA – The legal deputy of Iran’s Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA) announced the execution of a defendant convicted in the murder case of an anti-narcotics officer named Mohammadmehdi Vakili in Alborz Province. According to him, the police officer was killed during a confrontation related to drug trafficking.

According to ISNA, the legal deputy of FARAJA stated in this regard: “The defendant in the murder case of Mohammadmehdi Vakili, an anti-narcotics officer of the Law Enforcement Force in Charbagh County, located in Alborz Province, was hanged.”

He added that the police officer had been killed while on duty on February 20, 2023, during a clash with a drug trafficker.

In November 2023, the defendant in this case had been sentenced to death on the mentioned charge by Branch 2 of the Criminal Court One of Alborz Province.

The report does not provide further details, including the identity of the prisoner or the exact location and date of the execution.

According to HRA’s Annual Report, in 2025 at least 2,063 citizens, including 61 women and 2 juvenile offenders, were executed. Of these, the sentences of 11 individuals were carried out in public. During the same period, 172 other individuals were sentenced to death.

Report on the Arrest of 62 People Across Several Provinces

HRANA – Domestic media outlets have reported the arrest of 62 citizens in the provinces of Kermanshah, Kurdistan, Isfahan, Kerman, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Mazandaran, and Tehran.

According to Tabnak, a number of citizens were arrested in four different provinces. In a statement, the Ministry of Intelligence announced the arrest of 30 citizens. According to the statement, security agents in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad and Kurdistan provinces arrested 15 people on accusations of “cooperation with foreign countries.” In addition, 13 other citizens, accused of “sending information and coordinates of defense and sensitive sites to foreign media and countries,” were arrested in Kerman, Kurdistan, and Isfahan.

According to a report by ISNA, the Information Center of the Greater Tehran Police Command announced that an individual who had “sent the locations of inspection checkpoints and police units to anti-government channels” was identified and arrested.

Mersad News also reported that the commander of the IRGC in Songhor and Koliai County announced the arrest of one citizen in that county.

The report claimed that this citizen had been cooperating with foreign-based media outlets and had recorded images and videos from sensitive areas and sent them to those outlets. At the same time, a video of the individual’s forced confession was released, though it is unclear under what circumstances it was obtained.

Meanwhile, the FARAJA Intelligence Organization in Mazandaran Province announced that 30 citizens had been arrested in the province. The stated reason for their arrests was sending information and details related to provincial security and military sites to foreign media outlets.

These reports did not provide further details, including the identities of those arrested or their place of detention.

It is worth noting that the military attacks by the United States and Israel on Iran began on February 28, 2026. Since the beginning of these attacks, HRANA has been documenting and recording related incidents across different parts of the country on a daily basis. For more information, readers can refer to HRANA’s detailed report on the thirtieth day of the conflict, published last night.

At Least 90 Citizens Arrested in Various Provinces in Connection with the War

HRANA –Security authorities announced that a total of 90 individuals have been arrested in various provinces on charges of “anti-security” activities.

According to HRANA, citing Fars News Agency, the Public Security Police (FARAJA) reported the arrest of 54 citizens. In the statement, without specifying where the arrests took place, authorities claimed that the detainees intended to act as leaders in organizing street protests and damaging citizens’ property. It was further stated that at the time of arrest, 11 of these individuals opened fire on police officers, and several firearms and ammunition were seized from them.

FARAJA described these individuals as “monarchists” and claimed that two of them had sent the geographic coordinates of important locations to the intelligence services of countries involved in the war.

In another report, the news agency stated that 13 citizens in Qom Province were arrested by IRGC forces in the province on charges of “security-related” activities. Three Starlink satellite devices were confiscated from them.

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) News Agency, the Ministry of Intelligence also announced the arrest of 23 citizens in the provinces of Mazandaran, Razavi Khorasan, and Khuzestan.

The Ministry of Intelligence stated that 10 individuals were arrested in Mazandaran, 10 in Razavi Khorasan, and 3 citizens in Khuzestan. The reported reason for the arrest of 20 of these individuals was sending images of military locations and economic infrastructure to countries involved in the war.

Regarding the three individuals arrested in Khuzestan, the report claimed that they had carried out armed attacks against security forces and public places in recent days.

The reports did not provide information about the identities or places of detention of these individuals.

Since February 28, 2026, Iran has been subjected to a series of military attacks carried out by Israel and the United States. For further details, readers can refer to HRANA’s report, which provides a statistical overview of the war and its consequences.

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Arrest of Five Individuals for Filming and Sending Footage to Media

HRANA – At least four citizens in Tehran and one in Yazd have been arrested for filming sites where missiles struck and bombed areas and sending the footage to a foreign-based media outlet.

According to Fars News Agency, the public relations office of the Yazd Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office announced the arrest of a citizen. The individual was arrested following judicial coordination for filming and sending footage to a foreign-based media outlet (Iran International). After being formally charged and issued a legal bail order, the person was transferred to prison.

The report states that the individual had recorded images or videos from specific locations, including missile launch or impact sites during the recent war.

Meanwhile, Tasnim News Agency reported the arrest of four citizens in Tehran. According to the report, these individuals were also detained by the Special Units of the Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA) for the same actions.

The reports do not mention the identities of the detainees or the dates of their arrests.

Since February 28, Iran’s territory has been targeted by military attacks by Israel and the United States. For more information, you can refer to HRANA’s report on the thirteenth day after the start of these attacks, which was published last night.

Nationwide Protests: At Least 1,098 Citizens Arrested

HRANA – During the nationwide protests, at least 706 citizens were arrested in the cities of Dezful, Yazd, Borujen, Borujerd, and Nur. In addition, the Public Security Police of FARAJA reported the arrest of 327 protesters nationwide since December 28. The General Directorate of Intelligence of Hormozgan Province also announced the arrest of 65 citizens in connection with the protests in the province.

According to IRNA, the Lorestan Police Information Center claimed that an individual accused of killing a Basij member named Seyed Mohammad Javad Monavvar and injuring his son, Seyed Mohammad Naeim Monavvar, in the city of Borujerd, had been identified and arrested. It was alleged that the accused confessed to the killing during interrogations.

In another report, IRNA announced the arrest of 13 protesting citizens in Nur County, claiming that a large number of bladed weapons were confiscated from them and that they were accused of damaging public property.

IRNA also reported the arrest of 452 protesting citizens in Dezful County. According to this report, 19 individuals were arrested under the charge of being “main leaders of the protests,” and 21 others for being “responsible for spreading protest calls.”

The Dezful police commander claimed that firearms, bladed weapons, and incendiary materials were discovered and confiscated from the accused.

Meanwhile, the state broadcaster reported that the Public Security Police of FARAJA had arrested 327 protesting citizens nationwide since December 22, 2025. The media outlet claimed that these individuals were members of 57 organized networks and were accused of damaging public property. Allegations of discovering weapons and incendiary materials were also raised in connection with these arrests.

Additionally, the broadcaster reported the arrest of 27 citizens in Yazd on charges described as “filming and sending content to hostile media outlets.”

Ahmad Negahban, the commander of Yazd Province’s law enforcement forces, claimed that these individuals had filmed and photographed damage to public property and sent the images to Persian-language media outlets based outside the country.

In another report, the state broadcaster announced the arrest of 213 protesting citizens in Borujen, stating that 30 of them were detained under the charge of being “main leaders of the protests.”

The General Directorate of Intelligence of Hormozgan Province also announced, in a statement, the arrest of 65 citizens in connection with the protests. These individuals were accused of “setting fire to mosques, public and service facilities, buses, and attacking military and law enforcement centers in the province.”

These reports do not mention the identities of the detained citizens or their places of detention.

It should be noted that gatherings and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and after two days spread beyond bazaars and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests have become one of the most widespread demonstrations in recent years. For more information, readers can refer to HRANA’s detailed report published last night on the thirty-second day since the start of the protests.

FARAJA Reports Mass Arrests After Israeli Strike on Evin Prison, Including Thousands of Foreign Nationals

HRANA – The spokesperson for the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA) has announced the arrest of 2,774 foreign nationals and dozens of individuals accused of “anti-security activities” following Israel’s recent attack on Evin Prison.

According to Tasnim News Agency, Saeed Montazer-al-Mahdi presented a report on the agency’s activities during Israel’s attack on Evin Prison, including statistics on arrests and security measures.. He claimed that some detainees face charges of espionage and unauthorized filming. The FARAJA spokesperson also reported that 21,000 people were arrested during the 12-day war, attributing the arrests to a 41% increase in public tip-offs.

Montazer-al-Mahdi stated that following the attack, a total of 2,774 foreign nationals were arrested by FARAJA officers. He said examinations of the detainees’ mobile phones revealed that some had filmed or photographed highlands and sensitive sites, and had sent location data.

The spokesperson further said that during the 12-day war, calls to the 110 police hotline rose by about 41%, leading to 7,850 citizen reports and the arrest of 21,000 “suspects.”

He added that among them, 261 people were arrested on suspicion of espionage and 172 on charges of unauthorized filming. Additionally, during investigations, 30 individuals described as “special security cases” were identified through data retrieved from the mobile phones of suspects and detainees.

While combating espionage is not considered a human rights violation in itself, given the Iranian government’s history of using such charges as a tool against political opponents, such claims—especially when details and judicial procedures remain unclear—are often viewed with skepticism.

The social deputy of FARAJA also said that 30 individuals who had expressed support for Israel’s recent attack on social media were arrested. According to him, legal cases were opened against another 35 people deemed “prone to anti-security activities.”

Montazer-al-Mahdi added that 147 social media pages belonging to individuals who had merely expressed joy over Israel’s recent attacks were identified, but he did not provide further details on what measures were taken against them.

He reported that police forces prevented a gathering in Tehran’s Palestine Square, describing it as linked to Israel’s recent aerial and drone operations. He said calls to join the gathering had previously circulated online.

The spokesperson also claimed that after the bombing of Evin Prison, 127 political and security prisoners attempting to escape were identified and arrested by the northern Tehran police security unit. Among them, he said, were two prisoners who had disguised themselves in firefighter uniforms.

In another part of his remarks, Montazer-al-Mahdi stated that during the 12-day war, over 40,000 FARAJA officers were stationed on urban and intercity roads. He added that since the start of the current year, about 102,000 conscripts have been dispatched to service, with 30,000 of them appointed as police officers in the past month alone.

On June 23, during Israeli airstrikes on Tehran, Evin Prison was directly targeted. Several parts of the prison were hit, including the entrance gate, the judiciary building inside the compound, the infirmary, Ward 209, the bakery, and the visitation hall.

On the First Day of Iranian New Year, Several Citizens Arrested at Historical Sites

HRANA News Agency – The head of the Public Security Police of FARAJA announced that several citizens were arrested at various historical sites across the country on the first day of the Iranian New Year (1404). He claimed that these individuals were attempting to disrupt public order through “norm-breaking” behavior.

According to HRANA, quoting Mehr News Agency, a number of citizens were detained at cultural and historical locations across Iran on the first day of the new year.

The police official referred to the detainees as “leaders” and “main instigators,” accusing them of engaging in acts of “norm violation.” Seyed Majid Feyz Jafari, without providing any specific examples of the alleged misconduct, asserted that the detainees intended to disturb public security.

The report does not mention the identities or the number of those arrested. There is also no information available regarding their legal status or current conditions of detention.

In recent years, during the Nowruz holidays, as public presence in cultural and historical sites increases, numerous incidents have been reported involving authorities confronting citizens over issues such as dress code, dancing, or public celebration. In some cases, detainees were later released on bail but faced charges such as “propaganda against the regime” or “encouraging corruption and prostitution.”

An Increase in Women’s Activism alongside Rising Government Hostility in Iran –“They can imprison our bodies, but they will never imprison our fight for justice.”

As the two-year anniversary of Mahsa Zhina Amini’s death in detention approaches, HRA explores a surge in women’s activism in Iran and the worsening repression by the government in response. Despite the passage of time, accountability for the violence remains largely absent, and the situation continues to deteriorate.

This report features personal accounts from female prisoners and women who have had interactions with various hijab monitoring bodies. The report delves into a brief historical evolution of protests for women’s rights, and the growing solidarity among women activists over the past 44 years. Further, it examines the government’s view of these movements as threats, leading to an increase in punitive actions such as arrests, violence, and severe legal consequences.

Through this analysis, HRA aims to highlight the resilience of Iranian women in the face of extreme repression and the broader implications of their struggle for freedom and equality.

The Backdrop Women’s Activism in Iran

1.   Historical Background

In the 44 years since the Islamic Revolution, women’s rights in Iran have been significantly curtailed. The repression and violence against women have not only manifested in physical harm but have also been deeply embedded in political and legislative reforms. Key changes included granting men the exclusive right to seek divorce, implementing mandatory hijab rules, and lowering the legal marriage age for girls from 18 to 9. Women also could not leave the country without the permission of their husbands significantly impacting their right to freedom of movement. Additionally, The Family Protection Courts were initially abolished and replaced by regular courts, later succeeded by family courts presided over by clerics. These cleric-led courts routinely favored husbands in family disputes, further entrenching gender inequality.

Over the past 44 years, these restrictions have fueled a significant increase in women’s activism in Iran, leading to a decades-long struggle. One of the first major protests occurred on March 6, 1979, after Khomeini announced that women would be required to wear veils when entering government property or working in government ministries. This sparked a six-day protest, led by women, opposing the mandatory hijab ruling and advocating for equal rights. In response, pro-Khomeini Islamist forces met the protests with extreme violence and intimidation, including the chant: “Either hijab or a smack in the head!” Despite this, many women refused to be silenced, continuing to form women’s associations and gather, particularly in universities. By 1983, the government had passed laws punishing women who refused to comply with mandatory veiling. These laws led to severe harassment, assaults on women’s activists, and their eventual arbitrary arrests.1

2. Previous Protests

After the 1979 protest, numerous protests and significant moments of women-led activism have continued. On 12 June 2006, the One Million Signatures Campaign began after a gathering in Tehran’s Haft-Tir Square to mark Iranian Women’s Unity Day. Various groups came together to demand reform of discriminatory laws against women, especially focusing on family laws. Iranian women had been advocating for change for decades, but this campaign represented the most comprehensive and dynamic effort seen thus far. After months of preparation, the campaign produced three key documents: (1) A petition calling for legal changes, which was meant to collect one million signatures. (2) A campaign plan that outlined the goals, methods, and structure of the movement. (3) A pamphlet titled The Effect of Laws on Women’s Lives, distributed by activists to raise awareness and gather support. The campaign, known for its grassroots approach, united women from diverse backgrounds and built a strong foundation for  a long history of advocating for women’s rights in Iran. Despite facing government repression and the arrest of activists, it became a significant milestone in the fight for gender equality. The One Million Signatures Campaign continues to symbolize the ongoing struggle for legal reforms and gender justice in Iran.2

Launched in May 2017, The White Wednesday movement encouraged women to wear white head scarves or other white clothing on Wednesdays as a peaceful yet bold act of resistance. By choosing white—a symbol of peace—the movement underscores the desire for freedom and autonomy in the face of state-enforced dress codes. Through the present day, women bravely share videos and photos of themselves, sometimes removing their hijabs in public, on social media platforms, despite knowing the severe consequences they could face from the government–they are the faces of the collective bravery of Iranian women. This movement has not only mobilized women but has also garnered support from men and others who stand in solidarity against the regime’s oppressive laws. The Iranian government has responded with harsh repression, arresting and imprisoning those who participate.

3. 2022 Protests “Woman, Life, Freedom”

The 2022 protests represented a culmination of years of frustration, inequality, and repression. After the death in detention of Masha Zhina Amini following her encounter with the morality police for alleged hijab compliance, the country erupted in nationwide protests for 82 consecutive days–and more in some areas. Protestors came out onto the street with the slogan ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’, these protests were centralized around women’s rights but also the repressive laws, and the regime itself.  These protests were violently quashed by the anti-riot police and Iran’s militia force (Basij). Teargas, pellets, and live ammunition were used in the repression of protests. One HRA investigation even uncovered the use of paintball guns. The protests took place in 31 provinces, 160 cities, and 143 major universities. Tragically, these protests also led to the death of at least 530 individuals,3 including 68 children and teenagers. It’s also estimated that 18,242 protesters were arrested, HRA confirmed the identity of 3,670 arrested citizens, 605 students and 61 journalists or activists.

The 2022 nationwide protests were unlike any other protests the country had seen before. Unlike recent protests, which were largely driven by economic or environmental concerns, these demonstrations were centered on political and human rights demands. Because the protests were sparked by the death of a young Kurdish and Sunni woman, her identity highlighted the intersection of gender, ethnic, and religious discrimination.

Iranian youth, with an average age of 15 according to law enforcement officials, played a pivotal role in these protests. An unprecedented solidarity emerged between Iranians within the country and those in the diaspora, uniting almost all classes of society, including the urban middle class, lower and upper classes, different ethnic and religious groups, sexual minorities, and various trade groups such as teachers, workers, students, professors, artists, and athletes. Businesses also demonstrated their support by participating in strikes. In terms of duration, these protests are among the longest continuous protests since the inception of the Islamic Republic.

The international community, particularly celebrities in arts, culture, and politics, has shown unprecedented support for the protesters, amplifying their demands and drawing global attention to the situation in Iran. The protests’ focus on women’s rights has revealed the progressive and assertive nature of Iranian society. The protests were often women led and demonstrated significant female leadership and participation and supported by men. One distinguishing feature of these protests is the unarmed demonstrators who frequently confronted security forces, often standing together to prevent arrests and resisting the Moral Security Police, whose decades-long interference in women’s personal lives fueled public anger.

In addition to the street protests, cyber warfare emerged between opponents and supporters of the regime, with numerous government sites being hacked. The hashtag #MahsaAmini became the first in Twitter’s history to surpass 284 million tweets, reflecting the global solidarity with the protesters. The Iranian government, this time, allowed FARAJA, the main law enforcement agency, greater latitude in repressing the protests, and employed alternative methods for controlling communication, such as reducing internet speed rather than cutting it off entirely, and filtering certain sites. Media outlets close to Iran’s security apparatus attempted to cover the protests in a way that favored the government, often underreporting the number of deaths during the protests.

These protests, despite lacking centralized leadership, have demonstrated the determination of Iranian society, particularly its younger generation, to secure their basic human rights. Iran’s ethnic groups, especially Kurdish and Baloch citizens, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims, have played a significant role in these protests and have also faced some of the most brutal crackdowns.4

Government’s Perception and Response

1. Threat Perception

The increased activism around women’s rights, especially regarding the compulsory hijab has made women a target of the government. Since the 16 of September 2022 up until the 18th of August 2024, 682 women have been detained for hijab-related reasons. During the same time period, 18 women’s rights activists have been arrested. Notable arrests include Narges Mohammadi, Zhina Modarresi Gorji and Zeinab Khenyab.

Following the recent protests, several political leaders and officials in Iran have made statements regarding the mandatory hijab and women’s activism. On April 3, 2024, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, declared that compulsory veiling is a “religiously mandated decree and obligatory for women.” He attributed non-compliance to “foreign interference” and emphasized the need to address this issue.5

Subsequently, on April 13, 2024, Abbas Ali Mohammadian, the Commander of Tehran’s police force, announced that the police in Tehran and other provinces would begin confronting individuals who promote “social abnormalities,” such as appearing without a headscarf. He specifically mentioned that those who ignored previous police warnings would receive a final warning, with legal action to follow.6

On April 21, 2024, Hassan Hassanzadeh, the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran, introduced the formation of trained groups (the so-called “Ambassadors of Kindness”) to enforce compulsory veiling in public spaces, though he did not specify their exact composition or institutional affiliation.7

Finally, on April 23, 2024, Ahmadreza Radan, the Commander-in-Chief of Iran’s police force (FARAJA), announced the implementation of the “irreversible Noor Plan,” which has received approval from the parliament, judiciary, and government. On the same day, FARAJA issued a statement equating defiance of compulsory veiling with activities of “organized criminal gangs…involved in corruption, prostitution, and pornography.” Additionally, a “Bill to Support the Culture of Chastity and Hijab” is nearing adoption in Iran’s parliament. If passed, this law will formalize the government’s crackdown on women and girls defying the compulsory veiling mandate and will severely deepen the gender divide.8

The Iranian government perceives women’s activism, particularly in opposition to compulsory hijab, as a significant threat to its ideological and social control. Statements from key political and military leaders relieve a narrative that frames defiance of mandatory veiling not merely as a social or religious issue but as a challenge to state authority, ‘influenced by foreign interference.’  These statements also highlight the premeditated intent of the regime to suppress dissent. The rhetoric used by figures such as Ali Khamenei and Ahmadreza Radan equates women’s activism with organized crime and societal corruption, showcasing a deep-seated fear of the potential for these movements to destabilize the regime’s traditionalist foundations. The implementation of measures like the “irreversible Noor Plan” and the formation of enforcement groups like the “Ambassadors of Kindness” further underscores the government’s commitment to quelling these movements through legal, political, and physical means, viewing the activism as a direct assault on the state’s moral and cultural codes. This reaction highlights the regime’s view of women’s activism not just as a demand for rights but as a broader existential threat to the state’s ideological hegemony.

2. Current hijab monitoring bodies

hijab monitoring body

The hijab monitoring bodies often enforce violent methods to force women to comply with the mandatory hijab rules. So far in 2024, around 620 women have been arrested under Operation Noor. On June 21, on a street in Tehran, two teenage girls were violently assaulted and arrested by agents.9 These girls were then transferred to the Morality Police in a white van. According to the mother of one of the girls, when she visited the Morality Police, she saw her daughter with a bruised face, swollen lips, a bruised neck, and torn clothes. Additionally, they were threatened not to file complaints against the officers.

This incident resulted in injuries to at least one of the girls, Nafas Haji-Sharif, 14 years old. Maryam Abbasi, Nafas Haji-Sharif’s mother, disclosed that on July 1, her daughter was beaten by agents. She provided documents, including a video of the confrontation recorded by CCTV cameras, to Ensaf News. The video released from the time of the girls’ arrest shows that the girls were trying to hide on another street but were attacked by the agents. In the video, one of the girls is seen being severely beaten by the officers. As she resisted arrest, the officers grabbed her hair, dragged her violently on the ground, and forced her into a white van.

Maryam Abbasi said, “The hijab enforcers violently forced my daughter and her friend into the van, and her head was slammed into an electric post. Inside the van, they put their foot on my daughter’s neck and pulled her hair.” She also provided pictures of the injuries on her daughter’s body.

Abbasi mentioned that when she went to the Morality Police, she found her daughter with a bruised face, swollen lips, and a bruised neck. She also claimed that the officers involved in the incident treated her dismissively and ignored her complaint. She stated that the on-duty judge allowed her access to the CCTV footage, but subsequent follow-ups have been unsuccessful. She continues to call on various police and judicial authorities to investigate and address her complaint.

Meanwhile, the Morality Police claim that a female officer’s fingers were broken in the altercation and that the case’s judge threatened them not to file a complaint against the officers. Abbasi said, “In the presence of a lawyer, they told me not to complain against the officers; otherwise, the Intelligence and Security forces would get involved, making it costly for you and out of our control.”

In a similar act of violence against women, on July 22, Arezou Badri was heading home from work with her sister Sara while their car was flagged by the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) for improper hijab. Instead of de-escalating the situation, a First Sergeant in the LEF opened fire on the car as Sara attempted to drive away. One of the bullets struck Arezou in the spine. She was rushed to the hospital for emergency surgery. Arezou will likely never walk again.

In a conversation with HRA, several women told their stories of what it was like to be confronted and arrested by Operation Noor officers. One women stated “With the resumption of the Noor Plan this year (April 13, 2024), at 6 PM in Enghelab Square, I was attacked by plainclothes officers and baton-wielding hijab enforcers, both male and female, in Tehran’s Enghelab Square. The arrested women present on that day were taken away in ambulances, motorcycles, and white Peugeot cars. After a two-hour chase through the alleys of Enghelab to the route home, I was hit by tear gas and attacked by four plainclothes motorcyclists armed with batons and wooden sticks. I dragged myself to the next alley and street”.

Iranian women paint a harrowing picture of the oppressive and violent treatment they endure at the hands of their government. They recount experiences of being brutally targeted for the slightest deviation from the state-imposed dress code, such as improper hijab. Women are not only subjected to arbitrary arrests and physical assaults but also face severe, life-altering consequences for resisting these draconian measures. The government’s response to any form of dissent is often swift and ruthless, with agents employing excessive force, including beatings, shootings, and threats, to enforce compliance.

One woman’s testimony encapsulates the pervasive fear and helplessness felt by many:

Government’s Hostility and Vengeance

The rise in activism in Iran has made these very women significant force, leading the government to see them as a threat at both social and structural levels. Women’s issues, such as the compulsory hijab, are increasingly difficult for the Islamic Republic to justify internationally, adding pressure on the regime.

The hijab is central to the Islamic Republic’s identity, especially after the 1979 revolution when its enforcement impacted women’s workforce participation. Any concession on the hijab is viewed as a step towards secularism, which the regime perceives as an existential threat. Therefore, women’s demands for freedom and equality are seen as a fundamental challenge to the regime’s ideological foundation.

These factors have fueled the government’s hostility towards women. Traditional societal norms in Iran complicate the government’s ability to label women protesters as terrorists or vandals, giving women more freedom to radicalize their protests. The government’s use of extreme and illegal measures, such as sexual violence against female detainees, strict new laws, and brute force, highlights its desperation to maintain control.

Following the 2022 protest, the ‘Hijab and Chastity bill’ was introduced, eventually expanding from 15 to 70 articles to enforce stricter regulations on mandatory hijab and gender segregation in public spaces. The bill imposes severe penalties, including fines and corporal punishments, and utilizes technology like AI for enforcement. It empowers the Basij group, intensifying societal control. Despite concerns about privacy and freedom, the bill has been pushed forward, with recent amendments requiring police to obtain legal authorization before intervening in certain cases.10 11

The Hijab and Chastity Bill violates several key international human rights standards, especially under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Iran is a signatory. Firstly, the bill violats the Right to Freedom of Expression ( Art, 19 ICCPR); compulsory dress interferes with the freedom of expression and Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion ( Article 18, ICCPR) International law upholds an individual’s right to wear religious attire is voluntary, therefore forcing women to adhere to religious dress code contravenes this right.

Additionally, the Bill also violates the right to Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination (Article 3, ICCPR). The law disproportionately targets women and enforces gender-based discrimination. By mandating specific dress codes for women only, the bill discriminates on the basis of gender, violating the principle of equality before the law. Gender-based discrimination is explicitly prohibited under international human rights law​.

Lastly, The bill violates article 17, ICCPR, by enforcing strict dress codes through surveillance and state monitoring (including street enforcers and the potential for penalties based on social media activity), the law infringes on the individual’s right to privacy. Intruding into personal dress choices and punishing non-compliance directly violates the principle that individuals should be free from unwarranted interference in their personal life​

Amir-Hossein Bankipour Fard, a member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, stated on May 12,2024  that under the Hijab and Chasity bill citizens could be arrested for four reasons. (1) Individuals who are considered to be semi-naked, (2) those who are ‘connected’ to anti-regime or foreign groups, (3) Individuals who resists after being warned, (4) foreigners who do not have acceptable documentation with them. These measures, like many, are vague in nature leaving far too much discretion in the hands of authority. This subsequently led to the deportation of Kobra Gholami in August 2024. She is an Afghan citizen and researcher at Al-Zahra University, who was deported to Afghanistan after she “received a warning about her hijab”, Bankipour has also  stated that the nƒahmew bill will include camera surveillance.

Unprecedented Repression Signals a Growing Threat

Despite the government’s efforts, women’s activism continues, signaling its failure to fully suppress their movement. This situation has led to unprecedented repressive measures, including the potential issuance of death sentences to women activists, as a drastic and symbolic attempt to reassert control.

Among the harsh measures taken against women is the imprisonment of eleven prominent female activists in Gilan province. This crackdown on dissent extends to the imposition of death sentences as a form of retaliation. For example, Sharifeh Mohammadi, a labor activist, has been sentenced to death on charges of ‘Baghi’ (armed rebellion). Similarly, Pakhshan Azizi, a political prisoner, also received the death penalty on charges related to her alleged membership in anti-regime groups. Arrested on August 4th, 2023, in Tehran, Azizi was denied access to a private lawyer and was unable to see her family. After enduring four months of intense interrogation, she was transferred to the women’s ward of Evin Prison, where she remains detained.

The Iranian government’s relentless crackdown on women’s activism reveals its profound fear of losing control over a society that is increasingly demanding basic human rights and freedoms. Despite decades of repression, women in Iran continue to challenge the regime’s authoritarian grip, especially around the issues of compulsory hijab and broader gender discrimination. The state’s response—marked by escalating violence, arbitrary arrests, and draconian legislation—reflects its desperation to maintain an ideological stronghold that is becoming ever more tenuous. However, the resilience of Iranian women, who persist in their fight despite the ever-present threat of severe punishment, underscores a growing crisis for the regime. The harsh measures, including imprisonment and even death sentences, may silence some voices temporarily, but they also ignite a deeper resolve among others, ensuring that the struggle for freedom and equality in Iran is far from over. As one activist poignantly stated, “Hope lies in the continuous efforts of ordinary people to live, to expand life; hope lies in the progressive slogans of the masses despite the absence of progressive mass organizations and the presence of reactionary opposition media; hope lies in women not backing down from the street battles for their minimal freedoms despite the severe consequences. If there is any hope for me, it is certainly in the streets of Iran and among the people who have repeatedly risked their lives over the years and have attacked the Iranian regime.’
In a conversation with HRA a woman shares her experiences being arrested and interrogated by Ministry of Intelligence forces:

Insights from Iranian Women

The conditions faced by women in Iranian prisons are a stark testament to the regime’s efforts to suppress dissent and break the spirit of those who challenge its authority. Women imprisoned for their activism, resistance to the mandatory hijab, or other acts of defiance endure extreme hardships that are both physical and psychological in nature.

Testimonies from women detainees reveal a disturbing pattern of abuse. One prisoner recounts, “They tried to break us with isolation and deprivation, but our resolve only grew stronger.” In facilities like Evin prison, women are subjected to solitary confinement, where they are cut off from the outside world, denied basic rights such as medical care, and prevented from contacting their families.12 The unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, and lack of proper nutrition exacerbate their suffering, turning their imprisonment into a daily battle for survival.

High-security wards like Ward 209 in Evin Prison, controlled by the Ministry of Intelligence, are notorious for their harsh conditions. Women held here, often those seen as particularly threatening to the regime, are isolated even further. “They moved me to Ward 209 to silence me, but even in the darkness of solitary confinement, I knew I had to keep fighting,” said one woman who experienced this brutal treatment.

Hunger strikes have emerged as a desperate form of protest for these women, who use their bodies as the only means left to demand justice. The Iranian authorities respond to these protests with predictable cruelty. Rather than addressing the grievances of the prisoners, they intensify the repression. One prisoner stated, “When they saw we wouldn’t break, they only made it worse—more isolation, more threats.” In some cases, prisoners who refuse to wear the chador during court appearances or police check-ins face additional punishment, such as relocation to even harsher wards or further restrictions on their already limited freedoms.

Despite the brutal conditions, the spirit of resistance among these women remains unbroken. Their courage and resilience not only highlight the severe abuses they face but also serve as a beacon of hope and defiance against a regime determined to silence them. As one woman powerfully expressed, “They can imprison our bodies, but they will never imprison our fight for justice.”

A testament to unwavering commitment

Since the tragic and unlawful death of Mahsa Zhina Amini while in state custody, Iranian women have continued to demonstrate unparalleled courage and resilience in defiance of a systematic campaign of gender-based oppression orchestrated by the Iranian government. The international community must recognize and support this movement–and not only at times when it makes the headlines.

Despite decades of structural repression, Iranian women remain at the forefront of a growing movement for equality, fundamental rights, and personal autonomy, persistently challenging the discriminatory policies and practices of the regime. The Iranian government’s brutal attempts to suppress these voices – through widespread and systematic use of violence, arbitrary detention, and gender-based discriminatory laws – clearly amount to a sustained attack on the fundamental human rights of women.

As HRA’s investigation into the crime against humanity of gender and political persecution demonstrates, the ongoing state-sanctioned violence against women and girls in Iran fits squarely within the legal parameters of such crimes under international law. Under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), gender persecution is recognized as a crime against humanity when it involves “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.” The Iranian regime’s pervasive gender-based discrimination, coupled with its violent enforcement of discriminatory laws, constitutes such a deprivation of rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and security of person, freedom of expression, and freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Although Iran is not a party to the Rome Statute, which specifically enumerates gender persecution as a crime against humanity, customary international law imposes binding obligations on all states, including Iran, to prevent and punish acts of persecution on the basis of gender.

Customary international law, derived from consistent state practice, holds that persecution—whether on political, racial, religious, or gender-based grounds—violates fundamental human rights.

This oppression is not an isolated incident but part of a broader state policy aimed at the systemic subjugation of women. HRA’s investigation highlights the widespread and systematic nature of this persecution, a defining characteristic of crimes against humanity under international law. The regime’s crackdown on women’s rights activists and political prisoners is designed to stifle dissent and maintain a patriarchal structure that is incompatible with the basic principles of gender equality enshrined in international human rights instruments.

Testimonies collected by HRA from activists and political prisoners further reinforce the conclusion that the regime’s repressive tactics, while temporarily silencing some, cannot extinguish the movement for gender equality and human dignity.

As one woman interviewed by HRA expressed: “I hope that women will be recognized as half of the country’s human population and that conditions will change in a way that respects their rights and human dignity, and we will see them enjoying basic freedoms such as social freedoms.”

Such sentiments are a testament to the resilience and determination of Iranian women and symbolize the hope for a future where gender equality is realized, and repression is met with accountability.

It is essential for the international community to stand in solidarity with Iranian women, whose activism challenges not only gender inequality but also a deeply entrenched system of oppression that violates the very essence of universal human rights. There is both a legal and moral obligation to respond. The fight for women’s rights in Iran is not only a struggle for gender equality; it is a critical component of the global fight for justice, human dignity, and the rule of law and silence is complicity.

  1. 1. https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/203107/1/sadeghi_boroujerdi_2023_iran_s_uprisings_for_women_life_freedom_over_determination_crisis_and_the_lineages_of_revolt.pdf
  2. 2. https://learningpartnership.org/sites/default/files/resources/pdfs/One-Million-Signatures-Campaign-English_0.pdf
  3. 3. HRA’s reporting includes both civilians and security forces, though the vast majority of those killed were civilian protesters.
  4. 4. See HRA and parter UpRights inivestigation into the crime of humanity of gender and political persecution in the context of the 2022 protests, https://www.hra-iran.org/hra-with-legal-support-of-uprights-gender-political-persecution-in-iran-since-at-least-sept-2022-2/
  5. 5. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/MDE1380292024ENGLISH.pdf
  6. 6. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/MDE1380292024ENGLISH.pdf
  7. 7. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/MDE1380292024ENGLISH.pdf
  8. 8. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/MDE1380292024ENGLISH.pdf
  9. 9. https://www.en-hrana.org/report-on-violent-arrest-of-teenage-girls-in-tehran-over-mandatory-hijab/?hilite=two+girls
  10. 10. The important objection of the Guardian Council to the Chastity and Hijab bill about the police force
  11. 11. “Hijab and Chastity” bill; Resolution of two “ambiguities” of the Guardian Council by the Parliament
  12. 12. https://www.en-hrana.org/womens-rights-activists-zohreh-and-zahra-dadras-arrested-to-commence-serving-their-sentences/