According to HRANA, the pattern of events over the past six months indicates that southeastern Iran is entering a more volatile phase of armed confrontation. This shift has unfolded in a security environment profoundly affected since late winter 1404 by direct warfare between Iran, on one side, and the United States and Israel, on the other. During the same period, government concerns increased over the possibility that armed groups might become more active in border regions. Yet while much of the Iranian government’s public and security attention was focused on developments in the west and northwest, a quieter but sustained pattern of increasing attacks, security operations and armed clashes took shape in the southeast.

Most of the armed incidents were recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, while two were also reported in Faryab County, Kerman Province. Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr, and Rask emerged as the main centers of armed confrontation. Meanwhile, signs of growing coordination among some Baloch armed groups have emerged, particularly with the formation of the People’s Fighters Front (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi). However, many of the incidents remain unclaimed, and available evidence does not establish responsibility for a significant number of attacks.

Data Overview

Armed Clashes Intensify in September and Early October

A chronological review of the events clearly illustrates how armed clashes have increased over time. After four incidents in Khordad (21 May -21 June), the number rose to 10 in Mordad (23 July-22 August) and 11 in Shahrivar (23 August-22 September). Shahrivar was the most incident-heavy complete month of the period, but that record was broken in the first half of the following month: from 1 to 18 Mehr (23 September-10 October), 18 armed incidents were recorded. In other words, the pace of clashes in Mehr not only exceeded that of previous months, but reached an unprecedented level within less than a full month.

The escalation is evident not only in the growing number of incidents but also in the increasing intensity of armed confrontations. Seven armed attacks were reported in the six days between 13 and 18 Mehr alone (5 -10 October). During the same period, attacks on patrol units, police facilities and multi-vehicle convoys increased, and power or internet outages were reported after clashes in some locations. Taken together, these indicators suggest a gradual shift from isolated attacks toward confrontations that, in some cases, have become longer in duration, heavier in weaponry and broader in geographic reach.

From Targeted Killings to Ambushes and Semi-Heavy Weapons

The most frequently recorded type of incident during this period was attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys, with 17 cases documented. Fourteen targeted shootings of individuals were also recorded; in seven cases, the attacks occurred outside the victims’ homes, workplaces, or along their regular travel routes. Targeted shootings were more common in the earlier months, but in the final weeks, both the weapons used and the nature of the operations changed.

On 10 Mehr (October 2), in the Rudmahi area of Zahedan, a vehicle attributed to Fatemiyoun forces was struck by a booby trap and then came under gunfire. Five days later, reports on the attack against the Law Enforcement Command headquarters in Jalq described the use of mines, RPGs and semi-heavy weapons. On October 9 (17 Mehr), a roadside bomb exploded along the route of a police convoy in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan. In total, at least seven incidents involved equipment such as drones, artillery, RPGs, armored vehicles or explosives.

Government forces also used drones, artillery, armored vehicles and heavy weapons in several operations. In operations in Jahadabad, Gharibabad and Monzalab, locations of clashes and homes targeted during the operations were destroyed, blown up or set on fire. Such developments, particularly when operations take place in residential settings, increase the risk of harm to civilians and their property and heighten the need for precise documentation of operational methods and their consequences.

More Visible Emergence of Armed Opposition Groups

One notable development in recent weeks has been the growing number of armed clashes attributed to the People’s Fighters Front. The organization, which operates as an alliance of several Baloch armed groups, was linked to 11 recorded incidents in total. These include attacks for which it claimed responsibility, participation in certain clashes, and confirmation that some individuals killed in government operations were its members. Ten of those 11 incidents occurred on or after 21 Shahrivar (12 September).

Even so, the available data do not support attributing the overall increase in violence to a single group. Of the 42 incidents initiated by armed actors, a specific claim of responsibility was recorded for only seven attacks: six by the People’s Fighters Front and one by Ansar al-Furqan. A large share of attacks therefore remains unclaimed or cannot be reliably attributed. This makes it difficult to assess the actual capabilities of the groups, their chains of command, or the degree of operational coordination among them.

Fatemiyoun: Disputed Accounts of Presence and Casualties

Accounts involving the Fatemiyoun, a force operating under the IRGC Quds Force and composed primarily of Afghan nationals, have been disputed. While local sources and Baloch armed groups have identified personnel targeted in several incidents, including in Rudmahi, Zahedan, as Fatemiyoun members, Iranian officials and state media have either omitted any reference to the group or provided different accounts of the affiliation of the forces involved.

According to local reporting, at least nine personnel attributed to the Fatemiyoun were killed during this period – one of the principal factors behind the gap between official and unofficial casualty figures for government and affiliated forces. Four deaths were reported in the 20 Shahrivar (11 September) attack on a patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun in Rudmahi, and five more in the 10 Mehr ( 2 October) attack in the same area. Because there is no independent confirmation and the organizational affiliation of these forces is disputed, these cases should be treated as documented but contested claims rather than conclusive facts about the nature of their deployment or mission.

Two Different Narratives of Fatalities

The divergence between official and local accounts is not limited to the number of casualties. In several cases, the central dispute concerns who the person killed actually was and what role the person played. In local reporting, of 94 deaths, 62 were described as government or affiliated forces, 25 as armed individuals and seven as civilians. Official accounts, by contrast, reported 40 government and affiliated personnel, 46 armed individuals and only one civilian killed.

These two sets of figures should not be added together; they are parallel narratives of the same period. The gap is especially pronounced in two areas: first, a difference of 22 in the number of government and affiliated personnel reported killed; and second, 21 people whom officials described as armed or as perpetrators, but whose identities or deaths were not confirmed by local sources or related groups. In addition, local sources described at least five people whom official accounts labeled ‘armed’ or ‘attackers’ as civilians.

A specific dispute over the identity or affiliation of victims was documented in eight incidents. In 11 other incidents, casualties were reported but the precise number of dead or injured was unclear. Any aggregate casualty figure should therefore be read as the minimum that can be extracted from the available reporting, not as a definitive count of every victim.

Civilians Caught Between the Two Sides

Civilian deaths and injuries are among the most serious aspects of the recent developments. On 2 Mehr (24 September), as clashes continued in Jahadabad, Saravan, a nine-year-old child, Mohammadamin Dehghan, and his father were shot while traveling in a vehicle carrying water; the child died several days later. On 17 Mehr (9 October) in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan, a passing civilian, Abdollah Ghanbarzehi, was killed by gunfire from forces present at the scene, while state media published a different account of his role.

There are other cases in which families or local sources rejected the official claim that those killed were armed, including two people killed in Rask on 2 Ordibehesht (22 April) and two people in Kahnoak village in Taftan. These disputes underscore the importance of publishing verifiable information on the identity of victims, whether they were armed, the precise circumstances in which lethal force was used, and the results of post-incident investigations.

Two abductions of government personnel were also recorded during this period, resulting in three deaths. Delays in returning the bodies of some of those killed were also reported, including the return of bodies from the Berenjinan operation after 30 to 48 days. In the case of Abuzar Hamli, who was killed in the Bidedlad clash, local sources alleged that 10 billion tomans were demanded in exchange for the return of his body. These allegations require independent investigation and transparent responses from the responsible authorities.

Geography of Violence: Concentration in Underserved Areas

Of 61 incidents for which the location is known, 37 occurred in four counties: Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr and Rask. Zahedan ranked first with 11 incidents, while Saravan and Iranshahr recorded nine each and Rask eight. Both incidents recorded in Kerman Province occurred in Faryab County. This concentration indicates that most of the violence is occurring within a defined geographic belt and in areas that have for years faced deep challenges in development, employment, infrastructure and access to public services.

This economic and social context matters for understanding the region’s security developments. A 2025 International Crisis Group report, citing official Iranian data, placed Sistan and Baluchestan near the bottom of national development indicators and noted that 12 of the province’s 26 counties were among the country’s 20 poorest counties. The same report cited a provincial unemployment rate of 12.4 percent in 1402, compared with a national average of 8.1 percent. The United Nations Development Programme also emphasized in 2025 the severe pressure of water scarcity and prolonged drought on livelihoods and community resilience in parts of the province.

Economic deprivation by itself does not explain armed violence, and the coexistence of the two does not establish a definitive causal relationship. However, neglect of development gaps and an exclusively security-centered approach to the region can deepen mistrust, social vulnerability and cycles of violence. In an area already facing unemployment, infrastructure shortages and environmental pressures, expanding armed operations have consequences beyond direct casualties: restrictions on movement, communication disruptions, property damage, intensified military presence and greater risks to local communities.

Arrests and the Need for Accountability

At least 19 arrests directly linked to incidents in this period were specifically documented: 16 on the basis of official statements and three in local reporting. This total does not include Fars News Agency’s aggregate claim on 26 Farvardin (15 April) that 55 people had been arrested, because the locations, precise timing and details of those arrests were not disclosed and may overlap with other documented cases.

When accounts differ so sharply over casualty figures and even the identities of those killed, establishing accountability requires more than aggregate statistics. Essential steps include disclosing the names and legal status of detainees, providing information about their whereabouts and the charges against them, ensuring families have access to information, and conducting independent investigations into reported deaths and injuries. Clarifying the circumstances surrounding the use of lethal force, investigating reports of homes being destroyed, and examining allegations that the return of victims’ bodies was delayed or made conditional are also necessary to establish the facts and ensure accountability.

Southeastern Iran Requires Attention Beyond a Security-Only Approach

The clashes of the past six months show that developments in southeastern Iran can no longer be viewed as a series of isolated and disconnected incidents. The rising number of events, their concentration in several counties, the introduction of heavier weapons into some confrontations, the more visible presence of an armed alliance, and the widening gap between official and local accounts of casualties together point to an escalating trend.

This trend is unfolding in one of Iran’s most underserved regions – an area that has long faced development gaps, unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, a water crisis and a sense of deprivation. Turning such an environment into an arena of increasingly armed confrontation risks once again placing the heaviest burden on local civilians: through loss of life, damage to homes and livelihoods, arrests and security restrictions, and deepening mistrust between society and state institutions.

Reducing that risk requires more than an expanded security presence. Independent and transparent documentation, effective protection of civilians, investigations into suspicious deprivations of life, accountability for operations in residential areas, protection of detainees’ rights, and serious attention to the region’s structural deprivation are among the measures that could help prevent the cycle of violence from deepening. The pattern documented through 18 Mehr (10 October) indicates that without such an approach, the risk of continued and escalating tensions in southeastern Iran remains serious.

Detailed Table of Incidents

The table below lists 63 armed incidents recorded from March 31 to October 10, 2026 (11 Farvardin to 18 Mehr 1405), including date, location, type of attack or clash, casualties, victim/attacker attribution and reporting sources. The information was compiled from local reporting and official statements; cases involving conflicting accounts or lacking independent confirmation are presented with those qualifications.

Methodology note: Figures for casualties, victim identities and the attribution of some forces are based on cross-checking official reporting, local sources and statements by parties to the clashes through 18 Mehr 1405 (October 10, 2026). Cases without independent confirmation or involving conflicting accounts are presented with those qualifications.